

**HISTORY
OF
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
THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION



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EDITION



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"1807"

FRENCH CUIRASSIERS, GOING INTO ACTION AT THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND, SALUTING THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON

Painting by E. Meissonier

THE HISTORY OF NATIONS

HENRY CABOT LODGE, Ph. D., LL. D. · EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

FROM 1789 TO 1815

BY FRANCOIS AUGUSTE MARIE MIGNET

MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY

EDITED WITH ADDITIONAL CHAPTER ON THE HUNDRED DAYS

BY JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY
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VOLUME X



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PREFACE

THERE are four distinct periods observable in the histories of the French Revolution. The first is the epoch of contemporary histories, like that of Rabaut de St. Etienne: "*Histoire de la Révolution française*," which appeared in 1792. Naturally the authors of such works stood too close to the events whereof they wrote to be able to judge them properly; all were deeply imbued with the prejudices of the time; moreover, their information was necessarily limited, for this was the age when the documentary evidence was in process of production. Then came the period of the First Empire and the Restoration (1804-1824), in which a flood of recollections, memoirs, correspondence, etc., appeared. This mass of material paved the way for the first complete histories of the revolution. The first portions of Thiers's great work appeared in 1823; the French version of the work here edited next appeared, and the histories of Quinet, Louis Blanc, and Michelet followed in the middle of the century. But the writing of each of these historians was deeply imbued with the spirit of the age in which he lived. Louis Blanc was inspired by the socialistic movements in Europe which culminated in the revolution of 1848; Quinet was influenced by the national sentiment stirring in Germany, and especially Italy, and was romantically affected. Such also had been the case with Thiers and Mignet. The prophecy of Chateaubriand had been verified, at least partially, in the case of Thiers. The genius of Napoleon had enthralled his imagination; he honored the revolution as the mother and maker of Napoleon, and him he worshiped. With Mignet this was so in a less degree. He worshiped the revolution; he had neither in his heart nor in his mind to write much of Bonaparte. Yet although thus differing in the object of their admiration, Mignet and Thiers were alike in this respect: The history of each one of them was affected by the times in which he lived. Each was a liberal in politics and each was hostile to the narrowness, the bigotry, the stupidity of the Bourbon Restoration. Each was a journalist and actively interested in politics; "they


wrote the history of the revolution to justify the hopes or to strengthen the position of the Liberal party." This attitude of mind explains Mignet's idealization of the French Revolution. The glamour of the revolution had cast its spell over him, so much so, that despite his crisp—almost cold—precise style, he continually warms to his theme. One other peculiarity may also be noticed in Mignet. In spite of the great change which twenty-six years of revolution and of war had wrought in Europe, classic influences still obtained in literature. The early Frank kings are depicted in a romantic way, and some of the revolutionary leaders seem to have the pose of the actors of a Greek tragedy.

The manner of writing history changed in the middle of the last century. The influence of Ranke, Hausser, Sybel, Pertz, and other German specialists not only established new and more scientific modes of writing history, but also emancipated the historian from the earlier prejudices. Each of them might be a student of a certain theme, as for example, the economic history of the revolution or its foreign politics, but no one of them was a partisan. The influence of such men in due time inspired the greatest French historians, such as Albert Sorel,—one of the greatest historians of France, living or dead,—Aulard, Mortimer-Ternaux, Wallon, and Vandal.

And yet, although eighty years have elapsed since Mignet wrote, despite the enormous mass of new information which has been brought to light and in spite of more scientific methods, "The French Revolution" of Mignet has never been surpassed. The late Charles Kendall Adams wrote of it: "This still continues to be the most satisfactory short history of the revolution. In style it is compact, and in method of treatment it is clear, thoughtful, and just. The author believed in constitutional government, and his reflections on the mistakes of the revolutionists are worthy of careful attention. Mignet was one of the most conscientious and judicial of modern French writers." And Dr. Andrew D. White, than whom there is no higher authority, says: "Thorough enough for the general student, thoughtful, just, clear in style, compact in matter; the best, by far, of all the short histories."

The work of the editor has been twofold: First, to correct errors where Mignet has made them. It is inevitable that in the course of three generations of historical research, much new material unknown in 1824 must have been published and the truth

brought to light. Thanks to Mignet's conscientiousness, however, this portion of the task has been comparatively light. The heavier, yet the pleasanter one, has been the endeavor to bring the book to present-day ideas, and this has required the modification or enlargement of many paragraphs of the original. Where deemed advisable for the purposes of this book the text has been entirely rewritten, but where extensive changes were not necessary short notes have been preferred. Throughout references have been made to standard authorities, so that the critical reader may compare for himself. As large an amount of new information as practicable within the compass of this book has been added, and the effort made to embody the results of even recent research. In addition, an introductory chapter on the Old Régime, a chapter upon the important subject of the finances of the Revolution and one upon the Hundred Days, have been prepared, in order to give the treatment greater completeness.

A large, elegant handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "James Westfall Thompson". The signature is written in a cursive style with long, sweeping strokes, particularly in the first and last letters of the first and last names. The signature is positioned above a horizontal line that serves as a baseline for the text below.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

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PART I

FALL OF THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY
1789

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Chapter I

THE OLD RÉGIME

THE French Revolution was the last of those profound movements which, with the Renaissance and the Reformation, have formed modern history. As the Renaissance had been a movement for liberal knowledge, as the Reformation had liberalized religion, so the French Revolution liberalized politics. It was a supreme effort on the part of France and of all Europe to overthrow the mediæval structure of society and to build anew the social and political fabric of the state. It was essentially a social revolution, and in this respect differs from the others in its underlying causes as well as in the unparalleled tragic grandeur of its course. From the beginning it had a very powerful propagandist character. "The French Revolution," says Tocqueville, "acted with regard to things of this world precisely as religious revolutions have acted with regard to things of the other. It dealt with the citizen in the abstract, independent of particular social organizations, just as religions deal with mankind in general, independent of time and place. It inquired not what were the particular rights of French citizens, but what were the general rights and duties of mankind in reference to political concerns." Although its local character is stamped upon it with glowing distinctness, yet the French Revolution initiated in Europe the revolution which the United States had begun for the whole western civilized world.

In order to understand the nature and the depth of this great "crisis of modern reconstruction," it is necessary to know something of the political organization and social structure which it was the aim of the French Revolution to change.

The constitution of France was not written, but rested upon tradition. In theory the authority of the king was absolute. In fact, that authority was frequently traversed by feudal interests,

by tradition, and by conflicting precedents. The administration which obtained before the revolution had acquired fixity during the long reign of Louis XIV. (1643-1715); its institutions had then been definitively formed and did not vary from that time down to 1789, save in detail.

The king had the supreme political authority, which he either exercised in person or delegated. The royal prerogative was theoretically whole and complete, and every organ of the government was auxiliary to the crown and was operative only within the discretion of the king. In France the councils had not been formed, as in England, by division of duties, but had become technical boards with a less direct relation to the administration than the British exchequer, admiralty, or treasury. The French parlement, the *chambre des comptes* (chamber of accounts), and the *grand conseil* were only in indirect connection with the government. The most influential administrative body was the *conseil du roi*. It had general supervision of foreign affairs, and from it emanated the royal acts, ordinances, edicts, and declarations; it fixed the sum of the taxes to be raised and distributed them among the provinces. No budget existed. The taxes once levied continued to be levied indefinitely. This council was formed of certain persons, all chosen by the king and removable by him at pleasure without any formality, not even the signature of the chancellor. The number of members was variable, but always very small. For the dispatch of business, the *conseil du roi* was divided into various sections in which the same members were differently grouped, each presided over by a minister. The most important of these were those concerned with foreign affairs,—and in which the chancellor did not have a seat,—war, and finance. The three other ministers were those of marine, the interior, under the *contrôleur-général*, and the chancellorship. These various boards were, at least in theory, directed by the king in person. Louis XV. for a long time left the general direction to Cardinal Fleury. But after his death the ministers were left without regular direction. The actual government depended upon the influence which each minister exercised over the king, and the king too often was influenced by his mistress or his confessor.

Below the king's council was the *conseil d'état*, formed of members named by the king, and of *maîtres des requêtes*, who had purchased their places, often for sums as high as 200,000 livres,

and whose business it was to prepare the preliminary work. This body was administratively of great importance, because the intendants were generally taken from it. Some of the legislative work, such as the preparation of edicts and ordinances, was also in the care of this body.

These two bodies were the most important organizations of the government. Their members were recruited from the new nobility which had purchased position during the reign of Louis XIV. The king was therefore under the combined influence of his court, the royal family, the reigning favorite, and these functionaries. Instead of a landed aristocracy, as in England and Austria, a bureaucratic aristocracy prevailed in France.

In the provinces the central government was represented by two species of officials, the governors, who were drawn from the old nobility and whose duty was mostly ceremonial, and the intendants, generally former *maîtres des requêtes*, who were sent into the provinces and endowed with unlimited administrative authority. Most of the provinces were little more than administrative sections used by the government; some of them, however, called *pays d'état*, enjoyed special privileges. Such were Brittany, Normandy, Languedoc. There was nothing the intendants did not do or control. France was divided into thirty-three administrative divisions under them. But if the people had learned to consider themselves impotent, they had also learned to shift the whole responsibility on the government. And when later the revolutionary spirit burst forth it was with the cry "Down with the intendant!" and the intendant was the first victim of the maddened populace. But the provinces and the *généralités* of the intendants were but two sorts of administrative divisions. We must reckon also the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the dioceses, of which there were 135, besides thirty-four recruiting areas.

There were only two sorts of assemblies in France not directly under the king. The assembly of the clergy of France, including only the prelates of the ancient kingdom, for the bishops of the newly-acquired provinces had no seats in it, was convened every five years in order to vote a gift of money, called the *don gratuit*, to the crown. Aside from this, the only other assembly in any sense independent was to be found in certain of the provinces (*pays d'état*) which had preserved a vestige of their old feudal independence and in which the local estates had become a

sort of fiscal board. Properly speaking, however, these bodies were not political in their nature.

There was a third species of organization, the courts, or parlements, whose jurisdiction was limited to prescribed regions. There were fourteen such parlements, the most important being that of Paris. It had a grand chamber, the chamber of inquests, and the chamber of petitions. Like the council of state, it was an oligarchy of families who perpetuated their control, the members of the parlement being an hereditary nobility, the noblesse de robe,



who transmitted the office from father to son. It was the parlement of Paris which, by virtue of its position in the kingdom and the social prestige of its members, was the most powerful independent body of the kingdom. In a state where no power existed by the side of arbitrary government, it was the sole body representing the law and possessing the means of publicly manifesting its opinion. It was thus that the parlement came to play so prominent a part immediately before the revolution.

The administration of criminal justice was the only public

department in which the nobility still had a hand. The criminal law preserved most of the horrors of mediæval criminal practice. The gallows, mutilation, breaking upon the wheel, etc., were frequent penalties, and the complexity of the law was very great. In the civil law there were no less than 384 different practices. Other institutions were as bad. The army and the navy were mutinous and badly cared for. The officers' places were reserved for the scions of noble families, and compulsory military service was required in the ranks. In order to get a higher price for the captainships, the captains were allowed to appoint the inferior officers, from whom in their turn they received a remuneration. In consequence, the number of officers and under-officers became out of all proportion to the privates. The rich captains spent their time at court and proved novices at war. The privates were so badly fed, so badly clothed, and treated so like brutes that the number of deserters was calculated at 16,000.

The social institutions of France were as far from being in harmony with the new ideas as the political. The nation was divided into a hierarchy of unequal classes. The nobility monopolized the high offices of the government, and with the clergy enjoyed exemption from taxes, while the rich bourgeoisie of the cities controlled commerce and industry. An examination of the structure of society affords ample evidence of the unjust order of things prevailing in France. The high offices of the church were closed to men not of noble birth, not legally, but in fact. The clergy owned almost one-half the land of France, and save the *don gratuit*, which was a mere pittance when compared with their incomes, enjoyed exemption from taxation. The 298 members of the Benedictine monastery of Cluny enjoyed a revenue of 1,800,000¹ livres; the Dominicans of Toulouse disposed of two millions; Cardinal Rohan, the Bishop of Strasburg, lived like a prince of the blood, as he could well afford to on an income of over a million. By historical development, by moral authority, and veritably in wealth, the clergy were the first estate. As for the nobility of France in 1789, that class was, perhaps, one three-hundred-twenty-fifth of the population; yet they owned one-fifth of the land, so that more than one-half of France was possessed by classes exempt from taxation. The nobles enjoyed a large number of

¹ The livre (approximately 19½ cents) was superseded in 1795 by the franc, which has since been the unit of the French monetary system.

manorial privileges, chief among which were local justice, the right to exact forced service (*corvée*) from their dependents, and hunting rights, which were bitterly hated by the peasantry. Except in Brittany, the evils of absenteeism everywhere prevailed.

The court swallowed up the revenues of the nation. The household of the king comprised twenty-two departments, and every great noble attempted to imitate the life at Versailles. The drain upon the people was thus increased. The extravagance of the king almost baffles belief. The retinue of the king in 1770 numbered 9050 persons, causing a yearly expense of 8,000,000 livres.

"The king has some ninety gentlemen to take care of his bedchamber, nearly five hundred for his table, and more than fifteen hundred to attend to his horses. These offices about the royal person and household are considered the most honorable in the kingdom, since they are all filled by nobles whose pay is high, while their duties are very light or even nominal. Besides the household officers, the king has his guards, French and Swiss, cavalry and infantry, more than nine thousand men, costing the people annually more than \$1,500,000. When the king makes a journey, all these people must accompany him, at the expense of the state. In 1783 no less than \$33,800 was paid for feeding the king's horses, and more than \$10,000 for feeding his hunting-dogs. The coffee and bread for each of the ladies of the bedchamber costs \$400 a year. The court-kitchen, according to the printed register, employs two hundred and ninety-five cooks, and the total number of persons to be supported by the king amounts to more than fifteen thousand."

The king also gave many presents; this was especially true of Louis XV. Louis XVI., in 1785, gave away more than \$27,000,000, and Von Sybel reckons that the annual average given in this way would reach \$20,000,000. As for Louis XV., it is known that in one year he spent about \$36,000,000 on his own pleasures. The palace of Versailles itself cost more than \$50,000,000, while on the bridges, roads, public and scientific institutions not more than \$7,000,000 was expended.

Owing to the exemption of the privileged orders, the burden upon the mass of the nation became a fearful one. The bourgeoisie of Paris and some others of the great cities grew rich, for the monopolies of trade, the prohibitions upon manufacturing, were

manipulated by them. The guilds, originally created to emancipate and enlarge trade and commerce, had now become close corporations mastered by a few wealthy "bosses." Like so much else, they too had become poisoned with the virus of privilege and asserted and adhered to the doctrine that the right to labor had to be granted.

When we turn to agriculture, aside from the mediæval methods used, it was crushed by the weight of feudal dues, the outworn survival of mediæval conditions. "A system of tillage . . . prevailed without industry, without science, and above all, without capital." Quesnay, in 1750, estimated the uncultivated land as one-fourth the arable soil of France, and Young in 1790 thought it to be at least one-fifth. Taine has estimated that, all told, the French peasant bore a tax of eighty-one per cent., and Von Sybel figuring on data for the year 1785, computes that the nation bore a tax of some 800 millions, which, in terms of the present purchasing power of money, would to-day equal thrice that sum. Great as these amounts are, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that it was the inequality, not the weight, that was the real source of the burden. If the nobles and clergy had paid in proportion to their resources, instead of paying taxes upon consumption merely, the injustice would not have existed. But the actual value in figures does not measure the extent of the oppression suffered, for "taking all in all," concludes Von Sybel, "France, under the old monarchy, was four times as poor in manufactures, three times as poor in agriculture, and more than three times as poor in commerce."

The French Revolution came as the protest against this unjust political and social régime. But the French Revolution was not a sudden outburst of popular fury, however volcanic it may seem to be in certain of its phases. In reality the revolution was preceded and prepared by a series of conflicts, some knowledge of which is necessary in order accurately to understand the movement. This agitation may be divided into three phases: (1) From the death of Louis XIV. in 1715 down to 1754 the opposition was carried on by the parlement of Paris only, and the church was the object of attack: (2) from 1754 to 1774 all the parlements of France were united in a common agitation for better government; (3) from 1774 to 1789 many attempts at reform were made. In the first period the question turned upon the attempt of the clergy, in al-

liance with the Jesuits, to force upon the French people the papal bull which dealt with the Holy Sacrament. The government found itself drawn into the conflict, in the sense that it espoused the cause of the clerical party. This is the moment of the birth of the opposition of the people of Paris and of the legist class to the church and the absolute monarchy. But the idea of a revolution was yet vague and intangible. It is not until the second half of the reign of Louis XV. that the conflict becomes continuous and general. The provincial parlements then also began to attack the government, and frequent demands were made for reorganization and reformation. But the actions of the parlements were continually ridden down by the edicts of the king, who naturally supported the royal prerogative. Still the opposition gathered head and the idea of revolution grew broader and deeper. This agitation had no direct results, but it familiarized the people with the ideas and the formulas which came to be employed during the revolution.

The second phase of this broad opposition (1754-1774) is naturally divided into three periods: (1) The conflict during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763); (2) the conflict over the taxes (1763-1767); (3) the conflict over the financial policy of the Abbé Terray, which brought about some violent measures on the part of the crown against the parlement.

The conflict during the Seven Years' War is distinguished from preceding conflicts in that it was not local, but general, in its character. All the parlements took a hand in it and sustained that of Paris by making similar remonstrances. This coöperation of the parlements is noteworthy; and as this is the first time that we see any manifestation of it, their alliance had an important effect upon the future.

The immediate occasion of the conflict, as said, was the question of the sacraments. The king's council had been a docile instrument of the Jesuits, and on October 10, 1755, had formally approved the pontifical action. Not so the parlement, which replied by some remonstrances on November 27, 1755. It propounded a new theory, based upon the authority of the great chancellor of the sixteenth century, L'Hôpital, namely, that all the parlements of France were but a single grand institution, the provincial parlements being but different classes of the parlement of Paris. This theory was manifestly contrary to actual history, for the various parlements had been created in each province even before their

annexation to the royal domain. But the idea flattered the provincial parlements, which were thus made of equal rank with that of Paris. In consequence the parliamentary party solidly united in a common resistance. A long series of remonstrances followed. The government, in order to suppress the opposition, reverted to a process already applied in 1732. The declaration of the king was read in a bed of justice² on December 10, 1756. The parlement repudiated the act, but the chamber of inquests and the chamber of petitions yielded. The influence of Madame de Pompadour, and still more, the dismissal of the elder Maupeou, effected a temporary reconciliation. The exiled members of the parlement were permitted to return on condition of keeping silent.

Within a year, however, opposition broke out anew (1759-1761). This time a provincial parlement was the offender. The intendant of Franche-Comté, who had been named first president of the parlement of Besançon, encountered a storm of opposition from the members of the parlement with reference to the *don gratuit*, the quinquennial gift in money made by the church to the king. Violence resulted, and some thirty of the members were exiled. Thereupon the parlement of Paris protested that the king's use of *lettres de cachet* was an excess of his prerogative. The government reasserted the absolute authority of the king, though it prudently yielded the point immediately in controversy, owing to anxiety with reference to the war, and the exiled councilors of Besançon were recalled.

Peace again was of short duration. The second period of the conflict (1763-1767) began when the government resorted to a new species of taxes. Almost all the parlements refused to register the edicts. The most daring of them was that of Rouen. It called upon the government to justify the new taxes by giving to the public an honest statement of the finances. The parlement of Paris seconded the demand. It reasserted the theory of free verification and asserted the right of a supervisory control over the budget of the government. The crown had to resort to force, and the edicts

² The *lit de justice* (bed of justice) was a sitting of the parlement of Paris at which the king was present on the wool sack, hence the name. The parlement enjoyed the privilege, sanctified by tradition, to register all royal edicts. It sometimes abused the privilege to combat the monarchy by refusing assent, and thus compel the king either to withdraw or amend an ordinance. The king could only overcome the veto by a personal sitting and ordering registration. Notable instances of opposition by the parlement are during the Fronde, in 1771 and in 1787.

were registered with an array of soldiers in the chamber. By this time the idea of revolution was everywhere, and Voltaire and Lord Chesterfield both anticipated it.

Hitherto the government had always respected the jurisdiction of the parlements over their seats, but Maupeou, who had become vice-chancellor, adopted a new policy with those of Rennes and Pau. Some members having handed in their resignations, the government assumed charge of the vacant seats and appointed new members whose docility to the crown was assured. Again the parlement remonstrated. On March 3, 1776, the king read a declaration affirming the royal theory. He denied the solidarity of the parlements or that there was any constructive force in the parlement's privilege of confirmation, declaring that the parlement was but an instrument of publication. Legally the king was perfectly correct, for the crown was the fountain of both law and justice. But the theory and the fact were widely separated the one from the other.

For a time the storm blew over, but in 1769 broke out anew when the Abbé Terray, a creature of the king's mistress, was *contrôleur-général* of finances. This minister introduced some new financial measures, not the least of which was an arbitrary reduction of the interest on the government's bonds. Open opposition ensued, and the Chancellor Maupeou resorted to drastic measures. On the night of January 19, 1771, the members of the parlement were arrested in their beds by the soldiery. Under this pressure forty approved the edict. The rest refused to yield. Two days later the exile of the parlement of Paris was decreed, and on April 13 this famous body was suppressed by royal ordinance. Its functions passed over to a superior council, permitted to render justice and to register ordinances without remonstrance. The members of this new council were named and appointed by the king. As might have been imagined, the provincial parlements poured in their protests against this new order of things. But the government was angry, and some of the provincial parlements were treated as that of Paris had been. Their members were either exiled or dismissed, and the vacant seats filled by new appointees. The government, in theory and in fact alike, was now absolute, but the crisis had produced a profound moral impression. The spirit of protest and of reform was awakened never to perish.

The literary movement of the eighteenth century had much

to do with promoting the new spirit, although it is not to be regarded as the cause of the revolution so much as a symptom of it. Mignet makes a profound observation when he says: "The philosophers of the eighteenth century succeeded to the litterateurs of the seventeenth" for the transition from the classicism of the age of Louis XIV. was characterized by the rise of a generation of writers keenly observant and mordantly critical.

There were in France two generations of political theorists: one which included Voltaire (1694-1778) and Montesquieu (1689-1755) in the first half of the eighteenth century; the other, Rousseau, Diderot, and the materialists, who flourished after 1750. The first generation founded its theories upon observation. It was the historical school, accepting the general foundations of society as it found them and not demanding its overthrow. It regarded the body of institutions as the direct inheritance of France from the past and was willing to accept them with all their inequalities, only seeking to bring about a reform of them, both in church and state. These two schools influenced the thought of France in different epochs and with different classes. The historic school, for half a century, held sway among the cultivated classes and among men of public affairs throughout all Europe. It was this school which initiated the movement of political reform in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century which has come to be known as "enlightened despotism."

Voltaire and Montesquieu were avowed disciples of the English. Until his enforced retirement to England Voltaire had been wholly occupied with literature. But his three years of exile, during which he learned the language and made the acquaintance of the great men of England, especially Bolingbroke, gave him a new point of view, and his impressions of English life and institutions are to be found expressed in the "*Lettres Philosophiques*." Henceforth Voltaire was much interested in social and political questions, although he wrote no systematic work upon that subject. Montesquieu's first work was the "*Lettres Persanes*," which was a satire, cameo-like in its detailed criticism of the French government. After its publication he also visited England, and it is to the inspiration of this sojourn that his most famous work, "*L'esprit des Lois*," is due. Politically Voltaire and Montesquieu agreed, believing that the English guarantees for individual liberty should be emulated in other states. Following out the theories of Locke

and of Bolingbroke, Montesquieu asserted that liberty could not exist except when the different powers which constituted government were counterbalanced. Using the English constitution as an illustration, he established the distinction between the functions of government and the separation of the three powers, executive, legislative, and judicial, a mode of interpretation which exercised a large influence over the political thought of the eighteenth century, and is seen to-day in the Constitution of the United States. Both of these eminent writers were in no sense advocates of revolutionary dogma. They regarded the church and the state as the pillars of society, and venerated the body of institutions which centuries of historical revolution had created and formed.

Another class of genuine political thinkers remains to be noted—the physiocrats. In the eighteenth century a school of political economists came into being, who, from the nature of their teachings, were called physiocrats. Though the teaching of their theories can be traced back to Jean de Serres and Sully, it was not until Quesnay appeared that their doctrines became broadly known. Quesnay was born in 1694 and was educated as a physician. His political theories first found expression in the famous "*Encyclopédie*." The doctrine of the physiocrats was that agriculture was the economic foundation of a perfect society; that it was only agricultural nations that could found durable empires, and they quoted with approval the old proverb, "Poor peasant, poor realm; poor realm, poor king." Industry to them was only a branch of agriculture, since manufacturing was dependent upon the development of the natural resources of the country. Quesnay distinguished three classes in society: first, the proprietary class, that had the wealth and which claimed the exclusive possession of political rights; second, the producing class, that is to say, the cultivators of the soil; and third, the industrial and commercial class, who politically were dependent upon the first, and economically upon the second. Quesnay argued that the burden of taxation should fall solely upon the source of all wealth, namely the land, and that all other taxes were indirect, and he gave high sanction to his teachings by asserting that God had established certain economic laws, and that the physiocratic doctrines were most conformable thereto. The teachings of the physiocratic school had a great effect upon Turgot. But he was a profounder student than Quesnay and had better knowledge of the workings of eco-

conomic forces like production and exchange; his theories with reference to the division of labor and the influence of capital mark him as one of the greatest of political economists. Particular teaching aside, the general effect of the economic thought of the eighteenth century was to secure a wider liberty both for commerce and for industry, not merely by adopting new principles of action, but by the suppression of the old economic burdens inherited from a feudal régime, and the abolition of protections and monopolies. In this sense, therefore, as standing for a larger liberty, the physiocrats were in alignment with Voltaire and Montesquieu.

The second generation of political thinkers was made up, in the main, of pure theorists and doctrinaires. It was a dogmatic school which asserted certain principles and deduced absolute regulations from them. It was hostile to the prevailing social order and wished to return to "a state of nature." It wanted to uproot the oldest institutions, even proprietorship and the family relation. Equality was their dogma, and to secure it they preached revolution. The difference between these two conceptions is perhaps to be accounted for in two ways. In the first place, the position and education of the leaders of the two schools were different. Voltaire and Montesquieu were men of the upper class, used to the prevailing inequality, while Rousseau (1712-1778) and Diderot, on the contrary, had been born in a lower social stratum and hated the social inequalities and the privileges which their class in society had to endure. Again, the mass of the people, and above all the men of letters, being in fact and by principle excluded from actual political life, while the tendency of the leading literary minds was to make politics a part of their legitimate domain, the result of this strange contrast between their actual condition and their tendency led the French writers to believe those things in politics which were really not so. The facts were misunderstood, or not understood, because the people were excluded from active political life, and so they substituted hypotheses for facts. Starting from these hypotheses as if they were facts, they went on arguing, and their results were mere philosophical speculations: they had little conception of the great historical laws of cause and effect. They proceeded not from a historic basis of facts, but from a condition that never had existed or could exist, and the longer they pursued their speculations, the more radical they became, for, not dealing with facts, they had nothing to restrain them.

The encyclopedists had a common interest with the followers of Rousseau in that the teaching of both was so critical—even destructive, of the existing state of things. “France was now reaping the fruit of that . . . negative bent of thought introduced by Locke’s philosophy, from the first ardently studied here, with especial attention to its materialistic bearings. Condillac set aside reflection as a source of ideas, Helvetius reduced virtue to egoistic hedonism, La Mettrie and Maupertuis, the latter in the famous *Système de la Nature*, advanced a coarser, yet decrying belief in God, freedom, and a soul separable from the body, as baseless and mischievous vagaries. . . . Yet the negative and destructive in this tendency stopped far short of what might have been predicted from the execrable abuses prevalent in both state and church, conditions which should temper our judgment even of such then existing skepticism as we cannot after all excuse.”³

To conclude: The reign of Louis XIV. had closed with a general exhaustion of France. Religiously, skepticism had become general among the upper classes at the court and at Paris; politically, economic unrest and social discontent were everywhere. Just a century later than the English people, the French people were to take the exactly opposite course from that which experience had proved to be expedient in England. The compromise established in England between old institutions and new ideas by the revolution of 1688 could not be produced in France. The revolution overthrew the fundamental condition of civilized political life, for it subverted the principles and practices prevailing among societies which had existed since the origin of the civilized world, and replaced them by a new and opposite principle. Instead of a personal ruler exercising sway in the name of a mystic principle of religious sanction, each of these revolutions established a government in the name of the people. But the English Revolution stopped short with political change; not so the French Revolution. It is this supreme fact which gives it exceptional importance in the political history of the world. It was preëminently a social revolution.

³ Andrews, “Institutes of General History,” pp. 361-362.

Chapter II

THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION. 1789

I AM about to take a rapid review of the history of the French Revolution, which began the era of new societies in Europe, as the English Revolution had begun the era of new governments. This revolution not only modified the political power, but it entirely changed the internal existence of the nation. The forms of the society of the Middle Ages still remained. The land was divided into hostile provinces, the population into rival classes. The nobility had lost all their powers, but still retained all their distinctions: the people had no rights, royalty no limits; France was in an utter confusion of arbitrary administration,¹ of class legislation and special privileges to special bodies. For these abuses the revolution substituted a system more comformable with justice and better suited to our times. It substituted law in the place of arbitrary will, equality in that of privilege; delivered men from the distinctions of classes, the land from the barriers of provinces, trade from the shackles of corporations and fellowships, agriculture from feudal subjection and the oppression of tithes, property from the impediment of entails, and brought everything to the condition of one state, one system of law, one people.

In order to effect such mighty reformation as this, the revolution had many obstacles to overcome, involving transient excesses with durable benefits. The privileged sought to prevent it, Europe to subject it; and thus forced into a struggle, it could not set bounds to its efforts, or moderate its victory. Resistance from within brought about the sovereignty of the multitude, and aggression from without, military domination. Yet the end was attained, in spite of anarchy and in spite of despotism: the old society was destroyed during the revolution, and the new one became established under the empire.

¹ In the light of recent critical history of the French Revolution this paragraph must be considered as exaggerated. It is an error to believe that "the whole system of society and government was so utterly bad that nothing short of a complete social upheaval could do any good to France."—ED.

When a reform has become necessary, and the moment for accomplishing it has arrived, nothing can prevent it, everything furthers it. Happy were it for men could they then come to an understanding; would the rich resign their superfluity, and the poor content themselves with achieving what they really needed, revolutions would then be quietly effected, and the historian would have no excesses, no calamities to record; he would merely have to display the transition of humanity to a wiser, freer, and happier condition. But the annals of nations have not as yet presented any instance of such prudent sacrifices; those who should have made them have refused to do so; those who required them have forcibly compelled them; and good has been brought about, like evil, by the medium and with all the violence of usurpation. As yet there has been no sovereign but force.

In reviewing the history of the important period extending from the opening of the states-general to 1814,² I propose to explain the various crises of the revolution, while I describe their progress. It will thus be seen through whose fault, after commencing under such happy auspices, it so fearfully degenerated; in what way it changed France into a republic, and how upon the ruins of the republic it raised the empire.

The period between 1789 and 1815 has two distinct phases, a destructive one and a constructive one. The epoch of the revolution answers to the first; that of the directory and Napoleon to the second. Within the space of barely a quarter of a century France experienced six successive forms of government which it will be well to fix in mind: (1) States-General and National Constituent Assembly, from May 5 (June 17), 1789, to September 30, 1791; (2) Legislative Assembly, from October 1, 1791, to September 21, 1792; (3) National Convention, from September 22, 1792, to (July 27, 1794, Ninth Thermidor) October 25, 1795; Directory, from October 26, 1795, to November 9, 1799 (Eighteenth Brumaire); Consulate, from November 9, 1799 (December 25, 1799), to May 20, 1804; First Empire, from May 20, 1804, to (April, 1814) June 22, 1815.³

These various phases were almost inevitable, so irresistible was the power of the events which produced them. It would per-

² A supplemental chapter has been added by the editor which continues the history through 1815—the Waterloo campaign.

³ Ploetz, "Epitome of Universal History," p. 447; Tocqueville, "Old Régime," introd. p. v.

haps be rash to affirm that by no possibility could the face of things have been otherwise; but it is certain that the revolution, taking its rise from such causes, and employing and arousing such passions, naturally took that course, and ended in that result. Before we enter upon its history, let us see what led to the convocation of the states-general, which themselves brought on all that followed. The immediate occasion of the revolution was the enormous deficit which threatened national bankruptcy. Had that been provided against by wise administrative reforms, the revolution would probably have been averted. If Louis XVI. had sustained Turgot, his one capable minister, he might have bridged the crisis.⁴

From its establishment the French monarchy had had no settled form, no fixed and recognized public law. Under the first races the crown was elective, the nation sovereign, and the king a mere military chief, depending on the common voice for all decisions to be made, and all the enterprises to be undertaken. The nation elected its chief, exercised the legislative power in the Champ de Mars under the presidentship of the king, and the judicial power in the courts under the direction of one of his officers.⁵ Under the feudal régime, this royal democracy gave way to a royal aristocracy. Absolute power ascended higher, the nobles stripped the people of it, as the prince afterward despoiled the nobles. At this period the king became an hereditary monarch, not as king, but as individually possessor of a fief; the legislative authority over their vast territories belonging to the seigneurs, or in the barons' parlements, and the judicial authority to the vassals in the manorial courts. In a word, power had become more and more concentrated, and, as it had passed from the many to the few, it came at last from the few to be invested in one alone. During centuries of continuous efforts, the kings of France were battering down the feudal edifice, and at length they established themselves on its ruins, having step by step usurped the fiefs, subdued the vassals, suppressed the parlements of barons, annulled or subjected the manorial courts, assumed the legislative power, and effected that

⁴ See Hale, "Franklin in France," vol. II. p. 406.

⁵ Mignet is describing the constitution of the primitive Franks, rather than that under the first race of kings, the Merovingians (481-751). Since Mignet wrote, German and French scholars have shown that the Merovingian state was much more feudalized than used to be supposed. The Champ de Mars was the March-field, the annual spring meeting of all freeman capable of bearing arms.

judicial authority should be exercised in their name, and on their behalf, in parlements of legists.⁶

The states-general, which they convoked on pressing occasions for the purpose of obtaining subsidies, and which were composed of the three orders of the nation, the clergy, the nobility, and the third estate or commons, had no regular existence. Originated while the royal prerogative was in progress, they were at first controlled, and finally suppressed by it. The strongest and most determined opposition the kings had to encounter in their projects of aggrandizement proceeded much less from these assemblies, which they authorized or annulled at pleasure, than from the nobles vindicating against them, first their sovereignty, and then their political importance. From Philip Augustus (1180-1223) to Louis XI. (1461-1483) the object of all their efforts was to preserve their own power; from Louis XI. to Louis XIV. (1643-1715) to become the ministers of that of royalty. The Fronde⁷ was the last campaign of the aristocracy. Under Louis XIV. absolute monarchy definitively established itself, and dominated without dispute.

The government of France, from Louis XIV. to the revolution, was still more arbitrary than despotic; for the monarchs had much more power than they exercised. The barriers that opposed the encroachments of this immense authority were exceedingly feeble. The crown disposed of persons by lettres de cachet,⁸ of property by confiscation, of the public revenue by imposts. Certain bodies, it is true, possessed means of defense, which were termed

⁶ Against the severity of this arraignment we must weigh the fact that the growth of the king's prerogative was the surest remedy for the evils of feudalism. "The absolute monarchies of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries . . . gave liberty to the common man at the same time that they subjected the nobles to the law of the state."—Burgess, "Political Science and Constitutional Law," vol. I. p. 56. Cf. Von Ranke, "*Französische Geschichte*," vol. I. p. 34, and his "*Englische Geschichte*," vol. I. p. 97; Von Sybel: "*Ueber die Entwicklung der absoluten Monarchie in Preussen*," vol. III. p. 24 ff; Krones, "*Geschichte Oesterreichs*," vol. IV. p. 488.

⁷ The last armed rising of the French nobility, during the minority of Louis XIV., in order to prevent the continual growth of absolutism. There were two distinct movements, one in 1649, the second, and more formidable one, in 1650. Spanish intrigue was implicated in it. A combination of the two was crushed in 1653. The word *Fronde* means sling. The warfare of the nobles was so nicknamed in allusion to a dangerous game of the gamins of Paris, which consisted in throwing each other into the fosses of the Bastile, in spite of the efforts of the police to prevent them.

⁸ Lettres de cachet were warrants of arbitrary arrest. Their issuance was one of the grievances of France before 1789, but they were never issued in blank, as sometimes asserted.

1643-1715

privileges, but these privileges were rarely respected. The parlement had that of ratifying or of refusing an impost, but the king could compel its assent, by a bed of justice, and punish its members by exile. The nobility were exempt from taxation; the clergy were entitled to the privilege of taxing themselves, in the form of free gifts; some provinces enjoyed the right of compounding the taxes, and others made the assessment themselves. Such were the trifling liberties of France, and even these all turned to the benefit of the privileged classes, and to the detriment of the people.

And this France, so enslaved, was moreover miserably organized; the excesses of power were still less endurable than their unjust distribution. The nation, divided into three orders, which subdivided themselves into several classes, was a prey to all the attacks of despotism, and all the evils of inequality. The nobility were subdivided: into courtiers, living on the favors of the prince, that is to say, on the labor of the people, and whose aim was governorships of provinces, or elevated ranks in the army; ennobled parvenus, who conducted the interior administration, and whose object was to obtain comptrollerships, and to make the most of their place while they held it, by jobbing of every description; legists who administered justice, and were alone competent to perform its functions; and landed proprietors who oppressed the country by the exercise of those feudal rights which still survived. The clergy were divided into two classes: the one destined for the bishoprics and abbeys, and their rich revenues; the other for the apostolic function, and its poverty (*curés*). The third estate, ground down by the court, humiliated by the nobility, was itself divided into corporations, which, in their turn, exercised upon each other the evil and the contempt they received from the higher classes. It possessed scarcely a third part of the land, and this was burdened with the feudal rents due to the lords of the manor, tithes to the clergy, and taxes to the king. In compensation for all these sacrifices it enjoyed no political right, had no share in the administration, and was admitted to no public employment.

Louis XIV. wore out the mainspring of absolute monarchy by too protracted tension and too violent use. Fond of sway, rendered irritable by the vexations of his youth, he quelled all resistance, forbade every kind of opposition—that of the aristocracy which manifested itself in revolt; that of the parlements displayed by remonstrance; that of the Protestants, whose form was a liberty

of conscience which the church deemed heretical, and royalty factious. Louis XIV. subdued the nobles by summoning them to his court, where favors and pleasures were the compensation for their dependence. Parlement, till then the instrument of the crown, attempted to become its counterbalance, and the prince haughtily imposed upon it a silence and submission of sixty years' duration. At length, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) completed this work of despotism. An arbitrary government not only will not endure resistance, but it demands that its subjects shall approve and imitate it. After having subjected the actions of men, it persecutes conscience; needing to be ever in motion, it seeks victims when they do not fall in its way. The immense power of Louis XIV. was exercised, internally, against the heretics; externally, against all Europe. Oppression found ambitious men to counsel it, dragoons to serve, and success to encourage it; the wounds of France were hidden by laurels, her groans were drowned in songs of victory. But at last the men of genius died, and the victories ceased, industry emigrated, money disappeared; and the fact became evident that the very successes of despotism exhaust its resources, and consume its future ere that future has arrived.

The death of Louis XIV. was the signal for a reaction; there was a sudden transition from intolerance to incredulity, from the spirit of obedience to that of discussion. Under the regency (1715-1726) the third estate acquired in importance, by their increasing wealth and intelligence, all that the nobility lost in consideration, and the clergy in influence. Under Louis XV. the court prosecuted ruinous wars attended with little glory,⁹ and engaged in a silent struggle with opinion, in an open one with the parlement. Anarchy crept into its bosom, the government fell into the hands of royal mistresses, power was completely on the decline, and the opposition daily made fresh progress.

⁹ The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). France wasted blood and treasure to no profit. In the history of colonial America "King George's War" is a part of this great conflict.

The Seven Years' War (1756-1763), fought in Europe, America—the "French and Indian War"—and India. France lost to England Nova Scotia, Canada, Cape Breton, all territory east of the Mississippi, the French West Indian islands of St. Vincent, Dominique, Tobago, and Grenada; to Spain, Louisiana, which was retroceded to France in 1796 and sold by Napoleon to the United States. As the result of the war in India between France and England, British influence displaced that of France among the native princes, especially of the south.

1643-1774

The parlements had undergone a change of position and of system. Royalty had invested them with a power which they now turned against it. No sooner had the ruin of the aristocracy been accomplished by the combined efforts of the parlement and of royalty than the conquerors quarreled, according to the common practice of allies after a victory. Royalty sought to destroy an instrument that became dangerous when it ceased to be useful, and the parlement sought to govern royalty. This struggle, favorable to the monarch under Louis XIV., of mixed reverses and success under Louis XV., only ceased with the revolution. The parlement, from its very nature, was only called upon to serve as an instrument. The exercise of its prerogative, and its ambition as a body, leading it to oppose itself to the strong and support the weak, it served by turns the crown against the aristocracy and the nation against the crown. It was this that made it so popular under Louis XV. and Louis XVI., although it only attacked the court from a spirit of rivalry. Opinion, without inquiring into its motives, applauded not its ambition, but its resistance, and supported it because defended by it. Rendered daring by such encouragement, it became formidable to authority. After annulling the will of the most imperious and best-obeyed of monarchs (Louis XIV.); after protesting against the Seven Years' War; after obtaining the control of financial operations and the destruction of the Jesuits, its resistance became so constant and energetic that the court, meeting with it in every direction, saw the necessity of either submitting to or subjecting it. It accordingly carried into execution the plan of disorganization proposed by the Chancellor Maupeou. This daring man, who, to enjoy his own expression, had offered *retirer la couronne de greffe*, replaced this hostile parlement by one devoted to power, and subjected to a similar operation the entire magistracy of France, who were following the example of that of Paris.

But the time had passed for *coups d'état*. The current had set in against arbitrary rule so decidedly that the king resorted to it with doubt and hesitation, and even encountered the disapprobation of his court. A new power had arisen—that of opinion; which, though not recognized, was not the less influential, and whose decrees were beginning to assume sovereign authority. The nation, hitherto a nonentity, gradually asserted its rights, and without sharing power influenced it. Such is the course of all rising powers; they watch over it from without before they are admitted

into the government; then, from the right of control they pass to that of coöperation. The epoch at which the third estate was to share the sway had at last arrived. It had at former periods attempted to effect this, but in vain, because its efforts were premature. It was then but just emancipated, and possessed not that which establishes superiority, and leads to the acquisition of power; for right is only obtained by might. Accordingly, in insurrections, as in the states-general, it had held but the third rank; everything was done with its aid, but nothing for it. In times of feudal tyranny, it had served the kings against the nobles; when ministerial and fiscal despotism prevailed it assisted the nobles against the kings; but, in the first instance, it was nothing more than the servant of the crown; in the second, than that of the aristocracy. The struggle took place in a sphere, and on the part of interests, with which it was reputed to have no connection. When the nobles were definitively beaten in the time of the Fronde, it laid down its arms; a clear proof how secondary was the part it had played.

At length, after a century of absolute submission, it reappeared in the arena, but on its own account. The past cannot be recalled; and it was not more possible for the nobles to rise from their defeat than it would now be for absolute monarchy to regain its position. The court was to have another antagonist, for it must always have one, power never being without a candidate. The third estate, which increased daily in strength, wealth, intelligence, and union, was destined to combat and to displace it. The parlement did not constitute a class, but a body; and in this new contest, while able to aid in the displacement of authority, it could not secure it for itself.

The court had favored the progress of the third estate, and had contributed to the development of one of its chief means of advancement, its intelligence. The most absolute of monarchs aided the movement of mind, and, without intending it, created public opinion. By encouraging praise he prepared the way for blame; for we cannot invite an examination in our favor without undergoing one afterward to our prejudice. When the songs of triumph, and gratulation, and adulation were exhausted, accusation began, and the philosophers of the eighteenth century succeeded to the litterateurs of the seventeenth. Everything became the object of their researches and reflections; governments, religion, abuses, laws. They proclaimed rights, laid bare men's wants, denounced

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injustice. A strong and enlightened public opinion was formed, whose attacks the government underwent without venturing to attempt its suppression. It even converted those whom it attacked; courtiers submitted to its decisions from fashion's sake, power from necessity, and the age of reform was ushered in by the age of philosophy, as the latter had been by the age of the fine arts.

Such was the condition of France when Louis XVI. ascended the throne on May 10, 1774. Finances, whose deficiencies neither the restorative ministry of Cardinal Fleury¹⁰ (1726-1743), nor the bankrupt ministry of the Abbé Terray¹¹ had been able to make good; authority disregarded; intractable parlements; an imperious public opinion—such were the difficulties which the new reign inherited from its predecessors. Of all princes, Louis XVI., by his tendencies and his virtues, was best suited to his epoch. The people were weary of arbitrary rule, and he was disposed to renounce its exercise; they were exasperated with the burdensome dissoluteness of the court of Louis XV.; the morals of the new king were pure and his wants few; they demanded reforms that had become indispensable, and he appreciated the public want, and made it his glory to satisfy it. But it was as difficult to effect good as to continue evil; for it was necessary to have sufficient strength either to make the privileged classes submit to reform, or the nation to abuses; and Louis XVI. was neither a regenerator nor a despot. He was deficient in that sovereign will which alone accomplishes great changes in states, and which is as essential to monarchs who wish to limit their power as to those who seek to aggrandize it. Louis XVI. possessed a sound mind, a good and upright heart, but he was without energy of character and perseverance in action. His projects of amelioration met with obstacles which he had not foreseen, and which he knew not how to overcome. He accordingly fell beneath his efforts to favor reform, as another would have fallen

¹⁰ Cardinal Fleury was one of the best ministers France ever had. He reorganized the currency and put it on a stabler basis than it had been since Henry IV. (1589-1610); he paid off the enormous debts of the reign of Louis XIV.; enabled France to recover from the financial disasters of the regency, especially John Law's "Mississippi Bubble"; and left a surplus of fifteen millions in the treasury when he died. Cf. Perkins, "France under Louis XIV."

¹¹ The Abbé Terray was contrôleur-général during the last years of the reign of Louis XV. He forcibly reduced the interest from five per cent. to two and one-half per cent. in 1770. Voltaire was one of the victims of this act. He was notoriously corrupt. See Rocquain, "*L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution*," pp. 273, 305.

in his attempt to prevent it. Up to the meeting of the states-general, his reign was one long and fruitless endeavor at amelioration.

In choosing, on his accession to the throne, Maurepas as prime minister, Louis XVI. eminently contributed to the irresolute character of his reign. Young, deeply sensible of his duties and of his own insufficiency, he had recourse to the experience of an old man of seventy-three, who had lost the favor of Louis XV. by his opposition to the mistresses of that monarch. In him the king found not a statesman, but a mere courtier, whose fatal influence extended over the whole course of his reign. Maurepas had little heed to the welfare of France or the glory of his master; his sole care was to remain in favor. Residing in the palace at Versailles, in an apartment communicating with that of the king, and presiding over the council, he rendered the mind of Louis XVI. uncertain, his character irresolute; he accustomed him to half measures, to changes of system, to all the inconsistencies of power, and especially to the necessity of doing everything by others, and nothing of himself. Maurepas had the choice of the ministers, and these cultivated his good graces as assiduously as he the king's. Fearful of endangering his position, he kept out of the ministry men of powerful connections, and appointed rising men, who required his support for their own protection, and to effect their reforms. He successively called Turgot, Malesherbes, and Necker, to the direction of affairs, who undertook to effect ameliorations each in that department of the government which had been the immediate object of his studies.

Malesherbes, descended from a family in the law, inherited parliamentary virtues, and not parliamentary prejudices. To an independent mind he united a noble heart. He wished to give to every man his rights; to the accused, the power of being defended; to Protestants, liberty of conscience; to authors, the liberty of the press; to every Frenchman, personal freedom; and he proposed the abolition of the torture, the reestablishment of the Edict of Nantes, and the suppression of lettres de cachet and of the censure. Turgot, of a vigorous and comprehensive mind, and an extraordinary firmness and strength of character, attempted to realize still more extensive projects. He joined Malesherbes, in order, with his assistance, to complete the establishment of a system which was to bring back unity to the government and equality to the country. This virtuous citizen constantly occupied himself with the ameliora-

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tion of the condition of the people; he undertook, alone, what the revolution accomplished at a later period—the suppression of servitude and privilege. He proposed to enfranchise the rural districts from statute labor, provinces from their barriers, commerce from internal duties, trade from its shackles, and lastly, to make the nobility and clergy contribute to the taxes in the same proportion as the third estate.

Turgot was born in 1727, of noble origin, and was educated for the church, actually becoming prior of St. Sulpice. But being attracted to the law, he resigned his living. He made the acquaintance of Diderot and D'Alembert, and, having become intensely interested in economic subjects, was asked to contribute to the "*Encyclopédie*." As a political economist Turgot belonged to the physiocratic school. In 1761 he was appointed intendant in Limousin, where he speedily applied his theories by abolishing the *corvée* for public works and breaking down the interior barriers to trade and commerce. His reports to the *contrôleur-général*, advocating national reforms, attracted the attention of the government in a marked degree. He steadily refused promotion under Louis XV., knowing the inability of anyone successfully to combat the court influences of the king's declining years. But in 1774, when the accession of Louis XVI. was hailed as the dawn of a better day, he accepted the post of *contrôleur-général*. His financial policy may be summarized under three heads: (1) No state bankruptcy, either admitted or veiled; (2) no increase of taxes; (3) no loans at high interest. He began by assigning fifteen millions for pensions. The effect was magical. The rate of interest dropped to four per cent. Credit revived. Turgot was able at once to borrow sixty millions of Dutch bankers and ten millions at home, for the purpose of redeeming old loans contracted at much higher rates. Then ensued a rapid series of reforms: the establishment of free trade in grain; the abolition of the *corvée* on public works throughout France; the suppression of the guilds; the organization of a Bank of Discount to lend money for the furtherance of manufacturing and commerce at a low rate of interest and on long terms; finally, the prospect to all possessors of property of a gradually increasing share in local administration, through the establishment of provincial assemblies.¹²

¹² See Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. p. 40 ff; Blanqui, "History of Political Economy," ch. xxxiii.; Morley, "Critical Mis-

This great minister, of whom Malesherbes said, "he has the head of Bacon and the heart of L'Hôpital," wished by means of provincial assemblies to accustom the nation to public life, and prepare it for the restoration of the states-general. He would have effected the revolution by ordinances, had he been able to stand. But, under the system of special privileges and general servitude, all projects for the public good were impracticable. Turgot dissatisfied the courtiers by his ameliorations, displeased the parliament by the abolition of statute labor, wardenships, and internal duties, and alarmed the old minister by the ascendancy which his virtue gave him over Louis XVI. The prince forsook him, though at the same time observing that Turgot and himself were the only persons who desired the welfare of the people: so lamentable is the condition of kings!

Turgot was succeeded in 1776 in the general control of the finances by Clugny, formerly comptroller of Saint Domingo, who, six months after, was himself succeeded by Necker. Necker was a foreigner, a Protestant, a banker, and greater as an administrator than as a statesman; he accordingly conceived a plan for reforming France, less extensive than that of Turgot, but which he executed with more moderation, and aided by the times. Appointed minister in order to find money for the court, he made use of the wants of the court to procure liberties for the people. He reestablished the finances by means of order, and made the provinces contribute moderately to their administration. His views were wise and just; they consisted in bringing the revenue to a level with the expenditure, by reducing the latter; by employing taxation in ordinary times, and loans when imperious circumstances rendered it necessary to tax the future as well as the present; by causing the taxes to be assessed by the provincial assemblies, and by instituting the publication of accounts, in order to facilitate loans. This system was founded on the nature of loans, which, needing credit, require publicity of administration; and on that of taxation, which needing assent, requires also a share in the administration. Whenever there is a deficit and the government makes applications to meet it, if it address itself to lenders it must produce its balance

cellanies," vol. II.; Lowell, "Eve of the French Revolution." The best book upon this entire administration is Foncier, "*Essai sur le ministère Turgot.*" Condorcet wrote a life of Turgot. His "Works," with a memoir, have been published by Dupont de Nemours.

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sheet; if it address itself to the taxpayers, it must give them a share of the power. Thus loans led to the production of accounts, and taxes to the states-general; the first placing authority under the jurisdiction of opinion, and the second placing it under that of the people. But Necker, though less impatient for reform than Turgot, although he desired to redeem abuses which his predecessor wished to destroy, was not more fortunate than he. His economy displeased the courtiers; the measures of the provincial assemblies incurred the disapprobation of the parlements, which wished to monopolize opposition; and the prime minister could not forgive him an appearance of credit. He was obliged to quit power in 1781, a few months after the publication of the famous *Compte Rendu* of the finances, which suddenly initiated France in a knowledge of state matters, and rendered the return of an absolute government impossible.

Necker was not a constructive financier like Turgot, however. His art consisted in managing to secure great sums of money without raising the taxes, a doubtful benefit derived from his high personal credit as a private banker. He had no new ideas to apply and he had little constructive ability as a financier. It was largely owing to this minister that France aided the American colonies against England. His pride was hurt when doubt was expressed of French ability to do so, in the almost bankrupt condition in which the government was. The American Revolution cost France between one thousand and twelve hundred millions.¹³ The inevitable consequence of such participation Necker could not have failed to foresee. Yet he declared France was able to do so, and this in face of the fact that in the last five years 500,000,000 francs had been added to the old debt, with no increase in taxation! Necker was mortgaging the future to a terrible degree.

The methods by which he proposed to raise this loan will give us an idea of the prevailing financial methods of the times. From 1730 to 1754 every treasurer of France had employed the lottery to a greater or less extent, and Necker proposed to raise eighty-five millions by this means. Another method used was the "*rentes viageres*," a species of annuity. The purchaser of this annuity might buy under any one of four plans—10 per cent. interest ceasing at death of purchaser, 9 per cent. payable to two generations, 8½

¹³ Stourm, "*Les finances de l'ancienne régime et de la Révolution*," vol. II. p. 205.

per cent. to three generations, or 8 per cent. to the fourth generation, after which the principal reverted to the state. This rate of interest was exorbitant. Of course it decreased with the death of beneficiaries, but at the rate mentioned it would consume the principal in thirty-seven years, while the records show that the average life of these *rentes viagères* was from forty to forty-five years. It is estimated that those negotiated by Necker alone caused to the state a loss of six millions a year, or, taking their average length at forty years, a total of 240 millions. Necker also used the credit of the *pays d'état*, and raised ninety-one millions through them at 5 per cent. Right here comes a very clear illustration of the condition of state finances. Paris raised money on *rentes viagères* at 7 per cent., while the state paid $8\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 per cent. Another vicious method of financiering employed by all the *contrôleurs* from Necker's time on, was the sale of the revenues at a discount before they had been paid. These "anticipations" had increased until, in 1787, they reached the enormous amount of 255 millions.

But the day came when Necker's credit failed. No more loans could be made, and in his dismay and alarm—to save his reputation as a financier—he published the *Compte Rendu*—the Red Book—in 1780. The receipts and the expenses of the government were there given in detail. This was an unheard of proceeding, for hitherto absolute secrecy had been the policy of the ancient régime. But Necker did not truthfully present the facts. The figures were correct as far as they went, but the picture did not represent the real financial condition of France. This was partly because of the dexterous way in which the figures were grouped, partly because of what was omitted from the account. Of the enormous cost of French participation in America, he said nothing. The amounts due from the farmers and the clergy were put in the credit column, though many millions of them had already been advanced to the government, and many were arrears of payment too old ever to be collected. In figuring the extra resources of the state, so hard pushed was the *contrôleur-général* that he figured among the outside resources the bail bonds, or security bonds of treasury employees! By this juggling the revenue for the ensuing year was made to show an excess of 10,000,000 over the expenditure. The actual situation was that the expenses exceeded the revenue by 219,000,000.

The death of Maurepas followed close upon the retirement of Necker. The queen took his place with Louis XVI., and inherited

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all his influence over him. This good but weak prince required to be directed. His wife, young, beautiful, active, and ambitious, gained great ascendancy over him. Yet, it may be said, that the daughter of Marie Thérèse resembled her mother too much or too little. She combined frivolity with domination, and disposed of power only to invest with it men who caused her own ruin and that of the state. Maurepas, mistrusting court ministers, had always chosen popular ministers; it is true he did not support them; but if good was not brought about, at least evil did not increase. After his death, court ministers succeeded the popular ministers, and by their faults rendered the crisis inevitable, which others had endeavored to prevent by their reforms. This difference of choice is very remarkable; this it was which, by the change of men, brought on the change in the system of administration. The revolution dates from this epoch; the abandonment of reforms and the return of disorders hastened its approach and augmented its fury.

Calonne was called from an intendency to the general control of the finances. Two successors had already been given to Necker, when application was made to Calonne in 1783. Calonne was daring, brilliant, and eloquent; he had much readiness and a fertile mind. Either from error or design he adopted a system of administration directly opposed to that of his predecessor. Necker recommended economy, Calonne boasted of his lavish expenditure. Necker fell through courtiers, Calonne sought to be upheld by them. His sophisms were backed by his liberality; he convinced the queen by *fêtes*, the nobles by pensions; he gave a great circulation to the finances, in order that the extent and facility of his operations might excite confidence in the justness of his views; he even deceived the capitalists, by first showing himself punctual in his payments.

The annual deficit which Necker found at 30 to 35 millions, reached in 1783 the sum of 80 millions, and at the end of Calonne's administration in 1787, 115 millions, by his own statement, but 140 millions according to the committee of notables appointed to examine his accounts. All this, too, in time of peace, and in spite of the fact that the revenues had been increased annually by the addition of almost 53 millions of new taxes. Calonne began his administration by getting the king to pay his debts, which amounted to 230,000 francs. He actually congratulated the state upon having within it so many abuses by the abolition of which a saving might be made! The confidence of the courtiers in his policy, because of

his munificence, was great. One of them is reported to have said: "I never doubted M. Calonne could save the state, but I did not think he would be able to do it so quickly." But below his outward frivolity Calonne was a man of some force. After the great efforts which had been necessary to float a new loan of 80,000,000 francs in December, 1786, Calonne submitted a comprehensive reform to the king, based on the leading ideas of Turgot, and planned to put a part of the weight upon the privileged classes. He knew that the parlement would reject the reforms suggested, and so he resorted to an assembly of notables, which met at Versailles on February 22, 1787. Richelieu had last made use of them. This assembly of notables consisted of 144 members: 7 princes of the blood; 14 of the clergy; 36 of the nobility; 12 members of the conseil du roi; 38 representatives of the noblesse de robe; 12 deputies from the pays d'états; 25 officials from the chief cities. In the whole body there were but 27 representatives of the third estate.

The notables, chosen by the government from the higher classes, formed a ministerial assembly, which had neither a proper existence nor a commission. It was, indeed, to avoid parlements and states-general that Calonne addressed himself to a more subordinate assembly, hoping to find it more docile. But, composed of privileged persons, it was little disposed to make sacrifices. It became still less so when it saw the abyss which a devouring administration had excavated. It learned with terror that the loans of a few years amounted to 1646 millions, and that there was an annual deficit in the revenue of 140 millions.

Calonne knew that there was no hope of getting the privileged classes to tax themselves. But to compass his purpose he had cut up the assembly into seven bureaux, each of which was to deliberate and vote by itself. But at the time of the opening Calonne was ill, and instead of meeting separately, the notables met together. The opposition thus was able to concert a programme. The assembly demanded a statement of accounts. Calonne refused. He criticised Necker's financial policy and thus ranged public opinion against him.

The disclosure of the deficit was the signal for Calonne's fall. He fell, April 17, 1787, and was succeeded by Brienne, Archbishop of Sens,¹⁴ his opponent in the assembly. Brienne

¹⁴ Brienne was Archbishop of Toulouse at this time. He became Archbishop of Sens and was made a cardinal after his resignation, in 1788.

thought the majority of the notables was devoted to him, because it had united with him against Calonne. But the privileged classes were not more disposed to make sacrifices to Brienne than to his predecessor; they had seconded his attacks, which were to their interest, and not his ambition, to which they were indifferent.

The Archbishop of Sens, who is censured for a want of plan, was in no position to form one. He was not allowed to continue the prodigality of Calonne; and it was too late to return to the retrenchments of Necker. Economy, which had been a means of safety at a former period, was no longer so in this. Either taxation must be had recourse to, and that parlement opposed; or loans, and credit was exhausted; or sacrifices on the part of the privileged classes, who were unwilling to make them. Brienne, to whom office had been the chief object of life, who with the difficulties of his position combined slenderness of means, attempted everything, and succeeded in nothing. His mind was active, but it wanted strength; and his character rash without firmness. Daring, previous to action, but weak afterward, he ruined himself by his irresolution, want of foresight, and constant variation of means. There remained only bad measures to adopt, but he could not decide upon one, and follow that one; this was his real error.

The assembly of notables was but little submissive and very parsimonious. After having sanctioned the establishment of provincial assemblies, a regulation of the corn trade, the abolition of *corvées*, and a new stamp tax, it broke up on May 25, 1787. It spread throughout France what it had discovered respecting the necessities of the throne, the errors of the ministers, the dilapidation of the court, and the irremediable miseries of the people. Brienne, deprived of this assistance, had recourse to taxation, as a resource, the use of which had for some time been abandoned. He demanded the enrollment of various reforming edicts by the parlement. In June-July, 1787, as follows: the edict for establishing free trade in grain, on June 17; that for the provincial assemblies on June 22; the redemption of the *corvée* on June 27. The territorial subsidies act was introduced on July 16 and was forced through the parlement in a bed of justice on July 30, the parlement making the notable protest that only the states-general could affirm a permanent tax. But parlement, which was then in the full vigor of its existence and in all the ardor of its ambition, and to which the financial embarrassment of the ministry offered a means of augmenting its

power, refused the enrollment. Banished to Troyes (August), it grew weary of exile, and the minister recalled it on condition that the two edicts should be passed. But this was only a suspension of hostilities; the necessities of the crown soon rendered the struggle more obstinate and violent. The minister had to make fresh applications for money; his existence depended on the issue of several successive loans to the amount of 440 millions. It was necessary to obtain the enrollment of them. The whole amount was not to be taken up at once, but was to be distributed over five years. It is a significant fact that Loménie de Brienne was finally driven to the issuance of paper, in part payment of the interest and pensions, etc., due from the state. The decree promulgating these bills insists, however, that they are not to be classed as paper money, "of which the king," says he, "knows the inconvenience. They are bills of the Royal Treasury." Brienne's cautious utterance shows that the memory of John Law's financial operations was yet vivid in the minds of the French people. They soon, however, forgot the misfortunes which they had experienced from paper money.

Brienne, expecting opposition from the parlement, procured the enrollment of this edict, by a "bed of justice," and to conciliate the magistracy and public opinion, the Protestants were restored to their rights in the same sitting, and Louis XVI. promised an annual publication of the state of finances, and the convocation of the states-general before the end of five years. But these concessions were no longer sufficient: parlement refused the enrollment, and rose against the ministerial tyranny. Some of its members, among others the Duke of Orleans, were banished. Louis XVI. had converted the sitting of the parlement into a "royal session" by allowing a free discussion of the measures. When he finally ordered the registration of the edict, the Duke of Orleans protested on the ground that the registration was illegal. Marie Antoinette interceded for him and he soon returned. Parlement protested, by a decree dated May 3, 1788, against *lettres de cachet*, and required the recall of its members. This decree was annulled by the king, and confirmed by parlement. The warfare increased. The magistracy of Paris was supported by all the magistracy of France, and encouraged by public opinion. It proclaimed the rights of the nation, and its own incompetence in matters of taxation; and, become liberal from interest, and rendered generous by oppression, it exclaimed against arbitrary imprisonment, and demanded regularly convoked

states-general. After this act of courage, it decreed the irremovability of its members, and the incompetence of any who might usurp their functions. This bold manifesto was followed by the arrest of two members, D'Eprémesnil and Goislard, by the reform of the body, and the establishment of a plenary court.

Brienne understood that the opposition of the parlement was systematic, that it would be renewed on every fresh demand for subsidies, or on the authorization of every loan. Exile was but a momentary remedy, which suspended opposition, without destroying it. He then projected the reduction of this body to judicial functions, and associated with himself Lamoignon, keeper of the seals, for the execution of this project. Lamoignon was skilled in *coups d'état*. He had audacity, and combined with Maupeou's energetic determination a greater degree of consideration and probity. But he made a mistake as to the force of power, and what it was possible to effect in his times. Maupeou had reëstablished parlement, changing its members; Lamoignon wished to disorganize it. The first of these means, if it had succeeded, would only have produced temporary repose; the second must have produced a definitive one, since it aimed at destroying the power, which the other only tried to displace; but Maupeou's reform did not last, and that of Lamoignon could not be effected. The execution of the last was, however, tolerably well framed. All the magistracy of France was exiled on the same day, in order that the new judicial organization might take place. The keeper of the seals deprived the parlement of Paris of its political attributes, to invest with them a plenary court, ministerially composed, and reduced its judicial competence in favor of bailiwicks, the jurisdiction of which he extended. Public opinion was indignant; the Châtelet¹⁵ protested, the provinces rose, and the plenary court could neither be formed nor act. Disturbances broke out in Dauphiné, Brittany, Provence, Flanders, Languedoc, and Béarn; the ministry, instead of the regular opposition of parlement, had to encounter one much more animated and factious. The nobility, the third estate, the provincial states, and even the clergy, took part in it. Brienne, pressed for money, had called together an extraordinary assembly of the clergy, who immediately made an address to the king, demanding the abolition of his

¹⁵ The Châtelet was the chief criminal court of Paris. Technically, it was only the criminal court of the prévôté of Paris, but the importance of the capital gave it prééminence. Historically it was one of the oldest institutions of Paris, some historians even claiming a continuity from Roman times.

plenary court, and the recall of the states-general: they alone could thenceforth repair the disordered state of the finances, secure the national debt, and terminate these disputes for power.

The Archbishop of Sens, by his contest with the parlement, had postponed the financial, by creating a political difficulty. The moment the latter ceased, the former reappeared, and made his retreat inevitable. Obtaining neither taxes nor loans, unable to make use of the plenary court, and not wishing to recall the parlements, Brienne, as a last resource, promised the convocation of the states-general. By this means he hastened his ruin. He had been called to the financial department in order to remedy embarrassments which he had augmented, and to procure money which he had been unable to obtain. So far from it, he had exasperated the nation, raised a rebellion in the various bodies of the state, compromised the authority of the government, and rendered inevitable the states-general, which, in the opinion of the court, was the worst means of raising money. He succumbed on August 25, 1788. The cause of his fall was a suspension of the payment of the interest on the debt, which was the commencement of bankruptcy. This minister has been the most blamed because he came last. Inheriting the faults, the embarrassments of past times, he had to struggle with the difficulties of his position with inefficient means. He tried intrigue and oppression; he banished, suspended, disorganized parlement; everything was an obstacle to him, nothing aided him. After a long struggle he sank under lassitude and weakness; I dare not say from incapacity, for had he been far stronger and more skillful, had he been a Richelieu or a Sully, he would still have fallen. It no longer appertained to anyone arbitrarily to raise money or to oppress the people. It must be said in his excuse, that he had not created that position from which he was not able to extricate himself; his only mistake was his presumption in accepting it. He fell through the fault of Calonne, as Calonne had availed himself of the confidence inspired by Necker for the purposes of his lavish expenditure. The one had destroyed credit, and the other, thinking to reëstablish it by force, had destroyed authority.

The states-general had become the only means of government, and the last resource of the throne. They had been eagerly demanded by parlement and the peers of the kingdom, on July 13, 1787; by the states of Dauphiné, in the assembly of Vizille; by the clergy in its assembly at Paris. The provincial states had prepared

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the public mind for them; and the notables were their precursors. The king after having, on December 18, 1787, promised their convocation in five years, on August 8, 1788, fixed the opening for May 1, 1789. Necker was recalled, parlement reëstablished, the plenary court abolished, the bailiwicks destroyed, and the provinces satisfied; and the new minister prepared everything for the election of deputies and the holding of the states.

At this epoch a great change took place in the opposition, which till then had been unanimous. Under Brienne, the ministry had encountered opposition from all the various bodies of the state, because it had sought to oppress them. Under Necker, it met with resistance from the same bodies, which desired power for themselves and oppression for the people. From being despotic, it had become national, and it still had them all equally against it. Parlement had maintained a struggle for authority, and not for the public welfare; and the nobility had united with the third estate, rather against the government than in favor of the people. Each of these bodies had demanded the states-general: the parlement, in the hope of ruling them as it had done in 1614; and the nobility, in the hope of regaining its lost influence. Accordingly, the magistracy proposed as a model for the states-general of 1789, the form of that of 1614, and public opinion abandoned it. If this recommendation had been followed, whole provinces would have been in practice disfranchised. For example, Poitou, with 694,000 inhabitants, would have had no more representation than Gex, with 1300; Vermandois, with 774,000 inhabitants, would have had no more than Dourdan, with a population of 7800.¹⁶ The nobility refused its consent to the double representation of the third estate, as in Languedoc, Provence, Hainault. In most of them, however, as Brittany, Artois, Burgundy, an equal representation was the rule. Thus a division broke out between these two orders.

This double representation was required by the intellect of the age, the necessity of reform, and by the importance which the third estate had acquired. It had already been admitted into the provincial assemblies. Brienne, before leaving the ministry, had made an appeal to the writers of the day, in order to know what would be the most suitable method of composing and holding the states-general. Among the works favorable to the people there appeared

¹⁶ Cf. Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 14-15; "Memoirs of Talleyrand," vol. I. pp. 85-86.

the celebrated pamphlet of Sieyès on the third estate, and that of D'Entraigues on the states-general. Sieyès asked these questions, which he proceeded to answer: What is the third estate? Everything. What has it been thus far? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something.¹⁷ Opinion became daily more decided, and Necker wishing, yet fearing, to satisfy it, and desirous of conciliating all orders, of obtaining general approbation, convoked a second assembly of notables on November 6, 1788, to deliberate on the composition of the states-general, and the election of its members. He thought to induce it to accept the addition of the third estate, but it refused, and he was obliged to decide, in spite of the notables, that which he ought to have decided without them. Necker was not the man to avoid disputes by removing all difficulties beforehand. He did not take the initiative as to the representation of the third estate, any more than at a later period he took it with regard to the question of voting by orders or by poll. When the states-general were assembled the solution of this second question, on which depended the state of power and that of the people, was abandoned to force.

Be this as it may, Necker, having been unable to make the notables adopt the representation of the third estate, caused it to be adopted by the council. The royal declaration of November 27 decreed that the deputies in the states-general should amount to at least a thousand, and that the deputies of the third estate should be equal in number to the deputies of the nobility and clergy together. Necker, moreover, obtained the admission of the curés into the order of the clergy, and of Protestants into that of the third estate.

May 1, 1789, was the day fixed for the convening of the states-general. The letters convoking the electors were sent out in February. Each order named its deputies. With the third estate every Frenchman of twenty-five years of age paying any direct tax whatsoever had the right to vote. The form of the elections was the same as in 1614. The deputies of the three orders were nominated from bailiwicks. The clergy and the nobility named their representatives directly, but with the third estate indirect election prevailed, delegates being chosen in the parishes and villages to a subsequent

¹⁷ The flood of pamphlets at this time was enormous. Gouverneur Morris writes, in June, 1789, "Even lackeys are poring over them at the gates of hotels," and Arthur Young records about the same time, "Thirteen came out to-day; sixteen yesterday; and ninety last week."

assembly held in the chief place of the bailiwick, this body electing the actual deputies to the states-general.

The local election machinery was very various—the clergy generally elected out of the chapter, the monastic bodies from among their brotherhoods; industrial and mercantile interests were organized into crafts or guilds. Robespierre was elected by the cobblers' guild of Arras. About 5,000,000 voters thus elected 1139 deputies.

Parlement had but little influence in the elections, and the court none at all. The nobility selected a few popular deputies, but for the most part devoted to the interests of their order, and as much opposed to the third estate as to the oligarchy of the great families of the court. The clergy nominated bishops and abbés attached to privilege, and curés favorable to the popular cause, which was their own; lastly, the third estate selected men enlightened, firm, and unanimous in their wishes. Of the 285 nobles elected, 270 took their seats; of the clergy, 308 were elected and 291 took their seats; of the third estate, 621 were elected and 578 took their seats. The deputation of the nobility was comprised of 242 gentlemen and 28 members of parlement; that of the clergy, of 48 archbishops or bishops, 35 abbés or deans, and 208 curés; and that of the communes, of 2 ecclesiastics, 12 noblemen, 18 magistrates of towns, 200 county members, 212 barristers, 16 physicians, and 216 merchants and agriculturists. Among the nobles were the king's two brothers, the Count of Provence, later Louis XVIII. (1814-1824), and the Count d'Artois, afterward Charles X. (1824-1830); Philip, Duke of Orleans; and Lafayette. Talleyrand, then Bishop of Autun, the Abbé Maury, and "the great Gregoire" were among the clergy. Among the deputies of the third estate, besides 12 nobles and 2 priests, there were 13 municipal magistrates, 102 magistrates from bailiwicks, 216 lawyers, 16 physicians, and about 100 merchants and farmers.¹⁸ Conspicuous among them were Mirabeau, Sieyès, Robespierre, Pétion, Bailly, Barrère, Malouet, Mounier, Target, Lameth, and Dr. Guillotin. The Paris deputies included 9 lawyers, 6 tradesmen, 2 tailors, 1 grocer, 1 painter, 1 jeweler, 1 wine merchant. The opening of the states-general was fixed for May 5, 1789.

Thus was the revolution brought about. The court in vain tried to prevent, as it afterward endeavored to annul it. Under the

¹⁸ On the whole matter see Lowell, "Eve of the French Revolution," *ch. xxi.*; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 30-50.

direction of Maurepas the king nominated popular ministers and made attempts at reform; under the influence of the queen he nominated court ministers and made attempts at authority. Oppression met with as little success as reform. After applying in vain to courtiers for retrenchments, to parlement for levies, to capitalists for loans, he sought for new taxpayers, and made an appeal to the privileged orders. He demanded of the notables, consisting of the nobles and the clergy, a participation in the charges of the state, which they refused. He then for the first time applied to all France, and convoked the states-general. He treated with the various bodies of the nation before treating with the nation itself; and it was only on the refusal of the first, that he appealed from it to a power whose intervention and support he dreaded. He preferred private assemblies, which, being isolated, necessarily remained secondary to a general assembly, which, representing all interests, must combine all powers. Up to this great epoch every year saw the wants of the government increasing, and resistance becoming more extensive. Opposition passed from parlements to the nobility, from the nobility to the clergy, and from them all to the people. In proportion as each participated in power it began its opposition, until all these private oppositions were fused in or gave way before the national opposition. The states-general only decreed a revolution already formed.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gouverneur Morris, the American patriot, was in Paris at this time on private business, and was later made minister to France. In the spring of 1789 he wrote: "A spirit which has lain dormant for generations starts up and stares about, ignorant of the means of obtaining but ardently desirous to possess the object; consequently active, energetic, easily led, but alas! easily, too easily, misled." "Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris," vol. I. p. 21. And later, on April 29, 1789, he wrote to Washington: "The materials for a revolution in this country are very indifferent. Everybody agrees that there is an utter prostration of morals, but this general position can never convey to the American mind the degree of depravity. It is not by any figure of rhetoric, or force of language, that the idea can be communicated. An hundred anecdotes and a hundred thousand examples are required to show the extreme rottenness of every member. There are men and women who are greatly and eminently virtuous—but they stand forward from a background deeply and darkly shaded. It is, however, from such crumbling matter that the great edifice of freedom is to be erected here. Perhaps it may harden when exposed to the air, but it seems quite as likely that it will fall and crush the building." *Ibid.*, vol. I. pp. 68-69.

Chapter III

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATES-GENERAL

MAY 5-AUGUST 4, 1789

MAY 5, 1789, was fixed for the opening of the states-general. A religious ceremony preceded their installation. The King, his family, his ministers, the deputies of the three orders, on May 4 went in procession from the church of Notre-Dame to that of Saint Louis, to hear the opening mass. Lavarre, Bishop of Nancy, preached the sermon, which was much like a political harangue. In his prayer, he said: "Accept the homage of the clergy, the respect of the nobility, and the very humble requests of the third estate." Men did not without enthusiasm see the return of a national ceremony of which France had for so long a period been deprived. It had all the appearance of a festival. An enormous multitude flocked from all parts to Versailles; the weather was splendid; they had been lavish of the pomp of decoration. The excitement of the music, the kind and satisfied expression of the king, the beauty and demeanor of the queen, and, as much as anything, the general hope, exalted everyone. But the etiquette, costumes, and order of the ranks of the states in 1614 were seen with regret. The clergy, in cassocks, large cloaks, and square caps, or in violet robes and lawn sleeves, occupied the first place. Then came the nobles, attired in black coats with waistcoats and facings of cloth of gold, lace cravats, and hats with white plumes, turned up in the fashion of Henry IV. The modest third estate came last, clothed in black, with short cloaks, muslin cravats, and hats without feathers or loops. In the church the same distinction as to places existed between the three orders.

The royal sittings took place the following day in the Salle des Menus. Galleries, arranged in the form of an amphitheater, were filled with spectators. The deputies were summoned and introduced according to the order established in 1614. The clergy were conducted to the right, the nobility to the left, and the commons in front of the throne at the end of the hall. The deputation from

Dauphiné, from Crespy, in Valois, to which the Duke of Orleans belonged, and from Provence, were received with loud applause. Necker was also received on his entrance with general enthusiasm. Public favor was testified toward all who had contributed to the convocation of the states-general. When the deputies and ministers had taken their places the king appeared, followed by the queen, the princes, and a brilliant suite. The salle resounded with applause on his arrival. When he came in, Louis XVI. took his seat on the throne, and when he had put on his hat, the three orders covered themselves at the same time. The commons, contrary to the custom of the ancient states, imitated the nobility and clergy without hesitation: the time when the third order should remain covered and speak kneeling was gone by. The king's speech was then expected in profound silence. Men were eager to know the true feeling of the government with regard to the states. Did it purpose assimilating the new assembly to the ancient, or granting it the part which the necessities of the state and the importance of the occasion assigned to it?

"Gentlemen," said the king, with emotion, "the day I have so anxiously expected has at length arrived, and I see around me the representatives of the nation which I glory in governing. A long interval had elapsed since the last session of the states-general, and although the convocation of these assemblies seemed to have fallen into disuse, I did not hesitate to restore a custom from which the kingdom might derive new force, and which might open to the nation a new source of happiness."

These words which promised much were only followed by explanations as to the debt and announcements of retrenchment in the expenditure. The king, instead of wisely tracing out to the states the course they ought to follow, urged the orders to union, expressed his want of money, his dread of innovations, and complained of the uneasiness of the public mind, without suggesting any means of satisfying it. He was nevertheless very much applauded when he delivered at the close of his discourse the following words, which fully described his intentions: "All that can be expected from the dearest interest in the public welfare, all that can be required of a sovereign, the first friend of his people, you may and ought to hope from my sentiments. That a happy spirit of union may pervade this assembly, gentlemen, and that this may be an ever-memorable epoch for the happiness and prosperity of the kingdom, is the

wish of my heart, the most ardent of my desires; it is, in a word, the reward which I expect for the uprightness of my intentions, and my love of my subjects."

Barentin, keeper of the seals, spoke next. His speech was an amplification respecting the states-general and the favors of the king. After a long preamble he at last touched upon the topics of the occasion. "His majesty," he said, "has not changed the form of the ancient assemblies, by granting a double representation in favor of the most numerous of the three orders, that on which the burden of taxation chiefly falls; has not changed the form of the ancient deliberations; although that by poll, producing but one result, seems to have the advantage of best representing the general desire, the king wishes this new form should be adopted only with the free consent of the states, and the approval of his majesty. But whatever may be the opinion on this question, whatever distinctions may be drawn between the different matters that will become the subjects of deliberation, there can be no doubt but that the most entire harmony will unite the three orders on the subject of taxation." The government was not opposed to the vote by poll in pecuniary matters, it being more expeditious; but in political questions it declared itself in favor of voting by order, as a more effectual check on innovations. In this way it sought to arrive at its own end—namely, subsidies, and not to allow the nation to obtain its object, which was reform. The manner in which the keeper of the seals determined the province of the states-general discovered more plainly the intentions of the court. He reduced them, in a measure, to the inquiry into taxation, in order to vote it, and to the discussion of a law respecting the press, for the purpose of fixing its limits, and to the reform of civil and criminal legislation. He proscribed all other changes, and concluded by saying: "All just demands have been granted; the king has not noticed indiscreet murmurs; he has condescended to overlook them with indulgence; he has even forgiven the expression of those false and extravagant maxims under favor of which attempts have been made to substitute pernicious chimeras for the unalterable principles of monarchy. You will with indignation, gentlemen, repel the dangerous innovations which the enemies of public good seek to confound with the necessary and happy changes which this regeneration ought to produce, and which form the first wish of his majesty."³²

This speech displayed little knowledge of the wishes of the

nation, or it sought openly to combat them. The discussion assembly looked to Necker, from whom it expected different language. He was the popular minister, had obtained the double representation, and it was hoped he would approve of the vote by poll, the only way of enabling the third estate to name its members to represent. But he spoke as controller-general and as a man of caution. His speech, which lasted three hours, was a lengthened halcyon, and when, after closing the assembly, he touched on the topic of interest, he spoke under duress, in order to avoid committing himself either with the court or the people. Since the late emergency Necker said the deficit had been reduced by 20,000,000 francs, and now amounted to 30,000,000. The truth was the state was bankrupt, for it was carrying a floating debt of 321,500,000, a sum that could not be paid—even the interest upon it—unless returns were made. The Necker's reappointment, spoke payments had been immediately resumed, September 14, 1788. Indeed Necker was reappointed for just that purpose. From this time until the meeting of the states-general in 1789 he had concentrated his whole attention on keeping things going. By sheer personal strength he carried the finances through the period until he was personally elected once again to do it. When the states-general met on May 5, 1789, the statement showed an annual deficit of only 20 millions, and he stated that it was a small matter, and one that the king alone could easily deal with. This is the assembly where all has been suggested by the nobles to provide for Calonne's deficit of 200 millions, the assembly where election proceeded so slowly that Calonne had been forced to report to houses of peers, and yet, on the last gathering, it is told by the minister that there really was no intention for his resignation. By a stroke of the pen Necker had cut off more than two millions of deficit. What was Necker's object in this policy? Was it to prevent any action by the assembly in the hope that, before long, he would in the course of time be able to mend the floating debt, and so systematize the financial system that the expenses and receipts would hereafter be in equilibrium? Or was it that he really had no plan to propose? What he guided his policy, one thing is certain, and that is that he was not presenting to the assembly in May, 1789, a definite plan for the establishment of the assembly. He missed the opportunity of his life. In all probability the assembly would have passed any reasonable bill that he might have proposed, for there is no doubt that the majority of the members, at

the opening of the sessions, felt strongly their own inability to deal unaided with a problem so complicated.

The government ought to have better understood the importance of the states-general. The restoration of this assembly alone announced a great revolution. Looked for with hope by the nation, it reappeared at an epoch when the ancient monarchy was sinking, and when it alone was capable of reforming the state and providing for the necessities of royalty. The difficulties of the time, the nature of their mission, the choice of their members, everything announced that the states were not assembled as taxpayers, but as legislators. The right of regenerating France had been granted them by opinion, was devolved on them by public resolutions, and they found in the enormity of the abuses and the public encouragement strength to undertake and accomplish this great task.

It behooved the king to associate himself with their labors. In this way he would have been able to restore his power and insure himself from the excesses of a revolution by himself assisting in bringing it about. If, taking the lead in these changes, he had fixed the new order of things with firmness, but with justice; if, realizing the wishes of France, he had determined the rights of her citizens, the province of the states-general, and the limits of royalty; if, on his own part, he had renounced arbitrary power, inequality on the part of the nobility, and privileges on the part of the different bodies; in a word, if he had accomplished all the reforms which were demanded by public opinion, and executed by the constituent assembly, he would have prevented the fatal dissensions which subsequently arose. It is rare to find a prince willing to share his power, or sufficiently enlightened to yield what he will be reduced to lose. Yet Louis XVI. would have done this, if he had been less influenced by those around him, and had he followed the dictates of his own mind. But the greatest anarchy pervaded the councils of the king. When the states-general assembled, no measures had been taken, nothing had been decided on, which might prevent dispute. Louis XVI. wavered between his ministry, directed by Necker, and his court, directed by the queen and a few princes of his family.

Necker, satisfied with obtaining the representation of the third estate, dreaded the indecision of the king and the discontent of the court. Not appreciating sufficiently the importance of a crisis which he considered more as a financial than a social one, he waited for the course of events in order to act, and flattered himself with the

hope of being able to guide these events, without attempting to prepare the way for them. He felt that the ancient organization of the states could no longer be maintained; that the existence of three orders, each possessing the right of refusal, was opposed to the execution of reform and the progress of administration. He hoped, after a trial of this triple opposition, to reduce the number of the orders and bring about the adoption of the English form of government, by uniting the clergy and nobility in one chamber, and the third estate in another. He did not foresee that the struggle once begun, his interposition would be in vain: that half measures would suit neither party; that the weak through obstinacy, and the strong through passion, would oppose this system of moderation. Concessions satisfy only before a victory.

The court, so far from wishing to organize the states-general, sought to annul them. It preferred the casual resistance of the great bodies of the nation to the sharing authority with a permanent assembly. The separation of the orders favored its views; it reckoned on fomenting their differences, and thus preventing them from acting. The states-general had never achieved any result, owing to the defect of their organization; the court hoped that it would still be the same, since the first two orders were less disposed to yield to the reforms solicited by the last. The clergy wished to preserve its privileges and its opulence, and clearly foresaw that the sacrifices to be made by it were more numerous than the advantages to be acquired. The nobility, on its side, while it resumed a political independence long since lost, was aware that it would have to yield more to the people than it could obtain from royalty. It was almost entirely in favor of the third estate, that the new revolution was about to operate, and the first two orders were induced to unite with the court against the third estate as but lately they had coalesced with the third estate against the court. Interest alone led to this change of party, and they united with the monarch without affection, as they had defended the people without regard to public good.

No efforts were spared to keep the nobility and clergy in this disposition. The deputies of these two orders were the objects of favors and allurements. A committee, to which the most illustrious persons belonged, was held at the Countess de Polignac's; the principal deputies were admitted to it. It was here that were gained D'Emprémesnil and D'Entraigues, two of the warmest advocates of liberty in parlement, or before the states-general, and who after-

ward became its most decided opponents. Here also the costume of the deputies of the different orders was determined on, and attempts made to separate them, first by etiquette, then by intrigue, and, lastly, by force. The recollection of the ancient states-general prevailed in the court; it thought it could regulate the present by the past, restrain Paris by the army, the deputies of the third estate by those of the nobility, rule the states by separating the orders, and separate the orders by reviving ancient customs which exalted the nobles and lowered the commons. Thus, after the first sitting, it was supposed that all had been prevented by granting nothing.

On May 6, the day after the opening of the states, the nobility and clergy repaired to their respective chambers, and constituted themselves. The third estate being, on account of its double representation, the most numerous order, had the Salle des États allotted to it, and there awaited the two other orders; it considered its situation as provisional, its members as presumptive deputies, and adopted a system of inactivity till the other orders should unite with it. Then a memorable struggle commenced, the issue of which was to decide whether the revolution should be effected or stopped. The future fate of France depended on the separation or reunion of the orders. This important question arose on the subject of the verification of powers. The popular deputies asserted very justly that it ought to be made in common, since, even refusing the reunion of the orders, they could not deny the interest which each of them had in the examination of the powers of the others; the privileged deputies argued, on the contrary, that since the orders had a distinct existence, the verification ought to be made respectively. They felt that one single coöperation would, for the future, render all separation impossible.

The commons acted with much circumspection, deliberation, and steadiness. It was by a succession of efforts, not unattended with peril, by slow and undecided success, and by struggles constantly renewing, that they attained their object. The systematic inactivity they adopted from the commencement was the surest and wisest course; there are occasions when the way to victory is to know how to wait for it. The commons were unanimous, and alone formed the numerical half of the states-general; the nobility had in its bosom some popular dissentients; the majority of the clergy, composed of several bishops, friends of peace, and of the numerous class of the curés, the third estate of the church,

entertained sentiments favorable to the commons.¹ Weariness was therefore to bring about a union; this was what the third estate hoped, what the bishops feared, and what induced them on May 13 to offer themselves as mediators. But this mediation was of necessity without any result, as the nobility would not admit voting by poll, nor the commons voting by order. Accordingly, the conciliatory conferences, after being prolonged in vain till May 27, were broken up by the nobility, who declared in favor of separate verification.

The day after this hostile decision the commons determined to declare themselves the assembly of the nation, and invited the clergy to join them in the name of the God of peace and the common weal. The court, taking alarm at this measure, interfered for the purpose of having the conferences resumed. The first commissioners appointed for purposes of reconciliation were charged with regulating the differences of the orders; the ministry undertook to regulate the differences of the commissioners. In this way the states depended on a commission, and the commission had the counsel of the prince for arbiter. But these new conferences had not a more fortunate issue than the first. They lingered on without either of the orders being willing to yield anything to the others, and the nobility finally broke them up by confirming all its resolutions.²

Five weeks had already elapsed in useless parleys. The third estate, perceiving the moment had arrived for it to constitute itself, and that longer delay would indispose the nation toward it, and destroy the confidence it had acquired by the refusal of the privileged classes to coöperate with it, decided on acting, and displayed herein the same moderation and firmness it had shown during its inactivity. Mirabeau announced that a deputy of Paris had a motion to propose; and Sieyès, physically of timid character, but of an enter-

¹ In each of the privileged orders a motion toward union was made and defeated: in that of the clergy, by a vote of 133 to 114; in that of the nobility, by a vote of 188 to 47.

² Louis XVI. lost a golden opportunity at this time by failure to take any initiative. Gouverneur Morris wrote on June 2, 1789: "I propose to — that the king should cut the knot which the states cannot untie, viz.: that he should prescribe to them the future constitution and leave them to consider."—"Diary and Letters," vol. I. p. 96. Fundamentally, though, the blame must fall on Necker, as the king's chief minister. Of him Morris a little later than the above, on July 1, 1789, wrote to Washington: "If his abilities were equal to his genius and he was as much supported by firmness as he is swayed by ambition, he would have the exalted honor of giving a free constitution to above twenty millions of his fellow-creatures." (*Ibid.* vol. I. p. 110).

prising mind, who had great authority by his ideas, and was better suited than anyone to propose a measure, proved the impossibility of union, the urgency of verification, the justice of demanding it in common, and caused it to be decreed by the assembly that the nobility and clergy should be invited to the hall of the states in order to take part in the verification, which would take place, whether they were absent or present.

The measure for general verification was followed by another still more energetic. The commons, after having terminated the verification on June 17, on the motion of Sieyès, constituted themselves the national assembly.³ This bold step, by which the most numerous order and the only one whose powers were legalized, declared itself the representation of France, and refused to recognize the other two till they submitted to the verification, determined questions hitherto undecided, and changed the assembly of the states into an assembly of the people. The system of orders was lost in political powers, and this was the first step toward the abolition of classes in the private system. This memorable decree of June 17 contained the germ of the night of August 4, but it was necessary to defend what they had dared to decide, and there was reason to fear such a determination could not be maintained.

The first decree of the national assembly was an act of sovereignty. It placed the privileged classes under its dependence, by proclaiming the indivisibility of the legislative power. The court remained to be restrained by means of taxation. The assembly declared the illegality of previous imposts, voted them provisionally, as long as it continued to sit, and their cessation on its dissolution; it restored the confidence of capitalists by consolidating the public debt, and provided for the necessities of the people by appointing a committee of subsistence.

Such firmness and foresight excited the enthusiasm of the nation. But those who directed the court saw that the divisions thus excited between the orders had failed in their object; and that it was necessary to resort to other means to obtain it. They considered the royal authority alone adequate to prescribe the continuance of the orders, which the opposition of the nobles could no longer preserve. They took advantage of a journey to Marly to

³ Of this famous resolve it has been well said that "except the Declaration of Independence it was the most decisive step ever taken by any body of men." On July 9, the national assembly officially added the term "constituent" to the earlier title.

remove Louis XVI. from the influence of the prudent and pacific counsels of Necker, and to induce him to adopt hostile measures. This prince, alike accessible to good and bad counsels, surrounded by a court given up to party spirit, and entreated for the interests of his crown and in the name of religion to stop the pernicious progress of the commons, yielded at last and promised everything. It was decided that he should go in state to the assembly, annul its decrees, command the separation of the orders as constitutive of the monarchy, and himself fix the reforms to be effected by the states-general. From that moment the privy council held the government, acting no longer secretly, but in the most open manner. Barentin, the keeper of the seals, the Count d'Artois, the Prince de Condé, and the Prince de Conti conducted alone the projects they had concerted. Necker lost all his influence; he had proposed to the king a conciliatory plan, which might have succeeded before the struggle attained this degree of animosity, but could do so no longer. He had advised another royal sitting, in which the vote by poll in matters of taxation was to be granted, and the vote by order to remain in matters of private interest and privilege. This measure, which was unfavorable to the commons, since it tended to maintain abuses by investing the nobility and clergy with the right of opposing their abolition, would have been followed by the establishment of two chambers for the next states-general. Necker was fond of half-measures, and wished to effect, by successive concessions, a political change which should have been accomplished at once. The moment was arrived to grant the nation all its rights, or to leave it to take them. His project of a royal sitting, already insufficient, was changed into a stroke of state policy by the new council. The latter thought that the injunctions of the throne would intimidate the assembly, and that France would be satisfied with promises of reform. It seemed to be ignorant that the worst risk royalty can be exposed to is that of disobedience.

Strokes of state policy generally come unexpectedly, and surprise those they are intended to influence. It was not so with this; its preparations tended to prevent success. It was feared that the majority of the clergy would recognize the assembly by uniting with it; and to prevent so decided a step, instead of hastening the royal sittings, they closed the hall of the states, in order to suspend the assembly until the day of the sittings. The preparations rendered necessary by the presence of the king were the pretext for this

unskillful and improper measure. At that time Bailly presided over the assembly. This virtuous citizen had obtained, without seeking them, all the honors of dawning liberty. He was the first president of the assembly, as he had been the first deputy of Paris, and was to become its first mayor. Beloved by his own party, respected by his adversaries, he combined with the mildest and most enlightened virtues the most courageous sense of duty. Apprised on the night before June 20, by the keeper of the seals, of the suspension of the sittings, he remained faithful to the wishes of the assembly and did not fear disobeying the court. At an appointed hour on the following day he repaired to the hall of the states, and finding an armed force in possession, he protested against this act of despotism. In the meantime the deputies arrived, dissatisfaction increased, all seemed disposed to brave the perils of a sitting. The most indignant proposed going to Marly, and holding the assembly under the windows of the king; one named the tennis court;⁴ this proposition was well received, and the deputies repaired thither in procession. Bailly was at their head; the people followed them with enthusiasm; even soldiers volunteered to escort them, and there, in a bare hall, the deputies of the commons standing with upraised hands, and hearts full of their sacred mission, swore, with only one exception, not to separate until they had given France a constitution.

This solemn oath, taken on June 20, in the presence of the nation, was followed on the 22d by an important triumph. The assembly, still deprived of their usual place of meeting, unable to make use of the tennis court, the princes having engaged it purposely that it might be refused them, met in the church of Saint Louis. In this sitting the majority of the clergy joined them in the midst of patriotic transports. Thus the measures taken to intimidate the assembly increased its courage and accelerated the union they were intended to prevent. By these two failures the court prefaced the famous sitting of June 23.

At length it took place. A numerous guard surrounded the hall of the states-general, the door of which was opened to the deputies, but closed to the public. The king came surrounded with the pomp of power; he was received, contrary to the usual custom, in profound silence. His speech completed the measure of discontent

⁴ The tennis court was not an open piece of ground, but a covered building, not far from the palace of Versailles. It stands to-day, as a *monument historique*, and is used as a museum of the revolution.

by the tone of authority with which he dictated measures rejected by public opinion and by the assembly. The king complained of a want of union, excited by the court itself; he censured the conduct of the assembly, regarding it only as the order of the third estate; he annulled its decrees, enjoined the continuance of the orders, imposed reforms, and determined their limits; enjoined the states-general to adopt them, and threatened to dissolve them and to provide alone for the welfare of the kingdom if he met with more opposition on their part. After this scene of authority, so ill-suited to the occasion, and at variance with his heart, Louis XVI. withdrew, having commanded the deputies to disperse. The clergy and nobility obeyed. The deputies of the people, motionless, silent, and indignant, remained seated. They continued in that attitude some time, when Mirabeau, suddenly breaking silence, said: "Gentlemen, I admit that what you have just heard might be for the welfare of the country, were it not that the presents of despotism are always dangerous. What is this insulting dictatorship? The pomp of arms, the violation of the national temple, are resorted to—to command you to be happy! Who gives this command? Your mandatary. Who makes these imperious laws for you? Your mandatary; he who should rather receive them from you, gentlemen—from us, who are invested with a political and inviolable priesthood; from us, in a word, to whom alone twenty-five millions of men are looking for certain happiness, because it is to be consented to, and given and received by all. But the liberty of your discussions is enchained; a military force surrounds the assembly! Where are the enemies of the nation? Is Catiline at our gates? I demand, investing yourselves with your dignity, with your legislative power, you inclose yourselves within the religion of your oath. It does not permit you to separate till you have formed a constitution."


The grand master of the ceremonies, finding the assembly did not break up, came and reminded them of the king's order.

"Go and tell your master," cried Mirabeau, "that we are here at the command of the people, and nothing but the bayonet shall drive us hence."⁵

"You are to-day," added Sieyès calmly, "what you were yesterday. Let us deliberate."

The assembly, full of resolution and dignity, began the debate

⁵ There are various versions of this famous utterance by Mirabeau. Some authorities deny the speech *in toto*.



CAMILLE DESMOULINS IN THE GARDEN OF THE PALAIS ROYAL,
JULY 12, 1789

Painting by F. J. Barrias

accordingly. On the motion of Camus, it was determined to persist in the decrees already made; and upon that of Mirabeau the inviolability of the members of the assembly was decreed.

On that day the royal authority was lost. The initiative in law, and moral power passed from the monarch to the assembly. Those who by their counsels had provoked this resistance did not dare to punish it. Necker, whose dismissal had been decided on that morning, was in the evening entreated by the queen and Louis XVI. to remain in office. This minister had disapproved of the royal sitting, and by refusing to be present at it he again won the confidence of the assembly, which he had lost through his hesitation. The season of disgrace was for him the season of popularity. By this refusal he became the ally of the assembly, which determined to support him. Every crisis requires a leader, whose name becomes the standard of his party; while the assembly contended with the court that leader was Necker.

At the first sitting that part of the clergy which had united with the assembly in the church of Saint Louis again sat with it; a few days after forty-seven members of the nobility, among whom was the Duke of Orleans, joined them; and the court was itself compelled to invite the nobility, and a minority of the clergy, to discontinue a dissent that would henceforth be useless. On June 27 the deliberation became general. The orders ceased to exist legally, and soon disappeared. The distinct seats they had hitherto occupied in the common hall soon became confounded; the futile pre-eminences of rank vanished before national authority.⁶

The court, after having vainly endeavored to prevent the formation of the assembly, could now only unite with it to direct its operations. With prudence and candor it might still have repaired its errors and caused its attacks to be forgotten. At certain moments the initiative may be taken in making sacrifices; at others, all that can be done is to make a merit of accepting them. At the opening of the states-general the king might himself have made the constitution, now he was obliged to receive it from the assembly; had he submitted to that position he would infallibly have improved it.

⁶"The nobles have this day, agreeably to a request of the king, joined the other two orders. So that at length the great question is determined and the votes will be *par tête* (by poll). It remains for them only to form a constitution, and as the king is extremely timid, he will, of course, surrender at discretion. The existence of the monarchy, therefore, depends on the moderation of the assembly."—"Diary and Letters" of Gouverneur Morris, vol. I. p. 106.

But the advisers of Louis XVI., when they recovered from the first surprise of defeat, resolved to have recourse to the use of the bayonet, after they had failed in that of authority. They led the king to suppose that the contempt of his orders, the safety of his throne, the maintenance of the laws of the kingdom, and even the well-being of his people depended on his reducing the assembly to submission; that the latter, sitting at Versailles, close to Paris, two cities decidedly in its favor, ought to be subdued by force and removed to some other place, or dissolved; that it was urgent that this resolution should be adopted in order to stop the progress of the assembly, and that in order to execute it, it was necessary speedily to call together troops who might intimidate the assembly and maintain order at Paris and Versailles.

While these plots were hatching, the deputies of the nation began their legislative labors, and prepared the anxiously expected constitution, which they considered they ought no longer to delay. Addresses poured in from Paris and the principal towns of the kingdom, congratulating them on their wisdom, and encouraging them to continue their task of regenerating France. The troops, meantime, arrived in great numbers.⁷ Versailles assumed the aspect of a camp; the hall of the states was surrounded by guards, and the citizens refused admission. Paris was also encompassed by various bodies of the army, ready to besiege or blockade it, as the occasion might require. These vast military preparations, trains of artillery arriving from the frontiers, and the presence of foreign regiments, whose obedience was unlimited, announced sinister projects. The populace were restless and agitated; and the assembly desired to enlighten the throne with respect to its projects, and solicit the dismissal of the troops. At Mirabeau's suggestion, it presented on July 9 a firm but respectful address to the king, which proved useless. Louis XVI. declared that he alone had to judge the necessity of assembling or dismissing troops, and assured them that those assembled formed only a precautionary army to prevent disturbances and protect the assembly. He moreover offered the assembly to remove it to Noyon or Soissons, that is to say, to place it between two armies and deprive it of the support of the people.

⁷ There were eight foreign regiments. The plan was to reduce Paris to famine and to take two hundred members of the national assembly prisoners. See "Diary and Letters" of Gouverneur Morris, vol. I. p. 128.

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Paris was in the greatest excitement; this vast city was unanimous in its devotion to the assembly. The perils that threatened the representatives of the nation, and itself, and the scarcity of food disposed it to insurrection. Capitalists, from interest and the fear of bankruptcy; men of enlightenment and all the middle classes, from patriotism; the people, impelled by want, ascribing their sufferings to the privileged classes and the court, desirous of agitation and change, all had warmly espoused the cause of the revolution. It is difficult to conceive the movement which disturbed the capital of France. It was arising from the repose and silence of servitude; it was, as it were, astonished at the novelty of its situation, and intoxicated with liberty and enthusiasm. The press excited the public mind, the newspapers published the debates of the assembly, and enabled the public to be present, so to speak, at its deliberations, and the questions mooted in its bosom were discussed in the open air, in the public squares.⁸ It was at the Palais Royal,⁹ more especially, that the assembly of the capital was held. The garden was always filled by a crowd that seemed permanent, though continually renewed. A table answered the purpose of the tribune, the first citizen at hand became the orator; there men expatiated on the dangers that threatened the country, and excited each other to resistance. Already, on a motion made at the Palais Royal, the prisons of the Abbaye had been broken open, and some grenadiers of the French guards, who had been imprisoned for refusing to fire on the people, released in triumph. This outbreak was attended by no consequences; a deputation had already solicited, in behalf of the delivered prisoners, the interest of the assembly, who had recommended them to the clemency of the king. They had returned to prison, and had received pardon. But this regiment, one of the most complete and bravest, had become favorable to the popular cause.

⁸ On the state of Paris at this time see Taine, "French Revolution," vol. I. ch. ii.; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 128-193.

⁹ This palace is still standing and is at present occupied by the council of state. It was built by Cardinal Richelieu. After his death it became the residence of Anne of Austria, the widow of Louis XIII. (died 1643); Louis XIV. gave it to his brother, Philip, Duke of Orleans, from which time it was known as the Palais Royal. It was his son, a second Philip, regent of France during the minority of Louis XV., who built the rows of shops around the garden, which he rented for commercial purposes. These still exist in their original form. As Philip of Orleans was notoriously hostile to the king, the cafés on the ground floor, facing the garden, early became a rendezvous of the revolutionists.

Such was the disposition of Paris when the court, having established troops at Versailles, Sèvres, the Champ de Mars, and Saint Denis, thought itself able to execute its project. It commenced, on July 11, by the banishment of Necker and the complete reconstruction of the ministry. The marshal de Broglie, La Galissonnière, the Duke de la Vauguyon, the Baron de Breteuil, and the intendant Foulon were appointed to replace Puysegur, Montmorin, La Luzerne, Saint-Priest, and Necker. The latter received, while at dinner on July 11, a note from the king enjoining him to leave the country immediately. He finished dining very calmly, without communicating the purport of the order he had received, and then got into his carriage with Madame Necker, as if intending to drive to Saint Omer, and took the road to Brussels.

On the following day, Sunday, July 12, about four in the afternoon, Necker's disgrace and departure became known at Paris. This measure was regarded as the execution of the plot the preparations for which had so long been observed. In a short time the city was in the greatest confusion; crowds gathered together on every side; more than ten thousand persons flocked to the Palais Royal, all affected by this news, ready for anything, but not knowing what measure to adopt. Camille Desmoulins, a young man, more daring than the rest, one of the usual orators of the crowd, mounted on a table, pistol in hand, exclaiming: "Citizens, there is no time to lose; the dismissal of Necker is the knell of a Saint Bartholomew for patriots! This very night all the Swiss and German battalions will leave the Champ de Mars to massacre us all; one resource is left: to take arms!" These words were received with violent acclamations. He proposed that cockades should be worn for mutual recognition and protection. "Shall they be green," he cried, "the color of hope; or red, the color of the free order of Cincinnatus?" "Green! green!" shouted the multitude. The speaker descended from the table and fastened the sprig of a tree in his hat. Everyone imitated him. The chestnut-trees of the palace were almost stripped of their leaves, and the crowd went in tumult to the house of the sculptor Curtius.

They take busts of Necker and the Duke of Orleans, a report having also gone abroad that the latter would be exiled, and covering them with crape, carry them in triumph. This procession passes through the streets Saint Martin, Saint Denis, and Saint Honoré, augmenting at every step. The crowd obliges all they

meet to take off their hats. Meeting the horse-patrol, they take them as their escort. The procession advances in this way to the Place Vendôme, and there they carry the two busts twice round the statue of Louis XIV. A detachment of the Royal-allemand comes up and attempts to disperse the mob, but are put to flight by a shower of stones; and the multitude, continuing its course, reaches the Place Louis XV. Here they are assailed by the dragoons of the Prince de Lambesc; after resisting a few moments they are thrown into confusion; the bearer of one of the busts and a soldier of one of the French guards are killed. The mob disperses, part toward the quays, part fall back on the boulevards, the rest hurry to the Tuileries by the Pont Tournant. The Prince de Lambesc, at the head of his horsemen, with drawn saber pursues them into the gardens, and charges an unarmed multitude who were peaceably promenading, and had nothing to do with the procession. In this attack an old man is wounded by a saber cut; the mob defend themselves with the seats, and rush to the terraces; indignation becomes general; the cry *To arms!* soon resounds on every side, at the Palais Royal and the Tuileries, in the city and in the faubourgs.

We have already said that the regiment of the French guard was favorably disposed toward the people: it had accordingly been ordered to keep in barracks. The Prince de Lambesc, fearing that it might nevertheless take an active part, ordered sixty dragoons to station themselves before its dépôt, situated in the Chaussée-d'Antin. The soldiers of the guards, already dissatisfied at being kept as prisoners, were greatly provoked at the sight of these strangers, with whom they had had a skirmish a few days before. They wished to fly to arms, and their officers, using alternately threats and entreaties, had much difficulty in restraining them. But they would hear no more, when some of their men brought them intelligence of the attack at the Tuileries, and the death of one of their comrades: they seized their arms, broke open the gates, and drew up in battle array at the entrance of the barracks, and cried out: "*Qui vive?*"—"Royal-allemand."—"Are you for the third estate?" "We are for those who command us." Then the French guards fired on them, killed two of their men, wounded three, and put the rest to flight. They then advanced at quick time and with fixed bayonets to the Place Louis XV., and took their stand between the Tuileries and the Champs Elysées, the people and the

troops, and kept that post during the night. The soldiers of the Champ de Mars were immediately ordered to advance. When they reached the Champs Elysées the French guards received them with discharges of musketry. They wished to make them fight, but they refused: the Petits-Suisses were the first to give this example, which the other regiments followed. The officers, in despair, ordered a retreat; the troops retired as far as the Grille de Chaillot, whence they soon withdrew into the Champ de Mars. The defection of the French guard, and the manifest refusal even of the foreign troops to march on the capital, caused the failure of the projects of the court.

During the evening the people had repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, and requested that the tocsin might be sounded, the districts assembled, and the citizens armed. Some electors assembled at the Hôtel de Ville and took the authority into their own hands. They rendered great service to their fellow-citizens and the cause of liberty by their courage, prudence, and activity during these days of insurrection; but in the first confusion of the rising it was with difficulty they succeeded in making themselves heard. The tumult was at its height; each answered only the dictates of his own passions. Side by side with well-disposed citizens were men of suspicious character, who only sought in insurrection opportunities for pillage and disorder. Bands of laborers employed by the government in the public works, for the most part without home or substance, burned the barriers, infested the streets, plundered houses, and obtained the name of brigands. The night of the 12th and 13th was spent in tumult and alarm.

The departure of Necker, which threw the capital into this state of excitement, had no less effect at Versailles and in the assembly. It caused the same astonishment and discontent. The deputies repaired early in the morning to the hall of the states; they were gloomy, but their silence arose from indignation rather than dejection. "At the opening of the session," said a deputy, "several addresses of adherence to the decrees were listened to in mournful silence by the assembly, more attentive to their own thoughts than to the addresses read." Mounier began; he exclaimed against the dismissal of ministers beloved by the nation, and the choice of their successors. He proposed an address to the king demanding their recall, showing him the dangers attendant on violent measures, the misfortunes that would follow the em-

ployment of troops, and telling him that the assembly solemnly opposed itself to an infamous national bankruptcy. At these words, the feelings of the assembly, hitherto restrained, broke out in clapping of hands and cries of approbation. Lally-Tollendal, a friend of Necker, then came forward with a sorrowful air, and delivered a long and eloquent eulogium on the banished minister. He was listened to with the greatest interest; his grief responded to that of the public; the cause of Necker was now that of the country. The nobility itself sided with the members of the third estate, either considering the danger common, or dreading to incur the same blame as the court if it did not disapprove its conduct, or perhaps it obeyed the general impulse.

A noble deputy, the Count de Virieu, set the example, and said: "Assembled for the constitution, let us make the constitution; let us tighten our mutual bonds; let us renew, confirm, and consecrate the glorious decrees of June 17; let us join in the celebrated resolution made on the 20th of the same month. Let us all, yes, all, all the united orders, swear to be faithful to those illustrious decrees which now can alone save the kingdom." "The constitution shall be made, or we will cease to be," added the Duke de la Rochefoucauld. But this unanimity became still more confirmed when the rising of Paris, the excesses which ensued, the burning of the barriers, the assembling of the electors at the Hôtel de Ville, the confusion of the capital, and the fact that citizens were ready to be attacked by the soldiers or to slaughter each other, became known to the assembly. Then one cry resounded through the hall: "Let the recollection of our momentary divisions be effaced! Let us unite our efforts for the salvation of the country!" A deputation was immediately sent to the king, composed of eighty members, among whom were all the deputies of Paris. The Archbishop of Vienne, president of the assembly, was at its head. It was to represent to the king the dangers that threatened the capital, the necessity of sending away the troops, and intrusting the care of the city to a militia of citizens; and if it obtained these demands from the king, a deputation was to be sent to Paris with the consolatory intelligence. But the members soon returned with an unsatisfactory answer.

The assembly now saw that it must depend on itself, and that the projects of the court were irrevocably fixed. Far from being discouraged, it only became more firm, and immediately voted

unanimously a decree proclaiming the responsibility of the present ministers of the king, and of all his counselors, of whatever rank they might be; it further passed a vote of regret for Necker and the other disgraced ministers; it resolved that it would not cease to insist upon the dismissal of the troops and the establishment of a militia of citizens; it placed the public debt under the safeguard of French honor, and adhered to all its previous decrees. After these measures, it adopted a last one, not less necessary; apprehending that the hall of the states might, during the night, be occupied by a military force for the purpose of dispersing the assembly, it resolved to sit permanently till further orders. It decided that a portion of the members should sit during the night, and another relieve them early in the morning. To spare the venerable Archbishop of Vienne the fatigue of a permanent presidency, a vice-president was appointed to supply his place on these extraordinary occasions. Lafayette was elected to preside over the night sitting. It passed off without a debate, the deputies remaining in their seats, observing silence, but apparently calm and serene. It was by these measures, this expression of public regret, by these decrees, this unanimous enthusiasm, this sustained good sense, this inflexible conduct, that the assembly rose gradually to a level with its dangers and its mission.

On the 13th the insurrection took at Paris a more regular character. Early in the morning the populace flocked to the Hôtel de Ville; the tocsin was sounded there and in all the churches; and drums were beat in the streets to call the citizens together. The public places soon became thronged. Troops were formed under the titles of volunteers of the Palais Royal, volunteers of the Tuileries, of the Basoche, and of the Arquebuse. The districts¹⁰ assembled, and each of them voted two hundred men for its defense. Arms alone were wanting, and these were eagerly sought wherever there was any hope of finding them. All that could be found at the gunsmiths' and sword-cutlers' were taken, receipts being sent to the owners. They applied for arms at the Hôtel de Ville. The electors, who were still assembled, replied in vain that they had none; they insisted on having them. The electors then sent the head of the city, Flesselles, the provost of the merchants,¹¹

¹⁰ Mignet has anticipated one of the features of the reorganization of Paris after the fall of the Bastille. Old Paris was divided into faubourgs.

¹¹ The provost of the merchants was the mayor of Paris; he was assisted

who alone knew the military state of the capital, and whose popular authority promised to be of great assistance in this difficult conjuncture. He was received with loud applause by the multitude. "My friends," said he, "I am your father; you shall be satisfied." A permanent committee was formed at the Hôtel de Ville, to take measures for the general safety.

About the same time it was announced that the Maison des Lazaristes,¹² which contained a large quantity of grain, had been despoiled; that the Garde-Meuble¹³ had been forced open to obtain old arms, and that the gunsmiths' shops had been plundered. The greatest excesses were apprehended from the crowd; it was let loose, and it seemed difficult to master its fury. But this was a moment of enthusiasm and disinterestedness. The mob itself disarmed suspected characters; not a single house was plundered, and the carriages and vehicles filled with provisions, furniture, and utensils, stopped at the gates of the city, were taken to the Place de Grève, which became a vast dépôt. Here the crowd increased every moment, shouting Arms! It was now about one o'clock. The provost of the merchants then announced the immediate arrival of twelve thousand guns from the manufactory of Charleville, which would soon be followed by thirty thousand more.

This appeased the people for some time, and the committee was enabled to pursue quietly its task of organizing a militia of citizens. In less than four hours the plan was drawn up, discussed, adopted, printed, and proclaimed. It was resolved that the Parisian guard should, till further orders, be increased to forty-eight thousand men. All citizens were invited to enroll their names; every district had its battalion; every battalion its leaders; the command of this army of citizens was offered to the Duke

in the government by four échevins (aldermen) and twenty-four conseillers (common councilmen), elected by the guilds and confirmed by the king. The origin of this form of government is to be found in the fact that all municipal government in the Middle Ages developed out of the guild system, sometimes a merchant guild, as at Paris, sometimes a craft guild, as was frequently the case in Italian cities. On Paris see Monin, "*État de Paris en 1789*," p. 497 ff.

¹² Founded by the Lazarists in the seventeenth century as a leper hospital, but it was also used as a prison. The report turned out to be untrue. The mob stole nothing at the hospital. Cf. a letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, July 19, 1789, in his "Works," vol. II. p. 309.

¹³ The crown jewels were kept here. They disappeared during the massacres of September, 1792.

d'Aumont, who required twenty-four hours to decide. In the meantime the Marquis de la Salle was appointed second in command. The green cockade was then exchanged for a blue and red one, which were the colors of the city. All this was the work of a few hours. The districts gave their assent to the measures adopted by the permanent committee. The clerks of the Châtelet, those of the Palais, medical students, soldiers of the watch, and what was of still greater value, the French guards, offered their services to the assembly. Patrols began to be formed and to perambulate the streets.

The people waited with impatience the realization of the promise of the provost of the merchants, but no guns arrived; evening approached, and they feared during the night another attack from the troops. They thought they were betrayed when they heard of an attempt to convey secretly from Paris five thousand weight of powder, which had been intercepted by the people at the barriers. But soon after some cases arrived, labeled artillery. At this sight, the commotion subsided; the cases were escorted to the Hôtel de Ville, it being supposed that they contained the guns expected from Charleville. On opening them they were found to contain old linen and pieces of wood. A cry of treachery arose on every side, mingled with murmurs and threats against the committee and the provost of the merchants. The latter apologized, declaring he had been deceived; and to gain time, or to get rid of the crowd, sent them to the Chartreux, to seek for arms. Finding none there, the mob returned, enraged and mistrustful. The committee then felt satisfied there was no other way of arming Paris, and curing the suspicions of the people, than by forging pikes; and accordingly gave orders that fifty thousand should be made immediately. To avoid the excesses of the preceding night, the town was illuminated, and patrols marched through it in every direction.

The next day the people, who had been unable to obtain arms on the preceding day, came early in the morning to solicit some from the committee, blaming its refusal and failures of the day before. The committee had sent for some in vain; none had arrived from Charleville, none were to be found at the Chartreux, and the arsenal itself was empty.

The mob, no longer satisfied with excuses, and more convinced than ever that they were betrayed, hurried in a mass to the Hôtel

des Invalides,¹⁴ which contained a considerable dépôt of arms. It displayed no fear of the troops established in the Champ de Mars, broke into the Hôtel, in spite of the entreaties of the governor, De Sombreuil, found twenty-eight thousand guns concealed in the cellars, seized them, took all the sabers, swords, and cannon, and carried them off in triumph. The cannon were placed at the entrance of the faubourgs, at the palace of the Tuileries, on the quays and on the bridges, for the defense of the capital against the invasion of troops, which was expected every moment.

Even during the same morning an alarm was given that the regiments stationed at Saint Denis were on the march, and that the cannon of the Bastille were pointed on the Rue Saint Antoine. The committee immediately sent to ascertain the truth, appointed bands of citizens to defend that side of the town, and sent a deputation to the governor of the Bastille, soliciting him to withdraw his cannon and engage in no act of hostility.¹⁵ This alarm, together with the dread which that fortress inspired, the hatred felt for the abuses it shielded, the importance of possessing so prominent a point, and of not leaving it in the power of the enemy in a moment of insurrection, drew the attention of the populace in that direction. From nine in the morning till two the only rallying word throughout Paris was "*à la Bastille! à la Bastille.*" The citizens hastened thither in bands from all quarters, armed with guns, pikes, and sabers.¹⁶ The crowd which already surrounded it was considerable; the sentinels of the fortress were at their posts, and the drawbridges raised as in war.

A deputy of the district of Saint Louis de la Culture, named Thuriot de la Rosière, then requested a parley with Delaunay, the governor. When admitted to his presence he summoned him to change the direction of the cannon. The governor replied that the

¹⁴ The Hôtel des Invalides was a soldiers' hospital, founded by Louis XIV. in 1670, on the left bank of the Seine near the Champ de Mars.

¹⁵ This deputation came to see Delaunay, the commandant, at eight o'clock in the morning. Delaunay received them courteously and invited them to breakfast. He withdrew the cannon from the embrasures.

¹⁶ This is an exaggeration. Dr. Rigby, an Englishman, in Paris at this time, records in his "Journal": "We had gone to see the gardens of Monceaux in the afternoon, and on our return at 5 P. M. met a regiment of soldiers . . . learned that the Bastille had been attacked . . . ran down the Rue St. Honoré, at the (east) end of which we met the victors of the Bastille," p. 59. As a matter of fact, there was so much din of arms all over the city, due to riotous bands or citizens at target practice, that Paris as a whole probably was not aware of the attack upon the Bastille until it was over.

cannon had always been placed on the towers, and it was not in his power to remove them; yet, at the same time, having heard of the alarm prevalent among the Parisians, he had had them withdrawn a few paces, and taken out of the port-holes. With some difficulty Thuriot obtained permission to enter the fortress further, and examine if its condition was really as satisfactory for the town as the governor represented it to be. As he advanced he observed three pieces of cannon pointed on the avenues leading to the open space before the fortress, and ready to sweep those who might attempt to attack it. About forty Swiss and eighty Invalides were under arms. Thuriot urged them, as well as the staff of the place, in the name of honor and of their country, not to act as the enemies of the people. Both officers and soldiers swore they would not make use of their arms unless attacked. Thuriot then ascended the towers, and perceived a crowd gathering in all directions, and the inhabitants of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, who were rising in a mass. The multitude without, not seeing him return, were already demanding him with great clamor. To satisfy the people he appeared on the parapet of the fortress, and was received with loud applause from the gardens of the arsenal. He then rejoined his party, and having informed them of the result of his mission, proceeded to the committee.

But the impatient crowd now clamored for the surrender of the Bastile. From time to time the cry arose, "The Bastile! we will have the Bastile!" At length, two men, more determined than the rest, darting from the crowd, sprang on a guard-house and struck at the chains of the drawbridge with heavy hatchets. The soldiers shouted to them to retire, and threatened to fire; but they continued to strike, succeeded in breaking the chains and lowering the bridge, and then rushed over it, followed by the crowd. In this way they advanced to cut the chains of the second bridge. The garrison now dispersed them with a discharge of musketry. They returned, however, to the attack, and for several hours their efforts were confined to the second bridge, the approach to which was defended by a ceaseless fire from the fortress. The mob, infuriated by this obstinate resistance, tried to break in the gates with hatchets, and to set fire to the guard-house. A murderous discharge of grape-shot proceeded from the garrison, and many of the besiegers were killed and wounded. They only became the more determined, and, seconded by the daring and determination

of the two brave men, Elie and Hulin, who were at their head, they continued the attack with fury.

The committee of the Hôtel de Ville were in a state of great anxiety. The siege of the Bastille seemed to them a very rash enterprise. They ever and anon received intelligence of the disasters that had taken place before the fortress. They wavered between fear of the troops should they prove victorious, and that of the multitude who clamored for ammunition to continue the siege. As they could not give what they did not possess, the mob cried treachery. Two deputations had been sent by the committee for the purpose of discontinuing hostilities, and inviting the governor to confide the keeping of the place to the citizens; but in the midst of the tumult, the cries, and the firing they could not make themselves heard. A third was sent, carrying a drum and banner, that it might be more easily distinguished, but it experienced no better fortune: neither side would listen to anything. The assembly at the Hôtel de Ville, notwithstanding its efforts and activity, still incurred the suspicions of the populace. The provost of the merchants, especially, excited the greatest mistrust. "He has already deceived us several times during the day," said one. "He talks," said another, "of opening a trench; he only wants to gain time, to make us lose ours." Then an old man cried: "Comrades, why do you listen to traitors? Forward, follow me! In less than two hours the Bastille will be taken!"

The siege had lasted more than four hours when the French guards arrived with cannon. Their arrival changed the appearance of the combat. The garrison itself begged the governor to yield. The unfortunate Delaunay, dreading the fate that awaited him, wished to blow up the fortress, and bury himself under its ruins and those of the faubourg. He went in despair toward the powder magazine with a lighted match in his hand. The garrison stopped him, raised a white standard on the platform, and reversed the guns, in token of peace. But the assailants still continued to fight and advance, shouting "Lower the bridges!" Through the battlements a Swiss officer proposed to capitulate, with permission to retire from the building with the honors of war. "No! no!" clamored the crowd. The same officer proposed to lay down arms, on the promise that their lives should be spared. "Lower the bridge," rejoined the foremost of the assailants, "you shall not be injured." The gates were opened and the bridge lowered, on this

assurance, and the crowd rushed into the Bastile. Those who led the multitude wished to save from its vengeance the governor, Swiss soldiers, and Invalides; but cries of "Give them up! give them up! they fired on their fellow-citizens, they deserve to be hanged!" rose on every side. The governor, a few Swiss soldiers and Invalides were torn from the protection of those who sought to defend them, and put to death by the implacable crowd.¹⁷

The permanent committee knew nothing of the issue of the combat. The hall of the sittings was invaded by a furious multitude, who threatened the provost of the merchants and electors. Flesselles began to be alarmed at his position; he was pale and agitated. The object of the most violent reproaches and threats, they obliged him to go from the hall of the committee to the hall of the general assembly, where a great crowd of citizens was assembled. "Let him come; let him follow us," resounded from all sides. "This is too much!" rejoined Flesselles. "Let us go, since they request it; let us go where I am expected." They had scarcely reached the great hall, when the attention of the multitude was drawn off by shouts on the Place de Grève. They heard the cries of "Victory! victory! liberty!" It was the arrival of the conquerors of the Bastile which this announced. They themselves soon entered the hall with the most noisy and the most fearful pomp. The persons who had most distinguished themselves were carried in triumph, crowned with laurels. They were escorted by

¹⁷ Thuriot, their leader, was a lawyer who became a member both of the legislative assembly and of the convention. He survived the revolution and became a minor official under the empire. He came with no mandate, as was the case with the commission which came earlier to Delaunay, and pushing his way in began to make a political harangue to the soldiers. While he busied himself within, the crowd had multiplied on the outside. The garrison was composed of ninety-five Invalides, and thirty-two Swiss, with fifteen cannon, only one of which, that commanding the drawbridge, was fired. Moreover, Delaunay kept his word. The mob had broken the chains which let the outer drawbridge fall, and were in the second court, themselves directing a heavy fire upon the garrison, before Delaunay gave the word. The "murderous discharge of grape-shot" was fired clearly in the line of duty. See Funck-Brentano, "*Légendes et archives de la Bastille*" (1898), pp. 250-255. This author, who is custodian of the archives at the arsenal, has stripped off the myth and legend which has gathered around the history of this famous day.

It cannot truthfully be said that the Bastile was taken; Elie and Hutin did their best to keep their promise and to protect the garrison, if it would surrender. Ninety-six of the mob were killed on this day or died afterward of injuries then received. Delaunay's body was hacked into pieces and carried about the streets.

more than fifteen hundred men, with glaring eyes and disheveled hair, with all kinds of arms, pressing one upon another, and making the flooring yield beneath their feet. One carried the keys and standard of the Bastile; another, its regulations suspended to his bayonet; a third, with horrible barbarity, raised in his bleeding hand the buckle of the governor's stock. With this parade, the procession of the conquerors of the Bastile, followed by an immense crowd that thronged the quays, entered the hall of the Hôtel de Ville to inform the committee of their triumph, and decide the fate of the prisoners who survived. A few wished to leave it to the committee, but others shouted: "No quarter for the prisoners! No quarter for the men who fired on their fellow-citizens!" La Salle, the commandant, the elector Moreau de Saint-Méry, and the brave Elie succeeded in appeasing the multitude, and obtained a general amnesty.

It was now the turn of the unfortunate Flesselles. It is said that a letter found on Delaunay proved the treachery of which he was suspected. "I am amusing the Parisians," he wrote, "with cockades and promises. Hold out till the evening, and you shall be reinforced." The mob hurried to his office. The more moderate demanded that he should be arrested and confined in the Châtelet; but others opposed this, saying that he should be conveyed to the Palais Royal, and there tried. This decision gave general satisfaction. "To the Palais Royal! To the Palais Royal!" resounded from every side. "Well—be it so, gentlemen," replied Flesselles, with composure; "let us go to the Palais Royal." So saying, he descended the steps, passed through the crowd, which opened to make way for him, and which followed without offering him any violence. But at the corner of the Quay Pelletier a stranger rushed forward and killed him with a pistol-shot.¹⁸

After these scenes of war, tumult, dispute, and vengeance, the Parisians, fearing, from some intercepted letters, that an attack would be made during the night, prepared to receive the enemy.¹⁹ The whole population joined in the labor of fortifying the town; they formed barricades, opened intrenchments, unpaved streets, forged pikes, and cast bullets. Women carried stones to the tops of the houses to crush the soldiers as they passed. The national

¹⁸ Flesselles, like Delaunay, had only tried to do his duty and suppress the anarchy.

¹⁹ This was no more than a natural rumor. The "letters" have never come to light.

guard were distributed in posts; Paris seemed changed into an immense foundry and a vast camp, and the whole night was spent under arms, expecting the conflict.

While the insurrection assumed this violent, permanent, and serious character at Paris, what was doing at Versailles? The court was preparing to realize its designs against the capital and assembly. The night of the 14th was fixed upon for their execution. The Baron de Breteuil, who was at the head of the ministry, had promised to restore the royal authority in three days. Marshal de Broglie, commander of the army collected around Paris, had received unlimited powers of all kinds. On the 15th the declaration of June 23 was to be renewed, and the king, after forcing the assembly to adopt it, was to dissolve it. Forty thousand copies of this declaration were in readiness to be circulated throughout the kingdom; and to meet the pressing necessities of the treasury more than a hundred millions of paper money was created. The movement in Paris, so far from thwarting the court, favored its views. To the last moment it looked upon it as a passing tumult that might easily be suppressed; it believed neither in its perseverance nor in its success, and it did not seem possible to it that a town of citizens could resist an army.

The assembly was apprised of these projects. For two days it had sat without interruption, in a state of great anxiety and alarm. It was ignorant of the greater portion of what was passing in Paris. At one time it was announced that the insurrection was general, and that all Paris was marching on Versailles; then that the troops were advancing on the capital. They fancied they heard cannon, and they placed their ears to the ground to assure themselves. On the evening of the 14th it was announced that the king intended to depart during the night, and that the assembly would be left to the mercy of the foreign regiments. This last alarm was not without foundation. A carriage and horses were kept in readiness, and the body-guard remained booted for several days. Besides, at the Orangery, a terrace adjoining the Tuileries, incidents truly alarming took place; the troops were prepared and stimulated for their expedition by distributions of wine and by encouragements. Everything announced that a decisive moment had arrived.

Despite the approaching and increasing danger, the assembly was unshaken, and persisted in its first resolutions. Mirabeau, who had first required the dismissal of the troops, now arranged

another deputation. It was on the point of setting out when the Viscount de Noailles, a deputy, just arrived from Paris, informed the assembly of the progress of the insurrection, the pillage of the Invalides, the arming of the people, and the siege of the Bastille. Wimpfen, another deputy, to this account added that of the personal dangers he had incurred, and assured them that the fury of the populace was increasing with its peril. The assembly proposed the establishment of couriers to bring them intelligence every half hour. Ganiilh and Bancal-des-Issarts, dispatched by the committee at the Hôtel de Ville as a deputation to the assembly, confirmed all they had just heard. They informed them of the measures taken by the electors to secure order and the defense of the capital; the disasters that had happened before the Bastille; the inutility of the deputations sent to the governor, and told them that the fire of the garrison had surrounded the fortress with the slain. A cry of indignation arose in the assembly at this intelligence,²⁰ and a second deputation was instantly dispatched to communicate these distressing tidings to the king. The first returned with an unsatisfactory answer; it was now ten at night. The king, on learning these disastrous events, which seemed to presage others still greater, appeared affected. Struggling against the part he had been induced to adopt, he said to the deputies: "You rend my heart more and more by the dreadful news you bring of the misfortunes of Paris. It is impossible to suppose that the orders given to the troops are the cause of these disasters. You are acquainted with the answer I returned to the first deputation; I have nothing to add to it." This answer consisted of a promise that the troops of the Champ de Mars should be sent away from Paris, and of an order given to general officers to assume the command of the guard of citizens. Such measures were not sufficient to remedy the dangerous situation in which men were placed; and it neither satisfied nor gave confidence to the assembly.

Shortly after this the deputies D'Ormesson and Duport announced to the assembly the taking of the Bastille, and the deaths of Delaunay and Flesselles. It was proposed to send a third deputation to the king, imploring the removal of the troops. "No," said Clermont-Tonnerre, "leave them the night to consult in; kings

²⁰ The feeling of the assembly was not so much indignation "that the fire of the garrison had surrounded the fortress with the slain," as anxiety over the state of spontaneous anarchy which prevailed.

must buy experience as well as other men." In this way the assembly spent the night. On the following morning another deputation was appointed to represent to the king the misfortunes that would follow a longer refusal. When on the point of starting, Mirabeau stopped it. "Tell him," he exclaimed, "that the hordes of strangers who invest us, received yesterday visits, caresses, exhortations, and presents from the princes, princesses, and favorites; tell him that, during the night, these foreign satellites, gorged with gold and wine, predicted in their impious songs the subjection of France, and invoked the destruction of the national assembly; tell him that, in his own palace, courtiers danced to the sound of that barbarous music, and that such was the prelude to the massacre of Saint Bartholomew! Tell him that the Henry whose memory is universe-known, he, whom of his ancestors he said he would make his model, sent provisions into Paris, revolted, when besieging it in person,²¹ while the savage advisers of Louis send away the corn which trade brings into Paris loyal and starving."²²

But at that moment the king entered the assembly. The Duke de Liancourt, taking advantage of the access his quality of master of the robes gave him, had informed the king, during the night, of the desertion of the French guard, and of the attack and taking of the Bastile. At this news, of which his councilors had kept him in ignorance, the monarch exclaimed, with surprise: "This is a revolt!" "No, sire! it is a revolution." This excellent citizen had represented to him the danger to which the projects of the court exposed him; the fears and exasperation of the people, the disaffection of the troops, and he determined upon presenting himself before the assembly to satisfy them as to his intentions. The news at first excited transports of joy. Mirabeau represented to his colleagues that it was not fit to indulge in premature applause. "Let us wait," said he, "till his majesty makes known the good intentions we are led to expect from him. The blood of our brethren flows in Paris. Let a sad respect be the first reception given to the king by the representatives of an unfortunate people: the silence of the people is the lesson of kings."

²¹ Henry IV., during the siege of Paris in 1593.

²² There are various versions of this speech. Mirabeau was a statesman, but he was not above being a "practical" politician. He had a house in Paris in the district of the Oratoire, and controlled the suffrages of the quarter. Bailly, in his "Memoirs," perhaps unjustly, criticises his affiliation with the more radical element.

The assembly resumed the somber demeanor which had never left it during the three preceding days. The king entered without guards, and attended only by his brothers. He was received at first in profound silence; but when he told them he was one with the nation, and that, relying on the love and fidelity of his subjects, he had ordered the troops to leave Paris and Versailles; when he uttered the affecting words—" *Eh bien, c'est moi qui me fie à vous,*" " Ah, well, I entrust myself to you," general applause ensued. The assembly arose spontaneously and conducted him back to the château.

This intelligence diffused gladness in Versailles and Paris, where the reassured people passed, by sudden transition, from animosity to gratitude. Louis XVI. thus restored to himself, felt the importance of appeasing the capital in person, of regaining the affection of the people, and of thus conciliating the popular power. He announced to the assembly that he would recall Necker, and repair to Paris the following day. The assembly had already nominated a deputation composed of eighty persons to precede the king to the capital. It was received with enthusiasm. Bailly and Lafayette, who formed part of it, were appointed, the former mayor of Paris, the latter commander-in-chief of the citizen guard.

Bailly owed this recompense to his long and difficult presidency of the assembly, and Lafayette to his glorious and patriotic conduct. A friend of Washington, and one of the principal authors of American independence, he had, on his return to his country, first pronounced the name of the states-general, had joined the assembly with the minority of the nobility, and had since proved himself one of the most zealous partisans of the revolution. For the events of the 14th hastened to a conclusion a plan suggested on June 25, and adopted the day before the capture of the Bastille. Paris was divided into sixty districts, which were later reduced to forty-eight and called "sections," each district furnishing a battalion composed of seven companies. Lafayette was permitted to name his aides-de-camp, but the other officers were elected. A small property qualification was required until April, 1791, designed to prevent the enlistment of volunteers from the mob element.²³

²³ See a valuable note in Fletcher's edition of Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 215-216. The sixty districts served as election wards for the civil administration.

On the 27th the new magistrates went to receive the king at the head of the municipality and the Parisian guard. "Sire," said Bailly, "I bring your majesty the keys of your good town of Paris; they are the same which were presented to Henry IV.; he had regained his people; now the people have regained their king." From the Place Louis XV. to the Hôtel de Ville the king passed through a double line of the national guard, placed in ranks three or four deep, and armed with guns, pikes, lances, scythes, and staves. Their countenances were still gloomy; and no cry was heard but the oft-repeated shout of "*Vive la Nation!*" But when Louis XVI. had left his carriage and received from Bailly's hands the bi-colored cockade, and, surrounded by the crowd without guards, had confidently entered the Hôtel de Ville, cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" burst forth on every side. The reconciliation was complete; Louis XVI. received the strongest marks of affection.²⁴ After approving the choice of the people with respect to the new magistrates, he returned to Versailles, where some anxiety was entertained as to the success of his journey, on account of the preceding troubles. The national assembly met him in the Avenue de Paris; it accompanied him as far as the château, where the queen and her children ran to his arms.

The ministers opposed to the revolution, and all the authors of the unsuccessful projects, retired from court. The Count d'Artois and his two sons, the Prince de Condé, the Prince de Conti, and the Polignac family, accompanied by a numerous train, left France. They settled at Turin, where the Count d'Artois and the Prince de Condé were soon joined by Calonne, who became their agent.²⁵ Thus began the first emigration. The emigrant princes were not long in exciting civil war in the kingdom, and forming an European coalition against France.

Necker returned in triumph. This was the finest moment of his life; few men have had such. The minister of the nation, disgraced for it, and recalled for it, he was welcomed along the road from Bâle to Paris, with every expression of public gratitude and

²⁴ Dr. Rigby says "he received neither applause nor insult from the populace; the only person who was hissed was the Archbishop of Paris." "Journal," p. 88. Louis XVI. was welcomed with Masonic honors at the Hôtel de Ville. He had become a member of the order in 1776.

²⁵ The Count d'Artois had married a princess of Savoy, which explains his residence at Turin; he left France on July 18. There is an important history of the emigrés by Forneron.

joy. His entry into Paris was a day of festivity. But the day that raised his popularity to its height put a term to it. The multitude, still enraged against all who had participated in the project of July 14, had put to death, with relentless cruelty, Foulon, the intended minister, and his nephew, Berthier.²⁶ Indignant at these executions, fearing that others might fall victims, and especially desirous of saving the Baron de Brezenval, commander of the army of Paris, under Marshal de Broglie, and detained prisoner, Necker demanded a general amnesty and obtained it from the assembly of electors. This step was very imprudent, in a moment of enthusiasm and mistrust. Necker did not know the people; he was not aware how easily they suspect their chiefs and destroy their idols. They thought he wished to protect their enemies from the punishment they had incurred; the districts assembled, the legality of an amnesty pronounced by an unauthorized assembly was violently attacked, and the electors themselves revoked it. No doubt it was advisable to calm the rage of the people, and recommend them to be merciful; but instead of demanding the liberation of the accused, the application should have been for a tribunal which would have removed them from the murderous jurisdiction of the multitude. In certain cases that which appears most humane is not really so. Necker, without gaining anything, excited the people against himself, and the districts against the electors; from that time he began to contend against the revolution, of which, because he had been for a moment its hero, he hoped to become the master. But an individual is of slight importance during a revolution which raises the masses; that vast movement either drags him on with it or tramples him under foot; he must either precede or succumb. At no time is the subordination of men to circumstances more clearly manifested; revolutions employ many leaders, and when they submit, it is to one alone.

The consequences of July 14 were immense. The movement of Paris communicated itself to the provinces; the country population, imitating that of the capital, organized itself in all directions into municipalities for purposes of self-government, and into bodies

²⁶ Foulon had been intendant-général of the army in the Seven Years' War. He was the victim of popular fury, because he was reported to have said that grass was good enough for the hungry masses.

Berthier was a son-in-law of Foulon, and intendant of Paris at this time. He had done good service in relieving the distress of Paris in the hard winter of 1788.

of national guards for self-defense. Authority and force became wholly displaced; royalty had lost them by its defeat, the nation had acquired them. The new magistrates were alone powerful, alone obeyed; their predecessors were altogether mistrusted. In towns, the people rose against them and against the privileged classes, whom they naturally supposed enemies to the change that had been effected. In the country, the châteaux were fired and the peasantry burned the title-deeds of their lords.²⁷ In a moment of victory it is difficult not to make an abuse of power. But to appease the people it was necessary to destroy abuses, in order that they might not, while seeking to get rid of them, confound privilege with property. Classes had disappeared, arbitrary power was destroyed; with these, their old accessory, inequality, too, must be suppressed. Thus must proceed the establishment of the new order of things, and these preliminaries were the work of a single night.

The assembly had addressed to the people proclamations calculated to restore tranquillity. The constituting the Châtelet a court for trying the conspirators of July 14 had also contributed to the restoration of order by satisfying the multitude. An important measure remained to be executed, the abolition of privileges. On the night of August 4 the Viscount de Noailles gave the signal for this. He proposed the redemption of feudal rights, and the suppression of personal servitude. With this motion began the sacrifice of all the privileged classes; a rivalry of patriotism and public offerings arose among them. The enthusiasm became general; in a few hours the cessation of all abuses was decreed. The Duke du Châtelet proposed the redemption of tithes and their conversion into a pecuniary tax; the Bishop of Chartres, the abolition of the game-laws; the Count de Virieu, that of the law protecting doves and pigeons. The abolition of seigneurial courts, of the purchase and sale of posts in the magistracy, of pecuniary immunities, of favoritism in taxation, of surplice money, first-fruits, pluralities, and unmerited pensions, were successively proposed and carried. After sacrifices made by individuals came those of bodies,

²⁷ Taine has shown, "Ancient Régime," pp. 374-388, that there had been upward of thirty local risings in the provinces since January, so that the event of July 14 must be looked upon as both cause and effect. Professor H. Morse Stephens, "History of the French Revolution," I. pp. 174 ff., has admirably studied the psychology of this mob-movement. Readers of Dickens, "Tale of Two Cities," will recall the description of the burning château. In Burgundy one castle a day was burned, on an average, during the months of July and August, and in Dauphiné, seventy-two in two weeks.

of towns, and provinces. Companies and civic freedoms were abolished. The Marquis des Blacons, a deputy of Dauphiné, in the name of his province pronounced a solemn renunciation of its privileges. The other provinces followed the example of Dauphiné, and the towns that of the provinces. A medal was struck to commemorate the day; and the assembly decreed to Louis XVI. the title of Restorer of French Liberty.

That night, which an enemy of the revolution designated at the time the Saint Bartholomew of property, was only the Saint Bartholomew of abuses. It swept away the rubbish of feudalism; it delivered persons from the remains of servitude, properties from seigniorial liabilities; from the ravages of game, and the exaction of tithes. By destroying the seigniorial courts, that remnant of private power, it led to the principle of public power; in putting an end to the purchasing posts in the magistracy, it threw open the prospect of unbought justice. It was the transition from an order of things in which everything belonged to individuals, to another in which everything was to belong to the nation. That night changed the face of the kingdom; it made all Frenchmen equal; all might now obtain public employments; aspire to the idea of property of their own, of exercising industry for their own benefit. That night was a revolution as important as the insurrection of July 14, of which it was the consequence. The precipitate conduct of the assembly, though, was a grave blunder. Mirabeau, who was not present during the events of this famous night, called it an "orgy." He was close to the truth. Although the renunciations were made with the best intentions in the world, it was both an imprudent and an unjust action. For by destroying the whole fabric of the feudal system the assembly destroyed the only existing administrative institutions in France. They committed the great error of abolishing the only form of government yet remaining before they had framed a constitution to replace it. The result was that on August 5 France awoke to discover itself to be utterly without an administrative system. Instead of allaying the disturbances, the assembly aggravated the anarchy.²⁸

The revolution had progressed rapidly, had obtained great

²⁸ Taine makes a striking comparison between the action of August 4 and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. In both cases, he points out, a superior class was legislated against, deprived of property rights, and reduced to poverty and exile. He estimates that 123,000,000 francs' worth of property, equal to two thousand millions to-day, passed by that act from a creditor to a

results in a very short time; it would have been less prompt, less complete, had it not been attacked. Every refusal became for it the cause of a new success; it foiled intrigue, resisted authority, triumphed over force; and at the point of time we have reached the whole edifice of absolute monarchy had fallen to the ground through the errors of its chiefs. June 17 had witnessed the disappearance of the three orders, and the states-general changed into the national assembly; with June 23 terminated the moral influence of royalty; with July 14 its physical power; the assembly inherited the one, the people the other; finally, August 4 completed this first revolution. The period we have just gone over stands prominently out from the rest; in its brief course force was displaced, and all the preliminary changes were accomplished. The following period is that in which the new system is discussed, becomes established, and in which the assembly, after having been destructive, becomes constructive.

debtor class without redress or indemnification. "Through a great wrong, an entire class, the greatest part of which had no share in the favors of the court, were confounded with the parasites of Versailles . . . twenty-five thousand families, the nursery of the army and the fleet, the *élite* of the agricultural population, became the pariahs of a canton."—Taine, "Ancient Régime," p. 61. Even so liberal a person as Sieyès protested against the action of the assembly. There is no doubt that much of the economic and social phenomena of the revolution later on was due to the violent disturbance of such conditions at this time.

PART II

THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
AUGUST 4, 1789-SEPTEMBER 30, 1791

Chapter IV

THE RISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

AUGUST 4-OCTOBER 6, 1789

THE national assembly, composed of the *élite* of the nation, was full of intelligence, pure intentions, and projects for the public good. It was not, indeed, free from parties, or wholly unanimous; but the mass was, under the empire, neither of an idea nor of a man; and it was the mass which, upon a conviction ever untrammelled and often entirely spontaneous, decided the deliberations and decreed popularity. The following were the divisions of views and interests it contained within itself:

The court had a party in the assembly, the privileged classes, who remained for a long time silent, and took but a tardy share in the debates. This party consisted of those who during the dispute as to the orders had declared against union. The aristocratic classes, notwithstanding their momentary agreement with the commons, had interests altogether contrary to those of the national party; and, accordingly, the nobility and higher clergy, who formed the Right of the assembly, were in constant opposition to it, except on days of peculiar excitement. These foes of the revolution, unable to prevent it by their sacrifices, or to stop it by their adhesion, systematically contended against all its reforms. Their leaders were two men who were not the first among them in birth or rank, but who were superior to the rest in talents. Maury and Cazalès represented, as it were, the one the clergy, and the other the nobility.

These two orators of the privileged classes, according to the intentions of their party, who put little faith in the duration or these changes, rather protested than stood on the defensive; and in all their discussions their aim was not to instruct the assembly, but to bring it into disrepute. Each introduced into his part the particular turn of his mind and character. Maury made long speeches, Cazalès lively sallies. The first preserved at the tribune his habits as a preacher and academician; he spoke on legislative subjects

without understanding them, never seizing the right view of the subject, nor even that most advantageous to his party; he gave proofs of audacity, erudition, skill, a brilliant and well-sustained facility, but never displayed solidity of judgment, firm conviction, or real eloquence. The Abbé Maury spoke as soldiers fight. No one could contradict oftener or more pertinaciously than he, or more flippantly substitute quotations and sophisms for reasoning, or rhetorical phrases for real bursts of feeling. He possessed much talent, but wanted the faculty which gives it life and truth. Cazalès, who had been a captain in the French army, was the opposite of Maury: he had a just and ready mind; his eloquence was equally facile, but more animated; there was candor in his outbursts, and he always gave the best reasons. No rhetorician, he always took the true side of a question that concerned his party, and left declamation to Maury. With the clearness of his views, his ardent character, and the good use he made of his talents, his only fault was that of his position: Maury, on the other hand, added the errors of his mind to those which were inseparable from the cause he espoused.

Necker and the ministry had also a party, but it was less numerous than the other, on account of its moderation. France was then divided into the privileged classes opposed to the revolution, and the people who strenuously desired it. As yet there was no place for a mediating party between them. Necker had declared himself in favor of the English constitution, and those who from ambition or conviction were of his views rallied round him. Among these was Mounier, a man of strong mind and inflexible spirit, who considered that system as the type of representative governments; Lally-Tollendal, as decided in his views as the former, and more persuasive; Clermont-Tonnerre, the friend and ally of Mounier and Lally; in a word, the minority of the nobility, and some of the bishops, who hoped to become members of the upper chamber should Necker's views be adopted.

The leaders of this party, afterward called the monarchical party, wished to effect a revolution by compromise, and to introduce into France a representative government, ready formed, namely, that of England. At every point they besought the powerful to make a compromise with the weak. Before July 14 they asked the court and privileged classes to satisfy the commons; afterward they asked the commons to agree to an arrangement with

the court and the privileged classes. They thought that each ought to preserve his influence in the state; that deposed parties are discontented parties, and that a legal existence must be made for them, or interminable struggles be expected on their part. But they did not see how little their ideas were appropriate to a moment of exclusive passions. The struggle was begun, the struggle destined to result in the triumph of a system, and not in a compromise. It was a victory which had made the three orders give place to a single assembly, and it was difficult to break the unity of this assembly in order to arrive at a government of two chambers. The moderate party had not been able to obtain this government from the court, nor were they to obtain it from the nation: to the one it had appeared too popular; for the other, it was too aristocratic.

The rest of the assembly consisted of the national party. As yet there were not observed in it men who, like Robespierre, Pétion, and Buzot, wished to begin a second revolution when the first was accomplished. At this period the most extreme of this party were Duport, Barnave, and Lameth, who formed a triumvirate, whose opinions were prepared by Duport, sustained by Barnave, and managed by Alexander Lameth. There was something remarkable and announcing the spirit of equality of the times in this intimate union of an advocate belonging to the middle classes, of a counselor belonging to the parliamentary class, and a colonel belonging to the court, renouncing the interests of their order to unite in views of the public good and popular happiness. This party at first took a more advanced position than that which the revolution had attained. July 14 had been the triumph of the middle class; the constituent assembly was its legislature, the national guard its armed force, the mayoralty its popular power. Mirabeau, Lafayette, Bailly, relied on this class; one was its tribune, the other its general, and the third its magistrate. Duport, Barnave, and Lameth's party were the principles, and sustained the interests of that period of the revolution; but this party, composed of young men of ardent patriotism, who entered on public affairs with superior qualities, fine talents, and elevated positions, and who joined to the love of liberty the ambition of playing a leading part, placed itself from the first rather in advance of the revolution of July 14. Its fulcrum within the assembly was the members of the extreme Left; without, in the clubs; in the nation, in the party.

of the people who had coöperated on July 14 and who were unwilling that the bourgeoisie alone should derive advantage from the victory. By putting itself at the head of those who had no leaders, and who being a little out of the government aspired to enter it, it did not cease to belong to this first period of the revolution; only it formed a kind of democratic opposition, even in the middle class itself, only differing from its leaders on a few unimportant points, and voting with them on most questions. It was, among these popular men, rather a patriotic emulation than a party dissension.

The debate upon the constitution first brought out these party differences in the national assembly. The terms Right, Left, Center, etc., did not come into vogue until after the events of October 5-6, 1789, when the assembly, brought to Paris, found a place of meeting in a riding-hall adjoining the Tuileries palace. The horse-shoe shape of this amphitheater is said to have given rise to the distinctions. It is a singular circumstance that the terminology thus invented has passed into the political language of every Continental parliament to-day. The Right of European legislatures is the conservative party, the Left the radical. In proportion as the revolution becomes radical, the Right disappears, and the Left of one assembly becomes the Right of the succeeding assembly. Thus the Left of the national assembly became the Right of the legislative assembly; and the Left of the legislative assembly became the Right of the convention. The Left of the convention were those red terrorists known as the Mountain party; so named originally from the high seats they frequented in the hall.

Duport, who was strong-minded, and who had acquired premature experience of the management of political passions, in the struggles which parlement had sustained against the ministry, and which he had chiefly directed, knew well that a people reposes the moment it has gained its rights, and that it begins to grow weak as soon as it reposes. To keep in vigor those who governed in the assembly, in the mayoralty, in the militia; to prevent the public activity from slackening, and not to disband the people, whose aid he might one day require, he conceived and executed the famous confederation of the clubs. This institution, like everything that gives a great impulse to a nation, caused a great deal of good, and a great deal of harm. It impeded legal authority, when this of

itself was sufficient; but it also gave an immense energy to the revolution, when, attacked on all sides, it could only save itself by the most violent efforts. For the rest, the founders of this association had not calculated all its consequences. They regarded it simply as a wheel destined to keep or put in movement the public machine, without danger, when it tended to abate or to cease its activity; they did not think they were working for the advantage of the multitude. After the flight to Varennes (June 20, 1791), this party had become too exacting and too formidable; they forsook it, and supported themselves against it with the mass of the assembly and the middle class, whose direction was left vacant by the death of Mirabeau. At this period it was important to them speedily to fix the constitutional revolution; for to protract it would have been to bring on the republican revolution.

The mass of the assembly, we have just mentioned, abounded in just, experienced, and even superior minds. Its leaders were two men, strangers to the third estate, and adopted by it. Without the Abbé Sieyès, the constituent assembly would probably have had less unity in its operation, and, without Mirabeau, less energy in its conduct.

Sieyès was one of those men who create sects in an age of enthusiasm, and who exercise the ascendancy of a powerful reason in an enlightened age. Solitude and philosophical studies had matured him at an early age. His views were new, strong, and extensive, but somewhat too systematic. Society had especially been the subject of his examination; he had watched its progress, investigated its springs. The nature of government appeared to him less a question of right than a question of epoch. His vast intellect ranged the society of his day in its divisions, relations, powers, and movement. Sieyès, though of cold temperament, had the ardor which the pursuit of truth inspires, and the passion which its discovery gives; he was accordingly absolute in his views, disdaining those of others, because he considered them incomplete, and that, in his opinion, half truth was error. Contradiction irritated him; he was not communicative. Desirous of making himself thoroughly known, he could not do so with everyone. His adepts imparted his systems to others, which surrounded him with a sort of mystery and rendered him the object of a species of reverence. He had the authority which complete political science procures, and the constitution might have emerged from his head

completely armed, like the Minerva of Jupiter, or the legislation of the ancients, were it not that in his day everyone sought to be engaged in the task, or to criticise it. Yet, with the exception of some modifications, his plans were generally adopted, and he had in the committees more disciples than colleagues.

Mirabeau obtained in the tribune the same ascendancy as Sieyès in the committees. He was a man who only waited the occasion to become great. At Rome, in the best days of the republic, he would have been a Gracchus; in its decline, a Catiline; under the Fronde, a Cardinal de Retz; and in the decrepitude of a monarchy, when such a being could only find scope for his immense faculties in agitation, he became remarkable for the vehemence of his passions, and for their punishment, a life passed in committing disorders, and suffering for them. This prodigious activity required employment; the revolution provided it. Accustomed to the struggle against despotism, irritated by the contempt of a nobility who were inferior to him, and who excluded him from their body; clever, daring, eloquent, Mirabeau felt that the revolution would be his work, and his life. He exactly corresponded to the chief wants of his time. His thought, his voice, his action, were those of a tribune. In perilous circumstances his was the earnestness which carried away an assembly; in difficult discussions, the unanswerable sally which at once put an end to them; with a word he prostrated ambition, silenced enmities, disconcerted rivalries. This powerful being, perfectly at his ease in the midst of agitation, now giving himself up to the impetuosity, now to the familiarities of conscious strength, exercised a sort of sovereignty in the assembly. He soon obtained immense popularity, which he retained to the last; and he whom, at his first entrance into the legislature, every eye shunned, was, at his death (April 2, 1791), received into the Pantheon amid the tears of the assembly and of all France. Had it not been for the revolution, Mirabeau would have failed in realizing his destiny, for it is not enough to be great: one must live at the fitting period.

The Duke of Orleans, to whom a party has been given, had but little influence in the assembly; he voted with the majority, not the majority with him. The personal attachment of some of its members, his name, the fears of the court, the popularity his opinions enjoyed, hopes rather than conspiracies had increased his reputation as a factious character. He had neither the qualities

nor the defects of a conspirator; he may have aided with his money and his name popular movements, that would have taken place just the same without him, and which had another object than his elevation. It is still a common error to attribute the greatest of revolutions to some petty private maneuvering, as if at such an epoch a whole people could be used as the instrument of one man.

The assembly had acquired the entire power; the corporations depended on it; the national guards obeyed it. It was divided into committees to facilitate its operations and execute them. The royal power, though existing of right, was in a measure suspended, since it was not obeyed, and the assembly had to supply its action by its own. Thus, independently of committees intrusted with the preparation of its measures, it had appointed others to exercise a useful superintendence without. A committee of supply occupied itself with provisions, an important object in a year of scarcity; a committee of inquiry corresponded with the corporations and provinces; a committee of researches received informations against the conspirators of July 14. But finance and the constitution, which the past crises had adjourned, were the special subjects of attention.

After having momentarily provided for the necessities of the treasury, the assembly, although now become sovereign, consulted by examining the petitions, the wishes of its constituents. It then proceeded to form its institutions with a method, a liberal and extensive spirit of discussion, which was to procure for France a constitution conformable with justice and suited to its necessities. The United States of America, at the time of their independence, had set forth in a declaration the rights of man and those of the citizen. This will ever be the first step. A people rising from slavery feels the necessity of proclaiming its rights even before it forms its government. Those Frenchmen who had assisted at the American Revolution, and who coöperated now, proposed a similar declaration as a preamble to the laws. This was agreeable to an assembly of legislators and philosophers, restricted by no limits, since no institutions existed, and who were directed by primitive and fundamental ideas of society, for it was the pupil of the eighteenth century. Though this declaration contained only general principles, and confined itself to setting forth in maxims what the constitution was to put into laws, it was calculated to elevate the mind, and impart to the citizens a consciousness of their dignity

and importance. At Lafayette's suggestion the assembly had before commenced this discussion; but the events at Paris and the decrees of August 4 had interrupted its labors; they were now resumed, and concluded by determining the principles which were to form the table of the new law, and which were the assumption of right in the name of humanity.

Lafayette's motion had been made on July 11. It is a common statement of French and German works upon the French Revolution that the adoption of these principles by the assembly was in imitation of the United States. The facts do not warrant this statement. The American declaration of the Rights of Man at the head of the Declaration of Independence was of much more active political force in the anti-slavery conflict than in either the American or the French Revolution. The American colonists in 1776 were struggling for their rights as Englishmen, and when they secured independence, they had recovered the essential parts of the legal structure which they had inherited from England. In France the metaphysical abstractions called the Rights of Man were not the result of the influence of America, but had their root in the pseudo-political philosophy of the eighteenth century. It is significant that there is nothing like the "glittering generalities" of the opening paragraph of the Declaration of Independence in any article of the Constitution of the United States.¹

These generalities being adopted, the assembly turned its attention to the organization of the legislative power. This was one of its most important objects; it was to fix the nature of its functions, and establish its relations with the king. In this discussion the assembly had only to decide the future condition of the legislative power. Invested as it was with constituent authority, it was raised above its own decisions, and no intermediate power could suspend or prevent its mission. But what should be the form of the deliberative body in future sessions? Should it remain indi-

¹ There is a brief but admirable discussion of the real influence of America upon the French Revolution in the preface to the American edition of H. Morse Stephens, "History of the French Revolution," *Cf.* Bancroft, "History of United States" (centenary edition), vol. V. pp. 519-550, or last edition, vol. V. pp. 244-560; Buckle, "History of Civilization," vol. II. pp. 415-418 and 666-667; Charlemagne Towers, "Lafayette in America"; Andrew D. White, "Circular No. 2 of United States Bureau of Education"; "Diary and Letters" of Gouverneur Morris, vol. I. pp. 114-139; Tocqueville, "The Old Régime and the Revolution," p. 179; Rosenthal, "America and France," and review of same in the *New York Nation*, vol. XXXIV. p. 525.

visible, or be divided into two chambers? If the latter form should be adopted, what should be the nature of the second chamber? Should it be made an aristocratic assembly, or a moderative senate? And, whatever the deliberative body might be, was it to be permanent or periodical, and should the king share the legislative power with it? Such were the difficulties that agitated the assembly and Paris during the month of September.

If we consider the position of the assembly and its ideas of sovereignty, we shall easily understand the manner in which these questions were decided. It regarded the king merely as the hereditary agent of the nation, having neither the right to assemble its representatives nor that of directing or suspending them. Accordingly, it refused to grant him the initiative in making laws and dissolving the assembly. It considered that the legislative body ought not to be dependent on the king. It moreover feared that by granting the government too strong an influence over the assembly, or by not keeping the latter always together, the prince might profit by the intervals in which he would be left alone, to encroach on the other powers, and perhaps even to destroy the new system. Therefore to an authority in constant activity, they wished to oppose an always existing assembly, and the permanence of the assembly was accordingly declared. The debate respecting its indivisibility, or its division, was very animated. Necker, Mounier, and Lally-Tollendal desired, in addition to a representative chamber, a senate, to be composed of members to be appointed by the king on the nomination of the people. They considered this as the only means of moderating the power, and even of preventing the tyranny of a single assembly. They had as partisans such members as participated in their ideas, or who hoped to form part of the upper chamber. The majority of the nobility did not wish for a house of peers, but for an aristocratic assembly, whose members it should elect. They could not agree; Mounier's party refusing to fall in with a project calculated to revive the orders, and the aristocracy refusing to accept a senate, which would confirm the ruin of the nobility. The greater portion of the deputies of the clergy and of the commons were in favor of the unity of the assembly. The popular party considered it illegal to appoint legislators for life; it thought that the upper chamber would become the instrument of the court and aristocracy, and would then be dangerous, or become useless by uniting with the

commons. Thus the nobility, from dissatisfaction, and the national party, from a spirit of absolute justice, alike rejected the upper chamber.

This determination of the assembly has been the object of many reproaches. The partisans of the peerage have attributed all the evils of the revolution to the absence of that order; as if it had been possible for anybody whatsoever to arrest its progress. It was not the constitution which gave it the character it has had, but events arising from party struggles. What would the upper chamber have done between the court and the nation? If in favor of the first, it would have been unable to guide or save it; if in favor of the second, it would not have strengthened it; in either case, its suppression would have infallibly ensued. In such times progress is rapid, and all that seeks to check it is superfluous. In England, the house of lords, although docile, was suspended during the crisis. These various systems have each their epoch; revolutions are achieved by one chamber and end with two.²

The royal sanction gave rise to great debates in the assembly and violent clamors without. The question was as to the part of the king in the making of laws; the deputies were nearly all agreed on one point. They were determined, in admitting his right to sanction or refuse laws; but some desired that this right should be unlimited, others that it should be temporary. This, in reality, amounted to the same thing, for it was not possible for the king to prolong his refusal indefinitely, and the veto, though absolute, would only have been suspensive. But this faculty, bestowed on a single man, of checking the will of the people, appeared exorbitant, especially out of the assembly, where it was less understood.

Paris had not yet recovered from the agitation of July 14; the popular government was but beginning, and the city experienced all its liberty and disorder. The assembly of electors, who

² The single house was adopted on September 11, by a vote of 499 to 89. "I learn that the national assembly have agreed to a single chamber of legislation and a suspensive veto in the king. This is traveling on the highroad to anarchy, and that worst of all tyrannies, the despotism of a faction in a popular assembly."—"Diary and Letters" of Gouverneur Morris, vol. I. p. 154 (written on September 13).

For a discussion of the merits of the bicameral system of government, see Lieber, "Civil Liberty and Self-Government," pp. 197-200. Benjamin Franklin was a believer in the single legislative house, and his influence prevailed upon the framers of the early constitution of Pennsylvania so to provide. But it was soon abandoned. Vermont and Georgia are the only other commonwealths which have ventured to try the experiment in the United States.

in difficult circumstances had taken the place of a provisional corporation, had just been replaced. A hundred and eighty members, nominated by the districts, constituted themselves legislators and representatives of the city. While they were engaged on a plan of municipal organization each desired to command; for in France the love of liberty is almost the love of power. The committees acted apart from the mayor; the assembly of representatives arose against the committees, and the districts against the assembly of representatives. Each of the sixty districts attributed to itself the legislative power, and gave the executive power to its committees; they all considered the members of the general assembly as their subordinates, and themselves as invested with the right of annulling their decrees. This idea of the sovereignty of the principal over the delegate made rapid progress. Those who had no share in authority formed assemblies and then gave themselves up to discussion; soldiers debated at the Oratoire, journeymen tailors at the Colonnade, hair-dressers in the Champs Elysées, servants at the Louvre; but the most animated debates took place in the Palais Royal. There were inquired into the questions that occupied the national assembly, and its discussions criticised. The dearth of provisions also brought crowds together, and these mobs were not the least dangerous.

Such was the state of Paris when the debate concerning the veto was begun. The alarm aroused by this right accorded to the king was extreme. It seemed as though the fate of liberty depended on the decision of this question, and that the veto alone would bring back the ancient system. The multitude, ignorant of the nature and limits of power, wished the assembly, on which it relied, to do all, and the king, whom it mistrusted, to do nothing. Every instrument left at the disposal of the court appeared the means of a counter-revolution. The crowds at the Palais Royal grew turbulent; threatening letters were sent to those members of the assembly who, like Mounier, had declared in favor of the absolute veto. They spoke of dismissing them as faithless representatives, and of marching upon Versailles. The Palais Royal sent a deputation to the assembly, and required the municipality of Paris to declare the deputies revocable, and to make them at all times dependent on the electors. The commune remained firm, rejected the demands of the Palais Royal, and took measures to prevent the riotous assemblies. The national guard supported it;

this body was well disposed; Lafayette had acquired its confidence; it was becoming organized, it wore a uniform, submitted to discipline after the example of the French guard, and learned from its chief the love of order and respect for the law.³ But the middle class that composed it had not yet taken exclusive possession of the popular government. The multitude which was enrolled on July 14 was not as yet entirely disbanded. This agitation from without rendered the debates upon the veto stormy; in this way a very simple question acquired great importance, and the ministry, perceiving how fatal the influence of an absolute decision might prove, and seeing, also, that the unlimited veto and the suspensive veto were one and the same thing, induced the king to be satisfied with the latter, and give up the former. The assembly declared that the refusal of his sanction could not be prolonged by the prince beyond two sessions; and this decision satisfied everyone.

The court took advantage of the agitation in Paris to realize other projects. For some time it had influenced the king's mind. At first⁴ he had refused to sanction the decrees of August 4, although they were constitutive, and consequently he could not avoid promulgating them. After accepting them, on the remonstrances of the assembly, he renewed the same difficulties relative to the declaration of rights. The object of the court was to represent Louis XVI. as oppressed by the assembly, and constrained to submit to measures which he was unwilling to accept; it endured its situation with impatience, and strove to regain its former authority. Flight was the only means, and it was requisite to legitimate it; nothing could be done in the presence of the assembly, and the neighborhood of Paris. Royal authority had fallen on June 23, military power on July 14; there was no alternative but civil war. As it was difficult to persuade the king to this course,

³ These sentences give a rosy view of the state of Paris after July 14. Lafayette, in truth, found the formation of the national guard a difficult task; he admits that he could not make them do guard mount when it rained! The murder of Foulon and Berthier shows that at least ten days after the fall of the Bastille anarchy prevailed, and Lafayette himself says that his personal intervention rescued more than twenty persons from being murdered by rioters during this time.—*Mémoires et Correspondence de Lafayette*," vol. II., 153, 164.

⁴ Louis XVI.'s reply shows more political insight than he commonly displayed: "I can but admire the sacrifice, but I will never consent to deprive myself of nobility and clergy. I am obliged to give way to force. I can but give way, but in that case there will be no longer either monarchy or a monarch to France."—Van Laun, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I., p. 112. The king did not yield until October 5.

they waited till the last moment to induce him to flee; his hesitation caused the failure of the plan. It was proposed to retire to Metz, to Bouillé, in the midst of his army; to call around the monarch the nobility, the troops who continued faithful, the parlements; to declare the assembly and Paris in a state of rebellion; to invite them to obedience or to force them to it; and if the ancient system could not be entirely reëstablished, at least to confine themselves to the declaration of June 20. On the other hand, if the court had an interest in removing the king from Versailles, that it might effect something, it was the interest of the partisans of the revolution to bring him to Paris; the Orleans faction, if one existed, had an interest in driving the king to flight, by intimidating him, in the hope that the assembly would appoint its leader lieutenant-general of the kingdom; and, lastly, the people, who were in want of bread, wished the king to reside at Paris, in the hope that his presence would diminish or put a stop to the dearth of provisions. All these causes existing, an occasion was only wanting to bring about an insurrection; the court furnished this occasion. On the pretext of protecting itself against the movements in Paris, it summoned troops to Versailles, doubled the household guards, and sent for the dragoons and the Flanders regiment. All this preparation of troops gave rise to the liveliest fears; a report spread of an anti-revolutionary measure, and the flight of the king and the dissolution of the assembly were announced as at hand. Strange uniforms and yellow and black cockades were to be seen at the Luxembourg, the Palais Royal, and at the Champs Elysées; the foes of the revolution displayed a degree of joy they had not manifested for some time. The behavior of the court confirmed these suspicions, and disclosed the object of all these preparations.

The officers of the Flanders regiment, importuned with anxiety by the town of Versailles,⁵ were fêted at the château and even admitted to the queen's card tables. Endeavors were made to secure their devotion, and a banquet was given to them by the king's

⁵ The attitude toward the regiments was originally misstated. But it is clear that the municipality of Versailles, in fear of the rioters from Paris, had formally petitioned the king to reinforce the garrison. The Flanders regiment was brought to Versailles in compliance with this wish. (Loménie, "*Les Mirabeau*," vol. IV. p. 458.) Moreover, the presence of the foreign regiments afforded a pretext for revolutionary violence more than it occasioned fear. "The foreign regiments are not numerous enough to make any serious impression," writes Morris on July 7.—"*Diary and Letters*," vol. I. p. 115.

guards. The officers of the dragoons and the chasseurs, who were at Versailles, those of the Swiss guards, of the hundred Swiss, of the prévôté, and the staff of the national guard were invited. The theater in the château, which was reserved for the most solemn *fêtes* of the court, and which, since the marriage of the second brother of the king, had only been used for the Emperor Joseph II., was selected for the scene of the festival. The king's musicians were ordered to attend this, the first *fête* which the guards had given. During the banquet toasts to the king and royal family were drunk with enthusiasm, while the nation was omitted or rejected. At the second course the grenadiers of Flanders, the two bodies of Swiss, and the dragoons were admitted to witness the spectacle and share the sentiments which animated the guests. The enthusiasm increased every moment. Suddenly the king was announced; he entered attired in a hunting dress, the queen leaning on his arm and carrying the dauphin. Shouts of affection and devotion arose on every side. The health of the royal family was drunk with swords drawn; and when Louis XVI. withdrew, the music played, "*O Richard, O mon roi! l'univers t'abandonne.*" The scene now assumed a very significant character; the march of the Huzzars and the profusion of wine deprived the guests of all reserve. The charge was sounded; tottering guests climbed the boxes as if mounting to an assault; white cockades were distributed; the tri-colored cockade, it is said, was trampled on, and the guests then spread through the galleries of the château, where the ladies of the court loaded them with congratulations and decorated them with ribbons and cockades.

Such was this famous banquet of October 1, which the court was imprudent enough to repeat on the 3d. One cannot help lamenting its fatal want of foresight; it could neither submit to nor change its destiny. This assembling of the troops, so far from preventing aggression in Paris, provoked it; the banquet did not make the devotion of the soldiers any more sure, while it augmented the ill disposition of the people. To protect itself there was no necessity for so much ardor, nor for flight was there needful so much preparation; but the court never took the measure calculated to make its designs succeed, or else it only half took it, and, in order to decide, it always waited until there was no longer any time.

The news of this banquet produced the greatest sensation in

Paris. On the 4th suppressed rumors, counter-revolutionary provocations, the dread of conspiracies, indignation against the court, and increasing alarm at the dearth of provisions, all announced an insurrection; the multitude already looked toward Versailles. On the 5th the insurrection broke out in a violent and invincible manner; the entire want of flour was the signal. A young girl, entering a guard-house, seized a drum and rushed through the streets beating it, crying, "Bread! Bread!" She was soon surrounded by a crowd of women. This mob advanced toward the Hôtel de Ville, increasing as it went. It forced the guard that stood at the door and penetrated into the interior, clamoring for bread and arms; it broke open doors, seized weapons, and marched toward Versailles. The people soon rose *en masse*, uttering the same demand, till the cry, "To Versailles!" rose on every side. The women started first, headed by Maillard, one of the volunteers of the Bastille. The populace, the national guard, and the French guards requested to follow them. The commander, Lafayette, opposed their departure a long time, but in vain; neither his efforts nor his popularity could overcome the obstinacy of the people. For seven hours he harangued and retained them. At length, impatient at this delay, rejecting his advice, they prepared to set forward without him; when, feeling that it was now his duty to conduct as it had previously been to restrain them, he obtained his authorization from the corporation, and gave the word for departure about seven in the evening.⁶

⁶ Mignet's account has been allowed to stand, but in light of later research there is much misstatement in this paragraph and those following. To begin with, as far back as August 30, a plan had been concerted in Paris for an attack similar to this upon the court. (Malouet, "*Mémoires*," vol. II. p. 299.) It was fear of such an event that led the corporation of Versailles, as has been shown, to ask for an increase of troops. In the second place, the "dearth of provisions" was more fictitious than real. (See Loménie, "*Les Mirabeau*," vol. IV. p. 489.) The official market bulletin—*Bulletin des Halles*—of October 3, proves that there was plenty of provisions in Paris on that day. The scarcity on the 5th was due to the timidity of the small grocers to open their shops, for fear of rioters. The mobs of women reached the Hôtel de Ville between ten and eleven o'clock; the members of the national guard on duty there showed reluctance to use force against them, but it is an exaggeration to say that they "requested to follow them." As for Lafayette, he showed an almost criminal remissness at this time. (See Von Holst, "The French Revolution Tested by Mirabeau's Career," vol. II. p. 58 ff. Cf. Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. I. p. 127.) He had had full information from his lieutenants of the insurrectionary condition, but instead of being alive to the danger he delayed action. Not until after the crowd of women were on the road to Versailles did he appear—

The excitement at Versailles was less impetuous, but quite as real; the national guard and the assembly were anxious and irritated. The double banquet of the household troops, the approbation the queen had expressed, "*J'ai été enchantée de la journée de Jeudi*"—the king's refusal to accept simply the Rights of Man, his concerted temporizings, and the want of provisions, excited the alarm of the representatives of the people and filled them with suspicion. Pétion, having denounced the banquets of the guards, was summoned by a royalist deputy to explain his denunciation, and make known the guilty parties. "Let it be expressly declared," exclaimed Mirabeau, "that whosoever is not king is a subject and responsible, and I will speedily furnish proofs." These words, which pointed to the queen, compelled the Right side to be silent. This hostile discussion was preceded and succeeded by debates equally animated, concerning the refusal of the sanction, and the scarcity of provisions in Paris. At length, just as a deputation was dispatched to the king to require his pure and simple acceptance of the Rights of Man, and to solicit him to facilitate with all his power the supplying Paris with provisions, the arrival of the women, headed by Maillard, was announced.

Their unexpected appearance, for they had intercepted all the couriers who might have announced it, excited the terrors of the court. The troops of Versailles flew to arms and surrounded the château, but the intentions of the women were not hostile. Maillard, their leader, had recommended them to appear as suppliants, and in that attitude they presented their complaints successively to the assembly and to the king. Accordingly, the first hours of this about 1 P. M. Even then he dallied for three hours more, leaving for Versailles after four o'clock, declaring that he could not go without the authorization of the commune. Lafayette did not "oppose their departure a long time"; he did not "harangue them for seven hours." Camille Desmoulins writes with just derision, "*Le temporisateur Fabius! On prétend que le cheval blanc mit neuf heures à faire la route de Paris à Versailles,*" for he did not reach Versailles until 11 P. M.! The women had been there since three o'clock. Counting the gentlemen of the court who volunteered, there were 2800 soldiers available for defense of the palace. But when Louis XVI. was asked for orders, he asked: "What orders? against women? You mock me." It seems likely that Lafayette, who was fond of admiration, wanted to have the king and queen put in distress that he might dramatically play the part of rescuer. Gouverneur Morris penetrated his character, in writing: "He is a lover of freedom from ambition, of which there are two kinds: one born of pride, the other of vanity, and his partakes most of the latter."—"Diary and Letters," vol. I, p. 136. Even Jefferson wrote of him: "His foible is a canine appetite for popularity and fame."—Ed.

turbulent evening were sufficiently calm. Yet it was impossible but that causes of hostility should arise between an excited mob and the household troops, the objects of so much irritation. The latter were stationed in the court of the château opposite the national guard and the Flanders regiment. The space between was filled by women and volunteers of the Bastille. In the midst of the confusion, necessarily arising from such a juxtaposition, a scuffle arose; this was the signal for disorder and conflict. An officer of the guards struck a Parisian soldier with his saber, and was in turn shot in the arm. The national guards sided against the household troops; the conflict became warm, and would have been sanguinary but for the darkness, the bad weather, and the orders given to the household troops first to cease firing and then to retire. But as these were accused of being the aggressors, the fury of the multitude continued for some time; their quarters were broken into, two of them were wounded, and another saved with difficulty.

During this tumult the court was in consternation; the flight of the king was suggested, and carriages prepared; a picket of the national guard saw them at the gate of the Orangery, and having made them go back, closed the gate: moreover, the king, either ignorant of the designs of the court, or conceiving them impracticable, refused to escape. Fears were mingled with his pacific intentions when he hesitated to repel the aggression or to take flight. Conquered, he apprehended the fate of Charles I. of England; absent, he feared that the Duke of Orleans would obtain the lieutenancy of the kingdom. But, in the meantime, the rain, fatigue, and the inaction of the household troops lessened the fury of the multitude, and Lafayette arrived at the head of the Parisian army.

His presence restored security to the court, and the replies of the king to the deputation from Paris satisfied the multitude and the army. In a short time Lafayette's activity, the good sense and discipline of the Parisian guard restored order everywhere. Tranquillity returned. The crowd of women and volunteers, overcome by fatigue, gradually dispersed, and some of the national guard were intrusted with the defense of the château, while others were lodged with their companions in arms at Versailles. The royal family, reassured after the anxiety and fear of this painful night, retired to rest about two o'clock in the morning. Toward five, Lafayette, having visited the outposts which had been con-

fided to his care, and finding the watch well kept, the town calm, and the crowds dispersed or sleeping, also took a few moments' repose.⁷

About six, however, some of the lower class, more enthusiastic than the rest, and awake sooner than they, prowled round the château. Finding a gate open, they informed their companions, and entered.⁸ Unfortunately, the interior posts had been intrusted to the household guards, and refused to the Parisian army. This fatal refusal caused all the misfortunes of the night. The interior guard had not even been increased, the gates scarcely visited, and the watch kept as negligently as on ordinary occasions. These men, excited by all the passions that had brought them to Versailles, perceiving one of the household troops at a window, began to insult him. He fired and wounded one of them. They then rushed on the household troops, who defended the château breast to breast and sacrificed themselves heroically. One of them had time to warn the queen, whom the assailants particularly threatened, and, half-dressed, she ran for refuge to the king. The tumult and danger were extreme in the château.

Lafayette, apprised of the invasion of the royal residence, mounted his horse and rode hastily to the scene of danger. On the square he met some of the household troops surrounded by an infuriated mob, who were on the point of killing them. He threw himself among them, called some French troops, who were near, and having rescued the household troops and dispersed their assailants, he hurried to the château. He found it already secured by the grenadiers of the French guard, who at the first noise of the tumult had hastened and protected the household troops from the fury of the Parisians. But the scene was not over; the crowd assembled again in the marble court under the king's balcony, loudly called for him, and he appeared. They required his departure for Paris; he promised to repair thither with his family, and this

⁷ Details of this tumultuous night and the actual time of events are uncertain. Lafayette says he intended to go to bed—after 2 A. M., when he had visited the palace, but was interrupted by the alarm, which was certainly much earlier than six o'clock. See the note in Carlyle's "French Revolution," ed. Fletcher, vol. I. p. 333.

⁸ Owing to the carelessness of the officer in charge of it, this door had not been secured. The Marquis de Parroy, an officer of the guards, writing to his wife the next day, says he was wakened by the shouts of the mob crying out against the queen. Published in "*Revolution française*," vol. I. no. 2.

promise was received with general applause. The queen was resolved to accompany him; but the prejudice against her was so strong that the journey was not without danger; it was necessary to reconcile her with the multitude. Lafayette proposed to her to accompany him to the balcony; and after some hesitation she consented. They appeared on it together, and to communicate by a sign with the tumultuous crowd, to conquer its animosity and awaken its enthusiasm, Lafayette respectfully kissed the queen's hand; the crowd responded with acclamations. It now remained to make peace between them and the household troops. Lafayette advanced with one of these, placed his own tri-colored cockade on his hat, and embraced him before the people, who shouted "*Vivent les gardes-du corps!*" Thus terminated this scene; the royal family set out for Paris, escorted by the army, and its guards mixed with it.

The insurrection of October 5-6 was an entirely popular movement. We must not try to explain it by secret motives, nor attribute it to concealed ambition; it was provoked by the imprudence of the court. The banquets of the household troops, the reports of flight, the dread of civil war, and the scarcity of provisions alone brought Paris upon Versailles. If special instigators, which the most careful inquiries have still left doubtful, contributed to produce this movement, they did not change either its direction or its object. The result of this event was the destruction of the ancient régime of the court; it deprived it of its guard, it removed it from the royal residence at Versailles to the capital of the revolution, and placed it under the surveillance of the people. The last events had struck terror into the assembly. In one week, after October 6, more than 300 members demanded passports and 120 resigned.

Through Mirabeau's correspondence with La Marque we see that he foresaw the events of the 5th and 6th. From the first he had offered the king and the ministers his support. At the close of September he told La Marque to tell the king and queen that they could and must confide in him, but they still refused him their confidence. On October 17 Mirabeau went to La Marque and said: "If you have any means to get the ear of the king and queen, convince them that they are lost unless they leave Paris. I am busy with a plan to get them out of it. Assure them that they can count upon my assistance." Mirabeau gave him his plan

in the memoir of October 15. He saw that it was absolutely necessary to get the king out of Paris. The whole history of the revolution after October 6 verified this. The memoir was as a prophecy of the whole future history.

Mirabeau begins by stating that neither the king nor the national assembly are free in Paris, and he proceeds to ask whether the king is personally safe, and answers the question thus: "In the situation in which he is, the slightest catastrophe could compromise his safety. The excited mob at Paris is irresistible. What will Paris be three months hence? A hospital or perhaps a theater of horrors! The ministers are without resources. Only Necker still enjoys some popularity, but does not know how to use it." Then he goes on: "The provinces are not as yet torn from one another. There will come a time when there will be a danger of France becoming geographically disrupted. The exchange of provisions is more and more interrupted, and the nation has become disused to work." He goes on:

"The public force lies in public opinion and the revenues of the state. All ties of public opinion are severed. There is no government, because there is no freedom in the national assembly nor in the king. And at the same time the nation is getting disused to work. The more concentrated the revolutionary action becomes, the narrower and easier its basis of public opinion grows. The more absolutely radicalism holds sway, the less the number grows of those who pretend to represent the sovereign public opinion. Only the direct taxes are paid, and even these in part only, while half of the taxes are indirect ones. This means that they are rapidly going toward bankruptcy."

Mirabeau goes on: "A dull commotion is in course of preparation. When the body politic falls into solution, a crisis is necessary to regenerate it. The only means to save the state and the forming constitution is to bring the king into a situation which will allow him to unite himself with his people—not to take issue with the revolution, not to cross swords with them. The only means is to unite the king and the people.

"Paris for a long time has swallowed up all the revenues of the state. It is the seat of the fiscal régime abhorred by the provinces. Paris has caused the public debt, ruined public credit, and compromised the honor of the nation by these pernicious stock-jobbings. Is the national assembly going to ruin all France for

this one city? Can Paris save itself? No; Paris is lost if it is not forced to moderation."

Mirabeau then discusses the means by which these dangers may be arrested. The king must not withdraw to Metz or the frontier, for that would be to declare war to the nation. Nor should he unite with the nobility. To go away in order to gain liberty, renounce the national assembly, and dissolve every connection would be a less violent measure, but not less dangerous, for the king would then have neither the nobility nor the people with him. A great revolution is necessary to save the kingdom. The nation must regain its rights and have them consolidated. Only a national convention can regenerate France, and the king must unite with the people.

In the nature of things it is impossible to get out of a great political danger without danger—and the statesman must use all his efforts to prepare moderately and direct the crisis, but not prevent or postpone it, for that would serve to make it more violent.

Mirabeau's plan⁹ was as follows: Preparations should be made for the departure of the king, and public opinion in the provinces should be prepared for the impending events. By asking the assistance of the national assembly, its eyes would be opened to its own peril. To insure the king's departure, guards consisting of national regiments and amounting to 10,000 men should be stationed between Paris and Rouen. Then the king could depart in broad daylight. Rouen was chosen because it was in the interior, and besides, it could be easily provisioned, and finally Brittany and Anjou were loyal and within easy reach.

Proclamations should announce that the king threw himself into the arms of the people for protection, because he had been denied even the rights of a French citizen, and that he confided his honor and safety to the French loyalty. Proclamations should be issued enlightening the people about their true interests, and a change of the public opinion would soon work a change in the national assembly. The king would work for the welfare of the citizen, and wanted himself to be only a citizen.

⁹ The reader may consult the original text of this famous memoir in the "*Correspondence entre Mirabeau et le Comte de la Marche*," vol. I. pp. 364-382. It is translated in the "University of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints," vol. I. book 5, pp. 8-18.

Consult also Von Holst, "The French Revolution Tested by Mirabeau's Career," vol. II. pp. 68 ff.; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 245 ff.; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution, vol. I. p. 138.


This plan ought to have been carried out at once. But nothing came of it. The memoir fell into the hands of the king's eldest brother, who praised it and then pocketed it. Mirabeau's plan was the only means to save the king's head, spare France the reign of terror, and the ensuing despotism of Napoleon.

Mirabeau sincerely sought to conciliate the interests of the crown and those of the nation. His famous oratorical outbursts of June 23 and July 15 are simply manifestations of great impatience. He was not present on the night of August 4, and had no hand in the events of October 5 and 6. When a decree of the assembly forbade any minister to hold a seat in the body, he became the secret counselor of the court, demanding an absolute veto for the king, with power of dissolving the assembly and the right to declare war and peace. Mirabeau's greatest speech is probably that of September 26, 1789, upon the means to avoid national bankruptcy.



THE MOB ESCORTING BACK TO PARIS THE CARRIAGE CONTAINING LOUIS XVI AND MARIE ANTOINETTE

Painting by T. E. Sauindo



Chapter V

SEPARATION OF NATIONAL PARTIES

1789-1791

THE period which forms the subject of this chapter was less remarkable for events than for the gradually decided separation of parties. In proportion as changes were introduced into the state and the laws, those whose interests or opinions they injured declared themselves against them. The revolution had had as enemies, from the beginning of the states-general, the court; from the union of orders and the abolition of privileges, the nobility; from the establishment of a single assembly and the rejection of the two chambers, the ministry and the partisans of the English form of government. It had, moreover, against it since the departmental organization, the provinces; since the decree respecting the property and civil constitution of the clergy, the whole ecclesiastical body; since the introduction of the new military laws, all the officers of the army. It might seem that the assembly ought not to have effected so many changes at once, so as to have avoided making so many enemies; but its general plans, its necessities, and the very plots of its adversaries required all these innovations.

After October 5 and 6 the assembly emigrated as the court had done after July 14. Mounier and Lally-Tollendal¹ deserted it, despairing of liberty from the moment their views ceased to be followed. Too absolute in their plans, they wanted the people, after having delivered the assembly on July 14, suddenly to cease acting, which was displaying an entire ignorance of the impetus of revolutions. When the people have once been made use of, it is difficult

¹ Lally-Tollendal was descended from an Irish partisan of the Stuarts, who settled in France after the failure of the Jacobite cause. His father was court-martialed and sentenced to death for the reverses experienced by the French arms in India during the Seven Years' War. The sentence was an unjust one, and the son secured a reversal of the judgment in 1778, too late to save his father's life, although it saved his honor. Louis XVI. personally interested himself in the case, which accounts for Lally's strong support of the king's cause.

to disband them, and the most prudent course is not to contest, but to regulate their intervention. Lally-Tollendal renounced his title of Frenchman, and returned to England, the land of his ancestors. Mounier resigned his seat when he saw that a constitution after the English form was hopeless, preferring this course to that of an obstructionist in the assembly. He had been a leader in his native province, and had advocated the revival of the ancient estates of Dauphiné in place of the provincial assemblies established by Necker. Grenoble had rebelled in June, 1788, and Mounier had had a hand in the rising. At this time, however, he contented himself with protesting that the national assembly had exceeded its powers. He retired to Switzerland.


After October 5 and 6 the national representatives followed the king to the capital, which their common presence had contributed greatly to tranquilize. The people were satisfied with possessing the king; the causes which had excited their ebullition had ceased. The Duke of Orleans, who, right or wrong, was considered the contriver of the insurrection, had just been sent away; he had accepted a mission to England; Lafayette was resolved to maintain order; the national guard, animated by a better spirit, acquired every day habits of discipline and obedience; the corporation, getting over the confusion of its first establishment, began to have authority. There remained but one cause of disturbance—the scarcity of provisions.² Notwithstanding the zeal and foresight of the committee intrusted with the task of providing supplies, daily assemblages of the people threatened the public tranquillity. The people, so easily deceived when suffering, killed a baker called François, who was unjustly accused as a monopolist. On October 21 a martial law was proclaimed, authorizing the corporation to employ force to disperse the mob, after having summoned the citizens to retire. Power was vested in a class interested in maintaining order; the districts and the national guard were obedient to the assembly. Submission to the law was the prevailing passion of that epoch. The deputies on their side aimed only at com-

² During July the price of the four-pound loaf of bread had been fixed at 13 sous 6 deniers. After that there was no legislation in regard to bread till 1793. The government had started "relief works" during the hard winter of 1788 and the distributions there made had drawn thousands of vagrants to Paris. Seventeen thousand were fed in August. Not until June, 1791, was this practice discontinued. Belief in the "distress" of Paris must be taken with caution. The cause of disturbance had its seat in a moral unrest rather than in adversity.

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pleting the constitution and effecting the reorganization of the state. They had the more reason for hastening their task, as the enemies of the assembly made use of what remained of the ancient régime, to occasion it embarrassment. Accordingly, it replied to each of their endeavors by a decree which, changing the ancient order of things, deprived them of one of their means of attack.

It began by dividing the kingdom more equally and regularly. The provinces, which had witnessed with regret the loss of their privileges, forming small states, in extent too vast and in administra-



tion too independent, so that it was essential to reduce their size, change their names, and subject them to the same government. On December 22 the assembly adopted in this respect the project conceived by Sieyès and presented by Thouret in the name of a committee, which occupied itself constantly on this subject for two months.

France was divided into eighty-three departments, nearly equal in extent and population; these were divided into districts, the districts into cantons. Their administration received a uniform

and hierarchical form. The department had an administrative council composed of thirty-six members and an executive directory composed of five members: as the names indicate, the functions of the one were to decide and of the other to act. The district was organized in the same way: although on a smaller scale, it had a council and a directory, fewer in number and subordinate to the superior directory and council. The canton, composed of five or six parishes, was an electoral, not an administrative, division; the active citizens, and to be considered such it was necessary to pay taxes amounting to three days' earnings, united in the canton to nominate their deputies and magistrates. Everything in the new plan was subject to election, but this had several degrees. It appeared imprudent to confide to the multitude the choice of its delegates, and illegal to exclude them from it; this difficult question was avoided by the double election. The active citizens of the canton named electors intrusted with nominating the members of the national assembly, the administrators of the department, those of the district, and the judges of tribunals; a criminal court was established in each department, a civil court in each district, and a police court in each canton.

Such was the institution of the department. It remained to regulate that of the corporation: the administration of this was confided to the general council and a municipality, composed of members whose numbers were proportioned to the population of the towns. The municipal officers were named immediately by the people, and they alone could authorize the employment of armed force. The corporation formed the first step of the association, the kingdom formed the last; the department was intermediate between the corporation and the state, between universal interests and purely local interests.

The working of the system, however, disappointed the authors of it. Before the revolution France had been divided into four jurisdictions: (1) Dioceses, of which there were one hundred and eleven; (2) provinces, numbering forty-one; (3) généralités and dependencies of a fiscal character; (4) military recruiting areas. No state could have suffered, without harm, so violent an uprooting of its historic institutions as this drastic action. The abrupt break made by it with the past did much to destroy reverence for tradition and respect for law in the minds of the French people. The new and artificial nature of the sys-

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tem was made less likely to succeed by the fact that probably one-half of the authorities in the cantons and small municipalities were unable to read or write. Although it had been decided that the old boundaries and facility of intercourse should receive as much consideration as possible, yet in fact the kingdom was divided, without heeding historical development, into 83 departments, 574 arrondissements, 4730 cantons, and 44,000 municipalities. The acquisition of Avignon, Venaissin, and Vaucluse in 1791 added an eighty-fourth department; the department of the Rhône-and-Loire was later separated into two, giving 85 departments, and a similar division in the region of the Garonne created 86. Except during Napoleon's conquests this remained the number of departments until Napoleon III. added Nice and Savoy in 1859, making three new departments. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 reduced the number again to 86, as France is to-day. Paris received a special organization. The capital had been divided after the fall of the Bastille into 60 "sections," which were not to have the right to meet together unless convoked by the city council. But this was rendered null by an article that required this convocation whenever asked by eight sections. For each section there was a permanent committee of sixteen persons, whose functions were not clearly defined. The question of the organization of Paris is the pivotal point of the revolution in its succeeding phases.

The states of Languedoc and Brittany protested against the new division of the kingdom, and on their side the parlements of Metz, Rouen, Bordeaux, and Toulouse rose against the operations of the assembly which suppressed the *chambres de vacations*, abolished the orders, and declared the commissions of the states incompetent. The partisans of the ancient régime employed every means to disturb its progress: the nobility excited the provinces, the parlements took resolutions, the clergy issued mandates, and writers took advantage of the liberty of the press to attack the revolution. Its two principal enemies were the nobles and the bishops. Parlement, having no root in the nation, formed only a magistracy, whose attacks were prevented by destroying the magistracy itself, whereas the nobility and the clergy had means of action which survived the influence of the body. The misfortunes of these two classes were caused by themselves. After harassing the revolution in the assembly, they afterward attacked it with open force—the clergy, by internal insurrection—the nobility, by arming Europe

against it. They had great expectations from anarchy, which, it is true, caused France many evils, but which was far from rendering their own position better. Let us now see how the hostilities of the clergy were brought on; for this purpose we must go back a little.

The revolution had commenced with the finances, and had not yet been able to put an end to the embarrassments by which it was caused. More important objects had occupied the attention of the assembly. Summoned, no longer to defray the expenses of administration, but to constitute the state, it had suspended its legislative discussions, from time to time, in order to satisfy the more pressing necessities of the treasury. Necker had proposed provisional means, which had been adopted in confidence, and almost without discussion. Despite this zeal, he did not without displeasure see the finances considered as subordinate to the constitution, and the ministry to the assembly. A first loan of thirty millions (\$6,000,000), voted on August 9, had not succeeded; a subsequent loan of eighty millions (\$16,000,000), voted on the 27th of the same month, had been insufficient.³ Duties were reduced or abolished, and they yielded scarcely anything, owing to the difficulty of collecting them. It became useless to have recourse to public confidence, which refused its aid; and in September Necker had proposed, as the only means, an extraordinary contribution of a fourth of the revenue, to be paid at once. Each citizen was to fix his proportion himself, making use of that simple form of oath, which well expressed these first days of honor and patriotism: "I declare with truth."

Mirabeau now caused Necker to be invested with a complete financial dictatorship. He spoke of the urgent wants of the state, of the labors of the assembly, which did not permit it to discuss the plan of the minister, and which at the same time prevented its examining any other; of Necker's skill, which insured the success of his own measure; and urged the assembly to leave with him the responsibility of its success, by confidently adopting it. As some did not approve of the views of the minister, and others suspected the intentions of Mirabeau with respect to him, he closed

³ Necker had first negotiated these loans at five per cent. The national assembly cut the rate down to four and one-half. The American War had cost France between 1000 and 1200 millions, and part of this amount still remained unpaid and was included in the loan proposed by Necker. Stourm, "*Les Finances de l'ancienne régime et de la Révolution*," vol. II. p. 205.

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his speech, one of the most eloquent he ever delivered, by displaying bankruptcy impending, and exclaiming: "Vote this extraordinary subsidy, and may it prove sufficient! Vote it; for if you have doubts respecting the means, you have none respecting the want, and our inability to supply it. Vote it, for the public circumstances will not bear delay, and we shall be accountable for all postponement. Beware of asking for time; misfortune never grants it. Gentlemen, on the occasion of a ridiculous motion at the Palais Royal, an absurd incursion, which had never had any importance, save in feeble imaginations, or the minds of men of ill designs and bad faith, you once heard these words, 'Catiline is at the gates of Rome, and yet they deliberate!' And yet there were around us neither Catiline, nor perils, nor factions, nor Rome. But now bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy, is there; it threatens to consume you, your properties, your honor, and yet you deliberate!" Mirabeau had carried away the assembly by his oratory, and the patriotic contribution was voted with unanimous applause.

There was another important financial expedient of Necker's. He had recourse to a modified form of the old Bank of Discount, to be called the Caisse Patriotique. In order to convert the old organization into a national bank, the directors of it were to be chosen by the national assembly. The notes to be put in circulation were to be fixed at 240,000,000, and the state, by a special decree of the government, was to guarantee their security. The capital of the Bank of Discount, which represented at this time some thirty millions in circulation, was to be increased to fifty millions by the creation of 12,500 shares. Numbers of the deputies opposed this measure on the ground that it would associate the government in the possible bankruptcy of the bank. They argued that if the Bank of Discount were strong enough, it had no need of a national guarantee to protect its credit; and if the state had

⁴ The original idea was to persuade the nation to make a *don patriotique*—a patriotic gift—to the government, payable in three annual installments. When this suggestion failed of approval, Necker came forward with an income tax of twenty-five per cent., from which he hoped to acquire 400,000,000 francs! It is true that in favor of this measure Mirabeau, who had a horror of bankruptcy in the government, made one of his greatest speeches. But it is hardly accurate to say that it "was voted with unanimous applause." Necker's enemies adopted the measure, hoping that he and it would fall together. Cf. Morris, "Diary and Letters," vol. I. p. 162. The plan failed from the very beginning. Morris writes on September 20: "The finance . . . seem to be going fast to the devil."

the credit, it ought not to associate its name with a private corporation. Necker proposed this expedient on November 14, 1789; it was adopted on December 17, and on December 19 the Caisse Patriotique was opened to the public. Six days afterward the notes of the bank were two per cent. below par value. The patriotic loan was a failure. By January, 1791, it had amounted to only thirty millions.

In the meantime, immediately after the granting of the patriotic loan, September 26, 1789, there arose a movement which, while having no direct bearing on the issue of assignats, is of interest as showing the feeling that existed throughout France with reference to the condition of the treasury. This was the outbreak of enthusiasm which manifested itself in what were called the "patriotic gifts." Each day the president of the assembly announced new offerings. The announcement is made that "M. Carre and his wife offer 48 livres; M. de Montmouron makes a gift of 8000 livres"; another sends in the annual interest on a loan. The comedians of the king raise a subscription of 23,000 livres, payable the following January. A collegian offers a box of medals. One of the officers of the state offers his services without salary. A manufactory contributes five per cent. of its profits. Watch chains, silver buckles, earrings, jewelry of all sorts, are offered in great abundance. Besides these little gifts there were many larger ones. The young business men of Paris give 6029 livres, a gentleman servant of the king 6000 livres, an "*intendant de la guerre* 26,000 livres."

But this resource had only afforded momentary relief. The finances of the revolution depended on a more daring and more vast measure. It was necessary not only to support the revolution, but to repair the immense deficit which stopped its progress and threatened its future destiny. One way alone remained—to declare ecclesiastical property national, and to sell it for the rescue of the state. Public interest prescribed this course; and it could be done with justice, the clergy not being the proprietors, but the simple administrators of this property, devoted to religion, and not to the priests. The nation, therefore, by taking on itself the expenses of the altar, and the support of its ministers, might procure and appropriate an important financial resource and obtain a great political result.

It was important not to leave an independent body, and espe-

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cially an ancient body, any longer in the state; for in a time of revolution everything ancient is hostile. The clergy, by its formidable hierarchy and its opulence, a stranger to the new changes, would have remained as a republic in the kingdom. Its form belonged to another system: when there was no state, but only bodies, each order had provided for its own regulation and existence. The clergy had its decretals, the nobility its law of fiefs, the people its corporations; everything was independent, because everything was private. But now that functions were becoming public, it was necessary to make a magistracy of the priesthood as they had made one of royalty; and in order to make them dependent on the state it was essential they should be paid by it, and to resume from the monarch his domains, from the clergy its property, by bestowing on each of them suitable endowments. This great operation, which destroyed the ancient ecclesiastical régime, was effected in the following manner:

One of the most pressing necessities was the abolition of tithes. As these were a tax paid by the rural population to the clergy, the sacrifice would be for the advantage of those who were oppressed by them. Accordingly, after declaring they were redeemable on the night of August 4, they were suppressed on the 11th, without providing any equivalent. The clergy opposed the measure at first, but afterward had the good sense to consent. The Archbishop of Paris gave up tithes in the name of all his brethren, and by this act of prudence he showed himself faithful to the line of conduct adopted by the privileged classes on the night of August 4; but this was the extent of his sacrifices. The Abbé Maury precipitated the discussion on September 24 by suggesting the restoration of the tithes to the clergy. It is interesting, at this point, to recall that in June the clergy had offered the church property as a guarantee of the public debt, as had been done before in France, under Charles IX. and Henry III. (1560-1589). At that time it would still have been possible to save the credit of the state by the generous offer. Now, the progress of the revolution had annihilated the credit of the state.

On October 10, 1789, the debate respecting the possession of ecclesiastical property began. Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, proposed to the clergy that they should renounce it in favor of the nation, which would employ it in defraying the expenses of worship and liquidating its debt. He proved the justice and propriety of

this measure, and he showed the great advantages which would accrue to the state. The property of the clergy amounted to several thousand millions of francs. After paying its debts, providing for the ecclesiastical services and that of hospitals, and the endowment of its ministers, sufficient would still remain to extinguish the public debt, whether permanent or annuities, and to reimburse the money paid for judicial offices. The clergy rose against this proposition. The discussion became very animated; and it was decided, in spite of their resistance, that they were not proprietors, but simple depositaries of the wealth that the piety of kings and of the faithful had devoted to religion, and that the nation, on providing for the service of public worship, had a right to recall such property. The decree which placed it at its disposal was passed on December 2, 1789.

From that moment the hatred of the clergy to the revolution broke out. At the commencement of the states-general it had been less intractable than the nobility, in order to preserve its riches; it now showed itself as opposed as they to the new régime, of which it became the most tenacious and furious foe. Yet, as the decree placed ecclesiastical property at the disposal of the nation, without, as yet, displacing it, it did not break out into opposition at once. The administration was still confided to it, and it hoped that the possessions of the church might serve as a mortgage for the debt, but would not be sold.

It was, indeed, difficult to effect the sale, which, however, could not be delayed, the treasury only subsisting on anticipations, and the exchequer, which supplied it with bills, beginning to lose all credit on account of the number it had issued.

They obtained their end, and proceeded with the new financial organization in the following manner: The necessities of this and the following year required a sale of this property to the amount of four hundred millions of francs; to facilitate it, the corporation of Paris made considerable subscriptions, and the municipalities of the kingdom followed the example of Paris. They were to return to the treasury the equivalent of the property they received from the state to sell to private individuals; but they wanted money, and they could not deliver the amount since they had not yet met with purchasers. What was to be done? they supplied municipal notes intended to reimburse the public creditors until they should acquire the funds necessary for withdrawing the notes. Once arrived thus

far, they saw that, instead of municipal notes, it would be better to create exchequer bills, which would have a compulsory circulation and answer the purpose of specie: this was simplifying the operation by generalizing it. In this way the assignats had their origin.

The invention was of great utility to the revolution, and alone secured the sale of ecclesiastical property. The assignats, which were a means of payment for the state, became a pledge to the creditors. The latter by receiving them were not obliged to accept payment in land for what they had furnished in money. But sooner or later the assignats would fall into the hands of men disposed to realize them, and then they were to be destroyed at the same time that they ceased to be a pledge. In order that they might fulfill their design, their forced circulation was required; to render them safe, the quantity was limited to the value of the property proposed for sale; and that they might not fall by too sudden a change, they were made to bear interest. The assembly, from the moment of their issue, wished to give them all the consistency of money. It was hoped that specie concealed by distrust would immediately reappear, and that the assignats would enter into competition with it. Mortgage made them quite as sure, and interest made them more profitable; but this interest, which was attended with much inconvenience, disappeared after the first issue. Such was the origin of the paper money issued under so much necessity, and with so much prudence, which enabled the revolution to accomplish such great things, and which was brought into discredit by causes that belonged less to its nature than to the subsequent use made of it.

When the clergy saw by a decree of December 29 the administration of church property transferred to the municipalities, the sale they were about to make of it to the value of four hundred millions of francs, and the creation of a paper money calculated to facilitate this spoliation and render it definitive, it left nothing undone to secure the intervention of God in the cause of its wealth. It made a last attempt: it offered to realize in its own name the loan of four hundred millions of francs, which was rejected, because otherwise, after having decided that it was not the proprietor of church property, it would thus have again been admitted to be so. It then sought every means of impeding the operations of the municipalities. In the south it raised Catholics against Protestants; in the pulpit it alarmed consciences; in the confessional it

treated sales as sacrilegious, and in the tribune it strove to render the sentiments of the assembly suspected.

Such was the disposition of the clergy, when, in the months of June and July, 1790, the assembly turned its attention to its internal organization. The clergy waited with impatience for this opportunity of exciting a schism. This project, the adoption of which caused so much evil, went to reestablish the church on its ancient basis, and to restore the purity of its doctrine; it was not the work of philosophers, but of austere Christians, who wished to support religion by the state, and to make them concur mutually in promoting its happiness. The reduction of bishoprics to the same number as the departments, the conformity of the ecclesiastical circumscription with the civil circumscription, the nomination of bishops by electors, who also chose deputies and administrators, the suppression of chapters and the substitution of vicars for canons were the chief features of this plan; there was nothing in it that attacked the dogmas or worship of the church. For a long time the bishops and other ecclesiastics had been nominated by the people; as for diocesan limits, the operation was purely material, and in no respect religious. It moreover generously provided for the support of the members of the church, and if the high dignitaries saw their revenues reduced, the curés, who formed the most numerous portion, had theirs augmented.

The consequences of this reorganization were enormous. The bounds of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction were older than any other sort. At the time of the recognition of Christianity by Constantine (311 A. D.) the dioceses of the church had largely coincided with the provincial jurisdictions of the Roman Empire. The fact that a constitution nearly fifteen hundred years old was wiped out by decree cannot be lightly regarded. It provided: (1) That each department should be a diocese; (2) that pastors and bishops should be elected by citizens; (3) that church authorities should be subject to control of civil authorities; (4) that all priests should be required to take the oath of loyalty to nation, laws, and king, and to support the new constitution, although they could not know what this meant, for nobody as yet knew what the new constitution would be, and did not until a year later. The death of the Bishop of Grampy brought the question up. The assembly rendered two decrees, giving local courts jurisdiction in such cases and depriving priests of salary who refused oath. A majority of the clergy refused it

and were deprived of their seats in the assembly. The nation was henceforth divided in the great schism. It irrevocably determined the future course of the revolution and opened the breach between the king and the revolution in every Christian conscience. It made a gulf which could not be bridged over, and therefore it doomed the monarchy to destruction. But the question had another defect: the last possibility was lost to establish between the king and Mirabeau that confidence which was the prerequisite to the carrying out of the latter's plans. Mirabeau was in a high degree responsible for the objectionable decrees, and the king could never throw himself into the arms of a man who had done violence to his conscience, even if he were fully convinced that this man was the only one who could save his life and his throne.

Only nine archbishops out of 135 took the oath—among them the Cardinal-Archbishop of Sens, Loménie de Brienne, Jarente, Archbishop of Orleans, and Talleyrand. July 24 was set as the time limit of oath, and on November 27, 1790, all bishops and curés not taking the oath were declared refractories. It was reluctantly sanctioned by Louis XVI. on December 21, 1790.

The civil constitution of the clergy was eagerly seized upon by those opposed to the revolution. From the outset of the discussion the Archbishop of Aix protested against the principles of the ecclesiastical committees. In his opinion the appointment or suspension of bishops by civil authority was opposed to discipline; and when the decree was put to the vote, the Bishop of Clermont recapitulated the principles advanced by the Archbishop of Aix and left the hall at the head of all the dissentient members. The decree passed, but the clergy declared war against the revolution. From that moment it leagued more closely with the dissentient nobility. Equally reduced to the common condition, the two privileged classes employed all their means to stop the progress of reform.

The departments were scarcely formed when agents were sent by them to assemble the electors and try new nominations. They did not hope to obtain a favorable choice, but aimed at fomenting divisions between the assembly and the departments. This project was denounced from the tribune, and failed as soon as it was made known. Its authors then went to work in another way. The period allotted to the deputies of the states-general had expired, their power having been limited to one year, according to the desire of the districts. The aristocrats availed themselves of this

circumstance to require a fresh election of the assembly. Had they gained this point, they would have acquired a great advantage, and with this view they themselves appealed to the sovereignty of the people. "Without doubt," replied Chapelier, "all sovereignty rests with the people; but this principle has no application to the present case; it would be destroying the constitution and liberty to renew the assembly before the constitution is completed. This is, indeed, the hope of those who wish to see liberty and the constitution perish, and to witness the return of the distinction of orders, of prodigality in the public expenditure, and of the abuses that spring from despotism." At this moment all eyes were turned to the Right and rested on the Abbé Maury. "Send those people to the Châtelet," said the latter sharply; "or if you do not know them, do not speak of them." "The constitution," continued Chapelier, "can only be made by one assembly. Besides, the former electors no longer exist; the bailiwicks are used in the departments, the orders are no longer separate. The clause respecting the limitation of power is consequently without value; it will therefore be contrary to the constitution, if the deputies do not retain their seats in this assembly; their oath commands them to continue there, and public interest requires it."

"You entangle us in sophisms," replied the Abbé Maury; "how long have we been a national convention? You talk of the oath we took on June 20, without considering that it cannot weaken that which we made to our constituents. Besides, gentlemen, the constitution is completed; you have now only to declare that the king enjoys the plenitude of the executive power. We are here for the sole purpose of securing to the French nation the right of influencing its legislation, of establishing the principle that taxation shall be consented to by the people, and of securing our liberty. Yes, the constitution is made; and I will oppose every decree calculated to limit the rights of the people over their representatives. The founders of liberty ought to respect the liberty of the nation; the nation is above us all, and we destroy our authority by limiting the national authority."

The Abbé Maury's speech was received with loud applause from the Right. Mirabeau immediately ascended the tribune. "It is asked," said he, "how long the deputies of the people have been a national convention? I answer, from the day when, finding the door of their session-house surrounded by soldiers, they

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went and assembled where they could, and swore to perish rather than betray or abandon the rights of the nation. Whatever our powers were, that day their nature was changed; and whatever powers we may have exercised, our efforts and labors have rendered them legitimate, and the adhesion of the nation has sanctified them. You all remember the saying of the great man of antiquity, who had neglected legal forms to save his country. Summoned by a factious tribune to confess that he had violated the laws, he replied, 'I swear I have saved my country!' Gentlemen," he exclaimed, turning to the deputies of the commons, "I swear that you have saved France!"

The assembly then rose by a spontaneous movement and declared that the session should not close till their task was accomplished.⁵

Anti-revolutionary efforts were increasing, at the same time, without the assembly. Attempts were made to seduce or disorganize the army, but the assembly took prudent measures in this respect. It gained the affections of the troops by rendering promotion independent of the court, and of titles of nobility. The Count d'Artois and the Prince de Condé, who had retired to Turin after July 14, corresponded with Lyons and the south; but the emigrants, not having yet the external influence they afterward acquired at Coblenz, and failing to meet with internal support, all their efforts were vain. The attempts at insurrection, originating with the clergy in Languedoc, had as little effect. They brought on some transient disturbances, but did not effect a religious war.⁶ Time is necessary to form a party; still more is required to induce it to decide on serious hostilities. A more practicable design was that of carrying off the king and conveying him to Peronne. The Marquis de Favras, with the secret support of Monsieur, the king's

⁵ The national assembly met every day in the week, including Sundays, generally holding two sessions each day, one at 9 A. M., the other in the evening. After March, 1790, a regular routine was adopted, three days being devoted to financial considerations and four to the formation of the constitution. The evening sessions were occupied with social or casual business. Aulard, "*Les Orateurs de l'Assemblée constituante*," pp. 43-45.

This may conveniently be made the place to note a measure which Mignet does not mention, the law of December 24, 1789, declaring Protestants, Jews, and actors eligible for all civil and military offices.

⁶ There is an excellent work upon this subject by Ernest Daudet, "*Les Conjurations royalistes du Midi*," Paris, 1881. Cf. Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. I. p. 227.

brother, was preparing to execute it, when it was discovered. The Châtelet condemned to death this intrepid adventurer, who had failed in his enterprise through undertaking it with too much display.⁷ The king's flight, after the events of October, could only be effected furtively, as it subsequently happened at Varennes.

The position of the court was equivocal and embarrassing. It encouraged every anti-revolutionary enterprise and avowed none; it felt more than ever its weakness and dependence on the assembly; and while desirous of throwing off the yoke, feared to make the attempt because success appeared difficult. Accordingly, it excited opposition without openly coöperating in it; with some it dreamed of the restoration of the ancient régime, with others it only aimed at modifying the revolution. Mirabeau had been recently in treaty with it. After having been one of the chief authors of reform, he sought to give it stability by enchaining faction. His object was to convert the court to the revolution, not to give up the revolution to the court. The support he offered was constitutional; he could not offer any other; for his power depended on his popularity, and his popularity on his principles. But he was wrong in suffering it to be bought. Had not his immense necessities obliged him to accept money and sell his counsels,⁸ he would not have been more blamable than the unalterable Lafayette, the Lameths and the Girondins, who successively negotiated with it. But none of them gained the confidence of the court; it had recourse to them only in extremity. By their means it endeavored to suspend the revolution, while by the means of the aristocracy it tried to destroy it. Of all the popular leaders Mirabeau had perhaps the greatest ascendancy over the court, because he was the most winning, and had the strongest mind.

⁷ The nature and extent of this plot are alike a matter of doubt. It is not certain whether a counter-revolution on a formidable scale was planned, or only the escape of the king. Favras' last words on the scaffold were: "It is not I who was the chief of the plot, but they needed a victim and took me." Cf. "*Revue de la Révolution française*," vol. V. p. 64. He never divulged the secret.

⁸ La Marque says: "Mirabeau's worst enemies were his creditors." His father had died in the first month of the revolution and Mirabeau inherited enough to pay his debts, but he was too much absorbed in politics to attend to his personal affairs. He accepted from the king, first, the payment of his debts, amounting to something over 200,000 livres; secondly, a payment of 6000 a month to pay his running expenses; and thirdly, and for this he had not extenuating explanation, the promise that he would receive a million if he would remain faithful to the engagement until the end of the assembly.

Mirabeau sent on May 10, 1790, a written statement of his promises. But if anything was to be effected, it was necessary that Mirabeau have also the power to act. His written advice, clandestinely put into the hands of the king, would at best elicit reluctant consent, but unless the character of the king underwent a radical change, his accepting it so as to carry it out with determination was absolutely out of the question.

The assembly worked unceasingly at the constitution in the midst of these intrigues and plots. It decreed the new judicial organization of France. All the new magistracies were temporary. Under the absolute monarchy all powers emanated from the throne, and all functionaries were appointed by the king; under the constitutional monarchy all powers emanating from the people, the functionaries were to be appointed by it. The throne alone was transmissible; the other powers, being the property neither of a man nor of a family, were neither of life-tenure nor hereditary.

The legislation of that period depended on one sole principle, the sovereignty of the nation. The judicial functions had themselves that changeable character. Trial by jury, a democratic institution formerly common to nearly all the Continent, but which in England alone had survived the encroachments of feudalism and the throne, was introduced into criminal causes. For civil causes special judges were nominated. Fixed courts were established, two courts of appeal to prevent error, and a *cour de cassation* intended to secure the preservation of the protecting forms of the law. This formidable power, when it proceeds from the throne, can only be independent by being fixed; but it must be temporary when it proceeds from the people, because, while depending on all, it depends upon no one.

The new judicial organization was more commendable than most of the other features of the constitution. But its completion was deferred until October, 1790, and until it could be put in operation France was virtually without courts. Thus lawlessness and anarchy profited. Trial by jury did not extend to civil causes. On May 5, 1790, the motion passed that judges should be elected by the people, for six years. Each canton was to have a justice of the peace. Robespierre said that the duty of the *cour de cassation* was "to wage war against the adulterers of the moral existence of the people."

In another matter, quite as important, the right of making peace or war, the assembly decided a new and delicate question, and this in a sure, just, and prompt manner, after one of the most luminous and eloquent discussions that ever distinguished its sittings. As peace and war belonged more to action than to will, it confided, contrary to the usual rule, the initiative to the king. He who was best able to judge of its fitness was to propose the question, but it was left to the legislative body to decide it.

The definition of the war power in the constitution was forced forward by the prospect of war between England and Spain over Nootka Sound (Vancouver), in May, 1790. By the Family Compact of 1762 France had become an ally of Spain, and there was, therefore, prospect of France being drawn into the coming struggle. The king had been induced by the warlike attitude of England to order fourteen ships of the line to be got ready for the campaign. War had a number of partisans among the people of influence. A group animated by the war fever, was headed by Lafayette, partly because the part of a great general and a conquering hero suited his fancy, for his exploits in the American Revolution had, in his own mind at least, settled the question of his military genius without a doubt, and partly because he wanted to humor his old aversion to England.

Very different from Lafayette's position toward the question was that of the Jacobins. The war rumors were welcome to them, and the war apprehensions they fanned with all the characteristic energy of every radicalism. What other subject could they have found so apt to stir all the strongest passions of the human nature in the most violent excitement as war? But though the Jacobins made the most of war rumors, and war apprehensions, they dreaded nothing more than a war. They so little understood the true nature of the legitimate growth of their own policy that they were convinced that a war would result in at once propping up the tottering throne.

This delusion that the war would prop up the throne was shared by some others, who thought that the best way to quench the fire in the interior was to send the turbulent elements to the frontier. But it was a mistake to think that those who made July 14 and October 5, and who afterward carried through the wholesale butchery in the September massacres, would be the most eager to hurry to the frontier to face the enemy.

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The Left wanted the Right to declare war and peace to be vested in the national or legislative assembly. The Right contended that it must remain the exclusive prerogative of the crown. The discussion lasted several days, and both parties had taken the floor when Mirabeau took it. This speech is one of his best efforts. The motion with which he closed his speech commenced by declaring that the right of peace and war belonged with the nation, and then he proceeded to state how and to whom the exercising power should be delegated by the nation. The right to watch over the external safety is confided in the king. He alone is the organ of all international relations. He negotiates and makes the preparations for war, but when the legislative body has expressed its dissatisfaction with the war, the executive is bound to take all measures calculated to bring about its immediate cessation.

Barnave was charged with refuting him from the rostrum. He was a keen dialectician and an expert in supporting his dialectics with venomous insinuations. His leading idea was that the constitution was a division of powers, based on the fact that the expression of the general will is exclusively the province of the representatives of the people. Mirabeau replied with the coldest and most sober reasoning. He showed that Barnave presumed the legislative power and the legislative body to be identical. The principle underlying the constitution was that they are not. According to the constitution the legislative power was not vested exclusively in the legislative body, but in the legislative body conjointly with the king. The simplest legislative act had been made dependent upon the approval of the king till the time for the suspensive veto had expired with regard to peace and war; but just where all questions of expediency imperatively demanded his coöperation, the other delegate of the nation—the king—was not to be deprived of his share in the legislative power.

Barnave tried to answer him, but no answer was possible. A large majority voted with Mirabeau.

The popular torrent, after having burst forth against the ancient régime, gradually subsided into its bed; new dykes restrained it on all sides. The government of the revolution was rapidly becoming established. The assembly had given to the new régime its monarch, its national representation, its territorial division, its armed force, its municipal and administrative power, its popular tribunals, its currency, its clergy; it had made an arrange-

ment with respect to its debt, and it had found means to reconstruct property without injustice.

From the end of the year 1789 "fraternal associations" had been formed in various parts of France. Such were the *Fédération de l'Etoile*, near Valence, in November, 1789; the federation of 15,000 national guards, in Brittany, in January, 1790; the *Fédérations de l'Est*, of the garrisons and the national guards, with headquarters at Epinal, organized March 6, 1790; the *Fédération de Lyons*, May 30, 1790; the *Fédération Alsacienne*, under the presidency of the mayor of Strasburg, June 13, 1790. From Dauphiné the movement spread throughout the valley of the Rhone, and thence over all France.

July 14 approached: that day was regarded by the nation as the anniversary of its deliverance, and preparations were made to celebrate it with a solemnity calculated to elevate the souls of the citizens and to strengthen the common bonds of union. A confederation of the whole kingdom was appointed to take place in the *Champ de Mars*; and there, in the open air, the deputies sent by the eighty-three departments, the national representatives, the *Parisan guard*, and the monarch, were to take oath to the constitution. By way of prelude to this patriotic *fête*, the popular members of the nobility proposed the abolition of titles; and the assembly witnessed another sitting similar to that of August 4. Titles, armorial bearings, liveries, and orders of knighthood were abolished on June 20, and vanity, as power had previously done, lost its privileges.

This sitting established equality everywhere, and made things agree with words, by destroying all the pompous paraphernalia of other times. Formerly titles had designated functions; armorial bearings had distinguished powerful families; liveries had been worn by whole armies of vassals; orders of knighthood had defended the state against foreign foes, Europe against Islamism; but now nothing of this remained. Titles had lost their truth and their fitness; nobility, after ceasing to be a magistracy, had even ceased to be an ornament; and power, like glory, was henceforth to spring from plebeian ranks. But whether the aristocracy set more value on their titles than on their privileges, or whether they only awaited a pretext for openly declaring themselves, this last measure, more than any other, decided the emigration and its attacks. It was for the nobility, what the civil constitution

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had been for the clergy, an occasion, rather than a cause, of hostility.

July 14 arrived, and the revolution witnessed few such glorious days—the weather only did not correspond with this magnificent *fête*. The deputies of all the departments were presented to the king, who received them with much affability; and he, on his part, met also with the most touching testimonies of love, but as a constitutional king. “Sire,” said the leader of the Breton deputation, kneeling on one knee and presenting his sword, “I place in your hands the faithful sword of the brave Bretons: it shall only be reddened by the blood of your foes.” Louis XVI. raised and embraced him and returned the sword. “It cannot be in better hands than in those of my brave Bretons,” he replied; “I have never doubted their loyalty and affection; assure them that I am the father and brother, the friend of all Frenchmen.” “Sire,” returned the deputy, “every Frenchman loves and will continue to love you, because you are a citizen-king.”

The confederation was to take place in the Champ de Mars. The immense preparations were scarcely completed in time; all Paris had been engaged for several weeks to get the arrangements ready by the 14th. At seven in the morning the procession of electors, of the representatives of the corporation, of the presidents of districts, of the national assembly, of the Parisian guard, of the deputies of the army, and of the federates of the departments, set out in complete order from the site of the Bastille. The presence of all these national corps, the floating banners, the patriotic inscriptions, the varied costumes, the sounds of music, the joy of the crowd, rendered the procession a most imposing one. It traversed the city and crossed the Seine amidst a volley of artillery, over a bridge of boats which had been thrown across it the preceding day. It entered the Champ de Mars under a triumphal arch adorned with patriotic inscriptions. Each body took the station assigned it in excellent order and amid shouts of applause.

The vast space of the Champ de Mars was inclosed by raised seats of turf, occupied by four hundred thousand spectators. An antique altar was erected in the middle; and around it, on a vast amphitheater, were the king, his family, the assembly, and the corporation. The federates of the departments were ranged in order under their banners; the deputies of the army and the national guards were in their ranks, and under their ensigns. The Bishop

Talleyrand, of Autun, ascended the altar in pontifical robes; four hundred priests in white robes and decorated with flowing tri-colored sashes were posted at the four corners of the altar. Mass was celebrated amid the sounds of military music; and then the Bishop of Autun blessed the oriflamme, or military standard of the French kings, and the eighty-three banners of the departments.

A profound silence now reigned in the vast inclosure, and Lafayette, appointed that day to the command in chief of all the national guards of the kingdom, advanced first to take the civic oath. Borne on the arms of grenadiers to the altar of the country, amid the acclamations of the people, he exclaimed with a loud voice, in his own name and that of the federates and troops: "We swear eternal fidelity to the nation, the law, and the king; to maintain to the utmost of our power the constitution decreed by the national assembly and accepted by the king; and to remain united with every Frenchman by the indissoluble ties of fraternity." Forthwith the firing of cannon, prolonged cries of "*Vive la nation!*" "*Vive le roi!*" and sounds of music mingled in the air. The president of the national assembly took the same oath, and all the deputies repeated it with one voice. Then Louis XVI. rose and said: "I, king of the French, swear to employ all the power delegated to me by the constitutional act of the state, in maintaining the constitution decreed by the national assembly and accepted by me." The queen, carried away by the enthusiasm of the moment, rose, lifted up the dauphin in her arms, and, showing him to the people, exclaimed: "Behold my son, he unites with me in the same sentiments." At that moment the banners were lowered, the acclamations of the people were heard, and the subjects believed in the sincerity of the monarch, the monarch in the affection of the subjects, and this happy day closed with a hymn of thanksgiving.

The *fêtes* of the confederation were protracted for some days. Illuminations, balls, and sports were given by the city of Paris to the deputies of the departments. A ball took place on the spot where stood, a year before, the Bastile; gratings, fetters, ruins were observed here and there, and on the door was the inscription, "*Ici on danse,*" a striking contrast with the ancient destination of the spot. A contemporary observes: "They danced indeed with joy and security on the ground where so many tears had been shed; where courage, genius, and innocence had so often groaned; where so often the cries of despair had been uttered in death." A medal

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was struck to commemorate the confederation; and at the termination of the *fêtes* the deputies returned to their departments.

The confederation only suspended the hostilities of parties. Petty intrigues were resumed in the assembly as well as out of doors. The Duke of Orleans had returned from his mission, or, more strictly speaking, from his exile. The inquiry respecting the events of October 5 and 6, of which he and Mirabeau were accused as the authors, had been conducted by the Châtelet. This inquiry, which had been suspended, was now resumed. By this attack the court again displayed its want of foresight; for it ought to have proved the accusation or not to have made it. The assembly having decided on giving up the guilty parties, had it found any such, declared there was no ground for proceeding; and Mirabeau, after an overwhelming outburst against the whole affair, obliged the Right to be silent, and thus arose triumphantly from an accusation which had been made expressly to intimidate him.⁹

They attacked not only a few deputies, but the assembly itself. The court intrigued against it, but the Right drove this to exaggeration. "We like its decrees," said the Abbe Maury; "we want three or four more of them." Hired libelists sold, at its very doors, papers calculated to deprive it of the respect of the people; the ministers blamed and obstructed its progress. Necker, still haunted by the recollection of his former ascendancy, addressed to it memorials in which he opposed its decrees and gave it advice. This minister could not accustom himself to a secondary part; he would not fall in with the abrupt plans of the assembly, so entirely opposed to his ideas of gradual reform. At length, convinced or weary of the inutility of his efforts, he left Paris, after resigning, on September 4, 1790, and obscurely traversed those provinces which a year before he had gone through in triumph. In revolutions men are easily forgotten, for the nation sees many in its varied course. If we would not find them ungrateful, we must not cease for an instant to serve according to their own desire.

Necker's retirement forced forward a grave political question, namely, how far did the king have a right to select his ministers? Already, in the debates upon the formation of the constitution, Mirabeau had argued that the ministers should have seats in the assem-

⁹ Loménie, "*Les Mirabeau*," vol. IV. ch. xxvii., takes an adverse view of Mirabeau's political honesty. Von Holst, "The French Revolution Tested by Mirabeau's Career," holds a brief in his defense. Cf. the note in Fletcher's edition of Carlyle: "French Revolution," vol. I. p. 344.

bly, after the manner of the English form of government. The Right and Left were, from opposite reasons, opposed to Mirabeau's motion, but part of them were with him, and the Center seemed at first secure. When a motion to exclude the ministers from the assembly was made Mirabeau had replied in a scathing speech. But he did not change the votes. The motion was carried. This meant the adoption of the principle that the executive and administrative departments of the nation were antagonistic. Now, again, Mirabeau made an unsuccessful effort to inject strength into the constitution.

On the other hand, the nobility, which had found a new subject of discontent in the abolition of titles, continued its anti-revolutionary efforts. As it did not succeed in exciting the people, who from their position found the recent changes very beneficial, it had recourse to means which it considered more certain; it quitted the kingdom, with the intention of returning thither with all Europe as its armed ally; but while waiting till a system of emigration could be organized, while waiting for the appearance of foreign foes to the revolution, it continued to arouse enemies to it in the interior of the kingdom. The troops, as we have before observed, had already for some time been tampered with in various ways. The new military code was favorable to the soldiers; promotion formerly granted to the nobility was now granted to seniority. Most of the officers were attached to the ancient régime, nor did they conceal the fact, Compelled to take the oath of fidelity to the nation, the law, and the king, which was become the common oath, some left the army and increased the number of emigrants, while others endeavored to win the soldiers over to their party.

General Bouillé was of this number. After having long refused to take the civic oath, he did so at last with this intention. He had a numerous body of troops under his command near the northern frontier; he was clever, resolute, attached to the king, opposed to the revolution, such as it was now become, though the friend of reform, a circumstance that afterward brought him into suspicion at Coblenz. He kept his army isolated from the citizens, that it might remain faithful and that it might not be infected with the spirit of insubordination which they communicated to the troops. By skillful management and the ascendancy of a great mind he also succeeded in retaining the confidence and attachment of his soldiers. It was not thus elsewhere. The officers were the objects of a general

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dislike; they were accused of diminishing the pay and having no concern for the great body of the troops. The prevailing opinions had also something to do with this dissatisfaction. These combined causes led to revolts among the men; that of Nancy, on August 31, 1790, produced great alarm and became almost the signal of a civil war. Three regiments, those of Châteaueux, Maître-de-camp, and the Régiment-du roi, rebelled against their chiefs.¹⁰ Bouillé was ordered to march against them; he did so at the head of the garrison and national guard of Metz. After an animated skirmish he subdued them. The assembly congratulated him; but Paris, which saw in Bouillé a conspirator, was thrown into fresh agitation at this intelligence. Crowds collected, and the impeachment of the ministers who had given orders to Bouillé to march upon Nancy was clamorously demanded.¹¹ Lafayette, however, succeeded in allaying this ebullition, supported by the assembly, which, finding itself placed between a counter-revolution and anarchy, opposed both with equal wisdom and courage.

The aristocracy triumphed at the sight of the difficulties which perplexed the assembly. They imagined that it would be compelled to be dependent on the multitude or deprive itself entirely of its support; and in either case the return to the ancient régime appeared to them short and easy. The clergy had its share in this work. The sale of church property, which it took every means to impede, was effected at a higher price than that fixed. The people, delivered from the tithes and reassured as to the national debt, were far from listening to the angry suggestions of the priests; they accordingly made use of the civil constitution of the clergy to excite a schism.

¹⁰ There was only one full regiment, that of Maître-de-camp. Besides this, there were four battalions of the Régiment-du-roi and two battalions of the Swiss. It is an interesting fact that the regiment to which Napoleon was attached had mutinied in August, 1789.—Chuquet, "*La jeunesse de Napoleon*," vol. I. p. 118. That there was wisdom in Bouillé's precaution is proved by the action of the national assembly, which on August 6, 1790, forbade the organization of political clubs among the soldiers.

¹¹ Aulard has shown that radical members of the national assembly actually wrote to the soldiers at Nancy, inciting them to revolt! Bouillé intercepted some of the letters. Bouillé died in England in 1800—one of the best soldiers and truest patriots France had in these difficult times.

The Swiss regiment, who had been the leaders of the insurrection of Nancy, were praised as the martyrs of liberty and the avengers of the law. Bouillé, who had put down the revolt, was denounced as alone responsible for the shedding of blood. So, under the pressure of the Jacobin Club and the galleries, the Swiss were amnestied by the assembly.

We have seen that this decree of the assembly did not affect either the discipline or the creed of the church. The king sanctioned it on December 21; but the bishops declared that it encroached on the spiritual authority. The Pope, consulted as to this purely political measure, refused his assent to it, which the king earnestly sought, and encouraged the opposition of the priests. The latter decided that they would not concur in the establishment of the civil constitution; that those of them who might be suppressed would protest against this uncanonical act, that every bishopric created without the concurrence of the Pope should be null, and that the metropolitans should refuse institution to bishops appointed according to civil forms.

The assembly strengthened this league by attempting to frustrate it. If, contrary to their real desire, it had left the dissentient priests to themselves, they would not have formed the elements of a religious war. But the assembly decreed that the ecclesiastics should swear fidelity to the nation, the law, and the king, and to maintain the civil constitution of the clergy. Refusal to take this oath was to be attended by the substitution of others in their bishoprics and curés. The assembly hoped that the higher clergy from interest and the lower clergy from ambition would adopt this measure.

The bishops, on the contrary, thought that all the ecclesiastics would follow their example, and that by refusing to swear they would leave the state without public worship and the people without priests. The result satisfied the expectations of neither party; the majority of the bishops and curés of the assembly refused to take the oath, but a few bishops and many curés took it. The dissentient incumbents were deprived and the electors nominated successors to them, who received canonical institution from the Bishops of Autun and Lida. But the deprived ecclesiastics refused to abandon their functions, and declared their successors intruders, the sacraments administered by them null; and all Christians who should venture to recognize them excommunicated. They did not leave their dioceses; they issued charges and excited the people to disobey the laws; and thus an affair of private interest become first a matter of religion and then a matter of party. There were two bodies of clergy, one "constitutional," the other "refractory"; each had its partisans and they treated each other as rebels and heretics. According to passion or interest, religion became an instrument or an

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obstacle; and while the priests made fanatics the revolution made infidels. The people, not yet affected with this malady of the upper classes, lost, especially in towns, the faith of their fathers from the imprudence of these who placed them between the revolution and their religion. "The bishops," said the Marquis de Ferrières, who will not be suspected, "refused to fall in with my arrangements, and by their guilty intrigues closed every approach to reconciliation, sacrificing the Catholic religion to an insane obstinacy and a discreditable attachment to their wealth."

Every party sought to gain the people; it was courted as sovereign. After attempting to influence it by religion, other means was employed, that of the clubs. At that period clubs were private assemblies in which the measures of government, the business of the state, and the decrees of the assembly were discussed; their deliberations had no authority, but they exercised a certain influence. The first club owed its origin to the Breton deputies, who already met together at Versailles to consider the course of proceeding they should take. When the national representatives were transferred from Versailles to Paris the Breton deputies and those of the assembly who were of their views held their sittings in the old convent of the Jacobins, which subsequently gave its name to their meetings. It did not at first cease to be a preparatory assembly, but as all things increase in time, the Jacobin Club did not confine itself to influencing the assembly; it sought also to influence the municipality and the people, and received as associates members of the municipality and common citizens. Its organization became more regular, its action more powerful; its sittings were regularly reported in the papers; it created branch clubs in the provinces and raised by the side of legal power another power which first counseled and then conducted it.

The growth of the Jacobin Club was phenomenal. There was one in Marseilles before the end of the first year of the revolution; in June, 1790, there were sixty; by autumn they numbered a hundred and fifty; in two months, in 1791, six hundred new clubs were organized; by June, 1792, there were over a thousand Jacobin Clubs. While their membership was large, it was the fine organization which was the secret of success.

The official style of the Jacobin Club was "*Société des Amis de la Constitution*." On September 21, 1792, this was changed to "*Société des Jacobins amis de la liberté et de l'égalité*." The meet-

ings of the club were closed until October 12, 1791, when they were thrown open to the public.¹²

Secession from the Jacobin Club did not take place until after the attempted flight of the king to Varennes, June 20, 1791. After that event the Club of '89, popularly called the Feuillant Club, from the Maison des Feuillants in the Rue St. Honoré, was organized. Sieyès, Chapelier, Lafayette, La Rochefoucauld directed it, as Lameth and Barnave directed that of the Jacobins. Mirabeau belonged to both, and by both was equally courted. These clubs, of which the one prevailed in the assembly and the other among the people, were attached to the new order of things, though in different degrees. Both clubs were monarchical in political tendency, but the Jacobins inclined toward radical democracy, and ultimately became republican. Throughout the history of the revolution the Jacobin Club reflects the dominant politics of the time. The "*Club des Cordeliers, société des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*," named from its meeting place in the convent of the Cordeliers, was even more inclined to republicanism. It was not an offshoot of the Jacobin Club, but an organization of the electors in the district of the Cordeliers. Its first political move was to demand the deposition of the king and the establishment of a republic, on June 20, 1791. When the Jacobins became republican, the difference between the two clubs was more one of method than of political belief. The Cordeliers never had the complete organization enjoyed by the Jacobin Club. It was extinguished with the Terror in 1794. Danton was its political chief, Camille Desmoulins its intellectual leader. His paper, the *Vieux Cordelier*, was the organ of the society. It first appeared in December, 1793.

The aristocracy sought to attack the revolution with its own arms; it opened royalist clubs to oppose the popular clubs. The "*Club des Impartiaux*" was founded in January, 1790, but did not last long. It appeared under another form a year later as the "*Société des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique*"—the "*Club Monarchique*." It sought to render itself popular with the lower classes, and distributed bread; but far from accepting its overtures, the people considered such establishments as a counter-revolutionary movement. It disturbed the sittings, and obliged the members

¹² See Taine, "French Revolution"; Aulard, "*La Société des Jacobins*," 2 vols., 1889. At p. 81 of the first volume is to be found the constitution of the society and the list of affiliated clubs. See also Challemel, "*Les Clubs contre-révolutionnaires*," 1895.

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several times to change their place of meeting. The Jacobin Club formally denounced it on Christmas Day, 1790, and it was closed by the city authorities on March 28, 1791, as a police measure, in order to prevent rioting.

The distrust of the multitude was extreme; the departure of the king's aunts, to which it attached an exaggerated importance, increased its uneasiness and led it to suppose another departure was preparing. These suspicions were not unfounded, and they occasioned a kind of rising which the anti-revolutionists sought to turn to account by carrying off the king. This project failed, owing to the resolution and skill of Lafayette. While the crowd went to Vincennes to demolish the dungeon which they said communicated with the Tuileries, and would favor the flight of the king, more than six hundred persons armed with swords and daggers entered the Tuileries to compel the king to flee. Lafayette, who had repaired to Vincennes to disperse the multitude, returned to quell the anti-revolutionists of the château, after dissipating the mob of the popular party, and by this second expedition he regained the confidence which his first had lost him.¹³

The attempt rendered the escape of Louis XVI. more feared than ever. Accordingly, a short time after, when he wished to go to Saint Cloud, he was prevented by the crowd and even by his own guard, despite the efforts of Lafayette, who endeavored to make them respect the law and the liberty of the monarch. The assembly on its side, after having decreed the inviolability of the prince, after having regulated his constitutional guard and assigned the regency to the nearest male heir to the crown, declared that his flight from the kingdom would lead to his dethronement. The increasing emigration, the open avowal of its objects and the threatening attitude of the European cabinets, all cherished the fear that the king might adopt such a determination.

Then, for the first time, the assembly sought to stop the progress of emigration by a decree, but this decree was a difficult question. If they punished those who left the kingdom they violated

¹³ The attack of the mob upon the château of Vincennes was inspired by the same feeling as that which had actuated the men who beset the Bastille. Each structure was regarded as the symbol of absolutism. The immediate occasion was due to an endeavor of the municipality of Paris to put the castle in a state of repair in order to use it as a prison. The populace misunderstood the purpose of the act. Some time before this Lafayette had urged Louis XVI. to make himself popular by demolishing the castle.—“*Mémoires*,” vol. II. p. 465.

the maxims of liberty, rendered sacred by the declaration of rights; if they did not raise obstacles to emigration they endangered the safety of France, as the nobles merely quitted it in order to invade it. In the assembly, setting aside those who favored emigration, some looked only at the right, others only at the danger, and everyone sided with or opposed the restrictive law, according to his mode of viewing the subject. Those who desired the law wished it to be mild; but only one law could be practicable at such a moment, and the assembly shrank from enacting it. This law, by the arbitrary order of a committee of three members, was to pronounce a sentence of civil death on the fugitive and the confiscation of his property. "The horror expressed on the reading of this project," cried Mirabeau, "proves that this is a law worthy of being placed in the code of Draco, and cannot find place among the decrees of the national assembly of France. I proclaim that I shall consider myself released from every oath of fidelity I have made toward those who may be infamous enough to nominate a dictatorial commission. The popularity I covet, and which I have the honor to enjoy, is not a feeble reed; I wish it to take root in the soil, based on justice and liberty." The exterior position was not yet sufficiently alarming for the adoption of such a measure of safety and revolutionary defense.¹⁴

Mirabeau did not long enjoy the popularity which he imagined he was so sure of. That was the last sitting he attended. A few days afterward he terminated a life worn out by passions and toil. His death, which happened on April 2, 1791, was considered a public calamity; all Paris attended his funeral; there was a general mourning throughout France, and his remains were deposited in the Panthéon, which had just been "consecrated to the great men of France by a grateful country." No one succeeded him in power and popularity; and for a long time, in difficult discussions, the eyes of the assembly would turn toward the seat from which they had been accustomed to hear the commanding eloquence that terminated their debates. Mirabeau, after having assisted the revolution with his daring in seasons of trial, and with his powerful

¹⁴ The proposition forcibly to prevent emigration was first made on February 21, 1791. The motion to create a committee of three was made a week later, and failed to carry, chiefly owing to Mirabeau's attack. The question did not come up again until midsummer. It is interesting to observe that the formidable discretionary powers here advocated for the committee foreshadow the creation of the committee of public safety.

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reasoning since its victory, died seasonably. He was revolving vast designs; he wished to strengthen the throne and consolidate the revolution: two attempts extremely difficult at such a time. It is to be feared that royalty, if he had made it independent, would have put down the revolution; or, if he had failed, that the revolution would have put down royalty.¹⁵ It is perhaps impossible to convert an ancient power into a new order; perhaps a revolution must be prolonged in order to become legitimate, and the throne, as it recovers, acquire the novelty of the other institutions.

From October 5 and 6, 1789, to the month of April, 1791, the national assembly completed the reorganization of France; the court gave itself up to petty intrigues and projects of flight; the privileged classes sought for new means of power, those which they formerly possessed having been successively taken from them. They took advantage of all the opportunities of disorder which circumstances furnished them with to attack the new régime and restore the old by means of anarchy. At the opening of the parlements the nobility caused the *chambres de vacations* to protest; when the provinces were abolished it made the orders protest. As soon as the departments were formed it tried new elections; when the old writs had expired it sought the dissolution of the assembly; when the new military code passed it endeavored to excite the defection of the officers; lastly, all these means of opposition failing to effect the success of its designs, it emigrated to excite Europe against the revolution. The clergy, on its side, discontented with the loss of its possessions still more than with the ecclesiastical constitution, sought to destroy the new order by insurrections and to bring on insurrections by a schism. Thus it was during this epoch that parties became gradually disunited and that the two classes hostile to the revolution prepared the elements of civil and foreign war.

¹⁵ The opinion of critical historians to-day is that Mirabeau was the greatest statesman of the revolutionary period and that, if he had lived, the fall of the monarchy might have been averted. Cf. Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. p. 300 ff.; Von Holst, "The French Revolution Tested by Mirabeau's Career," *passim*, espec. vol. II. pp. 241 ff.

Chapter VI

THE CLOSE OF THE ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 30, 1791

THE French Revolution was to change the political state of Europe, to terminate the strife of kings among themselves and to commence that between kings and people. This would have taken place much later had not the kings themselves provoked it. They sought to suppress the revolution, and they extended it; for by attacking it they were to render it victorious. Europe had then arrived at the term of the political system which swayed it. The existence of the several states after being internal under the feudal government had become external under the monarchical government. The first period terminated almost at the same time among all the great nations of Europe. Then kings who had so long been at war with their vassals, because they were in contact with them, encountered each other on the boundaries of their kingdoms and fought. As no domination could become universal, neither that of Charles V. (1519-1556) nor that of Louis XIV. (1642-1715), the weak always uniting against the strong, after several vicissitudes of superiority and alliance, a sort of European equilibrium was established. To appreciate ulterior events it will not be unuseful to consider this equilibrium before the revolution.

Austria, England, and France had been from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the middle of the eighteenth century the three great powers of Europe. Interest had leagued the first two against the third. Austria had reason to dread the influence of France in the Netherlands; England feared it on the sea. Rivalry of power and commerce often set them at variance, and they sought to weaken or plunder each other. Spain, since a prince of the house of Bourbon had been on the throne, was the ally of France against England. This, however, was a fallen power; confined to a corner of the Continent, oppressed by the system of Philip II., deprived by family compact of the only enemy that could keep it in action, by sea only had it retained any of its ancient superiority. But France had

other allies on all sides of Austria: Sweden on the north; Poland and the Porte on the east; in the south of Germany, Bavaria; Prussia on the west; and in Italy, the kingdom of Naples. These powers, having reason to dread the encroachment of Austria, were naturally the allies of her enemy. Piedmont, placed between the two systems of alliance, sided, according to circumstances and its interests, with either. Holland was united with England or with France, as the party of the stadtholder or that of the people prevailed in the republic. Switzerland was neutral.

In the last half of the eighteenth century two powers had risen in the north, Russia and Prussia. The latter had been changed from a simple electorate into an important kingdom by Frederick William (1713-1740), who had given it a treasure and an army; and by his son, Frederick the Great (1740-1786), who had made use of these to extend his territory. Russia, long unconnected with the other states, had been more especially introduced into the politics of Europe by Peter I. (1689-1725) and Catherine II. (1762-1796). The accession of these two powers considerably modified the ancient alliances. In concert with the cabinet of Vienna, Russia and Prussia had executed the first partition of Poland in 1772; and after the death of Frederick the Great the Empress Catherine and the Emperor Joseph united in 1785 to effect that of European Turkey.

The cabinet of Versailles, weakened since the imprudent and unfortunate Seven Years' War, had assisted in the partition of Poland without opposing it, had raised no obstacle to the fall of the Ottoman empire, and even allowed its ally, the republican party in Holland, to sink under the blows of Prussia and England, without assisting it. The latter powers had in 1787 reëstablished by force the hereditary stadtholderate of the United Provinces. The only act which did honor to French policy was the support it had happily given to the emancipation of North America. The revolution of 1789, while extending the moral influence of France, diminished still more its diplomatic influence.

England, under the government of the younger Pitt, was alarmed in 1788 at the ambitious projects of Russia, and united with Holland and Prussia to put an end to them. Hostilities were on the point of commencing when the Emperor Joseph died in February, 1790, and was succeeded by Leopold, who in July accepted the Convention of Reichenbach. This convention, by the mediation of England, Russia, and Holland, settled the terms of

the peace between Austria and Turkey, which was signed definitely, on August 4, 1791, at Sistova. The convention at the same time provided for the pacification of the Netherlands. Urged by England and Prussia, Catherine II. also made peace with the Porte at Jassy, on December 29, 1791. These negotiations, and the treaties they gave rise to, terminated the political struggles of the eighteenth century, and left the powers free to turn their attention to the French Revolution.¹

The princes of Europe, who had hitherto had no enemies but themselves, viewed it in the light of a common foe. The revolution, by placing France in an exceptional situation, had changed its relations with the other states. By accomplishing a revolution within, France had introduced a new cause of conflict: the opposition between two political systems, between two opposing conceptions of government. The destruction of the old régime was an example given to other peoples, an act of indirect political propaganda. So great was this disquietude on the part of the European states that on May 22, 1790, the national assembly denounced any warlike enterprise "with a view of making conquests." In the very next month this pacific declaration was seriously compromised. The people of Avignon, a county on the Rhone, were subjects of the Pope, but in June, 1790, rebelled and asked to be annexed to France. The government of France refused so to do, but in the interest of public safety in Avignon it sent French troops to establish order. Later France acknowledged the "right of a sovereign people to choose its own ruler," and annexed the territory (September 14, 1791) thereby overthrowing the international laws of Europe; it rejected tradition and the doctrine of obedience to an arbitrary sovereign. The ancient relations of war and of alliance, already overlooked during the Seven Years' War, now ceased entirely: Sweden united with Russia and Prussia with Austria. There was nothing now but the kings on one side and the peoples on the other, waiting for the auxiliaries which its example, or the faults of the princes, might give it. A general coalition was soon formed against the French Revolution. Austria's participation was in order to prevent the spread of revolutionary influences in the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). England sought to avenge

¹ The best account of the important history here briefly summarized is to be found in the first volume of Sorel; "*L'Europe et la Révolution française*," or the same author's "The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century," which has been translated into English.

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the American war and to preserve herself from the spirit of the revolution, her chief fear being lest the Austrian Netherlands should rebel against Austria and side with France, in which event—as happened in 1792—the Scheldt River and the port of Antwerp, which had been closed since 1648, would be opened, to the detriment of English and Dutch commerce. Prussia wanted to strengthen the threatened absolute power, and profitably to engage its unemployed army; moreover, Prussia, like Austria, feared revolutionary propaganda in the Prussian Rhinelands. The German states engaged in it to restore feudal rights to some of their members who had been deprived of them by the abolition of the old régime in Alsace;² the King of Sweden, who had constituted himself the champion of arbitrary power, to reëstablish it in France, as he had just done in his own country; Russia, that it might execute without trouble the partition of Poland, while the attention of Europe was directed elsewhere; finally, all the sov-

² A great number of German princes owned large estates in Alsace. The Westphalian Peace of 1648 guaranteed sovereign rights to them in these possessions. But these rights had been all swept away on the night of August 4, 1789. Though their claims were incontestable, yet the chance of enforcing them was very small. The Alsatian nobles appealed to the treaty of 1648, which guaranteed their rights and feudal privileges, and refused to submit to the decrees of the assembly. The matter was brought before the national assembly, which, in principle, sustained the Alsatian people in their contention for freedom: "The Alsatian people," said the report presented to the assembly, "has united with the French people because it has willed so to do; it is therefore its will alone and not the Treaty of Munster, which has legalized the union." In sustaining this principle the national assembly really overthrew the old international law and established a new authority, the will of the sovereign people. However, in order to sugar-coat the pill, the assembly passed a decree providing for the indemnification of those Alsatian nobles who had suffered. Legal rights of the foreigners were opposed by reasons of state. Morris's legal quality of mind grasped the difficulty. He admirably expresses it:

"This controversy reduces itself to one point of right and the other of fact. By various treaties the princes have stipulated that the fiefs in question shall be held as heretofore by the German empire. The point of right, therefore, is, whether this tenure does not exempt them from the general decisions of the French nation respecting that species of property. The point of fact is whether the chief of the French or German empire be, by those treaties—*quoad hoc*—the liege lord. This, being a matter of interpretation, must be decided by the publicists, but the whole question being between sovereign nations, it is probable that the decision will depend on everything except the real merits." —"Diary and Letters," vol. I. p. 243.

The question was the subject of protracted negotiations between France and the empire. France offered to indemnify the dispossessed German nobles, but the diet refused to accept the terms. On the whole subject see Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 231 ff.

ereigns of the house of Bourbon,³ from the interest of power and family attachments. The emigrants encouraged them in these projects and excited them to invasion. According to them, France was without an army, or at least without leaders, destitute of money, given up to disorder, weary of the assembly, disposed to the ancient régime, and without either the means or the inclination to defend itself. They flocked in crowds to take a share in the promised short campaign, and formed into organized bodies under the Prince de Condé at Worms and the Count d'Artois at Coblenz.⁴

The Count d'Artois especially hastened the determination of the cabinets. The Emperor Leopold was in Italy, and the count repaired to him, with Calonne as minister, and the Count Alphonse de Durfort, who had been his mediator with the court of the Tuileries, and who had brought him the king's authority to treat with Leopold. The conference took place at Mantua, and the Count de Durfort returned and delivered to Louis XVI. in the name of the emperor a secret declaration, in which was announced to him the speedy assistance of the coalition. Austria was to advance thirty-five thousand men on the frontier of Flanders; the German states, fifteen thousand on Alsace; the Swiss, fifteen thousand on the Lyonnese frontier; the King of Sardinia, fifteen thousand on that of Dauphiné; Spain was to augment its army in Catalonia to twenty thousand; Prussia was well disposed in favor of the coalition, and the King of England was to take part in it as Elector of Hanover. All these troops were to move at the same time, at the end of July; the house of Bourbon was then to make a protest and the powers were to publish a manifesto; until then, however, it was essential to keep the design secret, to avoid all partial insurrection, and to make no attempt at flight. Such was the result of the conferences of Mantua on May 20, 1791.⁵

Louis XVI., either from a desire not to place himself entirely at the mercy of foreign powers or dreading the ascendancy which the Count d'Artois, should he return at the head of the victorious

³ The following princes of Europe may be considered of the Bourbon house: Charles IV., King of Spain; Victor Amadeus III., King of Sardinia, who was father-in-law of Louis XVI.'s brothers; Queen Maria of Portugal; Charles IV., King of Naples; and Ferdinand, Duke of Parma.

⁴ The Emperor Leopold ordered the Elector of Trèves to disperse these groups of emigrants.

⁵ Almost the whole of this grand plan was a figment of the imagination of Durfort.

emigrants, would assume over the government he had established, preferred restoring the government alone. In General Bouillé he had a devoted and skillful partisan, who at the same time condemned both emigration and the assembly, and promised him refuge and support in his army. For some time past a secret correspondence had taken place between him and the king. Bouillé prepared everything to receive him. He established a camp at Montmedy under the pretext of a movement of hostile troops on the frontier; he placed detachments on the route the king was to take to serve him for escort, and as a motive was necessary for these arrangements, he alleged that of protecting the money dispatched for the payment of the troops.

The royal family on its side made every preparation for departure; very few persons were informed of it and no measures betrayed it. Louis XVI. and the queen, on the contrary, pursued a line of conduct calculated to silence suspicion; and on the night of June 20 they issued at the appointed hour from the château, one by one, in disguise. In this way they eluded the vigilance of the guard, reached the boulevard, where a carriage awaited them, and took the road to Chalons and Montmedy. Throughout this course Louis XVI. was a passive follower of Marie Antoinette, who had taken the initiative and conducted the negotiations necessary to their flight. The king's behavior shows how little he understood the situation. He exposed himself to the eyes of the curious and was several times recognized. A postmaster at length stopped his progress.

On the following day the news of this escape threw Paris into consternation; indignation soon became the prevailing sentiment; crowds assembled and the tumult increased. Those who had not prevented the flight were accused of favoring it. Neither Bailly nor Lafayette escaped the general mistrust. This event was considered the precursor of the invasion of France, the triumph of the emigrants, the return of the ancient régime, and a long civil war. But the conduct of the assembly soon restored the public mind to calmness and security. It took every measure which so difficult a conjuncture required. It summoned the ministers and authorities to its bar; calmed the people by a proclamation; used proper precautions to secure public tranquillity; seized on the executive power; commissioned Montmorin, the minister of foreign affairs, to inform the European powers of its pacific intentions;

sent commissioners to secure the favor of the troops and receive their oath, no longer made in the name of the king, but in that of the assembly; and, lastly, issued an order through the departments for the arrest of anyone attempting to leave the kingdom. "Thus, in less than four hours," says the Marquis de Ferrières, "the assembly was invested with every kind of power. The government went on; public tranquillity did not experience the slightest shock; and Paris and France learned from this experience, so fatal to royalty, that the monarch is almost always a stranger to the government that exists in his name."

Meantime Louis XVI. and his family were drawing near the termination of their journey. The success of the first days' journeys, the increasing distance from Paris, rendered the king less reserved and more confident; he had the imprudence to show himself, was recognized, and arrested at Varennes on the 21st. The national guard were under arms instantly; the officers of the detachments posted by Bouillé sought in vain to rescue the king; the dragoons and hussars feared or refused to support them. Bouillé, apprised of this fatal event, hastened himself at the head of a regiment of cavalry. But it was too late; on reaching Varennes he found that the king had left it several hours before; his squadrons were tired and refused to advance. The national guard were on all sides under arms, and after the failure of his enterprise he had no alternative but to leave the army and quit France.

The assembly, on hearing of the king's arrest, sent to him, as commissioners, three of its members, Pétion, Latour-Maubourg, and Barnave. They met the royal family at Epernay and returned with them. It was during this journey that Barnave, touched by the good sense of Louis XVI., the fascinations of Marie Antoinette, and the fate of this fallen family, conceived for it an earnest interest. From that day he gave it his assiduous counsel and support. On reaching Paris the royal party passed through an immense crowd, which expressed neither applause nor murmurs, but observed a reproachful silence.⁶

⁶ On the whole episode see Oscar Browning, "The Flight of the King to Varennes" (1892); Bimbert, "*Fuite de Louis XVI. à Varennes*" (1868); Daniels, *Ludwig XVI. und Marie Antoinette und der Fleucht nach Montmédy*, Berlin, 1890; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 439-454; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 301-314; the itinerary may be found, with times and distances, in Fletcher's edition of Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. IV. p. 109, note 2.

The king was provisionally suspended: he had had a guard set over him, as had the queen, and commissioners were appointed to question him. Agitation pervaded all parties. Some desired to retain the king on the throne, notwithstanding his flight; others maintained that he had abdicated, by condemning, in a manifesto addressed to the French on his departure, both the revolution and the acts which had emanated from him during that period, which he termed a time of captivity.

The republican party now began to appear. Hitherto it had remained either dependent or hidden, because it had been without any existence of its own, or because it wanted a pretext for displaying itself. The struggle, which lay at first between the assembly and the court, then between the constitutionalists and the aristocrats, and latterly among the constitutionalists themselves, was now about to commence between the constitutionalists and the republicans. In times of revolution such is the inevitable course of events. The partisans of the order newly established then met and renounced differences of opinion which were detrimental to their cause, even while the assembly was all powerful, but which had become highly perilous, now that the emigration party threatened it on the one hand and the multitude on the other. Mirabeau was no more. The Center, on which this powerful man had relied, and which constituted the least ambitious portion of the assembly, the most attached to principles, might, by joining the Lameths, reestablish Louis XVI. and constitutional monarchy, and present a formidable opposition to the popular ebullition.

This alliance took place; the Lameth party came to an understanding with André and the principal members of the Center, made overtures to the court, and opened the club of the Feuillants in opposition to that of the Jacobins. But the latter could not want leaders; under Mirabeau they had contended against the Lameths; under the Lameths against Mirabeau; under Pétion and Robespierre they contended against the Lameths. The party which desired a second revolution had constantly supported the most extreme actors in the revolution already accomplished, because this was bringing within its reach the struggle and the victory. At this period, from subordinate it had become independent; it no longer fought for others and for opinions not its own, but for itself and under its own banner. The court, by its multiplied faults, its imprudent machinations, and, lastly, by the flight of the monarch, had

given it a sort of authority to avow its object; and the Lameths, by forsaking it, had left it to its true leaders.

The Lameths, in their turn, underwent the reproaches of the multitude, which saw only their alliance with the court, without examining its conditions. But supported by all the constitutionalists, they were strongest in the assembly; and they found it essential to establish the king as soon as possible, in order to put a stop to a controversy which threatened the new order, by authorizing the public party to demand the abolition of the royal power while its suspension lasted. The commissioners appointed to interrogate Louis XVI. dictated to him a declaration, which they presented in his name to the assembly, and which modified the injurious effect of his flight. The reporter declared, in the name of the seven committees intrusted with the examination of this great question, that there were no grounds for bringing Louis XVI. to trial or for pronouncing his dethronement. The discussion which followed this report was long and animated; the efforts of the republican party, notwithstanding their pertinacity, were unsuccessful. Most of their orators spoke; they demanded deposition or a regency; that is to say, popular government, or an approach toward it. Barnave, after meeting all their arguments, finished his speech with these remarkable words: "Regenerators of the empire, follow your course without deviation. You have proved that you had courage to destroy the abuses of power; you have proved that you possessed all that was requisite to substitute wise and good institutions in their place; prove now that you have the wisdom to protect and maintain these. The nation has just given a great evidence of its strength and courage; it has displayed, solemnly and by a spontaneous movement, all that it could oppose to the attacks which threatened it. Continue the same precautions; let our boundaries, let our frontiers, be powerfully defended. But while we manifest our power, let us also prove our moderation; let us present peace to the world, alarmed by the events which take place among us; let us present an occasion for triumph to all those who in foreign lands have taken an interest in our revolution. They cry to us from all parts: you are powerful; be wise, be moderate; let that be the height of your glory. Thus will you prove that in various circumstances you can employ various means, talents, and virtues."

The assembly sided with Barnave. But to pacify the people and to provide for the future safety of France it decreed that the

king should be considered as abdicating, *de facto*, if he retracted the oath he had taken to the constitution. The president of the assembly in his first communication of the news did not speak of the king's flight as such, but that the king had been carried off. Robespierre was undoubtedly right in declaring his assertion a palpable untruth. A note which the king had left admitted of no question that the fatal step had been taken by his own initiative and in pursuance of his most ardent desire. What was to be done with the king? was the question now to be solved by the national assembly. On the 25th the assembly declared that all persons who had accompanied the royal family should be arrested and the king and queen and dauphin be watched by a special guard. It was moved that these persons should be examined by the tribunal of Versailles. Robespierre demanded that the king and queen, like the rest, should be examined by the tribunal. The motion of the committee about those who had accompanied the royal family was carried, but that left the question open, "What should be done with the king?" Robespierre argued: 1. The question as to what position had been assigned in the constitution to the king, with regard to common crimes, was not at issue, for to try to get out of the country was not a common crime. 2. The constitution had not forbidden the king to leave the country. 3. The constitution had not conferred upon the national assembly the right to sit in judgment over the question whether the king had put himself without the pale of the constitution or not. Just because the question of the flight of the king was not treated in the constitution in any way whatever, it was not a question at all of law. It was a political question. Robespierre demanded that the fate of the king be submitted to the people. Buzot went farther and demanded that the king be at once proceeded against and receive his sentence. The assembly decided that the king should be suspended till the adoption of the constitution, and on September 13 Louis XVI. gave the constitution his sanction.

On the day that this decree was adopted by the assembly the leaders of the republican party excited the multitude against it. But the hall in which it sat was surrounded by the national guard, and it could not be assailed or intimidated. The agitators, unable to prevent the passing of the decree, aroused the people against it. They drew up a petition in which they denied the competency of the assembly; appealed from it to the sovereignty of the nation, treated

Louis XVI. as deposed since his flight, and demanded a substitute for him. This petition, drawn up by Brissot, editor of the *Patriote Français*, and president of the Comité des Recherches of Paris, was carried, on July 17, to the altar of the country in the Champ de Mars: an immense crowd flocked to sign it. The assembly, apprised of what was taking place, summoned the municipal authorities to its bar and directed them to preserve the public tranquillity. Lafayette marched against the crowd, and in the first instance succeeded in dispersing it without bloodshed. The municipal officers took up their quarters in the Invalides; but the same day the crowd returned in greater numbers and with more determination. Danton and Camille Desmoulins harangued them from the altar of the country. Two Invalides, supposed to be spies, were massacred and their heads stuck on pikes. The insurrection became alarming. Lafayette again repaired to the Champ de Mars at the head of twelve hundred of the national guard. Bailly accompanied him and had the red banner unfurled. The crowd was then summoned to disperse in the name of the law; it refused to retire, and, contemning authority, shouted: "Down with the red flag!" and assailed the national guard with stones. Lafayette ordered his men to fire, but in the air. The crowd was not intimidated with this and resumed the attack; compelled by the obstinacy of the insurgents, Lafayette then ordered another discharge, a real and effective one. The terrified multitude fled, leaving many dead on the field. The disturbances now ceased, order was restored, but blood had flown, and the people never forgave Bailly or Lafayette the cruel necessity to which itself had driven them. This was a regular combat, in which the republican party, not as yet sufficiently strong or established, was defeated by the constitutional monarchy party. The attempt of the Champ de Mars was the prelude of the popular movements which led to August 10.

While this was passing in the assembly and at Paris, the emigrants, whom the flight of Louis XVI. had elated with hope, were thrown into consternation at his arrest. Monsieur, who had fled at the same time as his brother, and with better fortune, arrived alone at Brussels with the powers and title of regent. The emigrants thenceforth relied only on the assistance of Europe; the officers quitted their colors; two hundred and ninety members of the assembly protested against its decrees; in order to legitimize

invasion, Bouillé wrote a threatening letter, in the inconceivable hope of intimidating the assembly, and at the same time to take upon himself the sole responsibility of the flight of Louis XVI.; finally, the emperor, the King of Prussia, and the Count d'Artois met at Pilnitz.

On July 6 the Emperor Leopold had addressed a letter to the leading European powers, proposing that they should conjointly declare the cause of Louis XVI. their own, demanding the king's personal liberty and safety, and announcing that the new order of things in France would only be recognized by them in case it was voluntarily sanctioned by the king. This circular letter was an absolutely empty demonstration.

What is said of the circular letter is true in a still higher degree of the Pilnitz convention. The two monarchs made an entirely vague promise to help the king, dependent upon a condition which they knew could not be fulfilled. The very wording of the document shows this:

"His Majesty, the Emperor, and His Majesty, the King of Prussia, having given attention to the wishes and representations of Monsieur (the brother of the King of France), and of M. le Count d'Artois, jointly declare that they regard the present situation of his Majesty, the King of France, as a matter of common interest to all the sovereigns of Europe. They trust that this interest will not fail to be recognized by the powers, whose aid is solicited, and that in consequence they will not refuse to employ, in conjunction with their said majesties, the most efficient means in proportion to their resources, to place the King of France in a position to establish, with the most absolute freedom, the foundations of a monarchical form of government, which shall at once be in harmony with the rights of sovereigns and promote the welfare of the French nation. In that case (*Alors et dans ce cas*) their said majesties the Emperor and the King of Prussia are resolved to act promptly and in common accord with the forces necessary to obtain the desired, common end.

"In the meantime they will give such orders to their troops as are necessary in order that these may be in a position to be called into active service." The emperor is reported to have said: "The words '*Alors et dans ce cas*' are the law and the prophets for me. If England fails us the '*cas*' will not exist at all."⁷

⁷ Quoted from Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. II. ch. vi.

In order to understand this equivocal conduct on the part of the emperor, we must glance at eastern European politics where the dominant interest of the powers lay.

Leopold was determined to cut loose from Russia, with the ultimate view of dividing Turkey between the two powers. The state of Austria was infinitely superior to that of Frederick William II., who had succeeded to Frederick the Great in 1786. Poland was now entering upon a new phase of life. The Polish princes of late had been greatly embittered against Russia. A bold attempt was made to bring about a radical political reorganization of the kingdom.

On May 3, 1791, King Stanislas appeared in the diet and submitted the draft of a new constitution, which was to restore the vitality of the kingdom. Changes made by this were: 1. The crown to become hereditary in the house of Saxony, instead of elective. 2. The *Liberum veto* to be abolished. 3. The bourgeoisie to be admitted to political rights. This *coup d'état* was justified by the assertion, unfounded, that Russia and Prussia contemplated a new partition of Poland. In the history of Poland there is no brighter day than May 3, 1791.

The interest of Austria was evidently to support any movement tending to restore some degree of vitality to Poland, because it would attach a heavy weight to the feet of Russia, which was constantly and energetically striving to block Austria's way in the East, and at the same time, on the other hand, keep Prussia, Austria's rival, in check. To Prussia, too, the political regeneration of Poland was, in the strictest sense of the word, a vital question, and she had in consequence, to the last strenuously to oppose the intention to make the crown hereditary. Everything concerning France is determined with these powers in the last place by what their interests in their opinion dictate with regard to the Eastern Question. The Prussian ministers were fully aware that not a sound political reason could be adduced for Prussia's intervening in France, while many reasons, of the greatest weight, admonished her to desist from such a policy.

This carefully worded declaration, although meant far more as a sop to the importunate emigrants than as a threat to France, only served to irritate the assembly and the people. Men asked one another what right the princes of Europe had to interfere in the government of France; by what right they gave orders to a great

people, and imposed conditions upon it; and since the sovereigns appealed to force, the people of France prepared to resist them. The frontiers were put in a state of defense; a hundred thousand men of the national guard were enrolled.

Meantime, the assembly approached the close of its labors; civil relations, public taxation, the nature of crimes, their prosecution, and their punishment had been by it as wisely regulated as were the public and constitutional relations of the country. Equality had been introduced into the law of inheritance, into taxation, and into punishments; nothing remained but to unite all the constitutional decrees into a body and submit them to the king for his approval. The assembly was growing weary of its labors and of its dissensions; the people itself, who in France ever become tired of that which continues beyond a certain time, desired a new national representation; the convocation of the electoral colleges was therefore fixed for August 5. Unfortunately, the members of the present assembly could not form part of the succeeding one; this had been decided before the flight to Varennes.⁸

The collection of the constitutional decrees into one body led to the idea of revising them. But this idea of revision gave great dissatisfaction, and was almost of no effect; it was not desirable to render the constitution more aristocratic by after-measures, lest the multitude should require it to be made more popular. To limit the sovereignty of the nation, and, at the same time, not to overlook it, the assembly declared that France had a right to revise its constitution, but that it was prudent not to exercise this right for thirty years.

The act of the constitution was presented to the king by sixty deputies; the suspension being taken off, Louis XVI. resumed the exercise of his power, and the guard the law had given him was placed under his own command. Thus restored to freedom, the constitution was submitted to him. After examining it for several days, "I accept the constitution," he wrote to the assembly (September 13, 1791): "I engage to maintain it at home, to defend it from all attacks from abroad, and to cause its execution by all the means it places at my disposal. I declare that, being informed of the attachment of the great majority of the people to the consti-

⁸ Robespierre in May had moved the famous "self-denying" ordinance, which provided that no member of the national assembly might sit in the legislative assembly. Such a doctrinaire resolution simply deprived France of what political wisdom and experience it had acquired since 1789.

tution, I renounce my claim to assist in the work, and that, being responsible to the nation alone, no other person, now that I have made this renunciation, has a right to complain."

This letter excited general approbation. Lafayette demanded and procured an amnesty in favor of those who were under prosecution for favoring the king's flight, or for proceedings against the revolution. Next day the king came in person to accept the constitution in the assembly. The populace attended him thither with acclamations; he was the object of the enthusiasm of the deputies and spectators, and he regained that day the confidence and affection of his subjects. The 30th of September was fixed for the closing of the assembly; the king was present; his speech was often interrupted by applause, and when he said: "For you, gentlemen, who during a long and arduous career have displayed such indefatigable zeal, there remains one duty to fulfill when you have returned to your homes over the country: to explain to your fellow-citizens the true meaning of the laws you have made for them; to urge those who slight them; to improve and unite all opinions by the example you shall afford of your love of order, and of submission to the laws," cries of "Yes! yes!" were uttered by all the deputies with one common voice. "I rely on your being the interpreters of my sentiments to your fellow-citizens." "Yes! yes!" "Tell them all that the king will always be their first and most faithful friend; that he needs their love; that he can only be happy with them and by their means; the hope of contributing to their happiness will sustain my courage, as the satisfaction of having succeeded will be my sweetest recompense."

"It is a speech worthy of Henry IV.," said a voice, and the king left the hall amid the loudest testimonials of love.

Then Thouret, in a loud voice, and addressing the people, exclaimed: "The constituent assembly pronounces its mission accomplished, and that its sittings now terminate." Thus closed this first and glorious assembly of the nation. It was courageous, intelligent, just, and had but one passion—a passion for law. It accomplished in two years, by its efforts and with indefatigable perseverance, the greatest revolution ever witnessed by one generation of men. Amid its labors it repressed despotism and anarchy by frustrating the conspiracies of the aristocracy and maintaining the multitude in subordination. Its only fault was the not confiding the guidance of the revolution to those who were its authors;

it divested itself of power, like those legislators of antiquity who exiled themselves from their country after giving it a constitution. A new assembly did not apply itself to consolidating its work, and the revolution, which ought to have been finished, was recommenced.

The constitution of 1791 was based on principles adapted to the ideas and situation of France. This constitution was the work of the middle class, then the strongest; for, as is well known, the predominant force ever takes possession of institutions. When it belongs to one man alone, it is despotism; when to several, it is privilege; when to all, it is right; this last state is the limit, as it is the origin, of society. France had at length attained it, after passing through feudalism, which was the aristocratic institution, and absolute power, which was the monarchical institution. Equality was consecrated among the citizens, and delegation recognized among the powers; such were to be, under the new system, the condition of men and the form of government.

In this constitution the people was the source of all powers, but it exercised none; it was intrusted only with election in the first instance, and its magistrates were selected by men chosen from among the enlightened portions of the community. The latter constituted the assembly, the law courts, the public offices, the corporations, the militia, and thus possessed all the force and all the power of the state. It alone was fit to exercise them, because it alone had the intelligence necessary for the conduct of government. The people were not yet sufficiently advanced to participate in power, consequently it was only by accident and in the most casual and evanescent manner that power fell into its hands; but it received civic education, and was disciplined to government in the primary assemblies, according to the true aim of society, which is not to confer its advantages as a patrimony on one particular class, but to make all share in them, when all are capable of acquiring them.

This was the leading characteristic of the constitution of 1791; as each, by degrees, became competent to enjoy the right, he was admitted to it; it extended its limits with the extension of civilization, which every day calls a greater number of men to the administration of the state. In this way it had established true equality, whose real character is admissibility, as that of inequality is exclusion. In rendering power transferable by election, it made

it a public magistracy; while privilege, in rendering it hereditary by transmission, makes it private property.

The constitution of 1791 established homogeneous powers which corresponded among themselves, and reciprocally restrained each other; still, it must be confessed, the royal authority was too subordinate to popular power. It is never otherwise; sovereignty, from whatever source derived, gives itself a feeble counterpoise when it limits itself. A constituent assembly enfeebles royalty; a king who is a legislator limits the prerogatives of an assembly.⁹

This constitution was, however, less democratic than that of the United States, which had been practicable, despite the extent of the territory, proving that it is not the form of institutions, but the assent which they obtain, or the dissent which they excite, which permits or hinders their establishment. In a new country, after a revolution of independence, as in America, any constitution is possible;¹⁰ there is but one hostile party, that of the metropolis, and when that is overcome, the struggle ceases, because defeat leads to its expulsion. It is not so with social revolutions among nations who have long been in existence. Changes attack interests, interests form parties, parties enter into contest, and the more victory spreads the greater grows opposition. This is what happened in France. The work of the constituent assembly perished less from its defects than from the attacks of faction. Placed between the aristocracy and the multitude, it was attacked by the one and invaded by the other. The latter would not have become sovereign had not civil war and the foreign coalition called for its intervention and aid. To defend the country it became necessary that it should govern it; then it effected its revolution, as the middle class had effected its own. It had its July 14 in August 10; its constituent assembly, the convention; its government, which was the committee of public safety; yet, as we shall see, without emigration there would have been no republic.

⁹ For some estimates of the work of the national assembly in daring, destroying, and doing, see Pierre, "*Assemblées politiques en France*," ch. i.; Burke's "Reflections upon the French Revolution"; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 464 ff.; Taine, "French Revolution," vol. I. p. 214 ff.

¹⁰ This statement shows the author's inability to recognize the difference between institutions which have grown and institutions which have been made.

PART III

THE FIRST REPUBLIC. OCTOBER 1, 1791.
JUNE 2, 1793

Chapter VII

THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

OCTOBER 1, 1791-SEPTEMBER 21, 1792

THE new assembly opened its session on October 1, 1791. It declared itself immediately the national legislative assembly, and sat in the riding-hall which stood in the present Rue de Rivoli, on ground actually a portion of the garden of the Tuileries. The national assembly had occupied this hall when it came to Paris, and it was the place of meeting of the convention down to May 9, 1793. From its first appearance it had occasion to display its attachment to the actual state of things and the respect it felt for the authors of French liberty. The book of the constitution was solemnly presented to it by the archivist Camus accompanied by twelve of the oldest members of the national representation. The assembly received the constitutional act standing and uncovered, and, amid the acclamations of the people who occupied the tribunes, took the oath "to live free or perish!" A vote of thanks was given by it to the members of the constituent assembly, and it then prepared to commence its labors.

But its first relations with the king had not the same character of union and confidence. The court, doubtless hoping to regain under the legislative the superior position which it had lost under the constituent assembly, did not employ sufficient management toward a susceptible and anxious popular authority, which was then considered the first of the state. The assembly sent a deputation of sixty of its members to the king to announce its opening. The king did not receive them in person, and sent word by the minister of justice that he could not give them audience till noon on the following day. This unceremonious dismissal, and the indirect communication between the national representatives and the prince, by means of a minister, hurt the deputation excessively. Accordingly, when the audience took place Duchastel said to him laconically: "Sire, the national legislative assembly is sitting; we are deputed to inform you of this." Louis XVI. replied still more

dryly: "I cannot visit you before Friday." This conduct of the court toward the assembly was impolitic, and little calculated to conciliate the affection of the people.

The assembly approved of the cold manner in which the president of the deputation had expressed himself, and soon indulged in an act of reprisal. The ceremony with which the king was to be received among them was arranged according to preceding laws. A fauteuil in the form of a throne was reserved for him; they used toward him the titles of sire and majesty, and the deputies, standing and uncovered on his entrance, were to sit down, put on their hats, and rise again, following with deference all the movements of the prince. Some restless and exaggerated minds considered this condescension unworthy of a sovereign assembly. The deputy Grange-neuve required that the words sire and majesty should be replaced by the "more constitutional and finer" title of king of the French. Couthon strongly enforced this motion, and proposed that a simple fauteuil should be assigned to the king, exactly like the president's. These motions excited some slight disapprobation on the part of a few members, but the greater number received them eagerly. "It gives me pleasure to suppose," said Guadet, "that the French people will always venerate the simple fauteuil upon which sits the president of the national representatives, much more than the gilded fauteuil where sits the head of the executive power. I will say nothing, gentlemen, of the titles of sire and majesty. It astonishes me to find the national assembly deliberating whether they shall be retained. The word sire signifies seigneur; it belonged to the feudal system, which has ceased to exist. As for the term majesty, it should only be employed in speaking of God and of the people."¹

The previous question was demanded, but feebly; these motions were put to the vote and carried by a considerable majority. Yet, as this decree appeared hostile, the constitutional opinion pronounced itself against it, and censured this too excessive rigor in the application of principles. On the following day those who had demanded the previous question moved that the decisions of the day before should be abandoned. A report was circulated at the same time that the king would not enter the assembly if the decree

¹ It was Couthon who first used this famous phrase. Compare it with the utterance of Challet on March 21, 1793, in the Central Clubs of Lyons: "Know that you are kings and crowned kings. Do you not feel the sovereignty which circulates in your veins!"

were maintained; and the decree was revoked. These petty skirmishes between two powers who had to fear usurpations, assumptions, and more especially ill will between them, terminated here on this occasion, and all recollection of them was effaced by the presence of Louis XVI. in the legislative body, where he was received with great respect and the most lively enthusiasm.

General pacification formed the chief topic of his speech. He pointed out to the assembly the subjects that ought to attract its attention—finance, civil law, commerce, trade, and the consolidation of the new government; he promised to employ his influence to restore order and discipline in the army, to put the kingdom in a state of defense and to diffuse ideas respecting the French Revolution calculated to reëstablish a good understanding in Europe. He added the following words, which were received with much applause: “Gentlemen, in order that your important labors, as well as your zeal, may produce all the good which may be expected from them, a constant harmony and unchanging confidence should reign between the legislative body and the king. The enemies of our peace seek but too eagerly to disunite us, but let love of country cement our union, and let public interest make us inseparable! Thus public power may develop itself without obstacle; government will not be harassed by vain fears; the possessions and faith of each will be equally protected, and no pretext will remain for anyone to live apart from a country where the laws are in vigor, and where the rights of all are respected.” Unfortunately there were two classes, without the revolution, that would not enter into composition with it, and whose efforts in Europe and the interior of France were to prevent the realization of these wise and pacific words. As soon as there are displaced parties in a state a struggle will result, and measures of hostility must be taken against them. Accordingly, the internal troubles, fomented by nonjuring priests, the military assemblings of emigrants, and the preparations for the coalition soon drove the legislative assembly further than the constitution allowed, and than itself had proposed.

The composition of this assembly was completely popular. The prevailing ideas being in favor of the revolution, the court, nobility, and clergy had exercised no influence over the elections. There were not in this assembly, as in the preceding, partisans of absolute power and of privilege. The two factions of the Left side, who had separated toward the close of the constituent assem-

bly, were again brought face to face, but no longer in the same proportion of number and strength. The popular minority of the previous assembly became the majority in this. But unfortunately France was compelled, on account of the mad motion of Robespierre, to take without a single exception men who were without any political, or at least without any legislative, experience. Moreover, the middle classes were tired of politics. Wherever elections took place only the minority went to the polls. The more radical becomes the revolution, the deeper the weariness and lassitude of politics in the overwhelming majority of the people, and the more radical the small minority who had, in fact, the monopoly of politics. Opinions and parties soon became known. As in the constituent assembly there was a Right, a Center, a Left, but of a perfectly different character.

The Right, composed of firm and absolute constitutionalists, composed the Feuillant party. Its principal speakers were Dumas, Ramond, Vaublanc, and Beugnot. It had some relations with the court, through Barnave, Duport, and Alexander Lameth, who were its former leaders, but whose counsels were rarely followed by Louis XVI., who gave himself up with more confidence to the advice of those immediately around him. Out of doors it supported itself on the club of the Feuillants and upon the bourgeoisie. The national guard, the army, the directory of the department, and in general all the constituted authorities were favorable to it. But this party, which no longer prevailed in the assembly, soon lost a post quite as essential, that of the municipality, which was occupied by its adversaries of the Left.

These formed the party called Girondist, and which in the revolution formed only an intermediate party between the middle class and the multitude. It had then no subversive project, but it was disposed to defend the revolution in every way, and in this differed from the constitutionalists, who would only defend it with the law. At its head were the brilliant orators of the department of the Gironde, who gave their name to the party, Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, and the Provençal Isnard, who had a style of still more impassioned eloquence than theirs. Its chief leader was Brissot, who, a member of the corporation of Paris during the last session, had subsequently become a member of the assembly. The opinions of Brissot, who advocated a complete reform; his great activity of mind, which he developed at once in the journal the *Patriote*, in

the tribune of the assembly, and at the club of the Jacobins; his exact and extensive knowledge of the position of foreign powers gave him great ascendancy at the moment of a struggle between parties, and of a war with Europe. Condorcet possessed influence of another description; he owed this to his profound ideas, to his superior reason, which almost procured him the place of Sieyès in this second revolutionary generation. Pétion, of a calm and determined character, was the active man of his party. His tranquil brow, his fluent elocution, his acquaintance with the people, soon procured for him the municipal magistracy, which Bailly had discharged for the middle class.²

The Left side had in the assembly the nucleus of a party more extreme than itself, and the members of which, such as Chabot, Bazire, Merlin, were to the Girondists what Pétion, Buzot, Robespierre had been to the Left side of the constituent. This was the commencement of the democratic faction which, without, served as auxiliary to the Gironde, and which managed the clubs and the multitude. Robespierre in the society of the Jacobins, where he established his sway after leaving the assembly; Danton, Camille Desmoulins, and Fabre d'Eglantine at the Cordeliers,

² Mignet uses the name Girondist by anticipation. The Girondist party was not so called until the time of the convention. In the legislative assembly they were generally called Brissotins.—Biré, "*La Légende des Girondins*," 1882, p. 34. On the party see Guadet, "*Les Girondins*," pp. 8-16, 36-39; Taine, "*French Revolution*," vol. II. 70-73; Von Sybel, "*History of the French Revolution*," vol. I. pp. 373-380. Lamartine's famous "*History of the Girondists*" created a cult in their behalf in the middle of the last century, but it is now recognized that as a party the Girondists merit more reproach than honor. With individual exceptions, like Condorcet, it was a party without principle and of ineffective leadership.

Brissot had won a doubtful reputation in America. The more the revolution took a radical turn, the more he commanded the favor of the mob. There was nothing of the statesman in him, but if anyone, he had been destined by nature for a political agitator. He used his pen and tongue with equal readiness.

Mignet's eulogy is an altogether false judgment of Pétion. He deserves nothing but execration.

Mignet's statement that the Girondist party "was disposed to defend the revolution in every way, and in this differed from the constitutionalists, who would only defend it with the law," is a euphemistic way of saying that the revolution had not been revolutionary enough; it is approval of further revolution. The Girondists had the conviction that the constitution was no longer abreast of the times. The basis of its leading members was a purely negative one. They schemed to supplant a monarchical form of government by that of a republican type. They were eminently fitted to excite the masses, but absolutely unfit to guide and restrain them. After they had demolished everything there was to demolish, after they had driven the country into a war of which nobody could see the end, they were powerless to control events.—ED.

where they had founded a club of innovators more extreme than the Jacobins, composed of men of the bourgeoisie; the brewer Santerre in the faubourgs, where the popular power lay, were the true chiefs of this faction, which depended on one whole class, and aspired at founding its own régime.

The Center of the legislative assembly was sincerely attached to the new order of things. It had almost the same opinions, the same inclination for moderation as the Center of the constituent assembly; but its power was very different: it was no longer at the head of an established class, and by the aid of which it could master all the extreme parties. Public dangers, making the want of exalted opinions and parties from without again felt, completely annulled the Center. It was soon won over to the strongest side, the fate of all moderate parties, and the Left swayed it.

The situation of the assembly was very difficult. Its predecessor had left it parties which it evidently could not pacify. From the beginning of the session it was obliged to turn its attention to these, and that in opposing them. Emigration was making an alarming progress: the king's two brothers, the Prince de Condé and the Duke de Bourbon, had protested against the accepting of the constitutional act by Louis XVI., that is, against the only means of accommodation; they had said that the king could not alienate the rights of the ancient monarchy; and their protest, circulating throughout France, had produced a great effect on their partisans. Officers quitted the armies, the nobility their châteaux, whole companies deserted to enlist on the frontiers. Distaffs were sent to those who wavered; and those who did not emigrate were threatened with the loss of their position when the nobility should return victorious. In the Austrian Low Countries and the bordering electorates there was formed what was called "*La France extérieure*." The counter-revolution was openly preparing at Brussels, Worms, and Coblenz under the protection and even with the assistance of foreign courts. The ambassadors of the emigrants were received, while those of the French government were dismissed, ill received, or even thrown into prison, as in the case of Duveryer. French merchants and travelers suspected of patriotism and attachment to the revolution were scouted throughout Europe. Several powers had declared themselves without disguise: of this number were Sweden, Russia, and Spain, the latter at that time being governed by the Marquis de Blanca-Florida, a

man entirely devoted to the emigrant party. At the same time Prussia kept its army prepared for war: the lines of the Spanish and Sardinian troops increased on the Alpine and Pyrenean frontiers, and Gustavus was assembling a Swedish army.

The dissentient ecclesiastics left nothing undone which might produce a diversion in favor of the emigrants at home. "Priests, and especially bishops," says the Marquis de Ferrières, "employed all the resources of fanaticism to excite the people, in town and country, against the civil constitution of the clergy." Bishops ordered the priests no longer to perform divine service in the same church with the constitutional priests, for fear the people might confound the two. "Independently," he adds, "of circular letters written to the curés, instructions intended for the people were circulated through the country. They said that the sacraments could not be effectually administered by the constitutional priests, whom they called Intruders, and that everyone attending their ministrations became by their presence guilty of mortal sin; that those who were married by Intruders were not married; that they brought a curse upon themselves and upon their children; that no one should have communication with them, or with those separated from the church; that the municipal officers who installed them like them became apostates; that the moment of their installation all bell-ringers and sextons ought to resign their situations. . . . These fanatical addresses produced the effect which the bishops expected. Religious disturbances broke out on all sides."

Insurrection more especially broke out in Calvados, Gervaudan, and La Vendée. These districts were ill-disposed toward the revolution, because they contained few of the middle and intelligent classes, and because the populace, up to that time, had been kept in a state of dependence on the nobility and clergy. The Girondists, taking alarm, wished to adopt rigorous measures against emigration and the dissentient priests who attacked the new order of things. Brissot proposed putting a stop to emigration by giving up the mild system hitherto observed toward it. He divided the emigrants into three classes: The principal leaders, and at their head the brothers of the king; public functionaries who forsook their posts and country and sought to entice their colleagues; private individuals, who, to preserve life or from an aversion to the revolution or from other motives, left their native land without taking arms against it. He required that severe

laws should be put in force against the first two classes, but thought it would be good policy to be indulgent toward the last. With respect to nonjuring ecclesiastics and agitators, some of the Girondists proposed to confine themselves to a stricter surveillance; others thought there was only one safe line of conduct to be pursued toward them; that the spirit of sedition could only be quelled by banishing them from the country. "All attempts at conciliation," said the impetuous Isnard, "will henceforth be in vain. What, I ask, has been the consequence of these reiterated pardons? The daring of your foes has increased with your indulgence; they will only cease to injure you when deprived of the means of doing so. They must be conquerors or conquered. On this point all must agree; the man who will not see this great truth is, in my opinion, politically blind."

The constitutionalists were opposed to all these measures; they did not deny the danger, but they considered such laws arbitrary. They said that before everything it was necessary to respect the constitution, and from that time to confine themselves to precautionary measures; that it was sufficient to keep on the defensive against the emigrants, and to wait, in order to punish the dissentient priests, till they discovered actual conspiracies on their part. They recommended that the law should not be violated even toward enemies, for fear that once engaging in such a course, it should be impossible to arrest that course, and so the revolution be lost, like the ancient régime, through its injustice. But the assembly, which deemed the safety of the state more important than the strict observance of the law, which saw danger in hesitation, and which, moreover, was influenced by passions which lead to expeditious measures, was not stopped by these considerations. With common consent it again, on October 30, passed a decree relative to the eldest brother of the king, Louis Stanislas Xavier. This prince was required, in the terms of the constitution, to return to France in two months, or at the expiration of that period he would be considered to have forfeited his rights as regent. But agreement ceased as to the decrees against emigrants and priests. On November 9 the assembly resolved that the French gathered together beyond the frontiers were suspected of conspiracy against their country; that if they remained assembled on January 1, 1792, they would be treated as conspirators, be punishable by death, and that after condemnation to death for contumacy, the proceeds of

their estates were to be confiscated to the nation, always without prejudice to the rights of their wives, children, and lawful creditors. On the 29th of the same month it passed a similar decree respecting the dissentient priests. They were obliged to take the civic oath, under pain of being deprived of their pensions and suspected of revolt against the law. If they still refused, they were to be closely watched; and if any religious disturbances took place in their parishes, they were to be taken to the chief town of the department, and if found to have taken any part in exciting disobedience, they were liable to imprisonment.

The king sanctioned the first decree respecting his brother; he put his veto on the other two. A short time before he had disavowed emigration by public measures, and he had written to the emigrant princes recalling them to the kingdom. He invited them to return in the name of the tranquillity of France, and of the attachment and obedience they owed to him as their brother and their king. "I shall," said he, in concluding the letter, "always be grateful to you for saving me the necessity of acting in opposition to you, through the invariable resolution I have made to maintain what I have announced." These wise invitations had led to no result: but Louis XVI., while he condemned the conduct of the emigrants, would not give his consent to the measures taken against them. In refusing his sanction he was supported by the friends of the constitution and the directory of the department. This support was not without use to him, at a time when, in the eyes of the people, he appeared to be an accomplice of emigration, when he provoked the dissatisfaction of the Girondists, and separated himself from the assembly. He should have united closely with it, since he invoked the constitution against the emigrants in his letters, and against the revolutionists by the exercise of his prerogative. His position could only become strong by sincerely falling in with the first revolution, and making his own cause one with that of the bourgeoisie.

But the court was not so resigned; it still expected better times, and was thus prevented from pursuing an invariable line of conduct, and thus induced to seek grounds for hope in every quarter. Now and then disposed to favor the intervention of foreign powers, it continued to correspond with Europe; it intrigued with its ministers against the popular party, and made use of the Feuillants against the Girondists, though with much distrust. At this period

its chief resource was in the petty schemes of Bertrand de Molleville, who directed the council; who had established a Club français, the members of which he paid; who purchased the applause of the tribunes of the assembly, hoping by this imitation of the revolution to conquer the true revolution, his object being to deceive parties and annul the effects of the constitution by observing it literally.

By this line of conduct the court had even the imprudence to weaken the constitutionalists, whom it ought to have reinforced; at their expense it favored the election of Pétion to the mayoralty. Through the disinterestedness with which the preceding assembly had been seized, all who had held popular posts under it successively gave them up. On October 18 Lafayette resigned the command of the national guard, and Bailly had just retired from the mayoralty. The constitutional party proposed that Lafayette should replace him in this first post of the state, which, by permitting or restraining insurrections, delivered Paris into the power of him who occupied it. Till then it had been in the hands of the constitutionalists, who by this means had repressed the rising of the Champ de Mars. They had lost the direction of the assembly, the command of the national guard; they now lost the corporation. The court gave to Pétion, the Girondist candidate, all the votes at its disposal. "M. de Lafayette," observed the queen to Bertrand de Molleville, "only wishes to be mayor of Paris in order to become mayor of the palace. Pétion is a Jacobin, a republican, but he is a fool, incapable of ever leading a party." On November 4 Pétion was elected mayor by a majority of 6708 votes in a total of 10,632. Only one-eighth of those enjoying the franchise had gone to the polls! In this election Manuel became public prosecutor, Danton assistant prosecutor, and Santerre, the brewer of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, was made commander-in-chief of the national guard.

It becomes necessary, at this place, to allude to an extremely important event of this time—the revolt of San Domingo. San Domingo was a French West Indian colony which had, for a long time, constituted an important factor in the economic life of the kingdom. The value of its imports to France preceding the revolution had been great. On May 15, 1791, the national assembly abolished slavery on all French soil, and conferred equal rights of citizenship upon all. This legislation was of a piece with that of

August 4, 1789, for already the revolutionary propaganda had spread to the French colonies, and a fierce negro insurrection had taken place in San Domingo. Too late, September 23, the assembly saw its folly and repealed the act, substituting the right of self-rule by the island planters. But already the white population had revolted from France. There were three elements in San Domingo: (1) The wealthy whites, who discussed questions of representation being demanded from the mother country, or separation from her; (2) the 15,000 free mulattoes who deemed themselves entitled to some share in the blessings of the revolution; (3) even the 400,000 slaves laid claim to the Rights of Man. The free colored people arose, supported by the slaves. The whole island was turned into a field of fearful carnage. Only in the city the whites had some chance to hold their own sufficiently at least to save their lives.

The effect of these events upon the mother country was serious. Bankruptcies in the seaboard cities followed one another. Tropical products and sugar rose to unheard of prices. Riots grew frequent after December, 1791. Organized bands captured the grain transports destined for the large cities and fixed the prices of the necessities of life. The legislative assembly did nothing but denounce the ministers. It paid no attention to what the ministers demanded in order to enable them in the remotest degree to be a government.³

The Girondists were not content with the acquisition of the mayoralty. France could not remain long in this dangerous and provisional state. The decrees which, justly or otherwise, were to provide for the defense of the revolution, and which had been rejected by the king, were not replaced by any government measure; the ministry manifested either unwillingness or sheer indifference. The Girondists, accordingly, accused Delessart, the minister for foreign affairs, of compromising the honor and safety of the nation by the tone of his negotiations with foreign powers, by his procrastination and want of skill. They also warmly attacked Du Portail, minister of war, and Bertrand de Molleville, minister of the marine, for neglecting to put the coasts and frontiers in a state of defense. The conduct of the Electors of Trèves, Mayence, and of the Bishop of Spire, who favored the military preparations

³ On the whole subject, see Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. III, ch. i.

of the emigrants, more especially excited the national indignation. The diplomatic committee proposed a declaration to the king, that the nation would view with satisfaction a requisition by him to the neighboring princes to disperse the military gatherings within three weeks, and his assembling the forces necessary to make them respect the right of nations. By this important measure they also wished to make Louis XVI. enter into a solemn engagement and signify to the Diet of Ratisbon, as well as to the other courts of Europe, the firm intentions of France.

Isnard ascended the tribune to support this proposition. "Let us," said he, "in this crisis rise to the full elevation of our mission; let us speak to the ministers, to the king, to all Europe, with the firmness that becomes us. Let us tell our ministers that hitherto the nation is not well satisfied with the conduct of any of them; that henceforth they will have no choice but between public gratitude and the vengeance of the laws; and that by the word responsibility we understand death. Let us tell the king that it is his interest to defend the constitution; that he only reigns by the people, and for the people; that the nation is his sovereign, and that he is subject to the law. Let us tell Europe that if the French people once draw the sword, they will throw away the scabbard, and will not raise it again till it may be crowned with the laurels of victory; that if cabinets engage kings in a war against the people, we will engage the people in a mortal warfare against kings. Let us tell them that all the fights the people shall fight at the order of despots"—here he was interrupted by loud applause—"Do not applaud," he cried—"do not applaud; respect my enthusiasm; it is that of liberty! Let us say to Europe that all the fights which the people shall fight at the command of despots resemble the blows that two friends, excited by a perfidious instigator, inflict on each other in darkness. When light arrives they throw down their arms, embrace, and chastise their deceiver. So will it be if, when foreign armies are contending with ours, the light of philosophy shine upon them. The nations will embrace in the presence of dethroned tyrants—of the earth consoled, of Heaven satisfied."

The assembly unanimously, and with transport, passed the proposed measure, and on November 29 sent a message to the king. Vaublanc was the leader of the deputation. "Sire," said he to Louis XVI., "the national assembly had scarcely glanced at

the state of the nation ere it saw that the troubles which still agitate it arise from the criminal preparations of French emigrants. Their audacity is encouraged by German princes, who trample under foot the treaties between them and France, and affect to forget that they are indebted to this empire for the Treaty of Westphalia, which secured their rights and their safety. These hostile preparations, these threats of invasion, will require armaments absorbing immense sums, which the nation would joyfully pay over to its creditors. It is for you, sire, to make them desist; it is for you to address to foreign powers the language befitting the king of the French. Tell them that wherever preparations are permitted to be made against France, there France recognizes only foes; that we will religiously observe our oath to make no conquests; that we offer them the good neighborhood, the inviolable friendship of a free and powerful people; that we will respect their laws, their customs, and their constitutions; but that we will have our own respected! Tell them that if princes of Germany continue to favor preparations directed against the French, the French will carry into their territories, not indeed fire and sword, but liberty. It is for them to calculate the consequences of this rousing up of nations."

Louis XVI. replied that he would give the fullest consideration to the message of the assembly; and in a few days he came in person to announce his resolutions on the subject. They were conformable with the general wish. The king said, amid vehement applause, that he would cause it to be declared to the Elector of Trèves and the other electors that, unless all gatherings and hostile preparations on the part of the French emigrants in their states ceased before January 15, he should consider them as enemies. He added that he would write to the emperor to engage him, as chief of the empire, to interpose his authority for the purpose of averting the calamities which the lengthened resistance of a few members of the Germanic body would occasion. "If these declarations are not heeded, then, gentlemen," said he, "it will only remain for me to propose war—war, which a people who have solemnly renounced conquest, never declare without necessity, but which a free and generous nation will undertake and carry on when its honor and safety require it."

The steps taken by the king with the princes of the empire were supported by military preparations. On December 6 a new

minister of war replaced Du Portail; Narbonne, taken from the Feuillants, young, active, ambitious of distinguishing himself by the triumph of his party and the defense of the revolution, repaired immediately to the frontiers. A hundred and fifty thousand men were placed in requisition; for this object the assembly voted an extraordinary supply of twenty millions of francs; three armies were formed under the command of Rochambeau, Luckner, and Lafayette and finally a decree was passed impeaching Monsieur, the Count d'Artois, and the Prince de Condé as conspirators against the general safety of the state and of the constitution. Their property was sequestered, and the period previously fixed on for Monsieur's return to the kingdom having expired, he was deprived of his claim to the regency.

Most of this demur against the emperor and other foreign princes for their support of the emigrants was mere verbiage. The Girondists were determined to have war and had fixed upon a war policy, because their efforts to overthrow the monarchy by previous means had failed. They had endeavored—and partially succeeded—in antagonizing the king and the nation by their drastic legislation against the king's brothers, and the nonjuring priests. Now they advocated war as a last resort. They argued, in event of a successful war, they as the authors of it could dictate their ideas to the king and the nation, *i. e.*, a republican government; on the other hand, in event of failure in war, they calculated that at least such an event would overwhelm the monarchy, and then, upon its ruins, they would hope to erect a republic. Very curiously, the constitutionalists were also in favor of war. They counted that successful war would make the king sufficiently strong to enable him to recover authority as the executive; while, if unsuccessful, the patriotism of France would rally around the king and endow him with dictatorial powers. Thus it came to pass that two parties hostile to one another both wanted war. This accounts for Narbonne's presence as minister of war in the cabinet.

But the Girondists were also influenced by other motives. Their financial situation involved the whole policy and success of the party. The danger of emitting the assignats had now become manifest. All the evils of an ill-regulated paper currency were besetting France. The first emission of four hundred millions had not reduced the debt at all, and had perceptibly injured the credit of the government. In August, 1790, the public debt was esti-

1791

mated at 190,000,000 livres. Nevertheless an additional issue of 800,000,000 in assignats was made in September, an action which had some influence upon Necker's resignation. Now, in prospect of war, recourse was again had to the press and new currency was printed. The national assembly, for current expenses, had spent 800,000,000. Other resources than the paper-press did not exist, so it was resolved on December 17 to issue 300,000,000 more, and in the worst possible shape, that is, in notes from 50 to 10 sou (about one dollar to 20 cents). The aggregate of assignats in December, 1791, amounted to 2,000,000,000.

The calculations of the revolutionists were anything but distinguished for sobriety and exactness. Narbonne was compelled to ask for a law for the more effective levying of troops, for the actual number of troops fell fully 50,000 short of the number on the paper. The French marine was more an object of contempt than of apprehension.

Narbonne's glowing reports had been composed for the satisfaction of the galleries. There was an insufficient number of men, and especially of officers; in ever-increasing numbers they were leaving the country. Four weeks of campaign soon swallowed 52,000,000. Clavière proposed to declare France bankrupt in order to carry on the war. On April 27 300,000,000 of assignats were issued. On May 15 it was resolved to stop payment of all debts which amounted to more than 10,000 livres till further notice.

Robespierre was the only notable leader opposed to the idea of war. He had been from the beginning decidedly against war. "This war," he said, "was planned by the court and all the enemies of liberty in order to form a fit instrument for a counter-revolution and an army hostile to the people. It is madness to commence war against the audacious despots under any leader like Lafayette, the traitor and venal henchman of despotism, against whom the cries of the patriots murdered on July 17 call to Heaven." He could keep the Jacobin club divided on the war question, but he could not prevail upon it to adopt his views. Brissot carried the day, but at the expense of complete rupture with Robespierre. Narbonne and the Girondists plotted war with the view of getting hold of the reins of government. With him, as with hundreds of others, personal wishes and desires were the only true motives of his doings.

On the contrary, the policy of the powers was a pacific one.

In December, 1791, Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria came to an agreement that the force of amicable argument should be tried once more. But the Girondists were determined to have a war, because they were tempted by bloody laurels, and because they hoped a war would help them out of many of the dangers with which they did not know how to deal. Brissot delivered a speech at the Jacobins which left no doubt as to who it was who really wanted war. He said: "We need war firmly to establish liberty. We need war to cure it from the vices of despotism. We need war to rid ourselves of the men who could destroy it."

The assembly determined to force the hand of the emperor. It looked on the electors as merely his agents, and on the emigrants as his instruments; for the Prince von Kaunitz recognized as legitimate "the league of sovereigns united for the safety and honor of crowns." The Girondists, therefore, wished to anticipate war, in order not to give Austria time for more mature preparations. They required from the emperor, before February 10, a definite and precise explanation of his real intentions with regard to France.⁴ They at the same time proceeded against those ministers on whom they could not rely in the event of war. The incapacity of Delessart, and the intrigues of Molleville especially, gave room for attack; Narbonne was alone spared.

What "gave room for attack" still more was the attitude of England. Late in January, 1791, Talleyrand had been sent to England, authorized to propose the cession of the island of France and Bourbon, and the island of Tobago, as the price of an alliance against the emperor. Brissot de Warville even went so far as to

⁴ Mignet has omitted certain important details concerning Leopold's conduct at this time. I quote from Fyffe, "History of Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 10-11:

"On January 16, 1792, Louis informed the assembly that the emigrants had been expelled from the electorate and acknowledged the good offices of Leopold in effecting this result. The substantial cause of war seemed to have disappeared; but another had risen in its place. In a note of December 21 the Austrian minister Kaunitz used expressions which implied that a league of the powers was still in existence against France. Nothing could have come more opportunely for the war party in the assembly. Brissot cried for an immediate declaration of war, and appealed to the French nation to vindicate its honor by an attack both upon the emigrants and upon their imperial protector. The issue depended upon the relative power of the crown and the opposition. Leopold saw that war was inevitable unless the constitutional party, which was still in office, rallied for one last effort and gained a decisive victory over its antagonists. In the hope of turning public opinion against the Gironde, he permitted Kaunitz to send a dispatch to Paris which loaded the leaders of the war party with abuse and exhorted the French nation to deliver itself from men who would bring

propose the retrocession of Calais and Dunkirk. Further, Talleyrand offered to destroy the fortifications of Cherbourg, over against Portsmouth, and an extension of commercial advantages. When England refused to enter into an alliance with France, Talleyrand asked Pitt for a promise of English neutrality. This he got, but events soon put an end to this attitude on the part of England.

When the Girondists heard that England was determined to remain neutral they pressed with more energy to war. Narbonne, the minister of war, being eager for war, Delessart and the Feuillants thought that by crowding him out of the cabinet it would still be possible to obviate war. Not to provoke public opinion, the stanch royalist, Bertrand de Molleville, should go at the same time. Rochambeau, Luckner, and Lafayette wrote letters from the frontier in which they declared the dismissal a public calamity, and these letters were published in the papers. Meanwhile the emperor had officially announced his determination not to go to war unless he was absolutely left to no choice. He informed the Elector of Trèves that the emigrant corps must be dissolved at once, and the elector obeyed the imperial orders.

On February 17 the emperor replied to the decree of the assembly. He mentioned how he had enforced the dissolution of the emigrant corps, and that he honestly desired peace. He said the European coalition had but a conditional existence since the adoption of the constitution by the king, but that it would not be dropped while the king was endangered by republican faction. But Leopold did not live to see one of the greatest wars in history actually declared. On March 9 the news was received that Leopold had died. He was succeeded by his son, Francis II., great in nothing but his absolutistic obtuseness and his crusade zeal

upon it the hostility of Europe (February 17). The dispatch gave singular proof of the inability of the cleverest sovereign and the most experienced minister of the age to distinguish between the fears of a timid cabinet and the impulses of an excited nation. Leopold's vituperations might have had the intended effect if they had been addressed to the Margrave of Baden or the Doge of Venice; addressed to the French nation and its popular assembly in the height of civil conflict, they were as oil poured upon the flames. Leopold ruined the party which he meant to reinforce; he threw the nation into the arms of those whom he attacked. His dispatch was received in the assembly with alternate murmurs and bursts of laughter; in the clubs it excited a wild outburst of rage. The exchange of diplomatic notes continued for a few weeks more; but the real answer of France to Austria was the '*Marseillaise*,' composed at Strasburg almost simultaneously with Kaunitz's attack upon the Jacobins."

against the revolution. Leopold, had he remained living, could not have avoided war, but the character of the war would have been somewhat different. The first impression produced in Paris by his death was that the preservation of peace had been secured, so completely had the Girondists pulled the wool over the eyes of the people.

In truth Leopold's death had broken down the last barrier. The war party was aided by the divisions of the council, which was partly aristocratic in Bertrand de Molleville, Delessart, and others, and partly constitutional, in Narbonne and Cahier de Gerville, minister of the interior. Men so opposed in character and intentions could scarcely be expected to agree; Bertrand de Molleville had warm contests with Narbonne, who wished his colleagues to adopt a frank, decided line of conduct, and to make the assembly the fulcrum of the throne. Narbonne succumbed in this struggle, and his dismissal involved the disorganization of the ministry. The Girondists threw the blame upon Bertrand de Molleville and Delessart; the former had the address to exonerate himself, but the latter was brought before the high court of Orleans. Brissot made a furious attack upon Delessart, on the strength of the correspondence with Austria, which the assembly had received with applause. Brissot now demanded the minister to be impeached for high treason. Violent denunciation made up for his utter lack of proof, and Delessart was thrown into prison.

As Lafayette had some share in the overthrow of the old cabinet, so now he had sufficient influence in the formation of the new to prevent its being exclusively Girondist.

The minister of war, Du Grave, had been brought into the cabinet by Delessart; still his relation to Pétion and Gensonné connected him with the Girondists. Clavière, the minister of finance, and Duranthon, the minister of justice, were considered Girondists.⁵

The king, intimidated by the assaults of the assembly upon the members of his council, and more especially by the impeachment of Delessart, had no resource but to select his new ministers from among the victorious party. An alliance with the actual rulers of the revolution could alone save liberty and the throne, by restoring concord between the assembly, the supreme authority, and the municipality; and if this union had been maintained, the

⁵ See Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. 433-435.

Girondists would have effected with the court that which, after the rupture itself, they considered they could only effect without it. The members of the new ministry were: Minister of the marine, Lacoste; of finance, Clavière; of justice, Duranthon; of war, Du Grave, soon afterward replaced by Servan; of foreign affairs, Dumouriez; of the interior, Roland. The two latter were the most important and most remarkable men in the cabinet.

Dumouriez was forty-seven years of age when the revolution began; he had lived till then immersed in intrigue, and he retained his old habits too closely at an epoch when he should have employed small means only to aid great ones, instead of supplying their place. The first part of his political life was spent in seeking those by whom he might rise: the second, those by whom he might maintain his position. A courtier up to 1789, a constitutionalist under the first assembly, a Girondist under the second, a Jacobin under the republic, he was eminently a man of circumstances. But he had all the resources of great men: an enterprising character, indefatigable activity, a ready, sure, and extensive perception, impetuosity of action, and an extraordinary confidence of success; he was, moreover, open, easy, witty, daring; adapted alike for arms and for factions, full of expedients, wonderfully ready, and, in difficult positions, versed in the art of stooping to conquer. It is true that his great qualities were weakened by defects; he was rash, flighty, full of inconsistency of thought and action, owing to his continual thirst for movement and machination. But his great defect was the total absence of a political conviction. In times of revolution nothing can be done for liberty or power by him who is not decidedly of one party or another, and when he is ambitious, unless he see further than the immediate objects of that party, and have a stronger will than his colleagues. This it was made Cromwell; this it was made Bonaparte; while Dumouriez, the employed of all parties, thought he could get the better of them all by intriguing. He wanted the passion of his time: that which completes a man and alone enables him to sway.

Roland was the opposite of Dumouriez; he had simple manners, austere morals, tried opinions; enthusiastically attached to liberty, he was capable of disinterestedly devoting to her cause his whole life, or of perishing for her, without ostentation and without regret. A man worthy of being born in a republic, but out of place in a revolution, and ill adapted for the agitation and struggle of

parties; his talents were not superior, his temper somewhat uncompliant; his political sagacity was confined to the maxim that to secure increased liberty the power of the crown must be absolutely paralyzed. He had no sense of official decorum, and was never anything more than the minister of his faction. He had formerly been an official of the treasury department. He was unskilled in the knowledge and management of men; and though laborious, well informed, and active, he would have produced little effect but for his wife. Madame Roland attracted men not by her youth or beauty, but by her intellect and the restless urgency of her political ambition. All he wanted she had for him; force, ability, elevation, foresight. Madame Roland was the soul of the Gironde; it was at her house that those brilliant and courageous men assembled to discuss the necessities and dangers of their country; it was she who stimulated to action those who she saw were qualified for action, and who encouraged to the tribune those whom she knew to be eloquent.⁶

The court named this ministry, which was appointed during the month of March, Le Ministère Sans-Culotte. The first time Roland appeared at the château with strings in his shoes and a round hat, contrary to etiquette, the master of the ceremonies refused to admit him. Obligated, however, to give way, he said despairingly to Dumouriez, pointing to Roland: "Ah, sir—no buckles in his shoes." "Ah, sir, all is lost," replied Dumouriez, with an air of the most sympathizing gravity. Such were the trifles which still occupied the attention of the court. The first step of the new ministry was war. The position of France was becoming more and more dangerous; everything was to be feared from the enmity of Europe. Leopold was dead, and this event was calculated to accelerate the decision of the cabinet of Vienna. His young successor, Francis II., was likely to be less pacific or less prudent than he. Moreover, Austria was assembling its troops, forming camps, and appointing generals; it had violated the territory of Bâle, and placed a garrison in Porentrury, to secure for itself the entry of the department of Doubs. There could be no doubt as to its projects. The gatherings at Coblenz had recom-

⁶ The reader is referred to the following upon Madame Roland: Stephens, vol. II. pp. 15-16; Von Sybel, vol. I. p. 378; St. Beauve, "Portraits of Celebrated Women"; Daubain, "*Étude sur Madame Roland*"; Yonge, "Life," etc.; Ida M. Tarbell, "Madame Roland."

menced to a greater extent than before; the cabinet of Vienna had only temporarily dispersed the emigrants assembled in the Belgian provinces, in order to prevent the invasion of that country at a time when it was not yet ready to repel invasion; it had, however, merely sought to save appearances, and had allowed a staff of general officers, in full uniform and with the white cockade, to remain at Brussels. Finally, the reply of the Prince von Kaunitz to the required explanations was by no means satisfactory. He even refused to negotiate directly, and the Baron von Cobentzel was commissioned to reply that Austria would not depart from the required conditions already set forth. The reestablishment of the monarchy on the basis of the royal sittings of the 23d of June; the restitution of its property to the clergy; of the territory of Alsace, with all their rights, to the German princes; of Avignon and the Venaissin to the Pope; such was the ultimatum of Austria. All accord was now impossible; peace could no longer be maintained. France was threatened with the fate which Holland had just experienced, and perhaps with that of Poland. The sole question now was whether to wait for or to initiate war, whether to profit by the enthusiasm of the people or to allow that enthusiasm to cool. The true author of war is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary.

In justice to Austria it should be stated, however, that these terms were required only after Dumouriez, in imperative and categorical terms, had demanded that Austria should both dissolve the alliance with Prussia and disarm. Count Cobentzel's demand was a counter-demand. The Girondists seem to have made a demand impossible to comply with, in order that war might be inevitable, but at the same time that they might escape criticism for having provoked it. Was the war thus begun offensive or defensive?

On April 20, 1792, Louis XVI. went to the assembly, attended by all his ministers. "I come, gentlemen," said he, "to the national assembly for one of the most important objects that can occupy the representatives of the nation. My minister for foreign affairs will read to you the report drawn up in our council, as to our political situation." Dumouriez then rose. He set forth the

⁷ Upon the grounds of war, see Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 381-394; Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 11-13; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. pp. 66-78; Thiers, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 236-239; Talleyrand, "Memoirs," vol. I. pp. 166-167. Upon the condition of Europe at this time, see Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 14-40.

grounds of complaint that France had against the house of Austria; the object of the conferences of Mantua, Reichenbach, and Pilnitz; the coalition it had formed against the French Revolution; its armaments becoming more and more considerable; the open protection it afforded to bodies of emigrants; the imperious tone and the undisguised procrastination of its negotiations; lastly, the intolerable conditions of its ultimatum; and after a long series of considerations founded on the hostile conduct of the King of Hungary and Bohemia (Francis II. was not yet elected emperor); on the urgent circumstances of the nation; on its formally declared resolution to endure no insult, no encroachment on its rights; on the honor and good faith of Louis XVI., the depositary of the dignity and safety of France, he demanded war against Austria. Louis XVI. then said, in a voice slightly tremulous: "You have heard, gentlemen, the result of my negotiations with the court of Vienna. The conclusions of the report are based upon the unanimous opinion of my council; I have myself adopted them. They are conformable with the wishes often expressed to me by the national assembly, and with the sentiments frequently testified by bodies of citizens in different parts of the kingdom; all prefer war to witnessing the continuance of insult to the French people, and danger threatening the national existence. It was my duty first to try every means of maintaining peace. Having failed in these efforts, I now come, according to the terms of the constitution, to propose to the national assembly war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia." The king's address was received with some applause, but the solemnity of the circumstances and the grandeur of the decision filled every bosom with silent and concentrated emotion. As soon as the king had withdrawn the assembly voted an extraordinary sitting for the evening. In that sitting war was almost unanimously decided upon. Thus was undertaken, against the chief of the confederate powers, that war which was protracted throughout a quarter of a century, which victoriously established the revolution, and which changed the whole face of Europe.

All France received the announcement with joy. War gave a new movement to the people already so excited. Districts, municipalities, and popular societies wrote addresses; men were enrolled, voluntary gifts offered, pikes forged, and the nation seemed to rise up to await Europe, or to attack it. But enthusiasm, which ensures victory in the end, does not at first supply the place of

organization. Accordingly, at the opening of the campaign the regular troops were all that could be relied upon until the new levies were trained. This was the state of the forces. The vast frontier from Dunkirk to Huninguen was divided into three great military districts. On the left from Dunkirk to Philippeville, the army of the north was under the orders of Marshal de Rochambeau. Lafayette commanded the army of the center, occupying the district between Philippeville and the lines of Weissenburg. Lastly, the army of the Rhine, extending from the lines of Weissenburg to Bâle, was under the command of Marshal Luckner. The frontier of the Alps and Pyrenees was confided to General Montesquiou, whose army was inconsiderable; but that part of France was not as yet in danger.

The Marshal de Rochambeau was of opinion that it would be prudent to remain on the defensive and simply to guard the frontiers. Dumouriez, on the contrary, wished to take the initiative in action, as they had done in declaring war, so as to profit by the advantage of being first prepared. He was very enterprising, and as, although minister of foreign affairs, he directed the military operations, his plan was adopted. It consisted of a rapid invasion of Belgium. This province had, in 1790, essayed to throw off the Austrian yoke, but, after a brief victory, was subdued by superior force. Dumouriez imagined that the Brabant patriots would favor the attack of the French as a means of freedom for themselves. With this view, he combined a triple invasion. The two generals, Théobald Dillon and Biron, who commanded in Flanders under Rochambeau, received orders to advance, the one with 4000 men from Lille upon Tournai, the other with 10,000 from Valenciennes upon Mons. At the same time, Lafayette with a part of his army quitted Metz and advanced by forced marches upon Namur, by Stenai, Sedan, Mézières, and Givet. But this plan implied in the soldiers a discipline which they had not of course as yet acquired, and on the part of the chiefs a concert very difficult to obtain; besides, the invading columns were not strong enough for such an enterprise. Théobald Dillon had scarcely passed the frontier when, on meeting the first enemy on April 28, a panic terror seized upon the troops. The cry of *sauve qui peut* ran through the ranks, and the general was carried off and massacred by his troops. Much the same thing took place, under the same circumstances, in the corps of Biron, who was obliged to

retreat in disorder to his previous position. The sudden and concurrent flight of these two columns must be attributed either to fear of the enemy, on the part of troops who had never before stood fire, or to a distrust of their leaders, or to traitors who sounded the alarm of treachery.

Lafayette, on arriving at Bouvines, after traveling fifty leagues of bad roads in two or three days, learned the disasters of Valenciennes and Lille; he at once saw that the object of the invasion had failed; and he justly thought that the best course would be to effect a retreat. Rochambeau complained of the precipitate and incongruous nature of the measures which had been in the most absolute manner prescribed to him. As he did not choose to remain a passive machine, obliged to fill, at the will of the ministers, a post of which he himself ought to have the full direction, he resigned. From that moment the French army resumed the defensive. The frontier was divided into two general commands only, the one intrusted to Lafayette, extending from the sea to Longwy, and the other, from the Moselle to the Jura, being confided to Luckner. Lafayette placed his left under the command of Arthur Dillon, and with his right reached to Luckner, who had Dillon as his lieutenant on the Rhine. In this position they awaited the allies.

Meantime the first checks increased the disunion of the Feuillants and the Girondists. The generals ascribed to them the plans of Dumouriez, the ministry attributed them to the manner in which its plans had been executed, or rather, not executed, by the generals, who, having been appointed by Narbonne, were of the constitutional party. The Jacobins, on the other hand, accused the anti-revolutionists of having occasioned the flight by the cry of *sauve qui peut!* Their joy, which they did not conceal, the declared hope of soon seeing the confederates in Paris, the emigrants returned, and the ancient régime restored, confirmed these suspicions. It was thought that the court, which had increased the household troops from 1800 to 6000 men, and these carefully selected anti-revolutionists, acted in concert with the coalition. The public denounced, under the name of Comité Autrichien, a secret committee, the very existence of which could not be proved, and mistrust was at its height.

The assembly at once took decided measures. It had entered upon the career of war, and it was thenceforth condemned to regu-

late its conduct far more with reference to the public safety than with regard to the mere justice of the case. It resolved upon sitting permanently, although it was shallow pretension for the Girondists to assert that a permanent sitting was made necessary by reason of the war. The Girondists' principal purpose was to break down the power of the king, which they hoped to do in this way. They actually established a republican newspaper with the government money. The assembly discharged the household troops; on account of the increase of religious disturbances it passed a decree exiling refractory priests, so that it might not have at the same time to combat a coalition and to appease revolts. It also sought to excite the public mind by revolutionary *fêtes*, and began to enroll the multitude and arm them with pikes, conceiving that no assistance could be superfluous in such a moment of peril.

The establishment of the camp of the federates was another scheme of the Girondists to overcome the monarchy. The minister moved on June 4 that every canton should be ordered to send five men to the anniversary of the Bastille. After the festival these 20,000 men were to be encamped near Paris and be given the artillery of the national guard. Thus the feet of the national guard were to be chained and the Gironde proposed getting an army of its own. In vain petitions were sent to the assembly to pray it to desist from the formation of the camp of the federates. Lafayette now again formed the Feuillants, and Dumouriez determined to break with the Gironde. Dumouriez read a long memoir concerning the pitiable condition of the army, and laid the blame upon the Girondist ministers, Du Grave and Servan. The king could not be prevailed upon to confirm this indictment, and Dumouriez resigned.

All these measures were not carried without opposition from the constitutionalists. They opposed the establishment of the camp of 20,000 men, which they regarded as the army of a party directed against the national guard and the throne. The staff of the latter protested, and the recomposition of this body was immediately effected in accordance with the views of the dominant party. Companies armed with pikes were introduced into the new national guard. The constitutionalists were still more dissatisfied with this measure, which introduced a lower class into their ranks, and which seemed to them to aim at superseding the bourgeoisie by the populace. Finally, they openly condemned the banishment of

the priests, which in their opinion was nothing less than proscription.

Louis XVI. had for some time past manifested a coolness toward his ministers, who on their part had been more exacting with him. They urged him to admit about him priests who had taken the oath, in order to set an example in favor of the constitutional religion, and to remove pretexts for religious agitation; he steadily refused this, determined as he was to make no further religious concession. These last decrees had put an end to his concord with the Gironde; for several days he did not mention the subject, much less make known his intentions respecting it. It was on this occasion that Roland addressed to him his celebrated letter on his constitutional duties, and entreated him to calm the public mind and to establish his authority, by becoming frankly the king of the revolution.

This letter still more highly irritated Louis XVI., already disposed to break with the Girondists. He was supported in this by Dumouriez, who, forsaking his party, had formed, with Duranthon and Lacoste, a division in the ministry against Roland, Servan, and Clavière. But, able as well as ambitious, Dumouriez advised Louis, while dismissing the ministers of whom he had to complain, to sanction their decrees, in order to make himself popular. He described that against the priests as a precaution in their favor, exile probably removing them from a proscription still more fatal; he undertook to prevent any revolutionary consequences from the camp of 20,000 men by marching off each battalion to the army immediately upon its arrival at the camp. On these conditions Dumouriez took upon himself the post of minister of war and sustained the attacks of his own party. The king dismissed his ministers on June 13, and, acting wholly within his prerogative, rejected the decrees on the 29th, and Dumouriez set out for the army, after having rendered himself an object of suspicion. The assembly declared that Roland, Servan, and Clavière carried with them the regrets of the nation.

The king selected his new ministers from among the Feuillants. Scipio Chambonnas was appointed minister of foreign affairs; Terrier Monteil, of the interior; Beaulieu, of finance; Lajarre, of war; Lacoste and Duranthon remained provisionally ministers of justice and of the marine. All these men were without reputation or credit, and their party itself was approaching the

term of its existence. The constitutional situation, during which it was to sway, was changing more and more decidedly into a revolutionary situation. How could a legal and moderate party maintain itself between two extreme and belligerent parties, one of which was advancing from without to destroy the revolution, while the other was resolved to defend it at any cost? The Feuillants became superfluous in such a conjuncture. The king, perceiving their weakness, now seemed to place his reliance upon Europe alone, and sent Mallet-Dupan on a secret mission to the coalition. It has been well said that "the choice of such a man proves that the king had nothing to do with the emigrants."

Meantime, all those who had been outstripped by the popular tide, and who belonged to the first period of the revolution, united to second this slight retrograde movement. The monarchists, at whose head were Lally-Tollendal and Malouet, two of the principal members of the Mounier and Necker party; the Feuillants, directed by the old triumvirate, Duport, Lameth, and Barnave; lastly, Lafayette, who had immense reputation as a constitutionalist, tried to put down the clubs and to reëstablish legal order and the power of the king. The Jacobins made great exertions at this period; their influence was becoming enormous; they were at the head of the party of the populace. To oppose them, to check them, the old party of the bourgeoisie was required; but this was disorganized, and its influence grew daily weaker and weaker. In order to revive its courage and strength, Lafayette, on June 16, addressed from the camp at Maubeuge a letter to the assembly, in which he denounced the Jacobin faction, required the cessation of the clubs, the independence and confirmation of the constitutional throne, and urged the assembly in his own name, in that of his army, in that of all the friends of liberty, only to adopt such measures for the public welfare as were sanctioned by law. This letter gave rise to warm debates between the Right and Left in the assembly. Though dictated only by pure and disinterested motives, it appeared, coming as it did from a young general at the head of his army, a proceeding *à la* Cromwell, and from that moment Lafayette's reputation, hitherto respected by his opponents, became the object of attack. In fact, considering it merely in a political point of view, this step was imprudent. The Gironde, driven from the ministry, stopped in its measures for the public good, needed no further goading; and, on the other hand, it was quite unde-

sirable that Lafayette, even for the benefit of his party, should use his influence.

The Gironde wished, for its own safety and that of the nation, to recover power, without, however, departing from constitutional means. Its object was not, as at a later period, to dethrone the king, but to bring him back among them. For this purpose it had recourse to the imperious petitions of the multitude. Since the declaration of war petitioners had appeared in arms at the bar of the national assembly, had offered their services in defense of the country, and had obtained permission to march armed through the house. This concession was blamable, neutralizing all the laws against military gatherings; but both parties found themselves in an extraordinary position, and each employed an illegal means; the court having recourse to Europe, and the Gironde to the people. The latter was in a state of great agitation. The leaders of the faubourgs, among whom were the deputy Chabot, Santerre, Legendre, a butcher, Gonchon, the Marquis de Saint Hurugues, prepared them, during several days, for a revolutionary outbreak, similar to the one which failed at the Champ de Mars. June 20 was approaching, the anniversary of the oath of the tennis-court. Under the pretext of celebrating this memorable day by a civic *fête*, and of planting a May pole in honor of liberty, an assemblage of about 8000 men left the faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau on June 20 and took their way to the assembly. Everyone was aware that not merely a harmless procession was intended. The worst of the Jacobin faction were the leaders of the scheme. Though Santerre and Alexandre were apparently the chief actors in it, Danton was the mover behind the scenes.

Pétion's participation in this abominable policy of the Girondists was a disgrace to his office. June 20 was the supreme attempt of the Girondists to overwhelm the monarchy. They never afterward commanded so much power. In order to succeed it was necessary to have Pétion, the mayor, as an ally. Pétion's desire to increase his power led him to aid the scheme on foot. On June 19 the directory of the department forbade the carrying out of the programme of the suburbs, because it was illegal for armed crowds to present petitions. Pétion consulted with the captains, among whom were the leaders of the whole movement, Santerre and Alexandre. They declared it impossible to make the people desist from their purpose.

Upon the suggestion of St. Prix, that the illegal acts of the people might be made legal by ordering the guardians of the law to participate in these illegal acts, Pétion wrote to the directory. The next morning Pétion was again peremptorily ordered to prevent the crowd going armed. Pétion was in no hurry to send the counter-order, and when he did so he sent it by policemen who did not wish to give it. Several of the captains tried to make their men obey orders, but it was of no avail. Santerre, seeing the whole plot was likely to miscarry, called to his men: "Pétion is with you; forward march." Upon this the procession started, followed by dense crowds. The assembly was informed that 8000 men were coming to present petitions. The Right insisted on the law forbidding the presentation of petitions of armed men. The Girondists assured the assembly that the mob had none but honest intentions.⁸ Vergniaud declared that the assembly would violate every principle by admitting armed bands among them; but, considering actual circumstances, he also declared that it was impossible to deny a request in the present case, that had been granted in so many others.

It was difficult not to yield to the desires of an enthusiastic and vast multitude, when seconded by a majority of the representatives. The crowd already thronged the passages, when the assembly decided that the petitioners should be admitted to the bar. The deputation was introduced. The spokesman expressed himself in threatening language. He said that the people were astir; that they were ready to make use of great means—the means comprised in the declaration of rights, resistance of oppression; that the dissentient members of the assembly, if there were any, would purge the world of liberty, and would repair to Coblenz; then, returning to the true design of this insurrectional petition, he added: "The executive power is not in union with you; we require no other proof of it than the dismissal of the patriot ministers. It is thus, then, that the happiness of a free nation shall depend on the caprice of a king! But should this king have any other will than that of the law? The people will have it so, and the life of the people is as valuable as that of crowned despots. That life is the genealogical tree of the nation, and the feeble reed must bend before

⁸ On these events see: Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. pp. 82-97; Thiers, "French Revolution," vol. I., pp. 266-273; Mortimer-Terneaux, "*La Terreur*," vol. I. pp. 129-223; Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. I. p. 476.

this sturdy oak! We complain, gentlemen, of the inactivity of our armies; we require of you to penetrate into the cause of this; if it spring from the executive power, let that power be destroyed!"

The assembly answered the petitioners that it would take their request into consideration; it then urged them to respect the law and legal authorities, and allowed them to defile before it. This procession, amounting to 30,000 persons, comprising women, children, national guards, and men armed with pikes, among whom waved revolutionary banners and symbols, sang, as they traversed the hall, the famous chorus, "*Ça ira*," and cried: "*Vive la nation!*" "*Vivent les sans-culottes!*" "*A bas le veto!*" It was led by Santerre and the Marquis de Saint Hurugues. On leaving the assembly it proceeded to the château, headed by the petitioners.

The outer doors were opened at the king's command; the multitude rushed into the interior. They ascended to the apartments, and while forcing the doors with hatchets, the king ordered them to be opened, and appeared before them, accompanied by a few persons. The mob stopped a moment before him; but those who were outside, not being awed by the presence of the king, continued to advance. Louis XVI. was prudently placed in the recess of a window. He never displayed more courage than on this deplorable day. Surrounded by national guards, who formed a barrier against the mob, seated on a chair placed on a table, that he might breathe more freely and be seen by the people, he preserved a calm and firm demeanor. In reply to the cries that arose on all sides for the sanction of the decrees, he said: "This is neither the mode nor the moment to obtain it of me." Having the courage to refuse the essential object of the meeting, he thought he ought not to reject a symbol, meaningless for him, but in the eyes of the people that of liberty: he placed on his head a red cap presented to him on the top of a pike. The multitude were quite satisfied with this condescension. A moment or two afterward they loaded him with applause, as, almost suffocated with hunger and thirst, he drank off, without hesitation, a glass of wine presented to him by a half-drunken workman. In the meantime, Vergniaud, Isnard, and a few deputies of the Gironde had hastened thither to protect the king, to address the people, and put an end to these indecent scenes. The assembly, which had just risen from a sitting, met again in haste, terrified at this outbreak, and dispatched several successive deputations to Louis XVI. by way of protection. At

length Pétion, the mayor, himself arrived; he mounted a chair, harangued the people, urging them to retire without tumult, and the people obeyed.

The events of June 20 excited the friends of the constitution against its authors. The violation of the royal residence, the insults offered to Louis XVI., the illegality of a petition presented amid the violence of the multitude, and the display of arms were subjects of serious censure against the popular party. The latter saw itself reduced for a moment to the defensive; besides being guilty of a riot, it had undergone a complete check. The constitutionalists assumed the tone and superiority of an offended and predominant party; but this lasted only a short time, for they were not seconded by the court. The national guard offered to Louis XVI. to remain assembled round his person; the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who commanded at Rouen, wished to convey him to his troops, who were devoted to his cause. Lafayette proposed to take him to Compiègne and place him at the head of his army; but Louis XVI. declined all these offers. He conceived that the agitators would be disgusted at the failure of their last attempt; and, as he hoped for deliverance from the coalition of European powers, rendered more active by the events of June 20, he was unwilling to make use of the constitutionalists, because he would have been obliged to treat with them.

Lafayette, however, attempted to make a last effort in favor of legal monarchy. After having provided for the command of his army, and collected addresses protesting against the late events, he started for Paris, and on June 28 he unexpectedly presented himself at the bar of the assembly. He required in his name, as well as in that of his army, the punishment of the insurrectionists of June 20 and the destruction of the Jacobin party. His proceeding excited various sentiments in the assembly. The Right warmly applauded it, but the Left protested against his conduct. Guadet proposed that an inquiry should be made as to his culpability in leaving his army and coming to dictate laws to the assembly. Some remains of respect prevented the latter from following Guadet's advice; and after tumultuous debates Lafayette was admitted to the honors of the sitting, but this was all on the part of the assembly. Lafayette then turned to the national guard, that had so long been devoted to him, and hoped with its aid to close the clubs, disperse the Jacobins, restore to Louis XVI. the authority

which the law gave him, and again establish the constitution. The revolutionists were astounded, and dreaded everything from the daring and activity of this adversary of the Champ de Mars. But the court, which feared the triumph of the constitutionalists, caused Lafayette's projects to fail; he had appointed a review, which it contrived to prevent by its influence over the officers of the royalist battalions. The grenadiers and chasseurs, picked companies, and those better disposed than the rest, were to assemble at his residence and proceed against the clubs; scarcely thirty men came. Having thus vainly attempted to rally in the cause of the constitution and the common defense, the court and the national guard, and finding himself deserted by those he came to assist, Lafayette returned to his army, after having lost what little influence and popularity remained to him. This attempt was the last symptom of life in the constitutional party.

The assembly naturally returned to the situation of France, which had not changed. The extraordinary commission of twelve presented, through Pastoret, an unsatisfactory picture of the state and divisions of party. Jean Debry, in the name of the same commission, proposed that the assembly should secure the tranquillity of the people, now greatly disturbed, by declaring that when the crisis became imminent the assembly would declare the country to be in danger, and that it would then take measures for the public safety. The debate opened upon this important subject. Vergniaud, in a speech which deeply moved the assembly, drew a vivid picture of all the perils to which the country was at that moment exposed. He said that it was in the name of the king that the emigrants were assembled, that the sovereigns of Europe had formed a coalition, that foreign armies were marching on the frontiers, and that internal disturbances were taking place. He accused him of checking the national zeal by his refusals, and of giving France up to the coalition. He quoted the article of the constitution by which it was declared that "if the king placed himself at the head of an army and directed its force against the nation, or if he did not formally oppose such an enterprise, undertaken in his name, he should be considered as having abdicated the throne." Supposing, then, that Louis XVI. voluntarily opposed the means of defending the country, in that case, said he: "Have we not a right to say to him: 'O king, who thought, no doubt, with the tyrant Lysander, that truth was of no more worth than falsehood, and that men were

to be amused by oaths, as children are diverted by toys; who only feigned obedience to the laws that you might better preserve the power that enables you to defy them; and who only feigned love for the constitution that it might not precipitate you from the throne on which you wished to remain, only to destroy the constitution, do you expect to deceive us by hypocritical protestations? Do you think to deceive us as to our misfortunes by the art of your excuses? Was it defending us to oppose to foreign soldiers forces whose known inferiority admitted of no doubt as to their defeat? to set aside projects for strengthening the interior? Was it defending us not to check a general who was violating the constitution, while you repressed the courage of those who sought to serve it? Did the constitution leave you the choice of ministers for our happiness or our ruin? did it place you at the head of our army for our glory or our shame? did it give you the right of sanction, a civil list and so many prerogatives, constitutionally to lose the empire and the constitution? No! no! Man, whom the generosity of the French could not affect, whom the love of despotism alone actuates, you are now nothing to the constitution you have so unworthily violated, and to the people you have so basely betrayed!"

The only recourse of the Gironde, in its present situation, was the abdication of the king; Vergniaud, it is true, as yet only expressed himself ambiguously, but all the popular party attributed to Louis XVI. projects which Vergniaud had only expressed in the form of suppositions. In a few days Brissot expressed himself more openly. "Our peril," said he, "exceeds all that past ages have witnessed. The country is in danger, not because we are in want of troops, not because those troops want courage, or that our frontiers are badly fortified, and our resources scanty. No; it is in danger because its force is paralyzed. And who has paralyzed it? A man—one man, the man whom the constitution has made its chief, and whom perfidious advisers have made its foe. You are told to fear the kings of Hungary and Prussia; I say the chief force of these kings is at the court, and it is there that we must first conquer them. They tell you to strike the dissentient priests throughout the kingdom. I tell you to strike at the Tuileries, that is, to fell all the priests with a single blow; you are told to prosecute all factious and intriguing conspirators; they will all disappear if you once knock loud enough at the door of the cabinet

of the Tuileries, for that cabinet is the point to which all these threads tend, where every scheme is plotted, and whence every impulse proceeds. The nation is the plaything of this cabinet. This is the secret of our position, this is the source of the evil, and here the remedy must be applied."

In this way the Gironde prepared the assembly for the question of deposition. But the great question concerning the danger of the country was first terminated. The three united committees declared that it was necessary to take measures for the public safety, and on July 5 the assembly pronounced the solemn declaration: Citizens, the country is in danger! All the civil authorities immediately established themselves *en surveillance permanente*. All citizens able to bear arms, and having already served in the national guard, were placed in active service; everyone was obliged to make known what arms and ammunition he possessed; pikes were given to those who were unable to procure guns; battalions of volunteers were enrolled on the public squares, in the midst of which banners were placed bearing the words—"Citizens, the country is in danger!" and a camp was formed at Soissons. These measures of defense, now become indispensable, raised the revolutionary enthusiasm to the highest pitch. It was especially observable on the anniversary of July 14, when the sentiments of the multitude and the federates from the departments were manifested without reserve. Pétion was the object of the people's idolatry, and had all the honors of the federation. A few days before he had been dismissed, on account of his conduct on June 20, by the directory of the department and the council; but the assembly had restored him to his functions, and the only cry on the day of the federation was: "Pétion or death!" The directory of the department had undertaken an examination of the events of the 20th and declared and decreed the suspension of Pétion and Procureur Manuel. The approval of the king was necessary, though the national assembly was empowered to annul the sentence, even after the approval of the king. If the king confirmed the sentence, he again provoked the passions of the masses; if he did not, he delivered the directory, which strove to maintain law and order, up to the rage of the mob. He asked them to dispense with his action, but the Left refused.

Pétition after petition was sent in for the reinstatement of Pétion in his office. On the 12th the king's approval of the sus-

pension was sent in. Pétion appeared before the assembly and hurled accusation and insult upon the directory and the king. The Right demanded to have the documents bearing on the case read. The Left thought no proofs were needed. The suspension of the mayor was canceled.

The national guard and the great majority of the better classes of the population were incensed and disgusted over the 20th. A petition in this sense received 20,000 signatures. The directory of the department is entitled to praise for having done with resoluteness and circumspectness everything in its power to set things right, but its legal power did not correspond with its will and judgment. The constitution had created the hierarchical power of the public authorities, but not in a single case had it accorded the higher authorities the means effectually to control their inferiors.

The Girondists had not the heart to take the lead of the elements who evidently were very soon to dictate the law. On July 20, Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud sent a letter to the king offering him an alliance. It was as certain that the king would not accede to their request as that it would be regarded by the Jacobins as a capital crime. The leaders were very much surprised at the refusal of the king. Guadet moved an address to the king. The Left boldly took the offensive. Couthon even advocated that in the future the decrees necessitated by circumstances should not need the approval of the king. As the assembly could declare any law such, it would be the abolishment of the constitutional veto power of the king. The assembly contented itself with simply affirming the existing law against armed crowds and the presentation of petitions by such. The Radicals grew bolder, and intended to renew the demands of the 20th on the 21st and the 27th, but it was not carried out. A few battalions of the national guard, such as that of the Filles-Saint-Thomas, still betrayed attachment to the court; they became the object of popular resentment and mistrust. A disturbance was excited in the Champs Elysées between the grenadiers of the Filles-Saint-Thomas and the federates of Marseilles, in which some grenadiers were wounded. Every day the crisis became more imminent; the party in favor of war could no longer endure that of the constitution. Attacks against Lafayette multiplied; he was censured in the journals, denounced in the assembly. At length hostilities began.

The club of the Feuillants was closed; the grenadier and chasseur companies of the national guard which formed the force of the bourgeoisie were disbanded; the soldiers of the line, and a portion of the Swiss, were sent away from Paris, and open preparations were made for the catastrophe of August 10.

The progress of the Prussians and the famous manifesto of Brunswick contributed to hasten this movement. Prussia had joined Austria and the German princes against France. This coalition, to which the court of Turin joined itself, was formidable, though it did not comprise all the princes that were to have joined it at first. The death of Gustavus, appointed at first commander of the invading army, detached Sweden; the substitution of the Count d'Aranda, a prudent and moderate man, for the minister Blanca-Florida, prevented Spain from entering it; Russia and England secretly approved the attacks of the European league, without as yet coöperating with it. After the military operations already mentioned they watched each other rather than fought. During the interval Lafayette had inspired his army with good habits of discipline and devotedness; and Dumouriez, stationed under Luckner at the camp of Maulde, had inured the troops confided to him by petty engagements and daily successes. In this way they had formed the nucleus of a good army, a desirable thing, as they required organization and confidence to repel the approaching invasion of the coalesced powers.

The Duke of Brunswick directed it. He had the chief command of the enemy's army, composed of 70,000 Prussians and 68,000 Austrians, Hessians, or emigrants. The plan of invasion was as follows. The Duke of Brunswick with the Prussians was to pass the Rhine at Coblenz, ascend the left bank of the Moselle, attack the French frontier by its central and most accessible point, and advance on the capital by way of Longwy, Verdun, and Châlons. The Prince de Hohenlohe, on his left, was to advance in the direction of Metz and Thionville, with the Hessians and a body of emigrants; while General Clairfait, with the Austrians and another body of emigrants, was to overthrow Lafayette, stationed before Sedan and Mézières, cross the Meuse, and march upon Paris by Reims and Soissons. Thus the center and two wings were to make a concentrated advance on the capital from the Moselle, the Rhine, and the Netherlands. Other detachments stationed on the frontier of the Rhine and the extreme northern frontier were to

attack the French troops on these sides and facilitate the central invasion.

When the army began to move from Coblenz, July 28, 1792, the Duke of Brunswick published a manifesto in the name of the emperor and the King of Prussia. He reproached those who had usurped the reins of administration in France with having disturbed order and overturned the legitimate government; with having used daily renewed violence against the king and his family; with having arbitrarily suppressed the rights and possessions of the German princes in Alsace and Lorraine; and, finally, with having crowned the measure by declaring an unjust war against his majesty the emperor and attacking his provinces in the Netherlands. He declared that the allied sovereigns were advancing to put an end to anarchy in France, to arrest the attacks made on the altar and the throne, to restore to the king the security and liberty he was deprived of, and to place him in a condition to exercise his legitimate authority. He consequently rendered the national guard and the authorities responsible for all the disorders that should arise until the arrival of the troops of the coalition. He summoned them to return to their ancient fidelity. He said that the inhabitants of the towns, who dared to stand on the defensive, should instantly be punished as rebels, with the rigor of war, and their houses demolished or burned; that if the city of Paris did not restore the king to full liberty and render him due respect, the coalesced princes would make it, all the members of the national assembly, of the department, of the district, the corporation, and the national guard, personally responsible with their heads, to be tried by martial-law, and without hope of pardon; and that if the château were attacked or insulted, the princes would inflict an exemplary and never-to-be-forgotten vengeance, by delivering Paris over to military execution and total subversion. He promised, on the other hand, if the inhabitants of Paris would promptly obey the orders of the coalition, to secure for them the mediation of the coalesced princes with Louis XVI. for the pardon of their offenses and errors. If this manifesto had been dictated to the duke by the Jacobins they could hardly have produced a paper better calculated to serve their purposes.

This fiery and impolitic manifesto, which disguised neither the designs of the emigrants nor those of Europe, which treated a great nation with a truly extraordinary tone of command and

contempt, which openly announced to it all the miseries of an invasion, and moreover, vengeance and despotism, excited a national insurrection. It more than anything else hastened the fall of the throne, and prevented the success of the coalition. There was but one wish, one cry of resistance, from one end of France to the other, and whoever had not joined in it would have been looked on as guilty of impiety toward his country and the sacred cause of its independence. The popular party, placed in the necessity of conquering, saw no other way than that of annihilating the power of the king, and in order to annihilate it than that of dethroning him. But in this party everyone wished to attain the end in his own way: the Gironde by a decree of the assembly; the leaders of the multitude by an insurrection. Danton, Robespierre, Camille Desmoulins, Fabre d'Eglantine, Marat, formed a displaced faction requiring a revolution that would raise it from the midst of the people to the assembly and the corporation. They were the true leaders of the new movement about to take place by the means of the lower class of society against the middle class, to which the Girondists belonged by their habits and position. A division arose from that day between those who only wished to suppress the court in the existing order of things and those who wished to introduce the multitude. The latter could not fall in with the tardiness of discussion. Agitated by every revolutionary passion, they disposed themselves for an attack by force of arms, the preparations for which were made openly and a long time beforehand. Their enterprise had been projected and suspended several times. On July 26 an insurrection was to break out; but it was badly contrived, and Pétion prevented it. When the federates from Marseilles arrived, on their way to the camp at Soissons, the faubourgs were to meet them, and then repair, unexpectedly, to the château. This insurrection also failed. Yet the arrival of the Marseillaise encouraged the agitators of the capital, and conferences were held at Charenton between them and the federal leaders for the overthrow of the throne. The sections were much agitated; that of Mauconseil was the first to declare itself in a state of insurrection, and notified this to the assembly.⁹ The dethronement

⁹ The Section Mauconseil on July 31 had, on its own account, declared the king a traitor, giving notice that it no longer recognized him, and asking all other sections to join in this declaration. When these resolutions were presented to the assembly, the assembly deemed it an excess of patriotism to refuse the deputation the honor of the session.

was discussed in the clubs, and on August 3 the mayor, Pétion, came to solicit it of the legislative body in the name of the commune and of the sections. The petition was referred to the extraordinary commission of twelve. On the 8th the accusation of Lafayette was discussed. Some remains of courage induced the majority to support him, and not without danger. He was acquitted; but all who had voted for him were hissed, pursued, and ill treated by the people at the breaking up of the sitting.

The following day the excitement was extreme. The assembly learned by the letters of a large number of deputies that the day before on leaving the house they had been ill used and threatened with death for voting the acquittal of Lafayette. Vaublanc announced that a crowd had invested and searched his house in pursuit of him. Girardin exclaimed: "Discussion is impossible without perfect liberty of opinion; I declare to my constituents that I cannot deliberate if the legislative body does not secure me liberty and safety." Vaublanc earnestly urged that the assembly should take the strongest measures to secure respect to the law. He also required that the federates who were defended by the Girondists should be sent without delay to Soissons. During these debates the president received a message from De Joly, minister of justice. He announced that the mischief was at its height, and the people urged to every kind of excess. He gave an account of those committed the evening before, not only against the deputies, but against many other persons. "I have," said the minister, "denounced these attacks in the criminal court; but law is powerless; and I am impelled by honor and probity to inform you that without the promptest assistance of the legislative body the government can no longer be responsible." In the meantime, it was announced that the section of the Quinze-vingts had declared that if the dethronement were not pronounced that very day, at midnight they would sound the tocsin, would beat the générale and attack the château. This decision had been transmitted to the forty-eight sections, and all had approved it except one. The assembly summoned the recorder of the department, who assured them of his good will, but his inability; and the mayor, who replied that, at a time when the sections had resumed their sovereignty, he could only exercise over the people the influence of persuasion. The assembly broke up without adopting any measures.

The insurgents fixed the attack on the château for the morn-

ing of August 10. On the 8th the Marseillaise had been transferred from their barracks in the Rue Blanche to the Cordeliers, with their arms, cannon, and standard. They had received five thousand ball cartridges, which had been distributed to them by command of the commissioner of police. The principal scene of the insurrection was the Faubourg Saint Antoine. In the evening, after a very stormy sitting, the Jacobins repaired thither in procession; the insurrection was then organized. It was decided to dissolve the department; to dismiss Pétion, in order to withdraw him from the duties of his place and all responsibility; and finally, to replace the general council of the present commune by an insurrectional municipality. The municipal council was the blind tool of the gang which called itself "The Commissaries of the Sections." Upon their behest the municipal council broke down in one place after another the ability of the legal authorities to offer any resistance. It had summoned the commissaries of the sections to the Hôtel de Ville on August 10 to deliberate on the formation of a camp at Paris. This furnished a pretext to call upon the ultra-revolutionists to assemble. Agitators repaired at the same time to the sections of the faubourgs and to the barracks of the federate Marseillaise and Bretons. In the government of Paris the following organizations are to be distinguished: The corps municipal, presided over by the mayor; it included the bureau municipal, formed of 16 administrators, and the conseil municipal, of 32 members. These 48 members, united with 82 others, composed the general council of the commune, having a procureur-syndic and 2 substitutes. They were all theoretically appointed by a process of double election, but in point of fact the leaders of the clubs imposed their choice upon the electors. The commune disposed of a force of 32,000 men, divided into 48 battalions.

The court had been apprised of the danger for some time and had placed itself in a state of defense. At this juncture it probably thought it was not only able to resist, but also entirely to reestablish itself. The interior of the château was occupied by Swiss to the number of eight or nine hundred, by officers of the disbanded guard, and by a troop of gentlemen and royalists, who had offered their services, armed with sabers, swords, and pistols. Mandat, the general-in-chief of the national guard, had repaired to the château, with his staff, to defend it; he had given orders to the battalions most attached to the constitution to take arms. Mandat

was one of the true heroes of the revolution, although the part he played was confined to one day. The national guard to the number of 950 men were ordered to Paris, but of these only a part could be relied upon.

Mandat's plan was to meet the crowds coming from Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau separately and outflank them both. Yet for this important work he had to trust the gendarmerie, who had first set the example of mutiny in the army. What could be expected from such men?

The ministers were also with the king; the recorder of the department had gone thither in the evening at the command of the king, who had also sent for Pétion, to ascertain from him the state of Paris, and obtain an authorization to repel force by force.

At midnight the tocsin sounded; the générale was beaten. The insurgents assembled and fell into their ranks; the members of the sections broke up the municipality and named a provisional council of the commune, which proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville to direct the insurrection. In spite of assertions to the contrary, it is now proved that the demagogues succeeded with great difficulty in getting the revolution properly under way; in all the sections but a small minority of the citizens acted. In several sections the most radical emphatically protested against the insurrection; the church doors were forcibly opened by roving bands to sound the tocsin; the principal conspirators conspired cautiously, in the background; in a word, we know that the revolution of August 10, 1792, owed its success not merely to the exertions of the populace, but to the partially cowardly and partially criminal failure of all legitimate authorities to act with vigor. The battalions of the national guard, on their side, took the route to the château and were stationed in the court, or at the principal posts, with the mounted gendarmerie; artillerymen occupied the avenues of the Tuileries, with their pieces, while the Swiss and volunteers guarded the apartments. The defense was in the best condition.

Some deputies, meanwhile, aroused by the tocsin, had hurried to the hall of the legislative body, and had opened the sitting under the presidentship of Verginaud. Hearing that Pétion was at the Tuileries, and presuming he was detained there, and wanted to be released, they sent for him to the bar of the assembly, to give an account of the state of Paris. On receiving this order he left the

château; he appeared before the assembly, where a deputation again inquired for him, also supposing him to be a prisoner at the Tuileries. With this deputation he returned to the Hôtel de Ville, where he was placed under a guard of three hundred men by the new commune. The latter, unwilling to allow any other authority on this day of disorder than the insurrectional authorities, early in the morning sent for the commandant Mandat to know what arrangements were made at the château. Mandat hesitated to obey; yet, as he did not know that the municipality had been changed, and as his duty required him to obey its orders, on a second call which he received from the commune he proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville. On perceiving new faces as he entered, he turned pale. He was accused of authorizing the troops to fire on the people. He became agitated and was ordered to the Abbaye. He was asked to sign an order commanding half of the troops at the Tuileries to retire. He declined and was condemned to prison, and the commissaries nominated Santerre in his place. The municipal council protested against this, and then they rushed into their room and pushed the counselors from their seats. Mandat was shot as he was being taken out of the room.

The court was thus deprived of its most determined and influential defender. The presence of Mandat and the order he had received to employ force in case of need were necessary to induce the national guard to fight. The sight of the nobles and royalists had lessened its zeal. Mandat himself, previous to his departure, had urged the queen in vain to dismiss this troop, which the constitutionalists considered as a troop of aristocrats.

About four in the morning the queen summoned Rœderer, the recorder of the department, who had passed the night at the Tuileries, and inquired what was to be done under these circumstances. Rœderer replied that he thought it necessary that the king and the royal family should proceed to the national assembly. "You propose," said Dubouchage, "to take the king to his foes." Rœderer replied that two days before four hundred members of that assembly out of six hundred had pronounced in favor of Lafayette, and that he had only proposed this plan as the least dangerous. The queen then said, in a very positive tone: "Sir, we have forces here: it is at length time to know who is to prevail, the king and the constitution or faction?" "In that case, madame," rejoined Rœderer, "let us see what arrangements have

been made for resistance." Laschenaye, who commanded in the absence of Mandat, was sent for. He was asked if he had taken measures to prevent the crowd from arriving at the château? If he had guarded the Carrousel? He replied in the affirmative, and addressing the queen, he said, in a tone of anger: "I must not allow you to remain in ignorance, madame, that the apartments are filled with people of all kinds, who very much impede the service, and prevent free access to the king, a circumstance which creates dissatisfaction among the national guard." "This is out of season," replied the queen; "I will answer for those who are here; they will advance first or last, in the ranks, as you please; they are ready for all that is necessary; they are sure men." They contented themselves with sending the two ministers, De Joly and Champion, to the assembly to apprise it of the danger, and ask for its assistance and for commissioners.

Division already existed between the defenders of the château, when Louis XVI. passed them in review at five o'clock in the morning. He first visited the interior posts, and found them animated by the best intentions. He was accompanied by some members of his family and appeared extremely sad. "I will not," he said, "separate my cause from that of good citizens; we will save ourselves or perish together." He then descended into the yard, accompanied by some general officers. As soon as he arrived they beat to arms. The cry of "*Vive le roi!*" was heard, and was repeated by the national guard; but the artillerymen and the battalion of the Croix Rouge replied by the cry of "*Vive la nation!*" At the same instant new battalions, armed with guns and pikes, defiled before the king and took their places upon the terrace of the Seine, crying "*Vive la nation!*" "*Vive Pétion!*" The king continued the review, not, however, without feeling saddened by this omen. He was received with the strongest evidences of devotion by the battalions of the Filles-Saint-Thomas and Petits-Peres, who occupied the terrace, extending the length of the château. As he crossed the garden to visit the ports of the Pont Tournant the pike battalions pursued him with the cry of "Down with the veto!" "Down with the traitor!" and as he returned they quitted their position, placed themselves near the Pont Royal, and turned their cannon against the château. Two other battalions stationed in the courts imitated them, and established themselves on the Place du Carrousel in an attitude of attack. On reëntering

the castle the king was pale and dejected, and the queen said: "All is lost! This kind of review has done more harm than good."

While all this was passing at the Tuileries the insurgents were advancing in several columns; they had passed the night in assembling and becoming organized. In the morning they had forced the arsenal and distributed the arms. The column of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, about 15,000 strong, and that of the Faubourg Saint Marceau, amounting to 5000, began to march about six. The crowd increased as they advanced. Artillerymen had been placed on the Pont Neuf by the directory of the department in order to prevent the union of the insurgents from the two sides of the river. But Manuel, the town clerk, had ordered them to be withdrawn, and the passage was accordingly free. The vanguard of the faubourgs, composed of Marseillaise and Breton federates, had already arrived by the Rue Saint Honoré, stationed themselves in battle array on the Carrousel, and turned their cannon against the château. De Joly and Champion returned from the assembly, stating that the attendance was not sufficient in number to debate, that it scarcely amounted to sixty or eighty members, and that their proposition had not been heard. Then Rœderer, the recorder of the department, with the members of the department, presented himself to the crowd, observing that so great a multitude could not have access to the king or to the national assembly, and recommending them to nominate twenty deputies and intrust them with their requests. But they did not listen to him. He turned to the national guard, and reminded them of the article of the law which enjoined them when attacked to repel force by force. A very small part of the national guard seemed disposed to do so, and a discharge of cannon was the only reply of the artillerymen. Rœderer, seeing that the insurgents were everywhere triumphant, that they were masters of the field, and that they disposed of the multitude, and even of the troops, returned hastily to the château, at the head of the executive directory.

The king held a council with the queen and ministers. A municipal officer had just given the alarm by announcing that the columns of the insurgents were advancing upon the Tuileries. "Well, what do they want?" asked De Joly, keeper of the seals. "Abdication," replied the officer. "And what will follow abdication?" inquired the queen. The municipal officer bowed in silence. At this moment Rœderer arrived and increased the alarm

of the court by announcing that the danger was extreme, that the insurgents would not be treated with, and that the national guard could not be depended upon. "Sire," said he urgently, "your majesty has not five minutes to lose: your only safety is in the national assembly; it is the opinion of the department that you ought to repair thither without delay. There are not sufficient men in the court to defend the château; nor are we sure of them. At the mention of defense the artillerymen discharged their cannon." The king replied, at first, that he had not observed many people on the Carrousel; and the queen rejoined with vivacity that the king had forces to defend the château. But, at the renewed urgency of Rœderer, the king, after looking at him attentively for a few minutes, turned to the queen and said as he rose: "Let us go." "Monsieur Rœderer," said Madame Elizabeth, addressing the recorder, "you answer for the life of the king?" "Yes, madame, with my own," he replied. "I will walk immediately before him."

Louis XVI. left his chamber with his family, ministers, and the members of the department, and announced to the persons assembled for the defense of the château that he was going to the national assembly. He placed himself between two ranks of national guards summoned to escort him and crossed the apartments and garden of the Tuileries. A deputation of the assembly, apprised of his approach, came to meet him. "Sire," said the president of this deputation, "the assembly, eager to provide for your safety, offers you and your family an asylum in its bosom." The procession resumed its march and had some difficulty in crossing the terrace of the Tuileries, which was crowded with an animated mob breathing forth threats and insults. The king and his family had great difficulty in reaching the hall of the assembly, where they took the seats reserved for the ministers. "Gentlemen," said the king, "I come here to avoid a great crime; I think I cannot be safer than with you." "Sire," replied Vergniaud, who filled the chair, "you may rely on the firmness of the national assembly. Its members have sworn to die in maintaining the rights of the people and the constituted authorities." The king then took his seat next the president. But Chabot reminded him that the assembly could not deliberate in the presence of the king, and Louis XVI. retired with his family and ministers into the reporter's box behind the president, whence all that took place could be seen and heard.

All motives for resistance ceased with the king's departure. The means of defense had also been diminished by the departure of the national guards who escorted the king. The gendarmerie left their posts crying "*Vive la nation!*" The national guard began to move in favor of the insurgents. But the foes were confronted, and although the cause was removed, the combat nevertheless commenced. The columns of the insurgents surrounded the château. The Marseillaise and Bretons who occupied the first rank had just forced the Porte Royale on the Carrousel and entered the court of the château. They were led by an old subaltern, called Westermann, a friend of Danton and a very daring man. He ranged his force in battle array, and approaching the artillerymen, induced them to join the Marseillaise with their pieces. The Swiss filled the windows of the château and stood motionless. The two bodies confronted each other for some time without making an attack. A few of the assailants advanced amicably, and the Swiss threw some cartridges from the windows in token of peace. They penetrated as far as the vestibule, where they were met by other defenders of the château. A barrier separated them. Here the combat began, but it is unknown on which side it commenced. The Swiss discharged a murderous fire on the assailants, who were dispersed. The Place du Carrousel was cleared. But the Marseillaise and Bretons soon returned with renewed force; the Swiss were fired on by the cannon and surrounded. They kept their posts until they received orders from the king to cease firing. The exasperated mob did not cease, however, to pursue them, and gave itself up to the most sanguinary reprisals. It now became a massacre rather than a combat; and the crowd perpetrated in the château all the excesses of victory. Some of the Swiss reached the manege and were imprisoned by the assembly; others were cut down on the march by the firing from windows and corners. At the Tuileries the worst excesses were committed. Everyone belonging to the male sex, even to the kitchen boy, was massacred. The women came near sharing the same fate.

Napoleon, an eye-witness, says that the Tuileries were stormed by the worst canaille of Paris; Marat spent August 10 in a cellar; Danton and Camille Desmoulins showed themselves for a moment, but no more. Not the heroes of the terror, but the unadulterated rabble of Paris did all the work of August 10.

All this time the assembly was in the greatest alarm. The

first cannonade filled them with consternation. As the firing became more frequent, the agitation increased. At one moment the members considered themselves lost. An officer entering the hall hastily exclaimed: "To your places, legislators; we are forced!" A few rose to go out. "No, no," cried others; "this is our post." The spectators in the gallery exclaimed instantly: "*Vive l'assemblée nationale!*" and the assembly replied: "*Vive la nation!*" Shouts of victory were then heard without, and the fate of monarchy was decided.

The assembly instantly made a proclamation to restore tranquillity, and implore the people to respect justice, their magistrates, the rights of man, liberty, and equality. Apparently the assembly had achieved a great victory, for it was the only piece of the old constitution left.

In truth, it had been prostrated by the rabble as completely as royalty itself. A deputation from the commissaries appeared before the bar of the assembly. Huguenin, the worthy president of the sections, says: "These are now the magistrates of the people. Circumstances rendered our election necessary. Legislators, we come here in the name of the people to concert with you the measures of the public welfare." Thus the sections constituted themselves another national representation. He goes on: "The people who have sent us have charged us to declare to you that they recognize as judge over the extraordinary measures to which they were driven by necessity and the resistance against oppression, only the French people united into the primaries, you and our sovereign."

Guadet, the president of the assembly, replied: "The assembly does you honor; the victory applauds your zeal. It can only see in you good citizens, desirous to restore peace, tranquillity, and order."

The multitude and their chiefs had all the power in their hands, and were determined to use it. The new municipality came to assert its authority. It was preceded by three banners, inscribed with the words "*Patrie, liberté, égalité.*" Its address was imperious, and concluded by demanding the deposition of the king and a national convention. Deputations followed, and all expressed the same desire, or rather issued the same command.

The assembly felt itself compelled to yield; it would not, however, take upon itself the deposition of the king. Vergniaud as-

cended the tribune, in the name of the commission of twelve, and said: "I am about to propose to you a very rigorous measure; I appeal to the affliction of our hearts to judge how necessary it is to adopt it immediately." This measure consisted of the convocation of a national assembly elected by citizens over twenty-five years of age, and of twelve months' residence, the dismissal of the ministers, and the suspension of the king. The assembly adopted it unanimously. The Girondist ministers were recalled; the celebrated decrees were carried into execution, about four thousand nonjuring priests were exiled, and commissioners were dispatched to the armies to make sure of them. Louis XVI., to whom the assembly had at first assigned the Luxembourg as a residence, was transferred as a prisoner to the Temple by the all-powerful commune, under the pretext that it could not otherwise be answerable for the safety of his person.

Finally, September 23 was appointed for opening the extraordinary assembly, destined to decide the fate of royalty. But royalty had already fallen on August 10, 1792, that day marked by the insurrection of the multitude against the middle class and the constitutional throne, as July 14, 1789, had seen the insurrection of the middle class against the privileged class and the absolute power of the crown. On August 10 began the dictatorial and arbitrary epoch of the revolution. Circumstances becoming more and more difficult to encounter, a vast warfare arose, requiring still higher energy than ever, and that energy irregular, because popular, rendered the domination of the lower class restless, cruel, and oppressive. The nature of the question was then entirely changed; it was no longer a matter of liberty, but of public safety; and the conventional period, from the end of the constitution of 1791 to the time when the constitution of the year III. established the directory, was only a long campaign of the revolution against parties and against Europe. It was scarcely possible it should be otherwise. "The revolutionary movement once established," says De Maistre, in his *Considerations sur la France*, "France and the monarchy could only be saved by Jacobinism. Our grandchildren, who will care little for our sufferings, and will dance on our graves, will laugh at our present ignorance; they will easily console themselves for the excesses we have witnessed, and which will have preserved the integrity of the finest of kingdoms."

The departments adhered to the events of August 10. The

army, which shortly afterward came under the influence of the revolution, was as yet of constitutional royalist principles; but as the troops were subordinate to parties, they would easily submit to the dominant opinion. The generals, second in rank, such as Dumouriez, Custine, Biron, Kellermann, and Labourdonnaie, were disposed to adopt the last changes. They had not yet declared for any particular party, looking to the revolution as a means of advancement. It was not the same with the generals-in-chief. Luckner floated undecided between the insurrection of August 10, which he termed "a little accident that had happened to Paris and his friend Lafayette." The latter, head of the constitutional party, firmly adhering to his oaths, wished still to defend the overturned throne and a constitution which no longer existed. He commanded about 30,000 men, who were devoted to his person and his cause. His headquarters were near Sedan. In his project of resistance in favor of the constitution he concerted with the municipality of that town, and the directory of the department of Ardennes, to establish a civil center round which all the departments might rally. The three commissioners, Kersaint, Antonelle, and Peraldy, sent by the legislature to his army, were arrested and imprisoned in the tower of Sedan. The reason assigned for this measure was that the assembly having been intimidated, the members who had accepted such a mission were necessarily but the leaders or instruments of the faction which had subjugated the national assembly and the king. The troops and the civil authorities then renewed their oath to the constitution, and Lafayette endeavored to enlarge the circle of the insurrection of the army against the popular insurrection.

General Lafayette at that moment thought, possibly, too much on the past, on the law, and the common oath, and not enough on the really extraordinary position in which France then was. He only saw the dearest hopes of the friends of liberty destroyed, the usurpation of the state by the multitude, and the anarchical reign of the Jacobins; he did not perceive the fatality of a situation which rendered the triumph of the latest comer in the revolution indispensable. It was scarcely possible that the bourgeoisie, which had been strong enough to overthrow the old system and the privileged classes, but which had reposed after that victory, could resist the emigrants and all Europe. For this there was needed a new shock, a new faith; there was needed a numerous, ardent, inexhaustible

class, as enthusiastic for August 10 as the bourgeoisie had been for July 14. Lafayette could not associate with this party; he had combated it, under the constituent assembly, at the Champ de Mars, before and after June 20. He could not continue to play his former part, nor defend a cause just in itself, but condemned by events, without compromising his country, and the results of a revolution to which he was sincerely attached. His resistance, if continued, would have given rise to a civil war between the people and the army, at a time when it was not certain that the combination of all parties would suffice against a foreign war.

It was August 19, and the army of invasion, having left Coblenz on July 30, was ascending the Moselle and advancing on that frontier. In consideration of the common danger, the troops were disposed to resume their obedience to the assembly; Luckner, who at first approved of Lafayette's views, retracted, weeping and swearing, before the municipality of Metz; and Lafayette himself saw the necessity of yielding to a more powerful destiny.

Lafayette was the one person in a position to have reversed the wheel of events in Paris, and in doing that the majority of the people would perhaps have ranged themselves on his side. The army was then said to be devoted to him. If he had appeared in Paris at the head of it, a large part of the national guard might have joined him. If, however, the attempt had failed, he would have paid for it with his head. If he had remained quiet, he could not have been reproached for it. But he pursued a middle course. He ought to have moved upon Paris at once with his army. Instead, he tried to bring about a counter-revolution by influencing the departments, and through them to bring pressure to bear upon the assembly to alter its course. Not a single department stirred a finger, and as these departments did nothing, so did also all the rest of those who might have done anything. He left his army, taking upon himself all the responsibility of the whole insurrection. He was accompanied by Bureau-de-Pusy, Latour-Maubourg, Alexander Lameth, and some officers of his staff. He proceeded through the enemy's posts toward Holland, intending to go to the United States, his adopted country. But he was discovered and arrested with his companions. In violation of the rights of nations, he was treated as a prisoner of war, and confined first in the dungeons of Magdeburg, and then by the Austrians at Olmütz.

The English parliament itself took steps in his favor; but it was not until the Treaty of Campo-Formio that Bonaparte released him from prison. During four years of the hardest captivity, subject to every description of privation, kept in ignorance of the state of his country and of liberty, with no prospect before him but that of perpetual and harsh imprisonment, he displayed the most heroic courage. He might have obtained his liberty by making certain retractions, but he preferred remaining buried in his dungeon to the abandoning in the least degree the sacred cause he had embraced.

The authors of the events of August 10 became more and more divided, having no common views as to the results which should arise from that revolution. The more daring party, which had got hold of the commune or municipality, wished by means of that commune to rule Paris; by means of Paris, the national assembly; and by means of the assembly, France. After having effected the transference of Louis XVI. to the Temple, it threw down all the statues of the kings and destroyed all the emblems of the monarchy. The department exercised a right of superintendence over the municipality; to be completely independent, it abrogated this right. The law required certain conditions to constitute a citizen; it decreed the cessation of these, in order that the multitude might be introduced into the government of the state.

The revolutionary commune consisted of 288 persons, being six persons from each of the forty-eight sections of Paris.

The reader is asked to observe how completely the legislative assembly had lost control of events. With adroitness the revolutionary commune had made itself the head of the national uprising. France was compelled to acknowledge that the municipal council, with the will and ability to organize, was the only power in France to organize her that she might cope with the allied powers. It strove to concentrate all power in its hands.

The following demands, in the name of the commune, were made: (1) a law of urgency, forbidding every Frenchman to leave the country while it was in danger; (2) the sequestration of the property of those who acted in contravention of this law; (3) the establishment of a vigilance committee in the municipality.

The deposition was everywhere discussed in the most direct manner. Robespierre in a speech foreshadowed the committee government of the terror, saying: "The root of all evils *is* in the

executive, but it is also in the legislative. The deposition of the king is necessary, but who will govern when the name of the king has disappeared? . . . I know nothing so terrible as the idea of unlimited power put in the hands of a numerous assembly, even if they were sages."

At the same time it demanded the establishment of an extraordinary tribunal to try the conspirators of August 10. As the assembly did not prove sufficiently docile, and endeavored by proclamations to recall the people to more just and moderate sentiments, it received threatening messages from the Hôtel de Ville. "As a citizen," said a member of the commune, "as a magistrate of the people, I come to announce to you that this evening, at midnight, the tocsin will sound, the drum beat to arms. The people are weary of not being avenged; tremble lest they administer justice themselves." "If, before two or three hours pass, the foreman of the jury be not named," said another, "and if the jury be not itself in a condition to act, great calamities will befall Paris." To avert the threatened outbreaks the assembly was obliged to appoint an extraordinary criminal tribunal. This tribunal condemned a few persons, but the commune having conceived the most terrible projects, did not consider it sufficiently expeditious.

The assembly, under the intimidation of the commune, resolved to send the defenders of the Tuileries before a court-martial appointed by Santerre. A proclamation of the council declared: "All the guilty ones will perish on the scaffold." On the 15th Robespierre declared the punishing of the crimes of the 10th, that is, the resistance to the insurrectionary mob, not sufficient, and that revenge must be extended to all traitors and conspirators. Robespierre continued:

"Liberate us from the constituted authorities. Abolish this twofold degree of jurisdiction which, by rendering justice slower, grants immunity. We demand the guilty ones to be judged in a sovereign manner and definitely, by commissioners taken from each section."

The assembly tried to compromise with the commune. A deputation of the commune again came to them, and they were told that if they did not at once do that, the tocsin would ring again, the people rise once more, to destroy the national assembly as they had destroyed royalty. The assembly could not defy such arguments for any length of time, and the first revolutionary tribunal

was established in the way demanded by the commune. Four days afterward its first victim's head was severed by the guillotine. On the following days others were sent to the scaffold. The system of hostages was introduced methodically and to an appalling extent. Wives and near relatives of emigrants accused for political crimes were seized in order to induce the accused to deliver themselves into the hands of their persecutors. The wife of Lafayette was one of the first to be arrested.

The national guard was dissolved. A new organization was effected, companies taking the place of battalions. The better classes were allowed to leave the ranks, some being even expelled.

By the law of August 11 the police was rendered completely the tool of the commune.

Article one of the new law made it the duty of the municipality to search for crimes against the security of the state. Article two invited the citizens to denounce the conspirators and suspected. Article three authorized the arrest of those who had been thus denounced. Article eight authorized every public official and active citizen to bring before the municipality such persons.

The question of the reorganization of the department brought about a conflict between the two authorities. The departmental government had been cashiered by the commune, and the assembly had submitted to that, but had at the same time ordered a new election. The commune advised the sections not to go to the polls. The sections obeyed, and the rural members elected were not enough to constitute a quorum. But the sections abandoned their passive resistance to the assembly, and the Hôtel de Ville was compelled to adopt more energetic measures. Robespierre appeared at the bar of the assembly and said the sections had been "forced to take the most vigorous measures to save the state, those whom they had elected to be their officials must have the fullness of power belonging to the sovereign. After the people have saved the country, after you have convoked a national convention, what else can be your business but to obey the demands of the people?"

At the head of the commune were Marat, Panis, Sergeant, Duplain, Lefent, Jourdeuil, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, and Tallien; but the chief leader of the party at that time was Danton. He was a gigantic revolutionist; he deemed no means censurable so they were useful, and according to him men could do whatever they dared attempt. Danton, who has been termed

the Mirabeau of the populace, bore a physical resemblance to that tribune of the higher classes; he had irregular features, a powerful voice, impetuous gesticulation, a daring eloquence, a lordly brow. Their vices, too, were the same, only Mirabeau's were those of a patrician, Danton's those of a democrat; that which there was of daring in the conceptions of Mirabeau was to be found in Danton, but in another way, because in the revolution he belonged to another class and another epoch. Ardent, overwhelmed with debts and wants, given up to his party, he was formidable while in the pursuit of an object, but became indifferent as soon as he had obtained it. This powerful demagogue presented a mixture of the most opposite qualities. He did not seem sordid; he was one of those who, so to speak, give an air of freedom even to baseness. He was an absolute exterminator, without being personally ferocious; inexorable toward masses, humane, even generous toward individuals. At the time the commune was arranging the massacre of September 21, he saved all who applied to him; he, of his own accord, released from prison Duport, Barnave, and Charles Lameth, his personal antagonists. Revolution, in his opinion, was a game at which the conqueror, if he required it, won the life of the conquered. The welfare of his party was, in his eyes, superior to law and even to humanity; this will explain his endeavors after August 10, and his return to moderation when he considered the republic established. Danton came of a provincial bourgeoisie family in comfortable circumstances; was educated by the Oratorians, learning Latin, English, and Italian; entered the law in 1785; in 1787 became *avocat-en-conseils-du-roi*, and when the revolution suppressed the offices of the old régime Danton was indemnified in the sum of seventy thousand livres. His revolutionary activity began with the Cordelier Club. He played a prominent part in the events preceding June 20, 1791, and was made *procureur-substitut* of Paris as a reward for his services. He was not dissolute, as Mirabeau. He had the disposal of large sums of money and was a careless accountant; but he probably never filched a sou; the assertion that "he had sold himself to the court" is unfounded. With the outward semblance of a demagogue in many particulars, Danton is second only to Mirabeau as the statesman of the French Revolution. He was a great man.¹⁰

¹⁰ See Belloc, "Danton," London, 1899, a capital book; Aulard, "*Les orateurs de l'Assemblée législative et de la convention*."

At this period the Prussians, advancing on the plan of invasion already described, passed the frontier after a march of twenty days. The army of Sedan was without a leader and incapable of resisting a force so superior in numbers and so much better organized. On August 20 Longwy was invested by the Prussians; on the 21st it was bombarded, and on the 24th it capitulated. On the 30th the hostile army arrived before Verdun, invested it, and began to bombard it. Verdun taken, the road to the capital was open. The taking of Longwy, and the approach of so great a danger, threw Paris into the utmost agitation and alarm.

The taking of Longwy opened the people's eyes to how badly France was prepared for war. The assembly decreed that (1) it should be a crime to speak, in a besieged city, of surrender; (2) all persons living in Longwy at the time of its surrender should have their political rights taken from them, criminal suits instituted against them, and the commander be sent to court-martial.

The executive council, composed of the ministers, was summoned by the committee of general defense to deliberate on the best measures to be adopted in this perilous conjuncture. Some proposed to wait for the enemy under the walls of the capital, others to retire to Saumur. "You are not ignorant," said Danton, when his turn to speak arrived, "that France is Paris; if you abandon the capital to the foreigner, you surrender yourselves, and you surrender France. It is in Paris that we must defend ourselves by every possible means. I cannot sanction any plan tending to remove you from it. The second project does not appear to me any better. It is impossible to think of fighting under the walls of the capital. The 10th of August has divided France into two parties, the one attached to royalty, the other desiring a republic. The latter, the decided minority of which in the state cannot be concealed, is the only one on which you can rely to fight; the other will refuse to march; it will excite Paris in favor of the foreigner, while your defenders, placed between two fires, will perish in repelling him. Should they fall, which seems to me beyond a doubt, your ruin and that of France are certain; if, contrary to all expectation, they return victorious over the coalition, this victory will still be a defeat for you; for it will have cost you thousands of brave men, while the royalists, more numerous than you, will have lost nothing of their strength and influence. It is my opinion that to

disconcert their measures and stop the enemy we must make the royalists fear." The committee, at once understanding the meaning of these words, were thrown into a state of consternation. "Yes, I tell you," resumed Danton, "we must make them fear." As the committee rejected this proposition by a silence full of alarm, Danton concerted with the commune. His aim was to put down its enemies by terror, to involve the multitude more and more by making them his accomplices, and to leave the revolution no other refuge than victory.

It became more apparent that the only alternative for the commune was to crush all its adversaries with one terrible blow or to be crushed itself. The courage of the assembly to join issue with the commune increased every day. There was a growing dissatisfaction among the sections themselves. Several recalled their representatives from the Hôtel de Ville. It is a question whether the honor of the first idea of the use of terror belongs to Danton or to Marat. Marat was half mad, but with remarkable skill he wrapped himself in a mysterious veil of eccentricities which exercised a most powerful charm over the masses. He spoke for "liberty by the liberating alliance of assassination with dictatorship."

On August 28 Danton had hurried to the assembly and demanded to be heard. "Our enemies have taken Longwy. But France is not Longwy. Only by a great revolution have we annihilated despotism in the capital; only by a national revolution can the despots be repelled. Everything must be put at the disposal of the municipality, and the barriers must be opened to bring the capital again into free communication with the country. The suspects must be seized. The houses must be searched for arms." The assembly yielded. Every section appointed commissioners for the house visitation. Seven hundred houses were searched. Nobody paid the slightest attention to the provisions of the decree. Whoever had money, whoever was thought fit prey for the September massacres, was arrested. Statements of arrests vary from 3000 to 8000.

The commune and Danton saw that the only way to maintain themselves for the moment and to make sure of the future was through terror. This is the key to the September murders. Marat's idea, if it was his originally, was not only accepted, but developed systematically on a gigantic scale.

The pretext of action was the resolution of the assembly,

which had decided to put into operation the law which the king had vetoed against the priests who did not take the required oath. Those who would not do this were required to take their passports and make for the frontier. But when they came to get them they were cast into prison, or rather, as was said at the time, brought to "places of detention."

The commune demanded that the prisoners at Orleans also should be brought to Paris, but the assembly would not comply. So 1000 federates and national guards left for Orleans to massacre the prisoners. The assembly ordered the cabinet to send troops for their protection. The cabinet, however, intrusted this task to the band which had just gone out to murder them.

Domiciliary visits were made with great and gloomy ceremony; a large number of persons whose condition, opinions, or conduct rendered them objects of suspicion were thrown into prison. These unfortunate persons were taken especially from the two dissentient classes, the nobles and the clergy, who were charged with conspiracy under the legislative assembly. All citizens capable of bearing arms were enrolled in the Champ de Mars and departed on September 1 for the frontier. The générale was beat, the tocsin sounded, cannon were fired, and Danton, presenting himself to the assembly to report the measures taken to save the country, exclaimed: "The cannon you hear are no alarm cannon, but the signal for attacking the enemy! To conquer them, to prostrate them, what is necessary? Daring, again daring, and still again and ever daring!"

Intelligence of the taking of Verdun arrived during the night of September 1. The commune availed themselves of this moment, when Paris, filled with terror, thought it saw the enemy at its gates, to execute their fearful projects. The cannon were again fired, the tocsin sounded, the barriers were closed, and the massacre began.

During three days the prisoners confined in the Carmes, the Abbaye, the Conciergerie, and La Force, were slaughtered by a band of about three hundred assassins, directed and paid by the commune. This body, with a calm fanaticism, prostituting to murder the sacred forms of justice, now judges, now executioners, seemed rather to be practicing a calling than to be exercising vengeance; they massacred without question, without remorse, with the conviction of fanatics and the obedience of executioners. If some

peculiar circumstances seemed to move them, and to recall them to sentiments of humanity, to justice, and to mercy, they yielded to the impression for a moment, and then began anew. In this way a few persons were saved; but they were very few. The assembly desired to prevent the massacres, but were unable to do so. The ministry were as incapable as the assembly; the terrible commune alone could order and do everything; Pétion, the mayor, had been cashiered; the soldiers placed in charge of the prisoners feared to resist the murderers, and allowed them to take their own course; the crowd seemed indifferent, or accomplices; the rest of the citizens dared not even betray their consternation. We might be astonished that so great a crime should, with such deliberation, have been conceived, executed, and endured, did we not know what the fanaticism of party will do, and what fear will suffer. But the chastisement of this enormous crime fell at last upon the heads of its authors. The majority of them perished in the storm they had themselves raised, and by the same violent means that they had themselves employed. Men of party seldom escape the fate they have made others undergo.¹¹

The executive council, directed, as to military operations, by General Servan, advanced the newly levied battalions toward the frontier. As a man of judgment, he was desirous of placing a general at the threatened point; but the choice was difficult. Among the generals who had declared in favor of the late political events Kellermann seemed only adapted for a subordinate command, and the authorities had therefore merely placed him in the room of the vacillative and incompetent Luckner. Custine was but little skilled in his art; he was fit for any dashing *coup de main*, but not for the conduct of a great army intrusted with the destiny of France. The same military inferiority was chargeable upon Biron, Labourdonnaie, and the rest, who were therefore left at their

¹¹ Probably 1500 persons perished. Mortimer Ternaux *proves* that 1368 persons perished.—“*La Terreur*,” vol. III. p. 297 ff.

The assembly declared the commune dissolved. The commune addressed the assembly and declared that it had saved the country. For an ingenious justification of these massacres the reader is recommended to Gronlund, “*Ca ira*,” pp. 89-93. See also Fletcher’s Carlyle, “French Revolution,” vol. II. pp. 324-326; Wallon, “*La Terreur*,” vol. I. pp. 31-45; Von Sybel, “History of the French Revolution,” vol. II. pp. 67-104; Taine, “French Revolution,” vol. II. pp. 219-233; Stephens, “French Revolution,” vol. II. pp. 139-150; Mortimer Ternaux, “*Histoire de la Terreur*,” vols. III. and IV.; Buchez et Roux, “*Histoire parlementaire*,” vol. XVII. pp. 331-475; vol. XVIII. pp. 70-177.

old stations, with the corps under their command. Dumouriez alone remained, against whom the Girondists still retained some rancor, and in whom they, moreover, suspected the ambitious views, the tastes, and character of an adventurer, while they rendered justice to his superior talents. However, as he was the only general equal to so important a position, the executive council gave him the command of the army of the Moselle.

Dumouriez repaired in all haste from the camp at Maulde to that of Sedan. He assembled a council of war, in which the general opinion was in favor of retiring toward Châlons or Reims, and covering themselves with the Marne. Far from adopting this dangerous plan, which would have discouraged the troops, given up Lorraine, the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and a part of Champagne, and thrown open the road to Paris, Dumouriez conceived a project full of genius. He saw that it was necessary, by a daring march, to advance on the forest of Argonne, where he might infallibly stop the enemy. This forest had four issues; that of the Chêne-Populeux on the left, those of the Croix-au-Bois and of Grandpré in the center, and that of Les Islettes on the right, which opened or closed the passage into France. The Prussians were only six leagues from the forest, and Dumouriez had twelve to pass over, and his design of occupying it to conceal, if he hoped for success. He executed his project skillfully and boldly. General Dillon, advancing on the Islettes, took possession of them with 7000 men; he himself reached Grandpré, and there established a camp of 13,000 men. The Croix-au-Bois and the Chêne-Populeux were in like manner occupied and defended by some troops. It was here that he wrote to the minister of war, Servan: "Verdun is taken; I await the Prussians. The camps of Grandpré and Les Islettes are the Thermopylæ of France; but I shall be more fortunate than Leonidas."

In this position Dumouriez might have stopped the enemy and himself have securely awaited the succors which were on their road to him from every part of France. The various battalions of volunteers repaired to the camps in the interior, whence they were dispatched to his army as soon as they were at all in a state of discipline. Beurnonville, who was on the Flemish frontier, had received orders to advance with 9000 men, and to be at Rhétel, on Dumouriez's left, by September 13. Duval was also on the 7th to march with 7000 men to the Chêne-Populeux; and Kellermann was

advancing from Metz, on his right, with a reinforcement of 22,000 men. Time, therefore, was all that was necessary.

The Duke of Brunswick, after taking Verdun, passed the Meuse in three columns. General Clairfait was operating on his right and Prince Hohenlohe on his left. Renouncing all hope of driving Dumouriez from his position by attacking him in front, he tried to turn him. Dumouriez had been so imprudent as to place nearly his whole force at Grandpré and the Islettes, and to put only a small corps at Chêne-Populeux and Croix-au-Bois—posts, it is true, of minor importance. The Prussians, accordingly, seized upon these, and were on the point of turning him in his camp at Grandpré, and of thus compelling him to lay down his arms. After this grand blunder, which neutralized his first maneuvers, he did not despair of his situation. He broke up his camp secretly during the night of September 14, passed the Aisne, the approach to which might have been closed to him, made a retreat as able as his advance on the Argonne had been, and concentrated his forces in the camp at Sainte-Menehould. He had already delayed the advance of the Prussians at Argonne. The season, as it advanced, became bad. He had now only to maintain his post till the arrival of Kellermann and Beurnonville, and the success of the campaign would be certain. The troops had become disciplined and inured, and the army amounted to about 70,000 men, after the arrival of Beurnonville and Kellermann, which took place on the 17th.

The Prussian army had followed the movements of Dumouriez. On the 20th it attacked Kellermann at Valmy, in order to cut off from the French army the retreat on Châlons. There was a brisk cannonade on both sides. The Prussians advanced in columns toward the heights of Valmy, to carry them. Kellermann also formed his infantry in columns, enjoined them not to fire, but to await the approach of the enemy, and charge them with the bayonet. He gave this command with the cry of "*Vive la nation!*" and this cry, repeated from one end of the line to the other, startled the Prussians still more than the firm attitude of the troops. The Duke of Brunswick made his battalions, already a little shaken, retrograde; the firing continued till the evening; the enemy attempted a fresh attack, but were repulsed. The day was a victory for France, and the, in itself, almost insignificant success of Valmy produced on the troops and upon opinion in France, the effect of the most complete victory.

From the same epoch may be dated the discouragement and retreat of the enemy. The Prussians had entered upon this campaign on the assurance of the emigrants that it would be a mere military promenade. They were without magazines or provisions; in the midst of a perfectly open country they encountered a resistance each day more energetic; the incessant rains had broken up the roads; the soldiers marched knee-deep in mud, and, for four



days past, boiled corn had been their only food. Diseases, produced by the chalky water, want of clothing, and damp, had made great ravages in the army. The Duke of Brunswick advised a retreat, contrary to the opinion of the King of Prussia and the emigrants, who wished to risk a battle and get possession of Châlons. But as the fate of the Prussian monarchy depended on its army, and the ruin of that army would be the inevitable consequence of a defeat, the Duke of Brunswick's opinion prevailed.

Negotiations were opened, and the Prussians, abating their first demands, now only required the restoration of the king upon the constitutional throne. But the convention had just assembled, the republic had been proclaimed, and the executive council replied "that the French republic could listen to no proposition until the Prussian troops had entirely evacuated the French territory." The Prussians, upon this, commenced their retreat on the evening of September 30.¹² It was slightly disturbed by Kellermann, whom Dumouriez sent in pursuit, while he himself proceeded to Paris to enjoy his triumph and concert measures for the invasion of Belgium.

Verdun was abandoned by the allies on October 12, and the French troops reëntered it and Longwy; and the enemy, after having crossed the Ardennes and Luxembourg, repassed the Rhine at Coblenz, and by October 23 the last of the invading armies crossed the frontier. This campaign had been marked by general success. In Flanders the Duke of Saxe-Teschen had been compelled to raise the siege of Lille. This siege began on September 16; the trenches were opened on September 29; on October 5 the siege was raised, after a severe bombardment, contrary, both in its duration and its useless barbarity, to all the usages of war. On the Rhine Custine had taken Trèves, Spire, and Mayence. In the Alps, General Montesquiou had invaded Savoy, and General Anselme the territory of Nice. The French armies, victorious in all directions, had everywhere assumed the offensive, and the revolution was saved.

If we were to present the picture of a state emerging from a great crisis, and were to say: there were in this state an absolute government whose authority has been restricted; two privileged classes which have lost their supremacy; a vast population, already freed by the effect of civilization and intelligence, but without political rights, and which have been obliged, by reason of repeated refusals, to gain these for themselves; if we were to add: the gov-

¹² The time between September 22-28 had been filled with negotiations, Mignet is right in emphasizing the great *moral* effect of Valmy. (See Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. p. 46 ff.). But otherwise Dumouriez's position was still a dangerous one, and his negotiations were protracted in order to give time for recruits to join him. In addition to the causes mentioned by Mignet which induced the retirement of the allies, it should be stated that the Austrians were concerned over Belgium and that the Prussian anxiety over the Polish situation was increasing. On the demoralization of the Prussian host, see the interesting note in Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 341, note 2.

ernment, after opposing this revolution, submitted to it, but the privileged classes constantly opposed it, it might probably be concluded from these data :

The government will be full of regret, the people will exhibit distrust, and the privileged classes will attack the new order of things, each in its own way. The nobility, unable to do so at home, from its weakness there, will emigrate in order to excite foreign powers, who will make preparations for attack; the clergy, who would lose its means of action abroad, will remain at home, where it will seek out foes to the revolution. The people, threatened from without, in danger at home, irritated against the emigrants who seek to arm foreign powers, against foreign powers about to attack its independence, against the clergy who excite the country to insurrection, will treat as enemies clergy, emigrants, and foreign powers. It will require first surveillance over, then the banishment of the refractory priests; confiscation of the property of the emigrants; war against coalesced Europe, in order to forestall it. The first authors of the revolution will condemn such of these measures as shall violate the law; the continuators of the revolution will, on the contrary, regard them as the salvation of the country; and discord will arise between those who prefer the constitution to the state and those who prefer the state to the constitution. The monarch, induced by his interests as king, his affections and his conscience, to reject such a course of policy, will pass for an accomplice of the counter-revolution, because he will appear to protect it. The revolutionists will then seek to gain over the king by intimidation, and failing in this, will overthrow his authority.¹³

Such was the history of the legislative assembly. Internal disturbances led to the decree against the priests; external menaces to that against the emigrants; the coalition of foreign powers to war against Europe; the first defeat of the armies, to the formation of the camp of twenty thousand. The refusal of Louis XVI. to adopt most of these decrees rendered him an object of suspicion to the Girondists; the dissensions between the latter and the constitutionalists, who desired some of them to be legislators, as in time of peace, others, enemies, as in time of war, disunited the partisans of the revolution. With the Girondists the question of liberty was involved in victory, and victory in the decrees. June 20 was

¹³ With this estimate the reader is recommended to read the notable letter of Morris, in "Diary and Letters," vol. I. pp. 597-603.

an attempt to force their acceptance; but having failed in its effect, they deemed that either the crown or the revolution must be renounced, and they brought on August 10. Thus, but for emigration which induced the war, but for the schism which induced the disturbances, the king would probably have agreed to the constitution, and the revolutionists would not have dreamed of the republic.

Chapter VIII

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AND THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI. SEPTEMBER 21, 1792- JANUARY 21, 1793

THE convention constituted itself on September 20, 1792, and commenced its deliberations on the 21st. There were 749 deputies in the convention, 486 of whom were new members. The deputies of Paris were: Robespierre, Danton, Marat, Camille Desmoulins, Manuel, Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, Legendre, Robert, the younger Robespierre, David, Panis, Sergent, Fabre D'Eglantine, Freron, Osselin, and Philip of Orleans. In its first sitting it abolished royalty and proclaimed the republic. On the 22d it appropriated the revolution to itself, by declaring it would not date from the year IV. of Liberty, but from the year I. of the French republic. After these first measures, voted by acclamation, with a sort of rivalry in democracy and enthusiasm in the two parties, which had become divided at the close of the legislative assembly, the convention, instead of commencing its labors, gave itself up to intestine quarrels. The Girondists and the Mountain, before they established the new revolution, desired to know to which of them it was to belong, and the enormous dangers of their position did not divert them from this contest. They had more than ever to fear the efforts of Europe. Austria, Prussia, and some of the German princes having attacked France before August 10, there was every reason to believe that the other sovereigns of Europe would declare against it after the fall of the monarchy, the imprisonment of the king, and the massacres of September. Within, the enemies of the revolution had increased. To the partisans of the ancient régime, of the aristocracy and clergy, were now to be added the friends of constitutional monarchy, with whom the fate of Louis XVI. was an object of earnest solicitude, and those who imagined liberty impossible without order, or under the empire of the multitude. Amid so many obstacles and adversaries, at a moment when their strictest union was requisite, the Gironde and the Mountain attacked each other with the fiercest animosity. It is true that these two parties were wholly incompatible, and that their respective

leaders could not combine, so strong and varied were the grounds of separation in their rivalry for power, and in their designs.¹

The Girondists found that during the course of the late events they had lost the assistance of the constitutionalists without procuring that of the democrats; they had a hold upon neither extreme of society.² Accordingly, they only formed a half party, which was soon overthrown, because it had no root. The Girondists, after August 10, were, between the middle class and the multitude, what the monarchists, or the Mounier and Necker party, had been after July 24, between the privileged classes and the bourgeoisie.

The Mountain, on the contrary, desired a republic of the people. The leaders of this party, annoyed at the credit of the Girondists, sought to overthrow and to supersede them. They were less intelligent and less eloquent, but abler, more decided, and in no degree scrupulous as to means. The extremest democracy seemed to them the best of governments, and what they termed the people, that is, the lowest populace, was the object of their constant adulation and most ardent solicitude. No party was more dangerous; most consistently, it labored for those with whom it fought.

Ever since the opening of the convention the Girondists had occupied the right benches, and the Mountain party the summit of the left, whence the name by which they were designated.³ The Girondists were the strongest in the assembly; the elections in the departments had generally been in their favor. A great num-

¹ Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 48-49, admirably shows the difference between these parties, although both were republican:

"The elections were held in the crisis of invasion, in the height of national indignation against the alliance of the aristocracy with the foreigner, and, in some districts, under the influence of men who had not shrunk from ordering the massacres in the prisons. At such a moment a constitutional royalist had scarcely more chance of election than a detected spy from the enemy's camp. The Girondins, who had been the party of extremes in the legislative assembly, were the party of moderation and order in the convention. By their side there were returned men whose whole being seems to be compounded out of the forces of conflict, men who, sometimes without conscious depravity, carried into political and social struggles that direct, unquestioning employment of force which has ordinarily been reserved for war or for the diffusion of religious doctrines. The moral differences that separated this party from the Gironde were at once conspicuous: the political creed of the two parties appeared at first to be much the same."

² The "legend" of the Girondists has been destroyed by Biré, "*La Légende des Girondins*," new edition, 1896.

³ The reader is again asked to note how the Left of one assembly becomes the Right of that which follows; *i. e.*, the revolution grows more radical. In course of time the Mountain split into three groups: (1) the followers of Robes-

ber of the deputies of the legislative assembly had been reëlected, and as connection effects much, as in these days habit and association go a great way, the members who had been united with the deputation of the Gironde and the commune of Paris before August 10 returned with the same opinions. Others came without any particular system or party, without enmities or attachments; these formed what was then called, from the seats they occupied, the Plain or the Marsh. This party, taking no interest in the struggles between the Gironde and the Mountain, voted with the side they considered the most just, so long as they were allowed to be moderate; that is to say, so long as they had no fears for themselves.

The Mountain was composed of deputies of Paris, elected under the influence of the commune of August 10, and of some very decided republicans from the provinces; it, from time to time, increased its ranks with those who were rendered enthusiastic by circumstances, or who were impelled by fear. But though inferior in the convention in point of numbers, it was none the less very powerful, even at this period. It swayed Paris; the commune was devoted to it, and the commune had managed to constitute itself the supreme authority in the state.⁴ The Mountain had sought to master the departments by endeavoring to establish an identity of views and conduct between the municipality of Paris and the provincial municipalities; they had not, however, completely succeeded in this, and the departments were for the most part favorable to their adversaries, who cultivated their good will by means of pamphlets and journals sent by the minister, Roland, whose house the Mountaineers called a *bureau d'esprit public*, and whose friends they called *intrigants*. But beside this junction of the communes, which sooner or later would take place, they were adopted by the Jacobins. This club, the most influential as well as the most ancient and extensive, changed its views at every crisis without changing its name; it was a frame-work ready for every dominating power, excluding all dissentients. That at Paris was the pierre; (2) the Dantonists; (3) the Hebertists, or representatives of the revolutionary commune. In the struggle the extremes fall first; *i. e.*, the Girondists on the Right, then the Hebertists on the extreme Left, then the Dantonists, and finally Robespierre.

⁴ This is quite true, strong as the statement is. Not until the establishment of the committee of public safety was the convention able to emancipate itself from the dictatorship of the commune. (See Mortimer Ternaux, "*La Terreur*," vol. IV. p. 18 ff.). But the convention never displayed the weakness and cowardice of the legislative assembly, and finally did rise superior to the situation.

metropolis of Jacobinism, and governed the others almost imperiously. The Mountaineers had made themselves masters of it; they had already driven the Girondists from it by denunciation and disgust, and replaced the members taken from the bourgeoisie by sans-culottes. Nothing remained to the Girondists but the ministry, who, thwarted by the commune, were powerless in Paris. The Mountaineers, on the contrary, disposed of all the effective force of the capital, of the public mind by the Jacobins, of the sections and faubourgs by the sans-culottes, of the insurrectionists by the municipality.

The first measure of parties after having decreed the republic was to contend with each other. The Girondists were indignant at the massacres of September, and they beheld with horror on the benches of the convention the men who had advised or ordered them. Above all others, two inspired them with antipathy and disgust: Robespierre, whom they suspected of aspiring to tyranny, and Marat, who from the commencement of the revolution had in his writings constituted himself the apostle of murder. They denounced Robespierre with more animosity than prudence; he was not yet sufficiently formidable to incur the accusation of aspiring to the dictatorship. His enemies by reproaching him with intentions then improbable, and at all events incapable of proof, themselves augmented his popularity and importance.

Robespierre was born at Arras in 1759, was early left an orphan, was educated by the Bishop of Arras at the College Louis-le-Grand in Paris, and became a lawyer in his native city. His public career began with his election to the States General in 1789. He was ineligible for the legislative assembly, but was offered the post of prosecuting attorney for the criminal tribunal of the Seine. This he declined, however, to become the political leader of the Jacobin Club. In 1792 he was elected to the convention as a deputy of Paris, and was now beginning to take a prominent position. Hitherto, despite his efforts, he had had superiors in his own party; under the constituent assembly, its famous leaders; under the legislative, Brissot and Pétion; on August 10, Danton. At these different periods he had declared himself against those whose renown or popularity offended him. Only able to distinguish himself among the celebrated personages of the first assembly, by the singularity of his opinions he had shown himself an exaggerated reformer; during the second he became a constitutionalist, because his rivals were innovators,

and he had talked in favor of peace to the Jacobins, because his rivals advocated war. From August 10 he essayed in that club to ruin the Girondists and to supplant Danton, always associating the cause of his vanity with that of the multitude. This man, of ordinary talents and vain character, owed it to his inferiority to rank with the last, a great advantage in times of revolution; and his conceit drove him to aspire to the first rank, to do all to reach it, to dare all to maintain himself there.

Robespierre had the qualifications for tyranny; a soul not great, it is true, but not common; the advantage of one sole passion, the appearance of patriotism, a deserved reputation for incorruptibility, an austere life, and no aversion to the effusion of blood. He was a proof that amid civil troubles it is not mind, but conduct, that leads to political fortune, and that persevering mediocrity is more powerful than wavering genius. It must also be observed that Robespierre had the support of an immense and fanatical sect, whose government he had solicited, and whose principles he had defended since the close of the constituent assembly. This sect derived its origin from the eighteenth century, certain opinions of which it represented. In politics its symbol was the absolute sovereignty of the "Social Contract" of Rousseau, and for creed it held the deism of "The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar"; at a later period it succeeded in realizing these for a moment in the constitution of '93, and the worship of the Supreme Being. More fanaticism and system existed in the different epochs of the revolution than is generally supposed.

Whether the Girondists distinctly foresaw the dominion of Robespierre, or whether they suffered themselves to be carried away by their indignation, they accused him, with republicans, of the most serious of crimes. Paris was agitated by the spirit of faction; the Girondists wished to pass a law against those who excited disorders and violence, and at the same time to give the convention an independent force derived from the eighty-three departments. They appointed a commission to present a report on this subject. The Mountain attacked this measure as injurious to Paris; the Gironde defended it by pointing out the project of a triumvirate formed by the deputation of Paris. "I was born in Paris," said Osselin; "I am deputy for that town. It is announced that a party is formed in the very heart of it, desiring a dictatorship, triumvirs, and tribunes. I declare that extreme ig-

norance or profound wickedness alone could have conceived such a project. Let the member of the deputation of Paris who has conceived such an idea be anathematized!" "Yes," exclaimed Rebecqui of Marseilles, "yes, there exists in this assembly a party which aspires at the dictatorship, and I will name the leader of this party: Robespierre. That is the man whom I denounce." Barbaroux supported this denunciation by his evidence; he was one of the chief authors of August 10; he was the leader of the Marseillaise, and he possessed immense influence in the south. He stated that about August 10 the Marseillaise were much courted by the two parties who divided the capital; he was brought to Robespierre's, and there he was told to ally himself to those citizens who had acquired most popularity and that Panis expressly named to him, Robespierre, as the virtuous man who was to be dictator of France. Barbaroux was a man of action. There were some members of the Right who thought, with him, that they ought to conquer their adversaries in order to avoid being conquered by them. They wished, making use of the convention against the commune, to oppose the departments to Paris, and while they remained weak, by no means to spare enemies, to whom they would otherwise be granting time to become stronger. But the greater number dreaded a rupture, and trembled at the idea of energetic measures.

This accusation against Robespierre had no immediate consequences; but it fell^o back on Marat, who had recommended a dictatorship in his journal *L'Ami du Peuple*, and had extolled the massacres. When he ascended the tribune to justify himself a shudder of horror seized the assembly. "Down! down!" resounded from all sides. Marat remained imperturbable. In a momentary pause he said: "I have a great number of personal enemies in this assembly. ["All! all!"] I beg of them to remember decorum; I exhort them to abstain from all furious clamors and indecent threats against a man who has served liberty and themselves more than they think for. For once let them learn to listen." And this man delivered in the midst of the convention, astounded at his audacity and *sang-froid*, his views of the proscriptions and of the dictatorship. For some time he had fled from cellar to cellar to avoid public anger and the warrants issued against him. His sanguinary journal alone appeared; in it he demanded heads and prepared the multitude for the massacres of September. There is no folly which may not enter a man's head,

and what is worse, which may not be realized for a moment. Marat was possessed by certain fixed ideas. The revolution had enemies, and, in his opinion, it could not last unless freed from them; from that moment he deemed nothing could be more simple than to exterminate them and appoint a dictator, whose functions should be limited to proscribing; these two measures he proclaimed aloud, not cruel, but indifferent; with no more regard for propriety than for the lives of men, and despising as weak minds all those who called his projects atrocious, instead of considering them profound. The revolution had actors really more sanguinary than he, but none exercised a more fatal influence over his times. He depraved the morality of parties already sufficiently corrupt; and he had the two leading ideas which the committee of public safety subsequently realized by its commissioners or its government—extermination in mass, and the dictatorship.⁵

Marat's accusation was not attended with any results; he inspired more disgust, but less hatred, than Robespierre; some regarded him as a madman; others considered these debates as the quarrels of parties, and not as an object of interest for the republic. Moreover, it seemed dangerous to attempt to purify the convention or to dismiss one of its members, and it was a difficult step to get over, even for parties. Danton did not exonerate Marat. "I do not like him," said he; "I have had experience of his temperament; it is volcanic, crabbed, and unsociable. But why seek for the language of a faction in what he writes? Has the general agitation any other cause than that of the revolutionary movement itself?" Robespierre, on his part, protested that he knew very little of Marat; that, previous to August 10, he had only had one conversation with him, after which Marat, whose violent opinions he did not approve, had considered his political views so narrow that he had stated in his journal that he had neither the higher views nor the daring of a statesman.

But he was the object of much greater indignation because he was more dreaded. The first accusation of Rebecqui and Barbaroux had not succeeded. A short time afterward the minister, Roland, made a report on the state of France and Paris; in it he denounced the massacres of September, the encroachments of the

⁵ The reader will find the salient features of Marat's life and copious reference to authorities in Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. I. pp. 67-69. See also Belfort Box, "Marat," which favorably regards him.

commune, and the proceedings of the agitators. "When," said he, "they render the wisest and most intrepid defenders of liberty odious or suspected, when principles of revolt and slaughter are boldly professed and applauded in the assemblies, and clamors arise against the convention itself, I can no longer doubt that partisans of the ancient régime, or false friends of the people, concealing their extravagance or wickedness under a mask of patriotism, have conceived the plan of an overthrow, in which they hope to raise themselves on ruins and corpses, and gratify their thirst for blood, gold, and atrocity."

He cited, in proof of his report, a letter in which the vice-president of the second section of the criminal tribunal informed him that he and the most distinguished Girondists were threatened; that, in the words of their enemies, another bleeding was wanted, and that these men would hear of no one but Robespierre.

At these words the latter hastened to the tribune to justify himself. "No one," he cried, "dare accuse me to my face!" "I dare!" exclaimed Louvet, one of the most determined men of the Gironde. "Yes, Robespierre," he continued, fixing his eye upon him, "I accuse you!" Robespierre, hitherto full of assurance, became moved. He had once before, at the Jacobins, measured his strength with this formidable adversary, whom he knew to be witty, impetuous, and uncompromising. Louvet now spoke, and in a most eloquent address spared neither acts nor names. He traced the course of Robespierre to the Jacobins, to the commune, to the electoral assembly: "calumniating the best patriots; lavishing the basest flatteries on a few hundred citizens, at first designated as the people of Paris, afterward as the people absolutely, and then as the sovereign; repeating the eternal enumeration of his own merits, perfections, and virtues; and never failing, after he had dwelt on the strength, grandeur, and sovereignty of the people, to protest that he was the people too." He then described him concealing himself on August 10, and afterward swaying the conspirators of the commune. Then he came to the massacres of September, and exclaimed: "The revolution of the 10th of August belongs to all!" and added, pointing out a few Mountaineers of the commune, "but that of the 2d of September, that belongs to them—and to none but them! Have they not glorified themselves by it? They themselves, with brutal contempt, only designated us as the patriots of the 10th of August. With ferocious pride they called them-

selves the patriots of the 2d of September! Ah, let them retain this distinction worthy of the courage peculiar to them; let them retain it as our justification, and for their lasting shame! These pretended friends of the people wish to cast on the people of Paris the horrors that stained the first week of September. They have basely slandered them. The people of Paris can fight; they cannot murder! It is true, they were assembled all the day long before the château of the Tuileries on the glorious 10th of August; it is false that they were seen before the prisons on the horrible 2d of September. How many executioners were there within? Two hundred; probably not two hundred. And without, how many spectators could be reckoned drawn thither by truly incomprehensible curiosity? At most, twice the number. But, it is asked, why, if the people did not assist in these murders, did they not hinder them? Why? Because Pétion's tutelary authority was fettered; because Roland spoke in vain; because Danton, the minister of justice, did not speak at all, . . . because the presidents of the forty-eight sections waited for orders the general in command did not give; because municipal officers, wearing their scarfs, presided at these atrocious executions. But the legislative assembly? the legislative assembly! representatives of the people, you will avenge it! The powerless state into which your predecessors were reduced is, in the midst of such crimes, the greatest for which these ruffians, whom I denounce, must be punished." Returning to Robespierre, Louvet pointed out his ambition, his efforts, his extreme ascendancy over the people, and terminated his fiery philippic by a series of acts, each one of which was preceded by this terrible form: "Robespierre, I accuse thee!"

Louvet descended from the tribune amid applause. Robespierre mounted it to justify himself; he was pale, and was received with murmurs. Either from agitation or fear of prejudice, he asked for a week's delay. The time arrived; he appeared less like one accused than as a triumpher; he repelled with irony Louvet's reproaches, and entered into a long apology for himself. It must be admitted that the facts were vague, and it required little trouble to weaken or overturn them. Persons were placed in the gallery to applaud him; even the convention itself, who regarded this quarrel as the result of a private pique, and, as Barrère said, did not fear a man of a day, a petty leader of riots, was disposed to close these debates. Accordingly, when Robespierre observed, as he

finished: "For my part, I will draw no personal conclusions; I have given up the easy advantage of replying to the calumnies of my adversaries by more formidable denunciations; I wished to suppress the offensive part of my justification. I renounce the just vengeance I have a right to pursue against my calumniators; I ask for no other than the return of peace and triumph of liberty!" he was applauded, and the convention passed to the order of the day. Louvet in vain sought to reply; he was not allowed. Barbaroux as vainly presented himself as accuser, and Lanjuinais opposed the motion for the order without obtaining the renewal of the discussion. The Girondists themselves supported it: they committed one fault in commencing the accusation and another in not continuing it. The Mountain carried the day, since they were not conquered, and Robespierre was brought nearer the assumption of the part he had been so far removed from. In times of revolution men very soon become what they are supposed to be, and the Mountain adopted him for their leader because the Girondists pursued him as such.

But what was much more important than personal attacks was the discussion respecting the means of government and the management of authorities and parties. The Girondists struck, not only against individuals, but against the commune. Not one of their measures succeeded; they were badly proposed or badly sustained. They should have supported the government, replaced the municipality, maintained their post among the Jacobins and swayed them, gained over the multitude, or prevented its acting; and they did nothing of all this. One among them, Buzot, proposed giving the convention a guard of three thousand men, taken from the departments. This measure, which would at least have made the assembly independent, was not supported with sufficient vigor to be adopted. Thus the Girondists attacked the Mountaineers without weakening them, the commune without subduing it, the faubourgs without suppressing them. They irritated Paris by invoking the aid of the departments, without procuring it, thus acting in opposition to the most common rules of prudence, for it is always safer to do a thing than to threaten to do it.

The political short-sightedness of the Girondists is remarkable; their hypocrisy little less. They did not hesitate to claim the rewards of August 10, and appropriated most of the offices of state, while at the same time they violently condemned Marat,

Danton, and Robespierre. They made the mistake of giving their antagonists the advantage of a defensive position, and without taking protective measures inveighed against the Mountain in the very home of its partisans—Paris.

Their adversaries skillfully turned this circumstance to advantage. They secretly circulated a report which could not but compromise the Girondists; it was that they wished to remove the republic to the south, and give up the rest of the empire. Then commenced that reproach of "federalism,"⁶ which afterward became so fatal. The Girondists disdained it because they did not see the consequences; but it necessarily gained credit in proportion as they became weak and their enemies became daring. What had given rise to the report was the project of defending themselves behind the Loire, and removing the government to the south, if the north should be invaded and Paris taken, and the predilection they manifested for the provinces, and their indignation against the agitators of the capital. Nothing is more easy than to change the appearance of a measure by changing the period in which the measure was adopted, and discover in the disapprobation expressed at the irregular acts of a city, an intention to form the other cities of the state into a league against it. Accordingly, the Girondists were pointed out to the multitude as federalists. While they denounced the commune, and accused Robespierre and Marat, the Mountaineers decreed the unity and indivisibility of the republic. This was a way of attacking them and bringing them into suspicion, although they themselves adhered so eagerly to these propositions that they seemed to regret not having made them.⁷

But a circumstance, apparently unconnected with the disputes of these two parties, served still better the cause of the Mountaineers. Already emboldened by the unsuccessful attempts which had been directed against them, they only waited for an opportunity to become assailants in their turn. The convention was fatigued by these long discussions. Those members who were not interested in them, and even those of the two parties who were not in the first rank, felt the need of concord, and wished to see men occupy themselves with the republic. There was an apparent truce, and

⁶ See Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 170 ff.; C1adet, "*Les Girondins*," p. 243 ff.; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. II. p. 153 ff. For some proofs that the charge of "federalism" was not wholly an empty term, see Carlyle, "French Revolution," edition of Fletcher, vol. III. p. 12, note.

⁷ See *Moniteur*, 1693, Nos. 102-104; Guadet, "*Les Girondins*," pp. 266-275.

the attention of the assembly was directed for a moment to the new constitution, which the Mountain caused it to abandon in order to decide on the fate of the fallen prince. The leaders of the extreme Left were driven to this course by several motives: they did not want the Girondists, and the moderate members of the Plain, who directed the committee of the constitution, the former by Pétion, Condorcet, Brissot, Vergniaud, Gensonné, the others, by Barrère, Sieyès, and Thomas Paine, to organize the republic. They would have established the system of the bourgeoisie, rendering it a little more democratic than that of 1791, while they themselves aspired at constituting the people. But they could only accomplish their end by power, and they could only obtain power by protracting the revolutionary state in France. Besides the necessity of preventing the establishment of legal order by a terrible *coup d'état*, such as the condemnation of Louis XVI., which would arouse all passions, rally round them the violent parties, by proving them to be the inflexible guardians of the republic, they hoped to expose the sentiments of the Girondists, who did not conceal their desire to save Louis XVI., and thus ruin them in the estimation of the multitude. There were, without a doubt, in this conjuncture, a great number of Mountaineers who, on this occasion, acted with the greatest sincerity, and only as republicans, in whose eyes Louis XVI. appeared guilty with respect to the revolution; and a dethroned king was dangerous to a young democracy. But this party would have been more clement had it not had to ruin the Gironde at the same time with Louis XVI.⁸

For some time past the public mind had been prepared for his trial. The Jacobin Club resounded with invectives against him; the most injurious reports were circulated against his character; his condemnation was required for the firm establishment of liberty. The popular societies in the departments addressed petitions to the convention with the same object. The sections presented themselves at the bar of the assembly, and they carried through it, on litters, the men wounded on August 10, who came to cry for vengeance on Louis Capet. They now only designated Louis XVI.

⁸ Upon this subject, the identification of the cause of the king with the Girondists, see Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. II. pp. 260-295; Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. pp. 212-222. The Girondists were forced to vote for the death of the king in order to free themselves from the charge of "royalism." But the Mountain, which had forced the fighting, took the laurel of victory.

by this name of the ancient chief of his race, thinking to substitute his title of king by his family name.⁹

Party motives and popular animosities combined against this unfortunate prince. Those who, two months before, would have repelled the idea of exposing him to any other punishment than that of dethronement, were stupefied; so quickly does man lose in moments of crisis the right to defend his opinions! The discovery of the iron chest especially increased the fanaticism of the multitude, and the weakness of the king's defenders. After August 10 there were found in the offices of the civil list documents which proved the secret correspondence of Louis XVI. with the discontented princes, with the emigration, and with Europe. In a report, drawn up at the command of the legislative assembly, he was accused of intending to betray the state and overthrow the revolution. He was accused of having written, on April 16, 1791, to the Bishop of Clermont that if he regained his power he would restore the former government, and the clergy to the state in which they previously were; of having afterward proposed war merely to hasten the approach of his deliverers; of having been in correspondence with men who wrote to him—"War will compel all the powers to combine against the seditious and abandoned men who tyrannize over France, in order that their punishment may speedily serve as an example to all who shall be induced to trouble the peace of empires. You may rely on a hundred and fifty thousand men, Prussians, Austrians, and Imperialists, and on an army of twenty thousand emigrants"; of having been on terms with his brothers, whom his public measures had discountenanced; and, lastly, of having constantly opposed the revolution.

Fresh documents were soon brought forward in support of this accusation. In the Tuileries, behind a panel in the wainscot, there

⁹ The name Capet, which was no more the name of Louis XVI. than Plantagenet or Tudor is the family name of Edward VII., was derived from Hugh Capet, the first king of the house which, as Capetian, Valois, and Bourbon, ruled France for 802 years. But "Capet" was a nickname, probably derived from the circumstance that Hugh, as his father before him, used to wear a small *cape* or *chapette* as the insignia of his position as lay abbot of St. Denis. The name, however, does not occur before the eleventh century, a fact which militates against this theory. The family name of the house was Robert, from Robert le Fort, who died in battle against the Northmen in 866. His son, Odo, became Count of Paris and Duke of France. When the Duke of France, in the person of Hugh Capet, ascended the throne the name of the duchy was applied *in extenso* to the kingdom.

was a hole wrought in the wall, and closed by an iron door. This secret closet was pointed out by the minister, Roland, and there were discovered proofs of all the conspiracies and intrigues of the court against the revolution; projects with the popular leaders to strengthen the constitutional power of the king, to restore the ancient régime and the aristocrats; the maneuvers of Talon, the arrangements with Mirabeau, the propositions accepted by Bouillé, under the constituent assembly, and some new plots under the legislative assembly. This discovery increased the exasperation against Louis XVI. Mirabeau's bust was broken by the Jacobins, and the convention covered the one which stood in the hall where it held its sittings.¹⁰

For some time there had been a question in the assembly as to the trial of this prince, who, having been dethroned, could no longer be proceeded against. There was no tribunal empowered to pronounce his sentence, no punishment which could be inflicted on him: accordingly, they plunged into false interpretations of the inviolability granted to Louis XVI., in order to condemn him legally. For the king could not be tried legally; for there was no provision for impeachment in the constitution. Despite ingenious arguments to the contrary, the question was, and had to be, a political question.

On October 16, 1792, the convention had received a petition from the Jacobins of Auxerre, who demanded the trial of the king. At bottom no one in the convention had any interest in his fate, for Louis XVI. had ceased to be dangerous, but once the question was raised, neither the Mountain nor the Girondists dared to risk the accusation of being moderates, for fear of being compromised. Two reports upon the matter were made to the convention, one by a Girondist, the other by a Mounraineer, both recommending the trial of the king (November 6-7). On November 13 the debate opened upon the question as to whether the convention could sit in judgment upon Louis XVI. Morrisson, taking his stand upon the precedent of 1791, argued for the inviolability of the king. Saint-Just now made himself famous, for the first time, by declaring: "Citizens: I shall undertake to prove

¹⁰ Both the nature and the extent of these compromising papers is uncertain. It is of curious significance that none of the Girondists were incriminated by the "documents." A committee of twenty-four persons had been appointed on October 1 to report upon the papers. Roland, who "discovered" the secret receptacle, was popularly believed to have suppressed some and fabricated others.



THE LAST INTERVIEW OF LOUIS XVI WITH HIS FAMILY IN THE TEMPLE

that the opinion of Morrisson, who asserts the king's inviolability, and that of the committee, which wishes to judge him as a citizen, are equally false. I say that the king should be judged as an enemy. . . . To judge a king as a citizen! This word will astonish posterity. To judge is to apply the law. A law is an institution of justice. What institution of justice is there between humanity and kings? Kingship is an eternal crime. No man can reign and be innocent." This doctrine, which was that of the Jacobins, was sustained by Robespierre in his speech on December 3. As was to be expected, the convention decided to bring Louis XVI. to trial and appointed a commission of twenty-one members to prepare the process.

The greatest error of parties, next to being unjust, is the desire not to appear so. The committee of legislation commissioned to draw up a report on the question as to whether Louis XVI. could be tried, and whether he could be tried by the convention, decided in the affirmative. The deputy Mailhe opposed, in its name, the dogma of inviolability; but as this dogma had influenced the preceding epoch of the revolution, he contended that Louis XVI. was inviolable as king, but not as an individual. He maintained that the nation, unable to give up its guarantee respecting acts of power, had supplied the inviolability of the monarch by the responsibility of his ministers; and that, when Louis XVI. had acted as a simple individual, his responsibility devolving on no one, he ceased to be inviolable. Thus Mailhe limited the constitutional safeguard given to Louis XVI. to the acts of the king. He concluded that Louis XVI. could be tried, the dethronement not being a punishment, but a change of government; that he might be brought to trial, by virtue of the penal code relative to traitors and conspirators; that he could be tried by the convention, without observing the process of other tribunals, because, the convention representing the people—the people including all interests, and all interests constituting justice—it was impossible that the national tribunal could violate justice, and that, consequently, it was useless to subject it to forms. Such was the chain of sophistry by means of which the committee transformed the convention into a tribunal. Robespierre's party showed itself much more consistent, dwelling only on state reasons, and rejecting forms as deceptive.

The discussion commenced on November 13, six days after the report of the committee. The partisans of inviolability, while

they considered Louis XVI. guilty, maintained that he could not be tried. The principal of these was Morrisson. He said that inviolability was general; that the constitution had anticipated more than secret hostility on the part of Louis XVI., an open attack, and even in that case had only pronounced his deposition; that in this respect the nation had pledged its sovereignty; that the mission of the convention was to change the government, not to judge Louis XVI.; that, restrained by the rules of justice, it was so also by the usages of war, which only permitted an enemy to be destroyed during the combat—after a victory, the law vindicates him; that, moreover, the republic had no interest in condemning Louis; that it ought to confine itself with respect to him, to measures of general safety, detain him prisoner, or banish him from France. This was the opinion of the Right of the convention. The Plain shared the opinion of the committee; but the Mountain repelled, at the same time, the inviolability and the trial of Louis XVI.

“Citizens,” said Saint-Just, “I engage to prove that the opinion of Morrison, who maintains the king’s inviolability, and that of the committee, which requires his trial as a citizen, are equally false; I contend that we should judge the king as an enemy; that we have less to do with trying than with opposing him: that having no place in the contract which unites Frenchmen, the forms of the proceeding are not in civil law, but in the law of the right of nations; thus, all delay or reserve in this case are sheer acts of imprudence, and next to the imprudence which postpones the moment that should give us laws, the most fatal will be that which makes us temporize with the king.” Reducing everything to considerations of enmity and policy, Saint-Just added: “The very men who are about to try Louis have a republic to establish: those who attach any importance to the just chastisement of a king will never found a republic. Citizens, if the Roman people, after six hundred years of virtue and of hatred toward kings; if Great Britain after the death of Cromwell saw kings restored in spite of its energy, what ought not good citizens, friends of liberty, to fear among us, when they see the ax tremble in your hands, and a people, from the first day of their freedom, respect the memory of their chains?”

This violent party, who wished to substitute a *coup d’état* for a sentence, to follow no law, no form, but to strike Louis XVI. like a conquered prisoner, by making hostilities even survive victory, had but a very feeble majority in the convention; but

without it was strongly supported by the Jacobins and the commune. Notwithstanding the terror which it already inspired, its murderous suggestions were repelled by the convention; and the partisans of inviolability, in their turn, courageously asserted reasons of public interest at the same time as rules of justice and humanity. They maintained that the same men could not be judges and legislators, the jury and the accusers. They desired also to impart to the rising republic the luster of great virtues, those of generosity and forgiveness; they wished to follow the example of the people of Rome, who acquired their freedom and retained it five hundred years, because they proved themselves magnanimous; because they banished the Tarquins instead of putting them to death. In a political view, they showed the consequences of the king's condemnation, as it would affect the anarchical party of the kingdom, rendering it still more insolent; and with regard to Europe, whose still neutral powers it would induce to join the coalition against the republic.

But Robespierre, who during this long debate displayed a daring and perseverance that presaged his power, appeared at the tribune to support Saint-Just, to reproach the convention with involving in doubt what the insurrection had decided, and with restoring, by sympathy and the publicity of a defense, the fallen royalist party. "The assembly," said Robespierre, "has involuntarily been led far away from the real question. Here we have nothing to do with trial: Louis is not an accused man; you are not judges, you are, and can only be statesmen. You have no sentence to pronounce for or against a man, but you are called on to adopt a measure of public safety; to perform an act of national precaution. A dethroned king is only fit for two purposes, to disturb the tranquillity of the state, and shake its freedom, or to strengthen one or the other of them.

"Louis was king; the republic is founded; the famous question you are discussing is decided in these few words. Louis cannot be tried; he is already tried, he is condemned, or the republic is not absolved." He required that the convention should declare Louis XVI. a traitor toward the French, criminal toward humanity, and sentence him at once to death, by virtue of the insurrection.

The Mountaineers, by these extreme propositions, by the popularity they attained without, rendered condemnation in a measure inevitable. By gaining an extraordinary advance on the other par-

ties, it obliged them to follow it, though at a distance. The majority of the convention, composed in a large part of Girondists, who dared not pronounce Louis XVI. inviolable, and of the Plain, decided, on Pétion's proposition, against the opinion of the fanatical Mountaineers and against that of the partisans of inviolability, that Louis XVI. should be tried by the convention. Robert Lindet then made, in the name of the commission of the twenty-one, his report respecting Louis XVI. The arraignment, setting forth the offenses imputed to him, was drawn up, and the convention summoned the prisoner to its bar.

Louis had been confined in the Temple for four months. He was not at liberty, as the assembly at first wished him to be in assigning him the Luxembourg for a residence. The suspicious commune guarded him closely; but, submissive to his destiny, prepared for everything, he manifested neither impatience, regret, nor indignation. He had only one servant about his person, Cléry, who at the same time waited on his family. During the first months of his imprisonment he was not separated from his family; and he still found solace in meeting it. He comforted and supported his two companions in misfortune, his wife and sister; he acted as preceptor to the young dauphin, and gave him the lessons of an unfortunate man, of a captive king. He read a great deal, and often turned to the "History of England," by Hume; there he read of many dethroned kings, and one of them condemned by the people. Man always seeks destinies similar to his own. But the consolation he found in the sight of his family did not last long: as soon as his trial was decided he was separated from them. The commune wished to prevent the prisoners from concerting their justification; the surveillance it exercised over Louis XVI. became daily more minute and severe.

In this state of things Santerre received the order to conduct Louis XVI. to the bar of the convention. He repaired to the Temple, accompanied by the mayor, who communicated his mission to the king, and inquired if he was willing to descend. Louis hesitated a moment, then said: "This is another violence. I must yield!" and he decided on appearing before the convention, not objecting to it, as Charles I. had done with regard to his judges. "Representatives," said Barrère, when his approach was announced, "you are about to exercise the right of national justice. Let your attitude be suited to your new functions"; and turning to the

gallery, he added: "Citizens, remember the terrible silence which accompanied Louis on his return from Varennes; a silence which was the precursor of the trial of kings by nations." Louis XVI. appeared firm as he entered the hall, and he took a steady glance round the assembly. He was placed at the bar, and the president said to him in a voice of emotion: "Louis, the French nation accuses you. You are about to hear the charges of the indictment. Louis, be seated." A seat had been prepared for him; he sat in it. During a long examination he displayed much calmness and presence of mind; he replied to each question appropriately, often in an affecting and triumphant manner. He repelled the reproaches addressed to him respecting his conduct before July 14, reminding them that his authority was not then limited; before the journey to Varennes, by the decree of the constituent assembly, which had been satisfied with his replies; and after August 10, by throwing all public acts on ministerial responsibility, and by denying all the secret measures which were personally attributed to him. This denial did not, however, in the eyes of the convention, overthrow facts, proved for the most part by documents written or signed by the hand of Louis XVI. himself; he made use of the natural right of every accused person. Thus he did not admit the existence of the iron chest and the papers that were brought forward. Louis XVI. invoked a law of safety, which the convention did not admit, and the convention sought to protect itself from anti-revolutionary attempts, which Louis XVI. would not admit.

When Louis had returned to the Temple the convention considered the request he had made for a defender. A few Mountaineers opposed the request in vain. The convention determined to allow him the services of a counsel. It was then that the venerable Malesherbes offered himself to the convention to defend Louis XVI. "Twice," he wrote, "have I been summoned to the council of him who was my master, at a time when that function was the object of ambition to every man; I owe him the same service now, when many consider it dangerous." His request was granted. Louis XVI. in his abandonment was touched by this proof of devotion. When Malesherbes entered his room, he went toward him, pressed him in his arms, and said with tears: "Your sacrifice is the more generous since you endanger your own life without saving mine." Malesherbes and Tronchet toiled uninterruptedly at his defense, and associated De Sèze with them; they sought

to reanimate the courage of the king, but they found the king little inclined to hope. "I am sure they will take my life; but no matter, let us attend to my trial the same as if I were about to gain it. In truth, I shall gain it, for I shall leave no stain on my memory."

At length the day for the defense arrived; it was delivered by De Sèze; Louis was present. The profoundest silence pervaded the assembly and the galleries. De Sèze availed himself of every consideration of justice and innocence in favor of the royal prisoner. He appealed to the inviolability which had been granted him; he asserted that as king he could not be tried; that as accusers the representatives of the people could not be his judges. In this he advanced nothing which had not already been maintained by one party of the assembly. But he chiefly strove to justify the conduct of Louis XVI. by ascribing to him intentions always pure and irreproachable. He concluded with these last and solemn words: "Listen, in anticipation, to what History will say to Fame; Louis ascending the throne at twenty, presented an example of morals, justice, and economy; he had no weakness, no corrupting passion: he was the constant friend of the people. Did the people desire the abolition of an oppressive tax? Louis abolished it: did the people desire the suppression of slavery? Louis suppressed it: did the people solicit reforms? he made them: did the people wish to change their laws? he consented to change them: did the people desire that millions of Frenchmen should be restored to their rights? he restored them: did the people wish for liberty? he gave it them. Men cannot deny to Louis the glory of having anticipated the people by his sacrifices; and it is he whom it is proposed to slay. Citizens, I will not continue; I leave it to History; remember, she will judge your sentence, and her judgment will be that of ages." But passion proved deaf and incapable of foresight.

The Girondists wished to save Louis XVI., but they feared the imputation of royalism, which was already cast upon them by the Mountaineers. During the whole transaction their conduct was rather equivocal; they dared not pronounce themselves in favor of or against the accused; and their moderation ruined them without serving him. At that moment his cause, not only that of his throne, but of his life, was their own. They were about to determine, by an act of justice or by a *coup d'état*, whether they should return to the legal régime or prolong the revolutionary régime. The triumph

of the Girondists or of the Mountaineers was involved in one or the other of these solutions. The latter became exceedingly active. They pretended that, while following forms, men were forgetful of republican energy, and that the defense of Louis XVI. was a lecture on monarchy addressed to the nation. The Jacobins powerfully seconded them, and deputations came to the bar demanding the death of the king.

Yet the Girondists, who had not dared to maintain the question of inviolability, proposed a skillful way of saving Louis XVI. from death, by appealing from the sentence of the convention to the people. The extreme Right still protested against the erection of the assembly into a tribunal; but the competence of the assembly having been previously decided, all their efforts were turned in another direction. Salles proposed that the king should be pronounced guilty, but that the application of the punishment should be left to the primary assembly. Buzot, fearing that the convention would incur the reproach of weakness, thought that it ought to pronounce the sentence, and submit the judgment it pronounced to the decision of the people. This advice was vigorously opposed by the Mountaineers, and even by a great number of the more moderate members of the convention, who saw in the convocation of the primary assemblies the germ of civil war.

The assembly had unanimously decided that Louis was guilty, when the appeal to the people was put to the question. Two hundred and eighty-three voices voted for, 424 against it; ten declined voting. Then came the terrible question as to the nature of the punishment.¹¹ Paris was in a state of the greatest excitement:

¹¹ Six hundred and eighty-three against 26 declared Louis guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation; 424 against 283 voted against appeal to the people; 387 deputies voted for death without condition, 334 for death with delay of execution or for punishment less than capital. The majority for death was 53. The first two votes were taken on January 15, 1793. Barrère had succeeded in having a motion carried to the effect that the vote should be taken by calling the roll instead of by ballot. This subtle species of intimidation accounts for the large vote. Worse still was the intimidation by the mob in the galleries. Cf. Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 216 ff. The vote is analyzed by persons in Fletcher's edition of Carlyle's "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 391, note.

It is interesting to Americans especially to know that Thomas Paine, the author of "Common Sense," who had a new field of political activity in France after the American Revolution, who was naturalized and was elected a deputy of Pason-Calais to the convention, tried to induce the convention to exile Louis XVI. to the United States. Dr. Priestly, the eminent chemist, and a famous radical, also was a member of the convention and supported Paine's suggestion.

deputies were threatened at the very door of the assembly; fresh excesses on the part of the populace were dreaded; the Jacobin clubs resounded with extravagant invectives against Louis XVI. and the Right. The Mountain, till then the weakest party in the convention, sought to obtain the majority by terror, determined, if it did not succeed, none the less to sacrifice Louis XVI. Finally, after four hours of nominal appeal, the president, Vergniaud, said: "Citizens, I am about to proclaim the result of the scrutiny. When justice has spoken, humanity should have its turn." There were 721 voters. The actual majority was 361, as 26 deputies voted for death with Maihli's amendment for postponement.¹² Opinions were very various; Girondists voted for his death, with a reservation, it is true; most of the members of the Right voted for imprisonment or exile, a few Mountaineers voted with the Girondists. As soon as the result was known, the president said, in a tone of grief: "In the name of the convention, I declare the punishment, to which it condemns Louis Capet, to be death." Those who had undertaken the defense appeared at the bar; they were deeply affected. They endeavored to bring back the assembly to sentiments of compassion, in consideration of the small majority in favor of the sentence. But this subject had already been discussed and decided. "Laws are only made by a simple majority," said a Mountaineer. "Yes," replied a voice, "but laws may be revoked: you cannot restore the life of a man." Malesherbes wished to speak, but could not. Sobs prevented his utterance; he could only articulate a few indistinct words of entreaty. His grief moved the assembly. The request for a reprieve was received by the Girondists as a last resource: but this also failed them, and the fatal sentence was pronounced.

Louis expected it. When Malesherbes came in tears to announce the sentence, he found him sitting in the dark, his elbows resting on a table, his face hid in his hands, and in profound meditation. At the noise of his entrance, Louis rose and said: "For two hours I have been trying to discover if, during my reign, I have deserved the slightest reproach from my subjects. Well, M. de Malesherbes, I swear to you, in the truth of my heart, as a man about to appear before God, that I have constantly sought the happiness of my people, and never indulged a wish opposed to it." Malesherbes urged that reprieve would not be rejected, but this Louis did not expect. As he saw Malesherbes go out, Louis begged him not to forsake him in his last moments; Malesherbes

¹² On January 16.

promised to return, and came often and was always admitted, though he was searched before being permitted to enter. Louis received without emotion the formal announcement of his sentence from the minister of justice. He asked three days to prepare to appear before God; and also to be allowed the services of a priest, and permission to communicate freely with his wife and children. Only the last two requests were granted. The Abbé Edgeworth, a nonjuring priest of his selection, was admitted, and his family was allowed to see him.

The interview was a distressing scene to this desolate family; but the moment of separation was far more so. Louis on parting with his family promised to see them again the next day, but on reaching his room he felt that the trial would be too much, and, pacing up and down violently, he exclaimed: "I will not go!" This was his last struggle; the rest of his time was spent in preparing for death. The night before the execution he slept calmly. Cléry awoke him, as he had been ordered, at five, and received his last instructions. He then communicated, commissioned Cléry with his dying words, and all he was allowed to bequeath, a ring, a seal, and some hair. The drums were already beating, and the dull sound of traveling cannon, and of confused voices, might be heard. At length Santerre arrived. "You are come for me," said Louis; "I ask one moment." He deposited his will in the hands of the municipal officer, asked for his hat, and said, in a firm tone: "Let us go."

The carriage was an hour on its way from the Temple to the Place de la Revolution. A double row of soldiers lined the road; more than forty thousand men were under arms. Paris presented a gloomy aspect. The citizens present at the execution manifested neither applause nor regret; all were silent. On reaching the place of execution Louis alighted from the carriage. He ascended the scaffold with a firm step, knelt to receive the benediction of the priest, who is recorded to have said, "Son of Saint Louis, ascend to heaven!" With some repugnance he submitted to the binding of his hands, and walked hastily to the left of the scaffold: "I die innocent," said he; "I forgive my enemies; and you, unfortunate people . . ." Here, at a signal, the drums and trumpets drowned his voice, and the three executioners seized him, and shortly after ten o'clock of January 21, 1793, he had ceased to live.

Thus perished, at the age of thirty-nine, after a reign of six-

teen years and a half, spent in endeavoring to do good, the best but weakest of monarchs. His ancestors bequeathed to him a revolution. He was better calculated than any of them to prevent and terminate it; for he was capable of becoming a reformer-king before it broke out, or of becoming a constitutional king afterward. He is, perhaps, the only prince who, having no other passion, had not that of power, and who united the two qualities which make good kings, fear of God, and love of the people. He perished, the victim of passions which he did not share; of those of the persons about him, to which he was a stranger, and to those of the multitude, which he had not excited. Few memories of kings are so commendable. History will say of him, that, with a little more strength of mind, he would have been an exemplary king.

Chapter IX

FALL OF THE GIRONDISTS

JANUARY 21-JUNE 2, 1793

THE death of Louis XVI. rendered the different parties irreconcilable, and increased the external enemies of the revolution. The republicans had to contend with all Europe, with several classes of malcontents, and with themselves. But the Mountaineers, who then directed the popular movement, imagined that they were too far involved not to push matters to extremity. To terrify the enemies of the revolution, to excite the fanaticism of the people by harangues, by the presence of danger, and by insurrections; to refer everything to it, both the government and the safety of the republic; to infuse into it the most ardent enthusiasm, in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity; to keep it in this violent state of crisis for the purpose of making use of its passions and its power; such was the plan of Danton and the Mountain, who had chosen him for their leader. It was he who augmented the popular effervescence by the growing dangers of the republic, and who, under the name of revolutionary government, established the despotism of the multitude, instead of legal liberty. Robespierre and Marat went even much further than he. They sought to erect into a permanent government what Danton considered as merely transitory. The latter was only a political chief, while the others were true sectarians; the first, more ambitious, the second, more fanatical.

The Mountaineers had, by the catastrophe of January 21, gained a great victory over the Girondists. They were accused of being the enemies of the people, because they opposed their excesses; of being the accomplices of the tyrant, because they had sought to save Louis XVI.; and of betraying the republic, because they recommended moderation. It was with these reproaches that the Mountaineers persecuted them with constant animosity in the bosom of the convention, from January 21 till May 31, and June 2. The Girondists were for a long time supported by the Center, which

sided with the Right against murder and anarchy, and with the Left for measures for public safety. The mass, which, properly speaking, formed the spirit of the convention, displayed some courage, and balanced the power of the Mountain and the commune as long as it possessed those intrepid and eloquent Girondists, who carried with them to prison and to the scaffold all the generous resolutions of the assembly.

For a moment union existed among the various parties of the assembly. Lepelletier-Saint-Fargeau was stabbed by a retired member of the household guard, named Pâris, for having voted the death of Louis XVI. The members of the convention, united by common danger, swore on his tomb to forget their enmities; but they soon revived them. Some of the murderers of September, whose punishment was desired by the more honorable republicans, were proceeded against at Meaux. The Mountaineers, apprehensive that their past conduct would be inquired into, and that their adversaries would take advantage of a condemnation to attack them more openly themselves, put a stop to these proceedings. This impunity further emboldened the leaders of the multitude; and Marat, who at that period had an incredible influence over the multitude, excited them to pillage the dealers, whom he accused of monopolizing provisions. He wrote and spoke violently, in his pamphlets and at the Jacobins, against the aristocracy of the burghers, merchants, and statesmen (as he designated the Girondists), that is to say, against those who, in the assembly or the nation at large, still opposed the reign of the sans-culottes and the Mountaineers. There was something frightful in the fanaticism and invincible obstinacy of these sectaries. The name given by them to the Girondists from the beginning of the convention was that of *intrigants*, on account of the ministerial and rather stealthy means with which they opposed in the departments the insolent and public conduct of the Jacobins.

Accordingly, they denounced them regularly in the club. "At Rome, an orator cried daily: 'Carthage must be destroyed!' well, let a Jacobin mount this tribune every day, and say these single words: 'The *intrigants* must be destroyed!' Who could withstand us? We oppose crime, and the ephemeral power of riches; but we have truth, justice, poverty, and virtue in our cause. With such arms, the Jacobins will soon have to say: 'We had only to pass on, they were already extinct.'" Marat, who was

much more daring than Robespierre, whose hatred and projects still concealed themselves under certain forms, was the patron of all denouncers and lovers of anarchy. Several Mountaineers reproached him with compromising their cause by his extreme counsels, and by unseasonable excesses; but the entire Jacobin people supported him even against Robespierre, who rarely obtained the advantage in his disputes with him. The pillage recommended in February, in *L'Ami du Peuple*, with respect to some dealers, "by way of example," took place, and Marat was denounced to the convention, who decreed his accusation after a stormy sitting. But this decree had no result, because the ordinary tribunals had no authority. This double effort of force on one side, and weakness on the other, took place in the month of February.¹ The absolute breach between the Girondists and the Mountain may be said to date from January 20, when the former flung down their defiance in supporting—and carrying—Gensonné's motion that the minister of justice initiate proceedings against the perpetrators of the September massacres. The daring of the Girondists was great, at least. The day after they voted against their wishes for the king's execution, and on January 23 Roland resigned. More decisive events soon brought the Girondists to ruin.

Hitherto, the military position of France had been satisfactory. Dumouriez had just crowned the brilliant campaign of Argonne by the conquest of Belgium. After the retreat of the Prussians he had repaired to Paris to concert measures for the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands. Returning to the army on October 20, 1792, he began the attack on the 28th. The plan attempted so inappropriately, with so little strength and success, at the commencement of the war, was resumed and executed with superior means. Dumouriez, at the head of the army of Belgium, 40,000 strong, advanced from Valenciennes upon Mons, supported on the right by the army of the Ardennes, amounting to about 16,000 men, under General Valence, who marched from Givet upon Namur; and on his left, by the army of the north, 18,000 strong, under General Labourdonnaie, who advanced from Lille upon Tournai. The Austrian army, posted before Mons, awaited battle in its intrenchments. Dumouriez completely defeated it; and the victory of

¹ On the mistakes of the Girondists at this critical time, see Taine, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 323 ff.; Mortimer Ternaux, "*Histoire de la Terreur*," vol. VII. p. 297 ff.

Jemmapes opened Belgium, and again gave to the French arms the ascendancy in Europe. A victor on November 6, Dumouriez entered Mons on the 7th, Brussels on the 14th, and Liège on the 28th. Valence took Namur, Labourdonnaie Antwerp; and by the middle of December the invasion of the Netherlands was completely achieved. The French army, master of the Meuse and the Scheldt, took up its winter quarters, after driving beyond the Roer the Austrians, whom they might have driven beyond the Lower Rhine.

From this moment hostilities began between Dumouriez and the Jacobins. A decree of the convention, dated November 16, abrogated the Belgian customs and democratically organized that country. This decree was the famous "opening of the Scheldt." It was a direct attack upon the system of the balance of power, and therefore a defiance of the prevailing principles of international law. For the Scheldt—Antwerp—had been closed to commerce since the Treaty of Westphalia; the act had been confirmed numerous times in other European settlements; and only as late as 1788 England had guaranteed the closure to the house of Orange. The war, on the part of France, had become "a crusade of democracy." The convention further passed a decree (November 19, 1792) offering assistance to peoples who rose against their governments; and a month later, on a motion of Cambon (December 15) declared that: "Wherever French armies shall come, all taxes, tithes, and privileges of rank are to be abolished; all existing authorities annulled, and provisional administrators elected by universal suffrage. The property of the fallen government, of the privileged classes and their adherents, is to be placed under French protection."²

The early objects of the allies—protection against expansion of revolution and restoration of pacific (monarchic) government in France had now given way to other motives. The war had degenerated on the part of the allies into a war of aggrandizement, *i. e.*, "the just acquisition of indemnities." Austria had conceived the idea of forcibly reducing Bavaria, in order to recompense herself for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands. This Prussia was bent on preventing, which accounts for the fact that the Prussian army was allowed to remain idle on the Rhine. But Poland offered greater rewards. The causes leading to its division may be seen in the following note on the part of Russia: "Should Poland be

² Rose, "Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era," p. 73. The decree of November 19 is in Thiers, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 188.

firmly and lastingly united to Saxony, a power of the first rank will arise, and one which will be able to exercise the most sensible pressure upon each of its neighbors. We are greatly concerned in this, in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and Prussia is no less so, from the inevitable increase which would ensue of Saxon influence in the German empire. We therefore suggest that Prussia, Austria, and Russia should come to an intimate understanding with one another on this most important subject." ³

The Jacobins sent agents to Belgium to propagate revolutionary principles and establish clubs on the model of the parent society; but the Flemings, who had received them with enthusiasm, became cool at the heavy demands made upon them, and at the general pillage and insupportable anarchy which the Jacobins brought with them. All the party that had opposed the Austrian army, and hoped to be free under the protection of France, found French rule too severe, and regretted having sought its aid, or supported France. Dumouriez, who had projects of independence for the Flemings, and of ambition for himself, came to Paris to complain of this impolitic conduct with regard to the conquered countries. He changed his hitherto equivocal course; he had employed every means to keep on terms with the two factions; he had ranged himself under the banner of neither, hoping to make use of the Right, through his friend Gensonné, of the Mountain, by Danton and Lacroix, and of awing both by his victories. But in this second journey he tried to stop the Jacobins and to save Louis XVI.; not having been able to attain his end, he returned to the army to begin the second campaign, very dissatisfied, and determined to make his new victories the means of stopping the revolution and changing its government.

This time all the frontiers of France were to be attacked by the European powers. The military successes of the revolution, and the catastrophe of January 21, had made most of the undecided or neutral governments join the coalition.

The cabinet of Saint James, on learning the death of Louis XVI., dismissed the ambassador, Chauvelin, whom it had refused

³ Upon the influence of Poland on continental policies at this time, and also of the effect of the denationalization of Poland—the second partition took place in January, 1793—and the sentiments of the convention, see Bourgeois, "*Manuel historique de politique étrangère*," pp. 85-92; Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 83-87; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. IX.

to acknowledge since August 10 and the dethronement of the king. The convention, finding England already leagued with the coalition, and consequently all its promises of neutrality vain and illusive, on February 1, 1793, declared war against the King of Great Britain and the Stadtholder of Holland, who had been entirely guided by the cabinet of Saint James since 1788. England had hitherto preserved the appearances of neutrality, but it took advantage of this opportunity to appear on the scene of hostilities.⁴ For some time disposed for a rupture, Pitt employed all his resources, and in the space of six months concluded seven treaties of alliance and six treaties of subsidies. England thus became the soul of the coalition against France; her fleets were ready to sail; the minister had obtained 3,200,000*l.* extraordinary, and Pitt designed to profit by the revolution by securing the preponderance of Great Britain, as Richelieu and Mazarin had taken advantage of the crisis in England in 1640 to establish the French domination in Europe. The cabinet of Saint James was only influenced by motives of English interests; it desired at any cost to effect the consolidation of the aristocratical power at home, and the exclusive empire in the two Indies, and on the seas.

The cabinet of Saint James then made the second *levée* of the coalition. Spain had just undergone a ministerial change; the famous Godoi, Duke of Alcudia, and since Prince of the Peace, had been placed at the head of the government by means of an intrigue of England and of the emigration. This power came to a rupture with the republic, after having interceded in vain for Louis XVI., and made its neutrality the price of the life of the king. The German empire entirely adopted the war; Bavaria, Suabia, and the Elector Palatine joined the hostile circles of the empire. Naples followed the example of the Holy See; and the only neutral powers were Venice, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Turkey. Russia was still engaged with the second partition of Poland.

The republic was threatened on all sides by the most warlike troops of Europe. It would soon have to face 45,000 Austro-Sardinians in the Alps; 50,000 Spaniards on the Pyrenees; 70,000 Austrians or Imperialists, reinforced by 38,000 Anglo-Batavians, on the Lower Rhine and in Belgium; 33,400 Austrians between the Meuse and the Moselle; 112,600 Prussians, Austrians and Imperial-

⁴ On England's entrance into the struggle, see Oscar Browning's article in *Fortnightly Review*, February, 1882.

ists on the Middle and Upper Rhine. In order to confront so many enemies, the convention decreed, February 24, 1793, a levy of 300,000 men. Two milliards of assignats were appropriated and eighty-two members of the convention detached as "deputies on mission," for the oversight of the armies. This measure of external defense was accompanied by a party measure for the interior. At the moment the new battalions, about to quit Paris, presented themselves to the assembly, the Mountain demanded the establishment of an extraordinary tribunal to maintain the revolution at home, which the battalions were going to defend on the frontiers. This tribunal, composed of nine members, was to try without jury or appeal. The Girondists arose with all their power against so arbitrary and formidable an institution, but it was in vain; for they seemed to be favoring the enemies of the republic by rejecting a tribunal intended to punish them. All they obtained was the introduction of juries into it, the removal of some violent men, and the power of annulling its acts, as long as they maintained any influence.

This was really the revival of an extraordinary tribunal first created on August 17, 1792, in order to expedite matters in the days following August 10. It was abolished by the Girondists on November 13, 1792. Now on March 9, 1793, the permanent revolutionary tribunal was established. Its functions were to punish crimes against the state, *i. e.*, traitors, rebels, and counterfeiters of the assignats. There was a jury until June, 1794, named by the judges. The jury voted openly; there was no appeal, and but one penalty—death.⁵

The principal efforts of the coalition were directed against the vast frontier extending from the North Sea to Huningen. The Prince of Coburg, at the head of the Austrians, was to attack the French army on the Roër and the Meuse, to enter Belgium; while the Prussians, on the other point, should march against Custine, give him battle, surround Mayence, and after taking it renew the preceding invasion. These two armies of operation were sustained in the intermediate positions by considerable forces. Dumouriez, engrossed by ambitious and reactionary designs, at a moment when he ought only to have thought of the perils of France, proposed to himself to establish the royalty of 1791, in spite of the convention

⁵ See Campardon, "*Le Tribunal révolutionnaire*"; Wallon, "*Le Tribunal révolutionnaire*"; Wallon, "*La Terreur*," vol. II. ch. ii.; Stephens, "*French Revolution*," vol. II. pp. 440-443.

and Europe. What Bouillé could not effect for an absolute nor Lafayette for a constitutional throne, Dumouriez, at a time much less propitious, hoped alone to achieve for an abolished constitution and for a royalty without a party. Instead of remaining neutral among factions, as circumstances dictated to a general, and even to an ambitious man, Dumouriez preferred a rupture with them, in order to sway them. He conceived a design of forming a party out of France; of entering Holland by means of the Batavian republicans opposed to the stadtholdership, and to English influence; to deliver Belgium from the Jacobins; to unite these countries in a single independent state, and secure for himself their political protectorate after having acquired all the glory of a conqueror. To intimidate parties, he was to gain over his troops, march on the capital, dissolve the convention, put down popular meetings, re-establish the constitution of 1791, and give a king to France.

This project, impracticable amid the great shock between the revolution and Europe, appeared easy to the fiery and adventurous Dumouriez. Instead of defending the line, threatened from Mayence to the Roër, he threw himself on the left of the operations and entered Holland at the head of 20,000 men. By a rapid march he was to reach the center of the United Provinces, attack the fortresses from behind, and be joined at Nimeguen by 25,000 men under General Miranda, who would probably have made himself master of Maestricht. An army of 40,000 men was to observe the Austrians and protect his right.

Dumouriez vigorously prosecuted his expedition into Holland; he took Breda and Gertruydenberg, and prepared to pass the Biesbos and capture Dort. But the army of the right experienced in the meantime the most alarming reverses on the Lower Meuse. The Austrians assumed the offensive, passed the Roër, beat Miazinski at Aix-la-Chapelle; made Miranda raise the blockade of Maestricht, which he had uselessly bombarded; crossed the Meuse, and at Liège put the French army, which had fallen back between Tirlemont and Louvain, wholly to the rout. Dumouriez received from the executive council orders to leave Holland immediately and to take command of the troops in Belgium; he was compelled to obey, and to renounce in part his wildest but dearest hopes.

The Jacobins, at the news of these reverses, became much more intractable; unable to conceive a defeat without treachery, especially after the brilliant and unexpected victories of the last cam-

paign, they attributed these military disasters to party combinations. They denounced the Girondists, the ministers, and generals who, they supposed, had combined to abandon the republic, and clamored for their destruction. Rivalry mingled with suspicion, and they desired as much to acquire an exclusive domination as to defend the threatened territory; they began with the Girondists. As they had not yet accustomed the multitude to the idea of the proscription of representatives, they at first had recourse to a plot to get rid of them; they resolved to strike them in the convention, where they would all be assembled, and the night of March 10 was fixed on for the execution of the plot. The assembly sat permanently on account of the public danger. It was decided on the preceding day at the Jacobins and Cordeliers to shut the barriers, sound the tocsin, and march in two bands on the convention and the ministers. They started at the appointed hour, but several circumstances prevented the conspirators from succeeding. The Girondists, apprised, did not attend the evening sitting; the sections declared themselves opposed to the plot, and Beurnonville, minister of war, advanced against them at the head of a battalion of Brest federalists; these unexpected obstacles, together with the ceaseless rain, obliged the conspirators to disperse. The next day Vergniaud denounced the insurrectional committee who had projected these murders, demanded that the executive council should be commissioned to make inquiries respecting the conspiracy of March 10, to examine the registers of the clubs, and to arrest the members of the insurrectional committee. "We go," said he, "from crimes to amnesties, from amnesties to crimes. Numbers of citizens have begun to confound seditious insurrections with the great insurrection of liberty; to look on the excitement of robbers as the outbursts of energetic minds, and robbery itself as a measure of general security. We have witnessed the development of that strange system of liberty, in which we are told: 'you are free; but think with us, or we will denounce you to the vengeance of the people; you are free, but bow down your head to the idol we worship, or we will denounce you to the vengeance of the people; you are free, but join us in persecuting the men whose probity and intelligence we dread, or we will denounce you to the vengeance of the people.' Citizens, we have reason to fear that the revolution, like Saturn, will devour successively all its children, and only engender despotism and the calamities which accompany it." These prophetic

words produced some effect in the assembly; but the measures proposed by Vergniaud led to nothing.

The Jacobins were stopped for a moment by the failure of their first enterprise against their adversaries; but the insurrection of La Vendée gave them new courage. The Vendean war was an inevitable event in the revolution. This country, bounded by the Loire and the sea, crossed by few roads, sprinkled with villages, hamlets, and manorial residences, had retained its ancient feudal state. In La Vendée there was no civilization or intelligence, because there was no middle class; and there was no middle class, because there were no towns, or very few. At that time the peasants had acquired no other ideas than those few communicated to them by the priests, and had not separated their interests from those of the nobility. These simple and sturdy men, devotedly attached to the old state of things, did not understand a revolution, which was the result of a faith and necessities entirely foreign to their situation. The nobles and priests, being strong in these districts, had not emigrated; and the ancient régime really existed there, because there were its doctrines and its society. Sooner or later, a war between France and La Vendée, countries so different, and which had nothing in common but language, was inevitable. It was inevitable that the two fanaticisms of monarchy and of popular sovereignty of the priesthood and human reason, should raise their banners against each other, and bring about the triumph of the old or of the new civilization.

Partial disturbances had taken place several times in La Vendée. In 1792 the Count de la Rouairie had prepared a general rising, which failed on account of his arrest; but all yet remained ready for an insurrection, when the decree for raising 300,000 men was put into execution.⁶ This levy became the signal of revolt. The Vendéans beat the gendarmerie at Saint Florens, and took for leaders, in different directions, Cathelineau, a wagoner, Charette, a naval officer, and Stofflet, a gamekeeper. Aided by arms and money from England, the insurrection soon overspread the coun-

⁶ The War of La Vendée may be divided into three periods: in the first (March-October, 1793), the Vendéans are successful. In the second (October, 1793-January, 1794), they suffer the defeats of Cholet, of Mans, and of Savenay, which put an end to the war proper. Then began the guerrilla warfare known as the Chouannerie, which was not crushed until 1796. The name "Chouannerie" was derived from the famous smuggler, Jean Cotterau, called "Le Chouan"—the owl. See Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 259 ff.

try; 900 communes flew to arms at the sound of the tocsin; and then the noble leaders, Bonchamps, Lescure, La Rochejacquelin, D'Elbée, and Talmont, joined the others. The troops of the line and the battalions of the national guard who advanced against the insurgents were defeated. General Marcé was beaten at Saint Vincent by Stofflet; General Gauvilliers at Beaupreau, by D'Elbée and Bonchamps; General Quetineau at Aubiers, by La Rochejacquelin; and General Ligonier at Cholet. The Vendéans, masters of Châtillon, Bressuire, and Vihiers, considered it advisable to form some plan of organization before they pushed their advantages further. They formed three corps, each from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, according to the division of La Vendée, under three commanders; the first, under Bonchamps, guarded the banks of the Loire, and was called L'Armée d'Anjou; the second, stationed in the center, formed the Grande Armée under D'Elbée; the third, in Lower Vendée, was styled L'Armée du Marais, under Charette. The insurgents established a council to determine their operations, and elected Cathelineau generalissimo. These arrangements, with this division of the country, enabled them to enroll the insurgents, and to dismiss them to their fields, or call them to arms.

The intelligence of this formidable insurrection drove the convention to adopt still more rigorous measures against priests and emigrants. It outlawed all priests and nobles who took part in any gathering, and disarmed all who had belonged to the privileged classes. The former emigrants were banished forever; they could not return, under penalty of death; their property was confiscated. On the door of every house the names of all its inmates were to be inscribed; and the revolutionary tribunal, which had been adjourned, began its terrible functions.

At the same time tidings of new military disasters arrived, one after the other. Dumouriez, returned to the army of Belgium, concentrated all his forces to resist the Austrian general, the Prince of Coburg. His troops were greatly discouraged and in want of everything; he wrote to the convention a threatening letter against the Jacobins, who denounced him. After having again restored to his army a part of its former confidence by some minor advantages, he ventured a general action at Neerwinden (March 18, 1793) and lost it. Belgium was evacuated, and Dumouriez, placed between the Austrians and Jacobins, beaten by the one and assailed by the other, had recourse to the guilty project of

defection, in order to realize his former designs. He had conferences with Colonel Mack, and agreed with the Austrians to march upon Paris for the purpose of reëstablishing the monarchy, leaving them on the frontiers, and having first given up to them several fortresses as a guarantee. It is probable that Dumouriez wished to place on the constitutional throne the young Duke de Chartres,⁷ who had distinguished himself throughout this campaign; while the Prince of Coburg⁸ hoped that if the counter-revolution reached that point, it would be carried further and restore the son of Louis XVI. and the ancient monarchy. A counter-revolution will not halt any more than a revolution; when once begun, it must exhaust itself. The Jacobins were soon informed of Dumouriez's arrangements; he took little precaution to conceal them; whether he wished to try his troops, or to alarm his enemies, or whether he merely followed his natural levity. To be more sure of his designs, the Jacobin Club sent to him a deputation, consisting of Proly, Pereria, and Dubuisson, three of its members. Taken to Dumouriez's presence, they received from him more admissions than they expected. "The convention," said he, "is an assembly of 735 tyrants. While I have four inches of iron I will not suffer it to reign and shed blood with the revolutionary tribunal it has just created; as for the republic," he added, "it is an idle word. I had faith in it for three days. Since Jemmapes I have deplored all the successes I obtained in so bad a cause. There is only one way to save the country—that is, to reëstablish the constitution of 1791, and a king." "Can you think of it, general?" said Dubuisson; "the French view royalty with horror—the very name of Louis——" "What does it signify whether the king be called Louis, Jacques, or Philippe?" "And what are your means?" "My army—yes, my army will do it, and from my camp, or the

⁷ Afterward King Louis Philippe (1830-1848). He distinguished himself at both Valmy and Neerwinden. He refused to bear arms against his country. For a time he taught mathematics in Suabian Germany; went to Sweden, and sailed thence to the United States in 1796; later he lived for many years in England, and returned to France after the fall of Napoleon. Consult Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. pp. 224-231, on Neerwinden.

⁸ Coburg was the Austrian commander; he signed the armistice with reluctance, although Dumouriez offered to surrender the border fortresses in proof of his sincerity. Everything fell to the ground when the convention suspected Dumouriez's treachery, and he had no other recourse. But Austria seems to have been suspicious of him, too, and would not accept his services. He died in 1823, a pensioner of the English government.

stronghold of some fortress, it will express its desire for a king." "But our project endangers the safety of the prisoners in the Temple." "Should the last of the Bourbons be killed, even those of Coblenz, France shall still have a king, and if Paris were to add this murder to those which have already dishonored it, I would instantly march upon it." After thus unguardedly disclosing his intentions, Dumouriez proceeded to the execution of his impracticable design. He was really in a very difficult position; the soldiers were very much attached to him, but they were also devoted to their country. He was to surrender some fortresses which he was not master of, and it was to be supposed that the generals under his orders, either from fidelity to the republic or from ambition, would treat him as he had treated Lafayette. His first attempt was not encouraging; after having established himself at Saint Amand, he essayed to possess himself of Lille, Condé, and Valenciennes, but failed in this enterprise. The failure made him hesitate, and prevented his taking the initiative in the attack.

It was not so with the convention; it acted with a promptitude, a boldness, a firmness, and above all, with a precision in attaining its object, which rendered success certain. When we know what we want, and desire it determinately and promptly, we nearly always attain our object. This quality was wanting in Dumouriez, and the want impeded his audacity and deterred his partisans. As soon as the convention was informed of his projects it summoned him to its bar. He refused to obey; without, however, immediately raising the standard of revolt. The convention instantly dispatched four representatives, Camus, Quinette, Lamarque Bancal, and Beurnonville, minister of war, to bring him before it, or to arrest him in the midst of his army. This is the first use of a practice which soon became formidable. The representatives on mission were endowed with the full powers of the committee of public safety. Like the ancient intendants, they were first attached to the armies. Conspicuous among them were Saint-Just, with the army of the Rhine; Merlin of Thionville in Maine and La Vendée; the younger Robespierre at Toulon; Couthon, Collot-d'Herbois and Fouché, at Lyon; Carrier at Nantes; Tallien at Bordeaux. Dumouriez received the commissioners at the head of his staff. They presented to him the decree of the convention; he read it and returned it to them, saying that the state of his army would not admit of his leaving it. He offered to resign, and promised in a

calmer season to demand judges himself, and to give an account of his designs and of his conduct. The commissioners tried to induce him to submit, quoting the example of the ancient Roman generals. "We are always mistaken in our quotations," he replied; "and we disfigure Roman history by taking as an excuse for our crimes the example of their virtues. The Romans did not kill Tarquin; the Romans had a well ordered republic and good laws; they had neither a Jacobin Club nor a revolutionary tribunal. We live in a time of anarchy. Tigers wish for my head; I will not give it them." "Citizen general," said Camus then, "will you obey the decree of the national convention, and repair to Paris?" "Not at present." "Well, then, I declare that I suspend you; you are no longer a general; I order your arrest." "This is too much," said Dumouriez; and he had the commissioners arrested by German hussars, and delivered them as hostages to the Austrians. After this act of revolt he could no longer hesitate. Dumouriez made another attempt on Condé, but it succeeded no better than the first. He tried to induce the army to join him, but was forsaken by it. The soldiers were likely for a long time to prefer the republic to their general; the attachment to the revolution was in all its fervor, and the civil power in all its force. Dumouriez experienced, in declaring himself against the convention, the fate which Lafayette experienced when he declared himself against the legislative assembly, and Bouillé when he declared against the constituent assembly. At this period, a general, combining the firmness of Bouillé with the patriotism and popularity of Lafayette, with the victories and resources of Dumouriez, would have failed as they did. The revolution, with the movement imparted to it, was necessarily stronger than parties, than generals, and than Europe. Dumouriez went over to the Austrian camp with the Duke de Chartres, Colonel Thouvenot, and two squadrons of Berchiny, April 4, 1793. The rest of his army went to the camp at Famars and joined the troops commanded by Dampierre.

The convention, on learning the arrest of the commissioners, established itself as a permanent assembly; declared Dumouriez a traitor to his country, authorized any citizen to attack him, set a price on his head, decreed the famous committee of public safety, and banished the Duke of Orleans and all the Bourbons from the republic. The convention did its work through the medium of sixteen committees, of which the committee of general defense and the com-

mittee of public safety were much the most important. The former was created in January, 1793; it was composed of twenty-four members. It originally included nine Girondists—Pétion, Gensonné, Vergniaud, Buzot, Guadet, Condorcet, Isnard, Lasource; nine of the Plain, of whom Barrère, Sieyès, Cambacérès and Camus were the principal; and six of the Mountain, including Danton, Robespierre, and Camille Desmoulins. The defection of Dumouriez so alarmed the convention that on April 6 Isnard moved to concentrate executive power in the hands of nine members, to be known as the committee of public safety. Its conferences were to be secret and it was to have a fund at its disposal, of which it did not have to give particular account. Theoretically, the members were to be renewed every three months, but the rule was a dead letter from the beginning. Until after Thermidor the only changes were those due to politics, *i. e.*, after June 2, 1793, all the Girondists were expelled from it; after April, 1794, all the Dantonists. The committee of public safety divided itself into these groups: (1) the *gens d'examen*, who, like Carnot and Cambon, gave their whole attention to external events or general administrative questions; the *gens révolutionnaires*, Collot d'Herbois, Barrère, Billaud-Varennes, who were genuine terrorists under the remaining three, Robespierre, Danton, Hébert—later Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just, who were the political chiefs. Local committees of public safety were created in each section of Paris and in every commune. The widespread organization of the Jacobin clubs made this an easy matter.

Although the Girondists had assailed Dumouriez as warmly as had the Mountaineers, they were accused of being his accomplices, and this was a new cause of complaint added to the rest. Their enemies became every day more powerful; and it was in moments of public peril that they were especially dangerous. Hitherto, in the struggle between the two parties, they had carried the day on every point. They had stopped all inquiries into the massacres of September; they had maintained the usurpation of the commune; they had obtained, first the trial, then the death, of Louis XVI.; through their means the plunderings of February and the conspiracy of March 10 had remained unpunished; they had procured the erection of the revolutionary tribunal despite the Girondists; they had driven Roland from the ministry in disgust; and they had just defeated Dumouriez. It only remained now to de-

prive the Girondists of their last asylum—the assembly; this they set about on April 10, and accomplished on June 2.

Robespierre attacked by name Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Pétion, and Gensonné in the convention; Marat denounced them in the popular societies. As president of the Jacobins, he wrote an address to the departments, in which he invoked the thunder of petitions and accusations against the traitors and faithless delegates who had sought to save the tyrant by an appeal to the public or his imprisonment. The Right and the Plain of the convention felt that it was necessary to unite. Marat was sent before the revolutionary tribunal. This news set the clubs in motion, the people, and the commune. By way of reprisal, Pache, the mayor, came in the name of thirty-five sections and of the general council to demand the expulsion of the principal Girondists. Young Boyer Fonfrède required to be included in the proscription of his colleagues, and the members of the Right and the Plain rose, exclaiming: "All! all!" This petition, though declared calumnious, was the first attack upon the convention from without, and it prepared the public mind for the destruction of the Gironde.

The accusation of Marat was far from intimidating the Jacobins who accompanied him to the revolutionary tribunal. Marat was acquitted April 24, 1793, and borne in triumph to the assembly. It was evident that the conflict could not end except in the extermination of one of the two adversaries. The Girondists still had the aid of the Plain, and thanks to the latter Isnard was made president of the convention on May 16. Then the commune and the Jacobin Club anew demanded the expulsion of the Girondist leaders. On May 18 the Girondists, by decree, established a committee of twelve, all of the party, authorized to take the necessary measures to secure public peace. The first act of this committee was to arrest Hébert, the editor of the atrocious paper known as *Le Père Duchesne*. A week later the commune demanded the liberation of Hébert and the suppression of the twelve. One section even went so far as to demand their trial before the revolutionary tribunal. Isnard, in replying, sustained the authority of the convention and defied the communards in the most haughty terms. As might have been expected, the sections rose in revolt, and on the night of May 27-28 some deputies of the Mountain, with whom citizens of Paris were mingled upon the benches, voted the suppression of the committee of twelve and the arrest of many

of the Girondists. But the latter bravely stood their ground and carried the day. The communards had no other recourse but more violent revolt. Thus was the way paved for the famous rising of May 31.

From that moment the approaches to the hall were thronged with daring sans-culottes, and the partisans of the Jacobins filled the galleries of the convention. The clubists and Robespierre's tricoteuses (knitters) constantly interrupted the speakers of the Right, and disturbed the debate; while without, every opportunity was sought to get rid of the Girondists. Henriot, commandant of the section of sans-culottes, excited against them the battalions about to march for La Vendée. Guadet then saw that it was time for something more than complaints and speeches; he ascended the tribune. "Citizens," said he, "while virtuous men content themselves with bewailing the misfortunes of the country, conspirators are active for its ruin. With Cæsar they say: 'Let them talk, we will act.' Well, then, do you act also. The evil consists in the impunity of the conspirators of March 10; the evil is in anarchy; the evil is in the existence of the authorities of Paris—authorities striving at once for gain and dominion. Citizens, there is yet time; you may save the republic and your compromised glory. I propose to abolish the Paris authorities, to replace within twenty-four hours the municipality by the presidents of the sections, to assemble the convention at Bourges with the least possible delay, and to transmit this decree to the departments by extraordinary couriers." The Mountain was surprised for a moment by Guadet's motion. Had his measures been at once adopted, there would have been an end to the domination of the commune, and to the projects of the conspirators; but it is also probable that the agitation of parties would have brought on a civil war, that the convention would have been dissolved by the assembly at Bourges, that all center of action would have been destroyed, and that the revolution would not have been sufficiently strong to contend against internal struggles and the attacks of Europe. This was what the moderate party in the assembly feared. Dreading anarchy if the career of the commune was not stopped, and counter-revolution if the multitude were too closely kept down, its aim was to maintain the balance between the two extremes of the convention. This party comprised the committees of general safety and of public safety. It was directed by Barrère, who, like all men

of upright intentions but weak characters, advocated moderation so long as fear did not make him an instrument of cruelty and tyranny. Instead of Guadet's decisive measures, he proposed to nominate an extraordinary commission of twelve members, deputed to inquire into the conduct of the municipality; to seek out the authors of the plots against the national representatives, and to secure their persons. This middle course was adopted; but it left the commune in existence, and the commune was destined to triumph over the convention.

The commission of twelve threw the members of the commune into great alarm by its inquiries. It discovered a new conspiracy, which was to be put into execution on May 22, and arrested some of the conspirators, and among others, Hébert, the deputy recorder, editor of *Père Duchesne*,⁹ who was taken in the very bosom of the municipality. The commune, at first astounded, began to take measures of defense. From that moment, not conspiracy, but insurrection was the order of the day. The general council, encouraged by the Mountain, surrounded itself with the agitators of the capital; it circulated a report that the twelve wished to purge the convention, and to substitute a counter-revolutionary tribunal for that which had acquitted Marat. The Jacobins, the Cordeliers, the sections, sat permanently. On May 26 the agitation became perceptible; on the 27th it was sufficiently decided to induce the commune to open the attack. It accordingly appeared before the convention and demanded the liberation of Hébert and the suppression of the twelve; it was accompanied by the deputies of the sections, who expressed the same desire, and the hall was surrounded by a large mob. The section of the city even presumed to require that the twelve should be brought before the revolutionary tribunal. Isnard, president of the assembly, replied, in a solemn tone: "Listen to what I am about to say. If ever by one of those insurrections, of such frequent recurrence since March 10, and of which the magistrates have never apprised the assembly, a

⁹ The newspapers of Paris during the revolution were legion and of every shade of politics. The most prominent royalist journals were the *Journal de la Cour et de la Ville*, the *Journal des Halles*, the *Ami du Roi*, the *Actes des Apôtres*. Of revolutionary journals may be mentioned the *Revolutions de Paris*, edited by Loustallot, the *Orateur du Peuple*, edited by Freron, the *Revolution de France et de Brabant*, edited by Camille Desmoulins, the *Point de Jours*, by Barrère. The worst sheets were the *Ami du Peuple*, of Marat, and the *Père Duchesne*, of Hébert.

hostile hand be raised against the national representatives, I declare to you in the name of all France, Paris will be destroyed. Yes, universal France would rise to avenge such a crime, and soon it would be matter of doubt on which side of the Seine Paris had stood." This reply became the signal for great tumult. "And I declare to you," exclaimed Danton, "that so much impudence begins to be intolerable; we will resist you." Then turning to the Right, he added: "No truce between the Mountain and the cowards who wished to save the tyrant."

The utmost confusion now reigned in the hall. The strangers' galleries vociferated denunciations of the Right; the Mountain broke forth into menaces; every moment deputations arrived without, and the convention was surrounded by an immense multitude. A few sectionaries of the Mail and of the Butte-des-Moulins, commanded by Raffet, drew up in the passages and avenues to defend it. The Girondists withstood, as long as they could, the deputations and the Mountain. Threatened within, besieged without, they would have availed themselves of this violence to arouse the indignation of the assembly. But the minister of the interior, Garat, deprived them of this resource. Called upon to give an account of the state of Paris, he declared that the convention had nothing to fear; and the opinion of Garat, who was considered impartial, and whose conciliatory turn of mind involved him in equivocal proceedings, emboldened the members of the Mountain. Isnard was obliged to resign the chair, which was taken by Herault de Séchelles, a sign of victory for the Mountain. The new president replied to the petitioners, whom Isnard had hitherto kept in the background. "The power of reason and the power of the people are the same thing. You demand from us a magistrate and justice. The representatives of the people will give you both." It was now very late; the Right was discouraged, some of its members had left. The petitioners had moved from the hall to the seats of the representatives, and there, mixed up with the Mountain, with outcry and disorder, they voted, all together, for the dismissal of the twelve and the liberation of the prisoners. It was at half-past twelve, amid the applause of the galleries and the people outside, that this decree was passed.

It would, perhaps, have been wise on the part of the Girondists, since they were really not the strongest party, to have made no recurrence to this matter. The movement of the preced-

ing day would have had no other result than the suppression of the twelve, if other causes had not prolonged it. But animosity had attained such a height that it had become necessary to bring the quarrel to an issue; since the two parties could not endure each other, the only alternative was for them to fight; they must needs go on from victory to defeat, and from defeat to victory, growing more and more excited every day, until the strongest finally triumphed over the weaker party. Next day the Right regained its position in the convention; they declared the decree of the preceding day illegally passed, in tumult and under compulsion, and the commission was reëstablished. "You yesterday," said Danton, "did a great act of justice; but I declare to you, if the commission retains the tyrannical power it has hitherto exercised; if the magistrates of the people are not restored to their functions; if good citizens are again exposed to arbitrary arrest; then, after having proved to you that we surpass our enemies in prudence, in wisdom, we shall surpass them in audacity and revolutionary vigor." Danton feared to commence the attack; he dreaded the triumph of the Mountain as much as he did that of the Girondists: he accordingly sought, by turns, to anticipate May 31, and to moderate its results. But he was reduced to join his own party during the conflict, and to remain silent after the victory.

The agitation, which had been a little allayed by the suppression of the twelve, became threatening at the news of their restoration. The benches of the sections and popular societies resounded with invectives, with cries of danger, with calls to insurrection. Hébert, having quitted his prison, reappeared at the commune. A crown was placed on his brow, which he transferred to the bust of Brutus, and then rushed to the Jacobins to demand vengeance of the twelve. Robespierre, Marat, Danton, Chaumette, and Pache then combined in organizing a new movement. The insurrection was modeled on that of August 10. May 29 was occupied in preparing the public mind. On the 30th members of the electoral college, commissioners of the clubs, and deputies of sections assembled at the Evêché, declared themselves in a state of insurrection, dissolved the general council of the commune, and immediately reconstituted it, making it take a new oath; Henriot received the title of commandant-general of the armed force, and the sans-culottes were assigned forty sous a day while under arms. These preparations made, early on the morning of

the 31st the tocsin rang, the drums beat to arms, the troops were assembled, and all marched toward the convention, which for some time past had held its sittings at the Tuileries.

The assembly had met at the sound of the tocsin. The minister of the interior, the administrators of the department, and the mayor of Paris had been summoned, in succession, to the bar. Garat had given an account of the agitated state of Paris, but appeared to apprehend no dangerous result. L'Huillier, in the name of the department, declared it was only a moral insurrection. Pache, the mayor, appeared last, and informed them, with a hypocritical air, of the operations of the insurgents; he pretended that he had employed every means to maintain order; assured them that the guard of the convention had been doubled, and that he had prohibited the firing of the alarm cannon; yet, at the same moment, the cannon was heard in the distance. The surprise and excitement of the assembly were extreme. Cambon exhorted the members to union, and called upon the people in the strangers' gallery to be silent. "Under these extraordinary circumstances," said he, "the only way of frustrating the designs of the malcontents is to make the national convention respected." "I demand," said Thuriot, "the immediate abolition of the commission of twelve." "And I," cried Tallien, "that the sword of the law may strike the conspirators who profane the very bosom of the convention." The Girondists, on their part, required that the audacious Henriot should be called to the bar for having fired the alarm cannon without the permission of the convention. "If a struggle take place," said Vergniaud, "be the success what it may, it will be the ruin of the republic. Let every member swear to die at his post." The entire assembly rose, applauding the proposition. Danton rushed to the tribune: "Break up the commission of twelve! you have heard the thunder of the cannon. If you are politic legislators, far from blaming the outbreak of Paris, you will turn it to the profit of the republic, by reforming your own errors, by dismissing your commission. I address those," he continued, on hearing murmurs around him, "who possess some political talent, not dullards, who can only act and speak in obedience to their passions. Consider the grandeur of your aim; it is to save the people from their foes, from the aristocrats, to save them from their own blind fury. If a few men, really dangerous, no matter to what party they belong, should then seek to prolong a move-

ment, because useless, by your act of justice, Paris itself will hurl them back into their original insignificance. I calmly, simply, and deliberately demand the suppression of the commission, on political grounds." The commission was violently attacked on one side, feebly defended on the other; Barrère and the committee of public safety, who were its creators, proposed its suppression, in order to restore peace, and to save the assembly from being left to the mercy of the multitude. The moderate portion of the Mountain were about to adopt this concession, when the deputations arrived. The members of the department, those of the municipality, and the commissaries of sections, being admitted to the bar, demanded not merely the suppression of the twelve, but also the punishment of the moderate members, and of all the Girondist chiefs.

The Tuileries was completely blockaded by the insurgents; and the presence of their commissaries in the convention emboldened the extreme Mountain, who were desirous of destroying the Girondist party. Robespierre, their leader and orator, spoke: "Citizens, let us not lose this day in vain clamors and unnecessary measures; this is, perhaps, the last day in which patriotism will combat with tyranny. Let the faithful representatives of the people combine to secure their happiness." He urged the convention to follow the course pointed out by the petitioners rather than that proposed by the committee of public safety. He was thundering forth a lengthened declamation against his adversaries, when Vergniaud interfered: "Conclude this!"—"I am about to conclude, and against you! Against you, who, after the revolution of August 10, sought to bring to the scaffold those who had effected it. Against you, who have never ceased in a course which involved the destruction of Paris. Against you, who desired to save the tyrant. Against you, who conspired with Dumouriez. Against you, who fiercely persecuted the same patriots whose heads Dumouriez demanded. Against you, whose criminal vengeance provoked those cries of vengeance which you seek to make a crime in your victims. I conclude: my conclusion is—I propose a decree of accusation against all the accomplices of Dumouriez, and against those who are indicated by the petitioners." Notwithstanding the violence of this outbreak, Robespierre's party were not victorious. The insurrection had only been directed against the twelve, and the committee of public safety, who proposed their suppression, prevailed over the commune. The assembly



THE LAST SUPPER OF THE GIRONDISTS INTERRUPTED BY THE CALL OF THE VICTIMS FOR THE GUILLOTINE. THE DEAD
VALAZÉ IS ON THE BARROW

Painting by François Flameng

adopted the decree of Barrère, which dissolved the twelve, placed the public force in permanent requisition and, to satisfy the petitioners, directed the committee of public safety to inquire into the conspiracies which they denounced. As soon as the multitude surrounding the assembly was informed of these measures it received them with applause and dispersed.

But the conspirators were not disposed to rest content with this half triumph: they had gone further on May 30 than on the 29th; and on June 2 they went further than on May 31. The insurrection, from being moral, as they termed it, became personal; that is to say, it was no longer directed against a power, but against the deputies; it passed from Danton and the Mountain to Robespierre, Marat, and the commune. On the evening of May 31 a Jacobin deputy said: "We have had but half the game yet; we must complete it, and not allow the people to cool." Henriot offered to place the armed force at the disposition of the club. The insurrectional committee openly took up its quarters near the convention. The whole of June 1 was devoted to the preparation of a great movement. The commune wrote to the sections: "Citizens, remain under arms: the danger of the country renders this a supreme law." In the evening Marat, who was the chief author of June 2, repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, ascended the clock-tower himself, and rang the tocsin; he called upon the members of the council not to separate till they had obtained a decree of accusation against the traitors and the "statesmen." A few deputies assembled at the convention, and the conspirators came to demand the decree against the proscribed parties; but they were not yet sufficiently strong to enforce it from the convention.

The whole night was spent in making preparations; the tocsin rang, drums beat to arms, the people gathered together. On Sunday morning, about eight o'clock, Henriot presented himself to the general council and declared to his accomplices, in the name of the insurrectionary people, that they would not lay down their arms until they had obtained the arrest of the conspirator deputies. He then placed himself at the head of the vast crowd assembled in the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, harangued them, and gave the signal for their departure. It was nearly ten o'clock when the insurgents reached the Place du Carrousel. Henriot posted round the château bands of the most devoted men, and the convention was soon surrounded by 80,000 men, the greater part ignorant of what was

required of them, and more disposed to defend than to attack the deputation.

The majority of the proscribed members had not proceeded to the assembly. A few, courageous to the end, had come to brave the storm for the last time. As soon as the sitting commenced the intrepid Lanjuinais ascended the tribune. "I demand," said he, "to speak respecting the general call to arms now beating throughout Paris." He was immediately interrupted by cries of "Down! down! He wants civil war! He wants a counter-revolution! He calumniates Paris! He insults the people." Despite the threats, the insults, the clamors of the Mountain and the galleries, Lanjuinais denounced the projects of the commune and of the malcontents; his courage rose with the danger. "You accuse us," he said, "of calumniating Paris! Paris is pure; Paris is good; Paris is oppressed by tyrants who thirst for blood and dominion." These words were the signal for the most violent tumult; several Mountain deputies rushed to the tribune to tear Lanjuinais from it; but he, clinging firmly to it, exclaimed, in accents of the most lofty courage: "I demand the dissolution of all the revolutionist authorities in Paris. I demand that all they have done during the last three days may be declared null. I demand that all who would arrogate to themselves a new authority contrary to law, be placed without the law, and that every citizen be at liberty to punish them." He had scarcely concluded, when the insurgent petitioners came to demand his arrest, and that of his colleagues. "Citizens," said they, "the people are weary of seeing their happiness still postponed; they leave it once more in your hands; save them, or we declare that they will save themselves."

The Right moved the order of the day on the petition of the insurgents, and the convention accordingly proceeded to the previous question. The petitioners immediately withdrew in a menacing attitude; the strangers quitted the galleries; cries to arms were shouted, and a great tumult was heard without: "Save the people!" cried one of the Mountain. "Save your colleagues, by decreeing their provisional arrest." "No, no!" replied the Right, and even a portion of the Left. "We will all share their fate!" exclaimed La Reveillère-Lepaux. The committee of public safety, called upon to make a report, terrified at the magnitude of the danger, proposed, as on May 31, a measure apparently conciliatory, to satisfy the insurgents, without entirely sacrificing the proscribed

members. "The committee," said Barrère, "appeal to the generosity and patriotism of the accused members. It asks of them the suspension of their power, representing to them that this alone can put an end to the divisions which afflict the republic, which can alone restore to it peace." A few among them adopted the proposition. Isnard at once gave in his resignation; Lanthenas, Dessaulx, and Fauchet followed his example; Lanjuinais would not. He said: "I have hitherto, I believe, shown some courage; expect not from me either suspension or resignation. When the ancients," he continued, amid violent interruption, "prepared a sacrifice, they crowned the victim with flowers and chaplets, as they conducted it to the altar; but they did not insult it." Barbaroux was as firm as Lanjuinais. "I have sworn," he said, "to die at my post; I will keep my oath." The conspirators of the Mountain themselves protested against the proposition of the committee. Marat urged that those who make sacrifices should be pure; and Billaud-Varennes demanded the trial of the Girondists, not their suspension.

While this was going on Lacroix, a deputy of the Mountain, rushed into the house and to the tribune, and declared that he had been insulted at the door, that he had been refused egress, and that the convention was no longer free. Many of the Mountain expressed their indignation at Henriot and his troops. Danton said it was necessary vigorously to avenge this insult to the national majesty. Barrère proposed to the convention to present themselves to the people. "Representatives," said he, "vindicate your liberty; suspend your sitting; cause the bayonets that surround you to be lowered." The whole convention arose and set forth in procession, preceded by its sergeants and headed by the president, who was covered, in token of his affliction. On arriving at a door on the Place du Carrousel they found there Henriot on horseback, saber in hand. "What do the people require?" said the president, Herault de Séchelles: "the convention is wholly engaged in promoting their happiness." "Herault," replied Henriot, "the people have not risen to hear phrases; they require twenty-four traitors to be given up to them." "Give us all up!" cried those who surrounded the president. Henriot then turned to his people and exclaimed: "Cannoneers, to your guns." Two pieces were directed upon the convention, who, retiring to the gardens, sought an outlet at various points, but found all the issues guarded. The

soldiers were everywhere under arms. Marat ran through the ranks, encouraging and exciting them. "No weakness," said he; "do not quit your posts till they have given them up." The convention then returned within the house, overwhelmed with a sense of their powerlessness, convinced of the inutility of their efforts, and entirely subdued. The arrest of the proscribed members was no longer opposed. Marat, the true dictator of the assembly, imperiously decided the fate of its members. "Dessaulx," said he, "is an old twaddler, incapable of leading a party; Lanthenas is a poor creature, unworthy of a thought; Ducos is merely chargeable with a few absurd notions, and is not at all a man to become a counter-revolutionary leader. I require that these be struck out of the list, and their names replaced by that of Valazé." These names were accordingly struck out, and that of Valazé substituted, and the list thus altered was agreed to, scarcely one-half of the assembly taking part in the vote.

These are the names of the illustrious men proscribed: the Girondists, Gensonné, Guadet, Brissot, Gorsas, Pétion, Vergniaud, Salles, Barbaroux, Cambon, Buzot, Birotteau, Lidon, Rabaud, Lasource, Lanjuinais, Grangeneuve, Lehardy, Lesage, Louvet, Valazé, Lebrun, minister of foreign affairs, Clavières, minister of taxes, and the members of the council of twelve, Kervelegan, Gardien, Rabaud-Saint-Étienne, Boileau, Bertrand, Vigée, Molleveau, Henri la Riviere, Gomaire, and Bergoing. The convention placed them under arrest at their own houses, and under the protection of the people. The order for keeping the assembly itself prisoners was at once withdrawn, and the multitude dispersed, but from that moment the convention ceased to be free.

The consequences of this disastrous event did not answer the expectations of anyone. The Dantonists thought that the dissensions of parties were at an end: civil war broke out. The moderate members of the committee of public safety thought that the convention would resume all its power: it was utterly subdued. The commune thought that May 31 would secure to it domination; domination fell to Robespierre and Danton, and to a few men devoted to his fortune, or to the principle of extreme democracy. Lastly, there was another party to be added to the parties defeated, and thenceforth hostile; and as after August 10 the republic had been opposed to the constitutionalists, after May 31 the reign of terror was opposed to the moderate party of the republic.

PART IV

THE TERROR AND THE REACTION
JUNE 2, 1793-OCTOBER 28, 1795

Chapter X

BEGINNING OF THE TERROR

JUNE 2, 1793-APRIL, 1794

IT was to be presumed that the Girondists would not bow to their defeat, and that May 31 would be the signal for the insurrection of the departments against the Mountain and the commune of Paris. This was the last trial left them to make, and they attempted it. But in this decisive measure there was seen the same want of union which had caused their defeat in the convention. It is doubtful whether the Girondists would have triumphed had they been united, and especially whether their triumph would have saved the revolution. How could they have done with just laws what the Mountaineers effected by violent measures? How could they have conquered foreign foes without fanaticism, restrained parties without the aid of terror, fed the multitude without a maximum, and supplied the armies without requisition? If May 3 had had a different result, what happened at a much later period would probably have taken place immediately, namely, a gradual abatement of the revolutionary movement, increased attacks on the part of Europe, a general resumption of hostilities by all parties, the days of Prairial, without power to drive back the multitude; the days of Vendémiaire, without power to repel the royalists; the invasion of the coalesced powers, and, according to the policy of the times, the partition of France. The republic was not sufficiently powerful to meet so many attacks as it did after the reaction of Thermidor.

However this may be, the Girondists, who ought to have remained quiet or fought all together, did not do so, and after June 2 all the moderate men of the party remained under the decree of arrest; the others escaped. Vergniaud, Gensonné, Ducos, Tonfrède, were among the first; Pétion, Barbaroux, Guadet, Louvet, Buzot, and Lanjuinais among the latter. They returned to Evreux, in the department of the Eure, where Buzot had much influence, and thence to Caen, in Calvados. They made this town the center of the insurrection. Brittany soon joined them. The insurgents, under the name of the assembly of the departments assembled at Caen,

formed an army, appointed General Wimpfen commander, arrested the Mountaineers Romme and Prieur de la Marne, commissaries of the convention, and prepared to march on Paris. From this place a young, beautiful, and courageous woman, Charlotte Corday, went to punish Marat, the principal author of May 31 and June 2. She hoped to save the republic by sacrificing herself to its cause. But tyranny did not rest with one man; it belonged to a party, and to the violent situation of the republic. Charlotte Corday, after executing her generous but vain design, died with unchanging calmness, modest courage, and the satisfaction of having done well.¹ But Marat, after his assassination, July 13, 1793, became a greater object of enthusiasm with the people than he had been while living. He was invoked on all the public squares; his bust was placed in all the popular societies and he was granted the honors of the Pantheon. At the same time Lyons arose, Marseilles and Bordeaux took arms, and more than sixty departments joined the insurrection. This attack soon led to a general rising among all parties, and the royalists for the most part took advantage of the movement which the Girondists had commenced. They sought especially to direct the insurrection of Lyons, in order to make it the center of the movement in the south. This city was strongly attached to the ancient order of things. Its manufactures of silver and gold and silken embroidery, and its trade in articles of luxury, made it dependent on the upper classes. It therefore declared at an early period against a social change which destroyed its former connections and ruined its manufactures by destroying the nobility and clergy. Lyons accordingly, in 1790, even under the constituent assembly, when the emigrant princes were in that neighborhood, at the court of Turin, had made attempts at rising. These attempts, directed by priests and nobles, had been repressed, but the spirit remained the same. There, as elsewhere after August 10, men had wished to bring about the revolution of the multitude and to establish its government.

¹ The following are a few of the replies of this heroic girl before the revolutionary tribunal: "What were your intentions in killing Marat?" "To put an end to the troubles of France." "Is it long since you conceived this project?" "Since the proscription of the deputies of the people on May 31." "You learned then by the papers that Marat was a friend of anarchy?" "Yes, I knew that he was perverting France. I have killed," she added, raising her voice, "a man to save a hundred thousand; a villain, to save the innocent; a wild beast, to give tranquillity to my country. I was a republican before the revolution, and I have never been without energy." But compare Stephens' account, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 251, and especially his estimate, p. 253.

Chalier, the fanatical imitator of Marat, was at the head of the Jacobins, the sans-culottes, and the municipality of Lyons. His audacity increased after the massacres of September and January 21. Yet nothing had as yet been decided between the lower republican class and the middle royalist class, the one having its seat of power in the municipality and the other in the sections. But the disputes became greater toward the end of May; they fought and the sections carried the day. The municipality was besieged and taken by assault. Chalier, who had fled, was apprehended and executed. The sectionaries, not as yet daring to throw off the yoke of the convention, endeavored to excuse themselves on the score of the necessity to which the Jacobins and the members of the corporation had reduced them of taking arms. The convention, which could only save itself by means of daring, losing everything if it yielded, would listen to nothing. Meanwhile the insurrection of Calvados became known, and the people of Lyons, thus encouraged, no longer feared to raise the standard of revolt. They put their own town in a state of defense; they raised fortifications, formed an army of 20,000 men, received emigrants among them, intrusted the command of their forces to the royalist Pr  cy and the Marquis de Virieux, and concerted their operations with the King of Sardinia.

The revolt of Lyons was so much the more to be feared by the convention that by its central position it was supported by the south, which took arms, while there was also a rising in the west. At Marseilles the news of May 31 had aroused the partisans of the Girondists: Rebecqui repaired thither in haste. The sections were assembled; the members of the revolutionary tribunal were outlawed; the two representatives, Baux and Antiboul, were arrested, and an army of 10,000 men raised to advance on Paris. These measures were the work of the royalists, who, there as elsewhere, only waiting for an opportunity to revive their party, had at first assumed a republican appearance, but now acted in their own name. They had secured the sections; and the movement was no longer effected in favor of the Girondists, but for the counter-revolutionists. Once in a state of revolt, the party whose opinions are the most violent and whose aim is the clearest supplants its allies. Rebecqui perceiving this new turn of the insurrection threw himself in despair into the port of Marseilles. The insurgents took the road to Lyons; their example was rapidly imitated at Toulon, Nimes, Montauban, and the principal towns in the south. In Calvados the insurrection

had had the same royalist character, since the Marquis de Puisaye, at the head of some troops, had introduced himself into the ranks of the Girondists. The towns of Bordeaux, Nantes, Brest, and L'Orient were favorable to the persons proscribed on June 2, and a few openly joined them; but they were of no great service, because they were restrained by the Jacobin party or by the necessity of fighting the royalists of the west.

The latter, during this almost general rising of the departments, continued to extend their enterprises. After their first victories the Vendéans seized on Bressuire, Argenton, and Thouars. Entirely masters of their own country, they proposed getting possession of the frontiers and opening the way to revolutionary France, as well as communications with England. On June 6 the Vendean army, composed of 40,000 men under Cathelineau, Lescure, Stofflet, and La Rochejacquelin, marched on Saumur, which it took by storm. It then prepared to attack and capture Nantes, to secure the possession of its own country and become master of the course of the Loire. Cathelineau, at the head of the Vendean troops, left a garrison in Saumur, took Angers, crossed the Loire, pretended to advance upon Tours and Le Mans, and then rapidly threw himself upon Nantes, which he attacked on the right bank, while Charette was to attack it on the left.

Everything seemed combined for the overthrow of the convention. Its armies were beaten on the north and on the Pyrenees, while it was threatened by the people of Lyons in the center, those of Marseilles in the south, the Girondists in one part of the west, the Vendéans in the other, and while 20,000 Piedmontese were invading France. The military reaction which, after the brilliant campaigns of Argonne and Belgium, had taken place, chiefly owing to the disagreement between Dumouriez and the Jacobins, between the army and the government, had manifested itself in a most disastrous manner since the defection of the commander-in-chief. There was no longer unity of operation, enthusiasm in the troops, or agreement between the convention, occupied with its quarrels, and the discouraged generals. The remains of Dumouriez's army had assembled at the camp at Famars, under command of Dampierre; but they had been obliged to retire after a defeat under the cannon of Bouchain. Dampierre was killed. The frontier from Dunkirk to Givet was threatened by superior forces. Custine was promptly called from the Moselle to the army of the north, but his presence did not restore

affairs. Valenciennes, the key to France, was taken (July 24, 1793); Condé shared the same fate (July 10, 1793); the army, driven from position to position, retired beyond the Scarpe, before Arras, the last post between the Scarpe and Paris. Mayence, on the other side, sorely pressed by the enemy and by famine, gave up all hope of being assisted by t' e army of the Moselle, reduced to inaction; and despairing of being able to hold out long, capitulated (July 23, 1793). Lastly, the English government, seeing that Paris and the departments were distressed by famine, after May 31 and June 2 pronounced all the ports of France in a state of blockade and that all neutral ships attempting to bring a supply of provisions would be confiscated. This measure, new to the annals of history and destined to starve an entire people, originated the law of the maximum, which was authorized September 29, 1793. It regulated the maximum price of food-stuffs and the wages of artisans. An absolute prohibition was put upon foreign imports, and the penalties for infringement were very severe. The situation of the republic could not have been worse.

The convention was, as it were, taken by surprise. It was disorganized, because emerging from a struggle, and that the conquerors had not had time to establish themselves. After June 2, before the danger became so pressing both on the frontiers and in the departments, the Mountain had sent commissioners in every direction and immediately turned its attention to the constitution, which had so long been expected and from which it entertained great hopes. The Girondists had wished to decree it before January 21, in order to save Louis XVI., by substituting legal order for the revolutionary state of things; they returned to the subject previous to May 31 in order to prevent their own ruin. But the Mountaineers, on two occasions, had diverted the assembly from this discussion by two *coups d'état*, the trial of Louis XVI., and the elimination of the Gironde. Masters of the field, they now endeavored to secure the republicans by decreeing the constitution. Herault de Séchelles was the legislator of the Mountain, as Condorcet had been of the Gironde. In a few days this new constitution was adopted in the convention and submitted to the approval of the primary assemblies. It was approved by 1,800,000 votes, out of about 4,000,000 electors. There were very few negative votes, those disapproving of it staying away from the polls. It is easy to conceive its nature with the ideas that then prevailed respecting democratic government. The con-

stituent assembly was considered as aristocratical; the law it had established was regarded as a violation of the rights of the people, because it imposed conditions for the exercise of political rights; because it did not recognize the most absolute equality; because it had deputies and magistrates appointed by electors, and these electors by the people; because, in some cases, it put limits to the national sovereignty, by excluding a portion of active citizens from high public functions and the proletariats from the functions of acting citizens; finally, because, instead of fixing on the population as the only basis of political rights, it combined it in all its operations with property. The constitutional law of 1793 established the pure régime of the multitude: it not only recognized the people as the source of all power, but also delegated the exercise of it to the people; an unlimited sovereignty; extreme mobility in the magistracy; direct elections, in which everyone could vote; primary assemblies, that could meet without convocation, at given times, to elect representatives and control their acts; a national assembly, to be annually renewed, and which, properly speaking, was only a committee of the primary assemblies; such was this constitution. As it made the multitude govern, and as it entirely disorganized authority, it was impracticable at all times; but especially in a moment of general war. The Mountain, instead of extreme democracy, needed a stern dictatorship. The constitution was suspended as soon as made, and the revolutionary government strengthened and maintained till the peace.

Both during the discussion of the constitution and its presentation to the primary assemblies the Mountaineers learned the danger which threatened them. These daring men, having three or four parties to put down in the interior, several kinds of civil war to terminate, the disasters of the armies to repair, and all Europe to repel, were not alarmed at their position. The representatives of the 44,000 municipalities came to accept the constitution. Admitted to the bar of the assembly, after making known the assent of the people, they required the arrest of all suspected persons and a levy *en masse* of the people. "Well," exclaimed Danton, "let us respond to their wishes. The deputies of the primary assemblies have just taken the initiative among us in the way of inspiring terror! I demand that the convention, which ought now to be penetrated with a sense of its dignity, for it has just been invested with the entire national power, I demand that it do now, by decree, invest the pri-

mary assemblies with the right of supplying the state with arms, provisions, and ammunition; of making an appeal to the people, of exciting the energy of citizens and of raising 400,000 men. It is with cannon-balls that we must declare the constitution to our foes! Now is the time to take the last great oath that we will destroy tyranny or perish!" This oath was immediately taken by all the deputies and citizens present. A few days after Barrère, in the name of the committee of public safety, which was composed of revolutionary members and which became the center of operations and the government of the assembly, proposed measures still more general: "Liberty," said he, "has become the creditor of every citizen; some owe her their industry; others their fortune; these their counsel; those their arms; all owe her their blood. Accordingly all the French, of every age and of either sex, are summoned by their country to defend liberty; all faculties, physical or moral; all means, political or commercial; all metal, all the elements, are her tributaries. Let each maintain his post in the national and military movement about to take place. The young men will fight; the married men will forge arms, transport the baggage and artillery and prepare provisions; the women will make tents and clothes for the soldiers and exercise their hospitable care in the asylums of the wounded; children will make lint from old linen; and the aged, resuming the mission they discharged among the ancients, shall cause themselves to be carried to the public places, where they shall excite the courage of the young warriors and propagate the doctrine of hatred to kings and the unity of the republic. National buildings shall be converted into barracks, public squares into workshops; the ground of the cellars will serve for the preparation of saltpetre; all saddle-horses shall be placed in requisition for the cavalry; all draught-horses for the artillery; fowling-pieces, pistols, swords, and pikes belonging to individuals shall be employed in the service of the interior. The republic being but a large city in a state of necessity France must be converted into a vast camp."

The measures proposed by Barrère were at once decreed. All Frenchmen from eighteen to twenty-five took arms, the armies were recruited by levies of men and supported by levies of provisions. One million two hundred thousand soldiers were expected as the result of the *levée en masse*. The united armies did not exceed 750,000 men. France, while it became a camp and a workshop for the republicans, became at the same time a prison for those who did

not accept the republic. While marching against avowed enemies it was thought necessary to make sure of secret foes, and the famous law of suspects was passed. All foreigners were arrested on the ground of their hostile machinations, and the partisans of constitutional monarchy and a limited republic were imprisoned, to be kept close until the peace. At the time this was so far only a reasonable measure of precaution. The bourgeoisie, the mercantile people and the middle classes furnished prisoners after May 31, as the nobility and clergy had done after August 10. A revolutionary army of 6000 soldiers and 1000 artillerymen was formed for the interior. Every indigent citizen was allowed forty sous a day to enable him to be present at the sectionary meetings. Certificates of citizenship were delivered in order to make sure of the opinions of all who coöperated in the revolutionary movement. The functionaries were placed under the surveillance of the clubs, a revolutionary committee was formed in each section, and thus they prepared to face the enemy on all sides, both abroad and at home.

The insurgents in Calvados were easily suppressed; at the very first skirmish at Vernon the insurgent troops fled. Wimpfen endeavored to rally them in vain. The moderate class, those who had taken up the defense of the Girondists, displayed little ardor or activity. When the constitution was accepted by the other departments it saw the opportunity for admitting that it had been in error when it thought it was taking arms against a mere factious minority. This retraction was made at Caen, which had been the headquarters of the revolt. The Mountain commissioners did not sully this first victory with executions. General Carteaux, on the other hand, marched at the head of some troops against the sectionary army of the south; he defeated its force, pursued it to Marseilles, entered the town after it, and Provence would have been brought into subjection like Calvados if the royalists, who had taken refuge at Toulon after their defeat, had not called in the English to their aid and placed in their hands, August 23, 1793, this key to France. Admiral Hood entered the town in the name of Louis XVII., whom he proclaimed king, disarmed the fleet, sent for 8000 Spaniards by sea, occupied the surrounding forts and forced Carteaux, who was advancing against Toulon, to fall back on Marseilles.

Notwithstanding this check the conventionalists succeeded in isolating the insurrection, and this was a great point. The Mountain commissioners had made their entry into the rebel capitals:

Robert Lindet into Caen; Tallien into Bordeaux; Barras and Fréron into Marseilles. Only two towns remained to be taken—Toulon and Lyons.

A simultaneous attack from the south, west, and center was no longer apprehended, and in the interior the enemy was only on the defensive. Lyons was besieged by Kellermann, general of the army of the Alps; three corps pressed the town on all sides. The veteran soldiers of the Alps, the revolutionary battalions, and the newly levied troops reinforced the besiegers every day. The people of Lyons defended themselves with all the courage of despair. At first they relied on the assistance of the insurgents of the south; but these having been repulsed by Carteaux, the Lyonnese placed their last hope in the army of Piedmont, which attempted a diversion in their favor, but was beaten by Kellermann. Pressed still more energetically, they saw their first positions carried. Famine began to be felt and courage forsook them. The royalist leaders, convinced of the inutility of longer resistance, left the town, and the republican army entered the walls, where they awaited the orders of the convention. A few months after Toulon itself, defended by veteran troops and formidable fortifications, fell into the power of the republicans. The battalions of the army of Italy, reinforced by those which the taking of Lyons left disposable, pressed the place closely. After repeated attacks and prodigies of skill and valor they made themselves masters of it, and the capture of Toulon, December 19, 1793, finished what that of Lyons had begun.

Everywhere the convention was victorious. The Vendéans had failed in their attempt upon Nantes, after having lost many men and their general-in-chief, Cathelineau. This attack put an end to the aggressive and previously promising movement of the Vendean insurrection. The royalists repassed the Loire, abandoned Saumur, and resumed their former cantonments. They were, however, still formidable; and the republicans who pursued them were again beaten in La Vendée. General Biron, who had succeeded General Berruyer, unsuccessfully continued the war with small bodies of troops; his moderation and defective system of attack caused him to be replaced by Canclaux and Rossignol, who were not more fortunate than he. There were two leaders, two armies, and two centers of operation—the one at Nantes and the other at Saumur, placed under contrary influences. General Canclaux could not agree with General Rossignol, nor the moderate Mountain commissioner

Philippeaux with Bourbotte, the commissioner of the committee of public safety; and this attempt at invasion failed like the preceding attempts, for want of concert in plan and action. The committee of public safety soon remedied this by appointing one sole general-in-chief, Lechelle, and by introducing war on a large scale into La Vendée. This new method, aided by the garrison of Mayence, consisting of 17,000 veterans, who, relieved from operations against the coalesced powers after the capitulation, were employed in the interior, entirely changed the face of the war. The royalists underwent four consecutive defeats, two at Châtillon, two at Cholet. Lescure, Bonchamps, and D'Elbée were mortally wounded, and the insurgents, completely beaten in Upper Vendée, and fearing that they should be exterminated if they took refuge in Lower Vendée, determined to leave their country, to the number of 80,000 persons. This emigration through Brittany, which they hoped to arouse to insurrection, became fatal to them. Repulsed before Granville, utterly routed at Mons, they were destroyed at Savenay, and barely a few thousand men, the wreck of this vast emigration, returned to Vendée. These disasters, irreparable for the royalist cause, the taking of their land of Noirmoutiers from Charette, the dispersion of the troops of that leader, the death of La Rochejacquelin, rendered the republicans masters of the country. The committee of public safety, thinking, not without reason, that its enemies were beaten but not subjugated, adopted a terrible system of extermination to prevent them from rising again. General Turreau surrounded Vendée with sixteen intrenched camps; twelve movable columns, called the infernal columns, overran the country in every direction, sword and fire in hand, scoured the woods, dispersed the assemblies and diffused terror throughout the unhappy country.²

The foreign armies had also been driven back from the frontiers they had invaded. After having taken Valenciennes and Condé, blockaded Maubeuge and Quesnoy, the enemy advanced on Cassel, Hondtschoote, and Furnes, under the command of the Duke of York. The committee of public safety, dissatisfied with Custine, whose measures they looked on with suspicion as a Girondist, superseded him by General Houchard. The enemy, hitherto successful, was defeated at Hondtschoote, September 6-8, 1793, and

² On the Vendean War, see Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 259 ff.; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. III. pp. 251-257; Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. p. 83 ff.

compelled to retreat. The military reaction began with the daring measures of the committee of public safety. Houchard himself was dismissed. Jourdan took the command of the army of the north, gained the important victory of Wattignies, October 16, 1793, over the Prince of Coburg, raised the siege of Maubeuge, and resumed the offensive on that frontier. Similar successes took place on all the others. The immortal campaign of 1793-1794 opened. What Jourdan had done with the army of the north, Hoche and Pichegru did with the army of the Moselle, and Kellermann with that of the Alps. The enemy was repulsed and kept in check on all sides. Then took place, after May 31, that which had followed August 10. The want of union between the generals and the leaders of the assembly was removed; the revolutionary movement, which had slackened, increased, and victories recommenced. Armies have had their crises, as well as parties, and these crises have brought about successes or defeat, always by the same law.

In 1792, at the beginning of the war, the generals were constitutionalists and the ministers Girondists. Rochambeau, Lafayette, and Luckner did not at all agree with Dumouriez, Servan, Clavière, and Roland. There was, besides, little enthusiasm in the army; it was beaten. After August 10 the Girondist generals, Dumouriez, Custine, Kellermann, and Dillon, replaced the constitutionalist generals. There was unity of views, confidence, and coöperation between the army and the government. The catastrophe of August 10 augmented this energy by increasing the necessity for victory; and the results were the plan of the campaign of Argonne, the victories of Valmy and Jemappes, and the invasion of Belgium. The struggle between the Mountain and the Gironde, between Dumouriez and the Jacobins, again created discord between the army and government and destroyed the confidence of the troops, who experienced immediate and numerous reverses. There was defection on the part of Dumouriez, as there had been withdrawal on the part of Lafayette. After May 31, which overthrew the Gironde party, after the committee of public safety had become established and had replaced the Girondist generals, Dumouriez, Custine, Houchard, and Dillon, by the Mountain generals, Jourdan, Hoche, Pichegru, and Moreau; after it had restored the revolutionary movement by the daring measures we have described, the campaign of Argonne and of Belgium was renewed in that of 1794, and the genius of Carnot equaled that of Dumouriez, if it did not surpass it.

During this war the committee of public safety gave way to the most terrible executions. Armies confine themselves to slaughter on the field of battle; it is not so with parties, who, under violent circumstances, fearing to see the combat renewed after the victory, secure themselves from new attacks by inexorable rigor. The usage of all governments being to make their own preservation a matter of right, they regard those who attack them as enemies so long as they fight; as conspirators when they are defeated; and thus destroy them alike by means of war and of law.

All these views at once guided the policy of the committee of public safety, a policy of vengeance, of terror, and of self-preservation. This was the maxim upon which it proceeded in reference to insurgent towns: "The name of Lyons," said Barrère, "must no longer exist. You will call it *Ville Affranchie*, and upon the ruins of that famous city there shall be raised a monument to attest the crime and the punishment of the enemies of liberty. Its history shall be told in these words: 'Lyons warred against liberty; Lyons exists no more.' " To realize this terrible anathema, the committee sent to this unfortunate city Collot d'Herbois, Fouché, and Couthon, who slaughtered the inhabitants with grapeshot and demolished its buildings. Couthon was reproved by the convention for being lenient! Between December, 1793, and April, 1794, 1682 persons were executed in Lyons alone. At Nantes, Carrier's *noyades* drowned 58 priests at one time, 90 at another, we know not how many at other odd intervals, but on one occasion no less than 800 persons; Legendre had suggested this means of execution in a speech at the Jacobin Club in May, 1792. The insurgents of Toulon underwent at the hands of the representatives, Barras and Fréron, a nearly similar fate. At Caen, Marseilles, and Bordeaux the executions were less general and less violent, because they were proportioned to the gravity of the insurrection, which had not been undertaken in concert with foreign foes. It must also be remembered that the Vendéans and Chouans were not one whit behind the republicans in massacres when they had the opportunity.

There was real system in the conduct of the committee of public safety. For the second time in history—the first being Sulla's dictatorship in the latter days of the Roman republic—the world witnessed the scientific application of terror as a principle of rule.

In the interior the dictatorial government struck at all the parties with which it was at war in the persons of their greatest mem-

bers. The condemnation of Queen Marie Antoinette was directed against Europe; that of the twenty-two against the Girondists; of the wise Bailly against the old constitutionalists; lastly, that of the Duke of Orleans against certain members of the Mountain who were supposed to have plotted his elevation. The unfortunate widow of Louis XVI. was first sentenced to death by this sanguinary revolutionary tribunal. The proscribed of June 2 soon followed her. She perished on October 16 and the Girondist deputies on the 31st. Those who then met death were: Brissot, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Fonfrède, Ducos, Valazé, Lasource, Sillery, Gardien, Carra, Duprat, Beauvais, Duchâtel, Mainvielle, Lacaze, Boileau, Lehardy, Antiboul, and Vigée.³ Seventy-three of their colleagues, who had protested against their arrest, were also imprisoned, but the committee did not venture to inflict death upon them. Custine and Beauharnais, generals of the French army, were recalled to Paris for not having attempted to deliver Valenciennes and Mainz, tried before the revolutionary tribunal, and guillotined.

During the debates these illustrious prisoners displayed uniform and serene courage. Vergniaud raised his eloquent voice for a moment, but in vain. Valazé stabbed himself with a poignard on hearing the sentence, and Lasource said to the judges: "I die at a time when the people have lost their senses; you will die when they recover them." They went to execution displaying all the stoicism of the times, singing the "*Marseillaise*" and applying it to their own case:

*"Allons, enfants de la patrie,
Le jour de gloire est arrivé:
Contre nous de la tyrannie
Le couteau sanglant est levé," etc.*

Nearly all the other leaders of this party had a violent end. Salles, Guadet, and Barbaroux were discovered in the grottos of

³ Upon the work of the terror government in the departments see Stephens, "French Revolution," vol. II. ch. ii.; Taine, "French Revolution," vol. II. p. 35 ff.; Wallon, "*Tribunal révolutionnaire*," vol. V. p. 326 ff. A succinct account of the organization of the revolutionary government, from the pen of Aulard, is to be found in Lavissee and Rambaud, "*Histoire générale*," vol. VIII. pp. 196-199.

Historians are divided into those who condemn and those who justify the terror, some contending, like Mignet, Thiers, Quinet, Louis Blanc, and Aulard, who is the greatest living authority upon the period, that the terror saved France from being destroyed by anarchy within and made the armies effective abroad; others, notably Sorel and Taine, seek to prove that "the victories were in spite of, not because of, the terror." Cf. Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. p. 46; Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. III. p. 148, note—very valuable.

Saint Emilion, near Bordeaux, and died on the scaffold. Pétion and Buzot, after wandering about some time, committed suicide; they were found dead in a field, half devoured by wolves. Rabaud-Saint-Etienne was betrayed by an old friend; Madame Roland was also condemned to death, and displayed the courage of a Roman matron. Her husband, on hearing of her death, left his place of concealment and killed himself on the highroad. Condorcet, outlawed soon after June 2, was taken while endeavoring to escape, and saved himself from the executioner's knife only by poison. Louvet, Kervelegan, Lanjuinais, Henri la Rivière, Lesage, La Réveillère-Lepeaux, were the only leading Girondists who, in secure retreat, awaited the end of the furious storm.

The revolutionary government was formed; it was proclaimed by the convention on October 10. Before May 31 power had been nowhere, neither in the ministry, nor in the commune, nor in the convention. It was natural that power should become concentrated in this extreme situation of affairs, and at a moment when the necessity of unity and promptitude of action was deeply felt. The assembly being the most central and extensive power, the dictatorship would as naturally become placed in its bosom, be exercised there by the dominant faction and in that faction by a few men. The committee of public safety of the convention created on April 6 in order, as the name indicates, to provide for the defense of the revolution by extraordinary measures, was in itself a complete framework of government. Formed during the divisions of the Mountain and the Gironde, it was composed of neutral members of the convention till May 31; and at its first renewal of members of the extreme Mountain. Barrère remained in it; but Robespierre acceded and his party dominated in it by Saint-Just, Couthon, Collot d'Herbois, and Billaud-Varennes. He set aside some Dantonists who still remained in it, such as Hérault de Séchelles and Robert-Lindet, gained over Barrère, and usurped the lead by assuming the direction of the public mind and of police. His associates divided the various departments among themselves. Saint-Just undertook the surveillance and denouncing of parties; Couthon, the violent propositions requiring to be softened in form; Billaud-Varennes and Collot d'Herbois directed the missions into the departments; Carnot took the war department; Cambon, the exchequer; Prieur de la Côte d'Or, Prieur de la Marne, and several others, the various branches of internal administration; and Barrère was the daily ora-

tor, the panegyrist ever prepared, of the dictatorial committee. Below these, assisting in the detail of the revolutionary administration, and of minor measures, was placed the committee of general safety, composed in the same spirit as the great committee, having, like it, twelve members, who were reëligible every three months, and always renewed in their office.

The whole revolutionary power was lodged in the hands of these men. Saint-Just, in proposing the establishment of the decemviral power until the restoration of peace, did not conceal the motives nor the object of this dictatorship. "You must no longer show any lenity to the enemies of the new order of things," said he. "Liberty must triumph at any cost. In the present circumstances of the republic the constitution cannot be established; it would guarantee impunity to attacks on our liberty, because it would be deficient in the violence necessary to restrain them. The present government is not sufficiently free to act. You are not near enough to strike in every direction at the authors of these attacks; the sword of the law must extend everywhere; your arm must be felt everywhere." Thus was created that terrible power which first destroyed the enemies of the Mountain, then the Mountain and the commune, and, lastly, itself. The committee did everything in the name of the convention, which it used as an instrument. It nominated and dismissed generals, ministers, representatives, commissioners, judges, and juries. It assailed factions; it took the initiative in all measures. Through its commissioners, armies and generals were dependent upon it and it ruled the departments with sovereign sway. By means of the law touching suspected persons, it disposed of men's liberties; by the revolutionary tribunal, of men's lives; by levies and the maximum, of property; by decrees of accusation in the terrified convention, of its own members. Lastly, its dictatorship was supported by the multitude, who debated in the clubs, ruled in the revolutionary committees; whose services it paid by a daily stipend and whom it fed with the maximum. The multitude adhered to a system which inflamed its passions, exaggerated its importance, assigned it the first place and appeared to do everything for it.

The innovators, separated by war and by their laws from all states and from all forms of government, determined to widen the separation. By an unprecedented revolution they established an entirely new era; they changed the divisions of the year, the names of the months and days; they substituted a republican for the Chris-

tian calendar, the decade for the week, and fixed the day of rest, not on the Sabbath, but on the tenth day. The new era dated from September 22, 1792, the epoch of the foundation of the republic. There were twelve equal months of thirty days, which began on September 11 in the following order: Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire, for the autumn; Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose, for the winter; Germinal, Floréal, Prairial, for the spring; Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor, for the summer. Each month had three decades, each decade ten days, and each day was named from its order in the decade: Primidi, Duodi, Tridi, Quartidi, Quintidi, Sextidi, Septidi, Octidi, Nonidi, Decadi. The surplus five days were placed at the end of the year; they received the name of *sans-culottides*, and were consecrated, the first, to the festival of genius; the second, to that of labor; the third, to that of actions; the fourth, to that of rewards; the fifth, to that of opinion.⁴ The constitution of 1793 led to the establishment of the republican calendar, and the republican calendar to the abolition of the Christian worship. We shall soon see the commune and the committee of public safety each proposing a religion of its own: the commune, the worship of reason; the committee of public safety, the worship of the Supreme Being. But we must first mention a new struggle between the authors of the catastrophe of May 31 themselves.

The commune and the Mountain had effected this revolution against the Gironde, and the committee alone had benefited by it. During the five months we have just gone over, from June to November, the committee, having taken all the measures of defense, had naturally become the first power of the republic. The actual struggle being, as it were, over, the commune sought to sway the committee, and the Mountain to throw off the yoke of the latter. The municipal faction was the end of the revolution. Having an object opposed to that of the committee of public safety, instead of the conventional dictatorship, it desired the most extreme local democracy; and instead of religion, the consecration of materialism. Political anarchy and religious atheism were the symbols of this party, and the means by which it aimed at establishing its own rule. A revolution is the effect of the different systems which have agi-

⁴ Napoleon abolished this decimal calendar in 1806. Fletcher makes the point that "the calendar is not at all an unreasonable one, as September 22 is the first day of autumn and is the ancient Egyptian and Babylonian New Year's Day."—Fletcher's edition Carlyle's "French Revolution," vol. III. p. 88, note.

tated the age which has originated it. Thus, during the continuance of the crisis in France, ultramontane Catholicism was represented by the nonjuring clergy; Jansenism by the constitutionist clergy; philosophical deism by the worship of the Supreme Being, instituted by the committee of public safety; and the materialism of Holbach's school by the worship of Reason and of Nature, decreed by the commune. It was the same with political opinions, from the royalty of the ancient régime to the unlimited democracy of the municipal faction. The latter had lost in Marat its principal support, its true leader, while the committee of public safety still retained Robespierre. It had at its head men who enjoyed great popularity with the lower classes; Chaumette⁵ and his substitute, Hébert, were its political leaders; Ronsin, commandant of the revolutionary army, its general; the atheist, Anacharsis Clootz, its apostle. In the sections it relied on the revolutionary committees, in which there were many obscure foreigners, supposed, and not without probability, to be agents of England sent to destroy the republic by driving it into anarchy and excess. The club of the Cordeliers was composed entirely of its partisans. The old Cordeliers of Danton, who had contributed so powerfully to August 10, and who constituted the commune of that period, had entered the government, and the convention, and had been replaced in the club by members whom they contemptuously designated the *patriotes de la troisième réquisition*.

Hébert's faction, which, in the sheet called *Père Duchesne*, popularized obscene language and low and cruel sentiments, and which added derision of the victims to the executions of party, in a short time made terrible progress. It compelled the Bishop of Paris and his vicars to abjure Christianity and decree that the worship of Reason should be substituted for the Catholic religion. In this policy we must carefully distinguish between the conduct of the commune and the conduct of the convention. In the beginning the convention adopted without change the religious policy of the national and the legislative assembly. It scrupulously respected the civil constitution of the clergy. On September 30, 1792, Cambon,

⁵ Chaumette's blood-thirstiness seems to have been the most extravagant type of political fanaticism. When not politically influenced, he seems to have been a kind-hearted man. It was due to him that a separate bed was provided for each patient in the hospitals of Paris, that whipping was abolished in the schools, and that equal burial honors should be given to all citizens, without distinction of wealth or of class.

in the name of the committee of finance, had demanded the suppression of the salaries of the clergy. Robespierre strongly opposed the proposition, and the convention declared that it "never had had the intention to deprive the country of the ministers of the Catholic religion." On June 27, 1793, during the terror, it again declared that "the support of the clergy was a part of the national debt." On August 1, 1793, the convention authorized the destruction of the tombs of the kings of France at St. Denis. This act is probably the most outrageous piece of legislation of which the convention was the author, for it is not true that the convention ever proscribed Christianity. In general, such legislation was due to the commune of Paris, which actually passed an ordinance for the destruction of church spires, because they were "symbols of inequality."

But the civil wars prevailing in the provinces, in which some of the priests of France were active, had the effect of producing vigorous measures against the "recalcitrant" clergy (decrees of April and September, 1793). On September 18, 1793, all clerical salaries were reduced, and on the 16th Brumaire, communes were given the legal right to suppress parishes.⁶ This policy seemed too moderate for radical revolutionists like Chaumette and Anarcharsis Cloutz, who wished to dechristianize France. Under their influence the commune of Paris, not the convention, passed decrees (November 28) ordaining the festival of Reason (November 10) and the closure of the churches.

Gobel, the "constitutional" Archbishop of Paris, Thomas Lindet, Bishop of Evreux, with a few others, abjured the Christian religion. Gregoire courageously vindicated his conscience, and at the very height of the terror sat upon the benches of the Mountain, clad in the violet robes of a bishop. Not so Sieyès, who issued a "letter of renegation" on November 10, 1793. The convention, while not strong enough to crush the madness of the commune, nevertheless frowned upon it. The churches were shut up or converted into temples of reason, and *fêtes* were established in every town, which became scandalous scenes of atheism. The committee of public safety grew alarmed at the power of this ultra-revolutionary faction and hastened to stop and to destroy it. Robespierre soon attacked it in the assembly on the 15th Frimaire (December 5, 1793). "Citizens, representatives of the people," said he, "the

⁶ Cf. Aulard, "*La separation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat sous la Convention.*"

kings coalesced against the republic are making war against us with armies and intrigues; we will oppose their armies by braver ones; their intrigues, by vigilance and the terror of national justice. Ever intent on renewing their secret plots, in proportion as they are destroyed by the hand of patriotism, ever skillful in directing the arms of liberty against liberty itself, the emissaries of the enemies of France are now laboring to overthrow the republic by republicanism and to rekindle civil war by philosophy." He classed the ultra-revolutionists of the commune with the external enemies of the republic. "It is your part," said he to the convention, "to prevent the follies and extravagances which coincide with the projects of foreign conspiracy. I require you to prohibit particular authorities (the commune) from serving our enemies by rash measures, and that no armed force be allowed to interfere in questions of religious opinions." And the convention, which had applauded the abjurations at the demand of the commune, decreed, on Robespierre's motion, that all violence and all measures opposed to the liberty of religion are prohibited.

The committee of public safety was too strong not to triumph over the commune; but at the same time it had to resist the moderate party of the Mountain, which demanded the cessation of the revolutionary government and the dictatorship of the committees. The revolutionary government had only been created to restrain, the dictatorship to conquer; and as Danton and his party no longer considered restraint and victory essential, they sought to establish legal order and the independence of the convention; they wished to frown down the faction of the commune, to stop the operation of the revolutionary tribunal, to empty the prisons now filled with suspected persons, to reduce or destroy the powers of the committees. This project in favor of clemency, humanity, and legal government was conceived by Danton, Philippeaux, Camille Desmoulins, Fabre d'Eglantine, Lacroix, General Westermann, and all the friends of Danton. Before all these things they wanted that the republic should secure the field of battle; but after conquest they wished to conciliate. Danton proved his statesmanship in advocating this policy. 'As a matter of fact, the terror government had done its work, both within and without France. After the great victories of the autumn of 1793 and the crushing of civil war in the departments, terror had no longer a reason for being.

This party, become moderate, had renounced power; it had

withdrawn from the government, or suffered itself to be excluded by Robespierre's party. Moreover, since May 31, zealous patriots had considered Danton's conduct equivocal. He had acted mildly on that day and had subsequently disapproved the condemnation of the twenty-two. They began to reproach him with his disorderly life, his venal passions, his change of party, and untimely moderation. To avoid the storm he had retired to his native place, Arcis-sur-Aube, and there he seemed to have forgotten all in retirement. During his absence the Hébert faction made immense progress; and the friends of Danton hastily summoned him to their aid. He returned at the beginning of Frimaire (December). Philippeaux immediately denounced the manner in which the Vendean war had been carried on; General Westermann, who had greatly distinguished himself in that war, and who had just been dismissed by the committee of public safety, supported Philippeaux, and Camille Desmoulins published the first numbers of his *Vieux Cordelier*. This brilliant and fiery young man had followed all the movements of the revolution, from July 14 to May 31, approving all its exaggerations and all its measures. His heart, however, was gentle and tender, though his opinions were violent and his humor often bitter. He had praised the revolutionary régime because he believed it indispensable for the establishment of the republic; he had coöperated in the ruin of the Gironde, because he feared the dissensions of the republic. For the republic he had sacrificed even his scruples and the desires of his heart, even justice and humanity; he had given all to his party, thinking that he gave it to the republic; but now he was able neither to praise nor to keep silent; his energetic activity, which he had employed for the republic, he now directed against those who were ruining it by bloodshed. In his *Vieux Cordelier* he spoke of liberty with the depth of Machiavelli, and of men with the wit of Voltaire. But he soon raised the fanatics and dictators against him by calling the government to sentiments of moderation, compassion, and justice.

He drew a striking picture of present tyranny, under the name of a past tyranny. He selected his examples from Tacitus. "At this period," said he, "words became state crimes: there wanted but one step more to render mere glances, sadness, pity, sighs—even silence itself criminal. It soon became high treason or an anti-revolutionary crime, for Cremutius Cordus to call Brutus and Cassius the last of the Romans; a counter-revolutionary crime in

a descendant of Cassius to possess a portrait of his ancestor; a counter-revolutionary crime in Mamercus Scaurus to write a tragedy in which there were lines capable of a double meaning; a counter-revolutionary crime in Torquatus Silanus to be extravagant; a counter-revolutionary crime in Pomponius, because a friend of Sejanus had sought an asylum in one of his country houses; a counter-revolutionary crime to bewail the misfortunes of the time, for this was accusing the government; a counter-revolutionary crime for the consul Fusius Geminus to bewail the sad death of his son.

“If a man would escape death himself, it became necessary to rejoice at the death of his friend or relative. Under Nero, many went to return thanks to the gods for their relatives whom he had put to death. At least, an assumed air of contentment was necessary; for even fear was sufficient to render one guilty. Everything gave the tyrant umbrage. If a citizen was popular, he was considered a rival to the prince, and capable of exciting a civil war, and he was suspected. Did he, on the contrary, shun popularity, and keep by his fireside, his retired mode of life drew attention, and he was suspected. Was a man rich, it was feared the people might be corrupted by his bounty, and he was suspected. Was he poor, it became necessary to watch him closely, as none are so enterprising as those who have nothing, and he was suspected. If his disposition chanced to be somber and melancholy, and his dress neglected, his distress was supposed to be occasioned by the state of public affairs, and he was suspected. If a citizen indulged in good living to the injury of his digestion, he was said to do so because the prince lived ill, and he was suspected. If virtuous and austere in his manners, he was thought to censure the court, and he was suspected. Was he philosopher, orator, or poet, it was unbecoming to have more celebrity than the government, and he was suspected. Lastly, if anyone had obtained a reputation in war, his talent only served to make him dangerous; it became necessary to get rid of the general, or to remove him speedily from the army; he was suspected.

“The natural death of a celebrated man, or even of one merely in place, was so rare that historians handed it down to posterity as an event worthy to be remembered in remote ages. The death of so many innocent and worthy citizens seemed less a calamity than the insolence and disgraceful opulence of their mur-

derers and denouncers. Every day the sacred and inviolable informer made his triumphant entry into the palace of the dead, and received some rich heritage. All these denouncers assumed illustrious names, and called themselves Cotta, Scipio, Regulus, Sævius, Severus. To distinguish himself by a brilliant *début*, the Marquis Serenus brought an accusation of anti-revolutionary practices against his aged father, already in exile, after which he proudly called himself Brutus. Such were the accusers, such the judges; the tribunals, the protectors of life and property, became slaughter-houses, in which theft and murder bore the names of punishment and confiscation."

Camille Desmoulins did not confine himself to attacking the revolutionary and dictatorial régime; he required its abolition. He demanded the establishment of a committee of mercy, as the only way of terminating the revolution and pacifying parties. His journal produced a great effect upon public opinion; it inspired some hope and courage. Have you read the *Vieux Cordelier*? was asked on all sides. At the same time Fabre d'Eglantine, Lacroix, and Bourdon de l'Oise excited the convention to throw off the yoke of the committee; they sought to unite the Mountain and the Right in order to restore the freedom and power of the assembly. As the committees were all powerful, they tried to ruin them by degrees,—the best course to follow. It was important to change the public opinion, and to encourage the assembly, in order to support themselves by a moral force against the revolutionary force, by the power of the convention against the power of the committees. The Dantonist Mountaineers endeavored to detach Robespierre from the other Decemvirs; Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois and Saint-Just alone appeared to them invincibly attached to the reign of terror. Barrère adhered to it through weakness—Couthon from his devotion to Robespierre. They hoped to gain over the latter to the cause of moderation, through his friendship for Danton, his ideas of order, his austere habits, his profession of public virtue, and his pride. He had defended seventy-three imprisoned Girondist deputies against the committees and the Jacobins; he had dared to attack Clootz and Hébert as ultra-revolutionists; and he had induced the convention to decree the existence of the Supreme Being. Robespierre was the most popularly renowned man of that time; he was, in a measure, the moderator of the republic and the dictator of opinion; by gaining

him, they hoped to overcome both the committees and the commune, without compromising the cause of the revolution.

Danton saw him on his return from Arcis-sur-Aube, and they seemed to understand one another; attacked at the Jacobins, he was defended by him. Robespierre himself read and corrected the *Vieux Cordelier*, and approved of it. At the same time he professed some principles of moderation; but then all those who exercised the revolutionary government, or who thought it indispensable, became aroused. Billaud-Varennes and Saint-Just openly maintained the policy of the committees. Desmoulins had said of the latter: "He so esteems himself, that he carries his head on his shoulders with as much respect as if it were the holy sacrament." "And I," replied Saint-Just, "will make him carry his like another Saint Denis." Collot d'Herbois, who was on a mission, arrived while matters were in this state. He protected the faction of the anarchists, who had been intimidated for a moment, and who derived fresh audacity from his presence. The Jacobins expelled Camille Desmoulins from their society, and Barrère attacked him at the convention in the name of the government. Robespierre himself was not spared; he was accused of moderatism, and murmurs began to circulate against him.

However, his credit being immense, as they could not attack or conquer without him, he was sought on both sides. Taking advantage of this superior position, he adopted neither party, and sought to put down the leaders of each, one after the other.

Under these circumstances he wished to sacrifice the commune and the anarchists; the committees wished to sacrifice the Mountain and the moderates. They came to an understanding: Robespierre gave up Danton, Desmoulins, and their friends to the members of the committee; and the members of the committee gave up Hébert, Clootz, Chaumette, Ronsin, and their accomplices. By favoring the moderates at first, he prepared the ruin of the anarchists, and he attained two objects favorable to his domination or to his pride—he overturned a formidable faction and he got rid of a revolutionary reputation, the rival of his own.

Motives of public safety, it must be admitted, mingled with these combinations of party. At this period of general fury against the republic, and of victories not yet definitive on its part, the committees did not think the moment for peace with Europe and the internal dissentients had arrived; and they considered it impossible

to carry on the war without a dictatorship. They, moreover, regarded the Hébertists as an obscene faction, which corrupted the people, and served the foreign foe by anarchy; and the Dantonists as a party whose political moderation and private immorality compromised and dishonored the republic. The government accordingly proposed to the assembly, through the medium of Barrère, the continuation of the war, with additional activity in its pursuit; while Robespierre, a few days afterward, demanded the continuance of the revolutionary government. In the Jacobins he had already expressed himself opposed to the *Vieux Cordelier*, which he had hitherto supported. He rejected legal government in the following terms:

"Without," said he, "all the tyrants surround us; within, all the friends of tyranny conspire against us; they will continue to conspire till crime is left without hope. We must destroy the internal and external enemies of the republic or perish with it. Now, in such a situation, the first maxim of your policy should be, to lead the people by reason, and the enemies of the people by terror. If, during peace, virtue be the mainspring of a popular government, its mainspring in the times of revolution is both virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror becomes fatal, terror, without which virtue is powerless. Subdue, then, the enemies of liberty by terror; and, as the founders of the republic, you will act rightly. The government of the revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny."

In this speech he denounced the moderates and the ultra-revolutionists, as both of them desiring the downfall of the republic. "They advance," said he, "under different banners and by different roads, but they advance toward the same goal; that goal is the disorganization of the popular government, the ruin of the convention, and the triumph of tyranny. One of these two factions reduces us to weakness, the other drives us to excesses." He prepared the public mind for their proscription; and his speech, adopted without discussion, was sent to all the popular societies, to all the authorities, and to all the armies.

After this beginning of hostilities, Danton, who had not given up his connection with Robespierre, asked for an interview with him. It took place at the residence of Robespierre himself. They were cold and bitter; Danton complained violently and Robespierre was reserved. "I know," said Danton, "all the hatred the

committee bear me; but I do not fear it." "You are wrong," replied Robespierre; "it entertains no ill designs against you; but you would do well to have an explanation." "An explanation?" rejoined Danton, "an explanation? That requires good faith!" Seeing that Robespierre looked grave at these words, he added: "No doubt it is necessary to put down the royalists, but we ought only to strike blows which will benefit the republic; we must not confound the innocent with the guilty." "And who says," exclaimed Robespierre sharply, "that an innocent person has been put to death?" Danton turned to one of his friends who had accompanied him, and said, with a bitter smile: "What do you say to this? Not one innocent person has perished!" They then separated and all friendship ceased between them.

A few days afterward Saint-Just ascended the tribune and threatened more openly than had yet been done all dissentients, moderates, or anarchists. "Citizens," said he, "you wished for a republic; if you do not at the same time desire all that constitutes it, you will overwhelm the people in its ruins. What constitutes a republic is the destruction of all that is opposed to it. We are guilty toward the republic because we pity the prisoners; we are guilty toward the republic because we do not desire virtue; we are guilty to the republic because we do not desire terror. What is it you want, those of you who do not wish for virtue, that you may be happy? [The anarchists.] What is it you want, those of you who do not wish to employ terror against the wicked? [The moderates.] What is it you want, those of you who haunt public places to be seen, and to have it said of you: 'Do you see such a one pass?' [Danton.] You will perish, those of you who seek fortune, who assume haggard looks, and affect the patriot that the foreigner may buy you up, or the government give you a place; you of the indulgent faction, who seek to save the guilty; you of the foreign faction, who direct severity against the defenders of the people. Measures are already taken to secure the guilty; they are hemmed in on all sides. Let us return thanks to the genius of the French people that liberty has triumphed over one of the most dangerous attacks ever meditated against it. The development of this vast plot, the panic it will create, and the measures about to be proposed to you, will free the republic and the world of all the conspirators."

Saint-Just caused the government to be invested with the most

extensive powers against the conspirators of the commune. He had it decreed that justice and probity were the order of the day. The anarchists were unable to adopt any measure of defense; they veiled for a moment the Rights of Man at the club of the Cordeliers, and they made an attempt at insurrection, but without vigor or union. The people did not stir, and the committee caused its commandant, Henriot, to seize the substitute Hébert, Ronsin, the revolutionary general, Anarcharsis Clootz, Monmoro, the orator of the human race, Vincent and others. They were brought before the revolutionary tribunal as the agents of foreign powers, and as having conspired to place a tyrant over the state. That tyrant was to have been Pache, under the title of Grand Juge. The anarchist leaders lost their audacity as soon as they were arrested; they defended themselves, were guillotined March 24, 1794, and, for the most part, died without any display of courage. The committee of public safety disbanded the revolutionary army, diminished the power of the sectionary committees, and obliged the commune to appear at the bar of the convention and give thanks for the arrest and punishment of the conspirators, its accomplices.

It was now time for Danton to defend himself; the proscription after striking the commune threatened him. He was advised to be on his guard and to take immediate steps; but not having been able to overturn the dictatorial power, by arousing public opinion and the assembly by the means of the public journals, and his friends the Mountaineers, on what could be depend for support? The convention, indeed, was inclined to favor him and his cause; but it was wholly subject to the revolutionary power of the committee. Danton having to support him neither the government, nor the assembly, nor the commune, nor the clubs, awaited proscription, without making any effort to avoid it.

His friends implored him to defend himself. "I would rather," said he, "be guillotined than be a guillotiner; besides, my life is not worth the trouble; and I am sick of the world." "The members of the committee seek thy death." "Well," he exclaimed impatiently, "should Billaud, should Robespierre kill me, they will be execrated as tyrants; Robespierre's house will be razed to the ground; salt will be strewn upon it; a gallows will be erected on it, devoted to the vengeance of crime! But my friends will say of me, that I was a good father, a good friend, a good citizen; they will not forget me." "Thou mayst avert—" "I would rather

be guillotined than be a guillotiner." "Well, then, thou shouldst depart." "Depart!" he repeated, curling his lip disdainfully, "depart! Can we carry our country away on the sole of our shoe?"

Danton's only resource now was to make trial of his so well known and potent eloquence to denounce Robespierre and the committee, and to arouse the convention against their tyranny. He was earnestly entreated to do this; but he knew too well how difficult a thing it is to overthrow an established domination; he knew too well the complete subjection and terror of the assembly, to rely on the efficacy of such means. He accordingly waited, thinking, he who had dared so much, that his enemies would shrink from proscribing him.

On the 10th of Germinal he was informed that his arrest was being discussed in the committee of public safety, and he was again entreated to save himself by flight. After a moment's reflection he exclaimed: "They dare not!" During the night his house was surrounded, and he was taken to the Luxembourg with Camille Desmoulins, Philippeaux, Lacroix, and Westermann. On his arrival he accosted with cordiality the prisoners who crowded round him. "Gentlemen," said he, "I had hoped in a short time to liberate you, but here I am come to join you, and I know not how the matter may end." In about an hour he was placed in solitary confinement in the cell in which Hébert had been imprisoned, and which Robespierre was so soon to occupy. There, giving way to reflection and regret, he exclaimed: "It was at this time I instituted the revolutionary tribunal. I implore forgiveness from God and man for having done so; but I designed it not for the scourge of humanity."

His arrest gave rise to general excitement, to a somber anxiety. The following day, at the opening of the sittings in the assembly, men spoke in whispers; they inquired with alarm what was the pretext for this new proceeding against the representatives of the people. "Citizens," at length exclaimed Legendre, "four members of this assembly have been arrested during the night. Danton is one; I know not the others. Citizens, I declare that I believe Danton to be as pure as myself, yet he is in a dungeon. They feared, no doubt, that his replies would overturn the accusations brought against him: I move, therefore, that before you listen to any report you send for the prisoners and hear them." This motion was favorably received, and inspired the assembly,

with momentary courage: a few members desired it might be put to the vote, but this state of things did not last long. Robespierre ascended the tribune. "By the long since unusual agitation that pervades the assembly," said he, "by the sensation the words of the speaker you have just heard have produced, it is easy to see that a question of great interest is before us: a question whether two or three individuals shall be preferred to the country. We shall see to-day whether the convention can crush to atoms a mock idol, long since decayed, or whether its fall shall overwhelm both the convention and the French people." And a few words from him sufficed to restore silence and subordination to the assembly, to restrain the friends of Danton, and to make Legendre himself retract. Soon after Saint-Just entered the house, followed by other members of the committees. He read a long report against the members under arrest, in which he impugned their opinions, their political conduct, their private life, their projects; making them appear, by improbable and subtle combinations, accomplices in every conspiracy and the servants of every party. The assembly, after listening without a murmur, with a bewildered sanction unanimously decreed, and with applause even, the impeachment of Danton and his friends. Everyone sought to gain time with tyranny, and gave up others' heads to save his own.

The accused were brought before the revolutionary tribunal; their attitude was haughty and full of courage. They displayed an audacity of speech and a contempt of their judges wholly unusual. Danton replied to the president, Dumas, who asked him the customary questions as to his name, his age, his residence: "I am Danton, tolerably well known in the revolution; I am thirty-five years old. My residence will soon be nothing. My name will live in the Pantheon of history." His disdainful or indignant replies, the cold and measured answers of Lacroix, the austere dignity of Philippeaux, the vigor of Desmoulins, were beginning to move the people. But the accused were silenced, under the pretext that they were wanting in respect to justice, and were immediately condemned without a hearing. "We are immolated," cried Danton, "to the ambition of a few miserable brigands, but they will not long enjoy the fruit of their criminal victory. I draw Robespierre after me—Robespierre will follow me." They were taken to the Conciergerie and thence to the scaffold.

They went to death with the intrepidity usual at that epoch.

There were many troops under arms, and their escort was numerous. The crowd, generally loud in its applause, was silent. Camille Desmoulins, when in the fatal cart, was still full of astonishment at his condemnation, which he could not comprehend. "This, then," said he, "is the reward reserved for the first apostle of liberty." Danton stood erect, and looked proudly and calmly around. At the foot of the scaffold he betrayed a momentary emotion. "Oh, my best beloved—my wife!" he cried, "I shall not see thee again." Then suddenly interrupting himself: "No weakness, Danton!" Thus, on April 6, 1794, perished the last defenders of humanity and moderation; the last who sought to promote peace among the conquerors of the revolution and pity for the conquered. For a long time after them no voice was raised against the dictatorship of terror; and from one end of France to the other it struck silent and redoubled blows. The Girondists had sought to prevent this violent reign—the Dantonists to stop it; all perished, and the conquerors had the more victims to strike the more foes arose around them. In so sanguinary a career there is no stopping until the tyrant is himself slain. The Decemvirs, after the definitive fall of the Girondists, had made terror the order of the day; after the fall of the Hébertists, justice and probity, because these were impure men of faction; after the fall of the Dantonists, terror and all virtues, because these Dantonists were, according to **their** phraseology, indulgents and immoral.

Chapter XI

FALL OF ROBESPIERRE. APRIL 6-JULY 28, 1794

DURING the four months following the fall of the Danton party the committees exercised their authority without opposition or restraint. Death became the only means of governing, and the republic was given up to daily and systematic executions. It was then were invented the alleged conspiracies of the inmates of the prisons, crowded under the law of suspects, or emptied by that of the 22d Prairial, which might be called the law of the condemned; then the emissaries of the committee of public safety entirely replaced in the departments those of the Mountain; and Carrier, the protégé of Billaud, was seen in the west; Maigret, the protégé of Couthon, in the south; and Joseph Lebon, the protégé of Robespierre, in the north. The extermination *en masse* of the enemies of the democratic dictatorship, which had already been effected at Lyons and Toulon by grapeshot, became still more horrible, by the *noyades* of Nantes, and the scaffolds of Arras, Paris, and Orange.

May this example teach men a truth, which for their good ought to be generally known, that in a revolution all depends on a first refusal and a first struggle. To effect a pacific innovation, it must not be contested; otherwise war is declared and the revolution spreads, because the whole nation is aroused to its defense. When society is thus shaken to its foundations, it is the most daring who triumph, and instead of wise and temperate reformers, we find only extreme and inflexible innovators. Engendered by contest, they maintain themselves by it; with one hand they fight to maintain their sway, with the other they establish their system with a view to its consolidation; they massacre in the name of their doctrines: the name of virtue, of humanity, of the welfare of the people, of all that is holiest on earth, they use to warrant their executions, and to protect their dictatorship. Until they become exhausted and fall, all perish indiscriminately, both the enemies and the partisans of reform. The tempest dashes a whole nation

against the rock of revolution. Inquire what became of the men of 1789 in 1794, and it will be found that they were all alike swept away in this vast shipwreck. As soon as one party appeared on the field of battle, it summoned all the others thither, and all like it were in turn conquered and exterminated: constitutionalists, Girondists, the Mountain, and the Decemvirs themselves. At each defeat the effusion of blood became greater, and the system of tyranny more violent. The Decemvirs were the most cruel, because they were the last.

The committee of public safety, being at once the object of the attacks of Europe, and of the hatred of so many conquered parties, thought that any abatement of violence would occasion its destruction; it wished at the same time to subdue its foes and to get rid of them. "The dead alone do not return," said Barrère. "The more freely the social body perspires the more healthy it becomes," added Collot d'Herbois. But the Decemvirs, not suspecting their power to be ephemeral, aimed at founding a democracy, and sought in institutions a security for its permanence in the time when they should cease to employ executions. They possessed in the highest degree the fanaticism of certain social theories, as the millenarians of the English Revolution, with whom they may be compared, had the fanaticism of certain religious ideas. The one originated with the people, as the other looked to God; these desired the most absolute political equality, as those sought evangelical equality; these aspired to the reign of virtue, as those to the reign of the saints. Human nature flies to extremes in all things, and produces, in a religious epoch, democratic Christians—in a philosophical epoch, political democrats.

Robespierre and Saint-Just had given it the plan of that democracy, whose principles they professed in all their speeches; they wished to change the manners, mind, and customs of France, and to make it a republic after the manner of the ancients; they sought to establish the dominion of the people; to have magistrates free from pride; citizens free from vice; fraternity of intercourse, simplicity of manners, austerity of character, and the worship of virtue. The symbolical words of the sect may be found in the speeches of all the reporters of the committee, and especially in those of Robespierre and Saint-Just. Liberty and equality for the government of the republic; indivisibility for its form; public safety for its defense and preservation; virtue for its principle; the Su-

preme Being for its religion; as for the citizens, fraternity for their daily intercourse; probity for their conduct; good sense for their mental qualities; modesty for their public actions, which were to have for object the welfare of the state, and not their own: such was the symbol of this democracy. Fanaticism could not go further. The authors of this system did not inquire into its practicability; they thought it just and natural; and having power, they tried to establish it by violence. Not one of these words but served to condemn a party or individuals. The royalists and aristocrats were hunted down in the name of liberty and equality; the Girondists in the name of indivisibility; Philippeaux, Camille Desmoulins, and the moderate party, in the name of public safety; Chaumette, Anacharsis Clootz, Gobet, Hébert, all the anarchical and atheistical party, in the name of virtue and the Supreme Being; Chabot, Bazire, Fabre d'Eglantine, in the name of probity; Danton in the name of virtue and modesty. In the eyes of fanatics these moral crimes necessitated their destruction, as much as the conspiracies which they were accused of.

Robespierre was the patron of this sect, which had in the committee a more zealous, disinterested, and fanatic partisan than himself in the person of Saint-Just, who was called the Apocalyptic. His features were bold but regular, and marked by an expression determined but melancholy. His eye was steady and piercing; his hair black, straight, and long. His manners cold, though his character was ardent; simple in his habits, austere and sententious, he advanced without hesitation toward the completion of his system. Though scarcely twenty-five years old, he was the boldest of the Decemvirs, because his convictions were the deepest. Passionately devoted to the republic, he was indefatigable in the committees, intrepid on his missions to the armies, where he set an example of courage, sharing the marches and dangers of the soldiers. His predilection for the multitude did not make him pay court to their propensities; and far from adopting their dress and language with Hébert, he wished to confer on them ease, gravity, and dignity. But his policy made him more terrible than his popular sentiments. He had much daring, coolness, readiness, and decision. Little susceptible of pity, he reduced to form his measures for the public safety, and put them into execution immediately. If he considered victory, proscription, the dictatorship necessary, he at once demanded them. Unlike Robespierre, he was completely a man

of action. The latter, comprehending all the use he might make of him, early gained him over in the convention. Saint-Just, on his part, was drawn toward Robespierre by his reputation for incorruptibility,¹ his austere life, and the conformity of their ideas.

The terrible effects of their association may be conceived when we consider their popularity, the envious and tyrannical passions of the one, and the inflexible character and systematic views of the other. Couthon had joined them; he was personally devoted to Robespierre. Although he had a mild look and a partially paralyzed frame, he was a man of merciless fanaticism. They formed, in the committee, a triumvirate which soon sought to engross all power. This ambition alienated the other members of the committee and caused their own destruction. In the meantime, the triumvirate imperiously governed the convention and the committee itself. When it was necessary to intimidate the assembly, Saint-Just was intrusted with the task; when they wished to take it by surprise, Couthon was employed. If the assembly murmured or hesitated, Robespierre rose, and restored silence and terror by a single word.

During the first two months after the fall of the commune and the Danton party the Decemvirs, who were not yet divided, labored to secure their domination: their commissioners kept the departments in restraint, and the armies of the republic were victorious on all the frontiers. The committee took advantage of this moment of security and union to lay the foundation of new manners and new institutions. It must never be forgotten that in a revolution men are moved by two tendencies, attachment to their ideas and a thirst for command. The members of the committee, at the beginning, agreed in their democratic sentiments; at the end, they contended for power.

Billaud-Varenes presented the theory of popular government, and the means of rendering the army always subordinate to the nation. Robespierre delivered a discourse on the moral sentiments and solemnities suited to a republic: he dedicated festivals to the Supreme Being, to Truth, Justice, Modesty, Friendship, Frugality, Fidelity, Immortality, Misfortune,—in a word, to all

¹ An opposite view may well be taken. Some years before the revolution began Saint-Just had stolen his mother's plate and squandered the money he received for it. He was imprisoned in consequence, and imbibed a fierce hatred of *lettres de cachet* and all the police power of the ancient régime.

the moral and republican virtues. In this way he prepared the establishment of the new worship of the Supreme Being. Barrère made a report on the extirpation of mendicity, and the assistance the republic owed to indigent citizens. All these reports passed into decrees, agreeably to the wishes of the democrats. Barrère, whose habitual speeches in the convention were calculated to disguise his servitude from himself, was one of the most supple instruments of the committee; he belonged to the régime of terror, neither from cruelty nor from fanaticism. His manners were gentle, his private life blameless, and he possessed great moderation of mind. But he was timid; and after having been a constitutional royalist before August 10, a moderate republican prior to May 31, he became the panegyrist and the coöperator of the decemviral tyranny. This shows that, in a revolution, no one should become an actor without decision of character. Intellect never knows when to stop, at a time when one ought always to be prepared to die, and to end one's part or end one's opinions.

Robespierre, who was considered the founder of this moral democracy, now attained the highest degree of elevation and of power. He became the object of the general flattery of his party; he was the great man of the republic. Men spoke of nothing but of his virtue, of his genius, and of his eloquence. Two circumstances contributed to augment his importance still further. On the 3d Prairial an obscure but intrepid man, named L'Admiral, was determined to deliver France from Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois. He waited in vain for Robespierre all day, and at night he resolved to kill Collot. He fired twice at him with pistols, but missed him. The following day a young girl, named Cecile Renaud, called at Robespierre's and earnestly begged to speak with him. As he was out, and as she still insisted upon being admitted, she was detained. She carried a small parcel, and two knives were found on her person. "What motive brought you to Robespierre's?" inquired her examiners. "I wanted to speak to him." "On what business?" "That depended on how I might find him." "Do you know Citizen Robespierre?" "No, I sought to know him; I went to his house to see what a tyrant was like." "What did you propose doing with your two knives?" "Nothing, having no intention to injure anyone." "And your parcel?" "Contains a change of linen for my use in the place I shall be sent to." "Where is that?" "To prison; and from there to the guil-

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lotine." The unfortunate girl was ultimately taken there, and her family shared her fate.

Robespierre received marks of the most intoxicating adulation. At the Jacobins and in the convention his preservation was attributed to the good genius of the republic, and to the Supreme Being, whose existence he had decreed on the 18th Floréal. The celebration of the new religion had been fixed for the 20th Prairial throughout France. On the 16th Robespierre was unanimously appointed president of the convention, in order that he might officiate as the pontiff at the festival. At that ceremony he appeared at the head of the assembly, his face beaming with joy and confidence, an unusual expression with him. He approached alone, fifteen feet in advance of his colleagues, attired in a magnificent dress, holding flowers and ears of corn in his hand, the object of general attention. Expectation was universally raised on this occasion: the enemies of Robespierre foreboded attempts at usurpation, the persecuted looked forward to a milder régime. He disappointed everyone. He harangued the people in his capacity of high priest, and concluded his speech, in which all expected to find a hope of happier prospects, with these discouraging words: "People, let us to-day give ourselves up to the transports of pure delight! To-morrow we will renew our struggle against vices and against tyrants."

Two days after, on the 22d Prairial, Couthon presented a new law to the convention. The revolutionary tribunal had dutifully struck all those who had been pointed out to it: royalists, constitutionalists, Girondists, anarchists, and Mountaineers, had been all alike dispatched to execution. But it did not proceed expeditiously enough to satisfy the systematic exterminators, who wished promptly, and at any cost, to get rid of all their prisoners. It still observed some forms; these were suppressed. "All tardiness," said Couthon, "is a crime, all indulgent formality a public danger; there should be no longer delay in punishing the enemies of the state than suffices to recognize them." Hitherto the prisoners had counsel; they had them no longer. The law furnishes patriot jurymen for the defense of calumniated patriots; it grants none to conspirators. They tried them, at first, individually; now they tried them *en masse*. There had been some precision in the crimes even when revolutionary; now all the enemies of the people were declared guilty, and all were pronounced enemies of the people

who sought to destroy liberty by force or stratagem. The jury before had the law to guide their determination; they now only had their conscience. A single tribunal, Fouquier-Tinville, and a few jurymen were not sufficient for the increase of victims the new law threatened to bring before it: the tribunal was divided into four sections, the number of judges and juries was increased, and the public accuser had four substitutes appointed to assist him. Lastly, the deputies of the people could not before be brought to trial without a decree of the convention; but the law was now so drawn up that they could be tried on an order from the committees. The law respecting suspected persons gave rise to that of Prairial.

As soon as Couthon had made his report a murmur of astonishment and alarm pervaded the assembly. "If this law passes," cried Ruamps, "all we have to do is to blow our brains out. I demand an adjournment." This motion was supported; but Robespierre ascended the tribunal. "For a long time," said he, "the national assembly has been accustomed to discuss and decree at the same time, because it has long been delivered from the thralldom of faction. I move that without considering the question of adjournment, the convention debate, till eight in the evening, if necessary, on the proposed law." The discussion was immediately begun, and in thirty minutes after the second reading, the decree was carried. But the following day a few members, more afraid of the law than of the committee, returned to the debate of the day before. The Mountaineers, the friends of Danton, fearing, for their own sakes, the new provisions, which left the representatives at the mercy of the Decemvirs, proposed to the convention to provide for the safety of its members. Bourdon de l'Oise was the first to speak on this subject; he was supported. Merlin, by a skillful amendment, restored the old safeguard of the conventionalists, and the assembly adopted Merlin's measure. Gradually objections were made to the decree; the courage of the Mountaineers increased and the discussion became very animated. Couthon attacked the Mountaineers. "Let them know," replied Bourdon de l'Oise—"let the members of the committee know that if they are patriots, we are patriots too. Let them know that I shall not reply with bitterness to their reproaches. I esteem Couthon, I esteem the committee; but I also esteem the unshaken Mountain which has saved our liberty." Robespierre, surprised at this unexpected resistance, hurried to the tribune. "The conven-

tion," said he, "the Mountain, and the committee are the same thing! Every representative of the people who sincerely loves liberty, every representative of the people who is ready to die for his country, belongs to the Mountain! We should insult our country, assassinate the people, did we allow a few intriguing persons, more contemptible than others, because they are more hypocritical, to draw off a portion of the Mountain and make themselves the leaders of a party." "It never was my intention," said Bourdon, "to make myself leader of a party." "It would be the height of opprobrium," continued Robespierre, "if a few of our colleagues, led away by calumny respecting our intentions and the object of our labors. . . ." "I insist on your proving what you assert," rejoined Bourdon. "I have been very plainly called a scoundrel." "I did not name Bourdon. Woe to the man who names himself! Yes, the Mountain is pure, it is sublime; intriguers do not belong to the Mountain!" "Name them!" "I will name them when it is necessary." The threats and the imperious tone of Robespierre, the support of the other Decemvirs, and the feeling of fear which went round caused profound silence. The amendment of Merlin was revoked as insulting to the committee of public safety, and the whole law was adopted.

From the day of the 22d Prairial until the 9th Thermidor—June 11-July 27—there were 1366 executions, or 31 *per diem*. This was much the highest average. From 13 per month before November, 1793, it rose to 65 from thence till February, 1794; during March and April the average was 135; between April 20 and June 10 there were 636 executions.

During the course of the revolution the number of small proprietors, already more considerable in France under the ancient régime than elsewhere in Europe, was much increased. Among the causes which favored this movement may be enumerated the abolition of feudal rights, the abolition of the tithes, the suppression of the taille and other reforms in taxation, the sale of the property confiscated from the emigrants, and above all the sale of the land of the clergy. It was this class which suffered most in the last days of the terror.

But the end of this system drew near. The sittings of Prairial were the end of union for the members of the committees. From that time silent dissensions existed among them. They had advanced together, so long as they had to contend together; but

this ceased to be the case when they found themselves alone in the arena, with habits of contest and the desire for dominion. Moreover, their opinions were no longer entirely the same: the democratic party were divided by the fall of the old commune; Billaud-Varrennes, Collot d'Herbois, and the principal members of the committee of general safety, Vadier, Amar, Vouland, clung to this overthrown faction, and preferred the worship of Reason to that of the Supreme Being. They were also jealous of the fame and anxious at the power of Robespierre, who, in his turn, was irritated at their secret disapprobation and the obstacles they opposed to his will. At this period the latter conceived the design of putting down the most enterprising members of the Mountain, Tallien, Bourdon Legendre, Fréron, Rovère, and his rivals of the committee.

Robespierre had a prodigious force at his disposal; the common people, who considered the revolution as depending on him, supported him as the representative of its doctrines and interests; the armed force of Paris, commanded by Henriot, was at his command. He had entire sway over the Jacobins, whom he admitted and ejected at pleasure; all important posts were occupied by his creatures; he had formed the revolutionary tribunal and the new committee himself, substituting Payan, the national agent, for Chaumette, the attorney-general, and Henriot for Pache, in the office of mayor. But what was his design in granting the most influential places to new men, and in separating himself from the committees? Did he aspire to the dictatorship? did he only seek to establish his democracy of virtue by the ruin of the remaining immoral Mountaineers, and the factious of the committee? Each party had lost its leaders; the Gironde had lost the twenty-two; the commune, Hébert, Chaumette, and Ronsin; the Mountain, Danton, Chabot, Lacroix, and Camille Desmoulins. But while thus proscribing the leaders, Robespierre had carefully protected the sects. He had defended the seventy-three prisoners against the denunciations of the Jacobins and the hatred of the committees; he had placed himself at the head of the new commune; he had no longer reason to fear opposition to his projects, whatever they might be, except from a few Mountaineers and the members of the conventional government. It was against this double obstacle that he directed his efforts during the last moments of his career. It is probable that he did not separate the republic from

his protectorate, and that he thought to establish both on the overthrow of the other parties.

The committees opposed Robespierre in their own way. They secretly strove to bring about his fall by accusing him of tyranny; they caused the establishment of his religion to be considered as the presage of his usurpation; they recalled the haughty attitude he assumed on the 20th Prairial, and the distance at which he kept even the national convention. Among themselves they called him Pisistratus, and this name already passed from mouth to mouth. A circumstance, insignificant enough at any other time, gave them an opportunity of attacking him indirectly. An old woman, called Catherine Theot, played the prophetess in an obscure habitation, surrounded by a few mystic sectaries; they styled her the Mother of God, and she announced the immediate coming of a Messiah. Among her followers there was an old associate of Robespierre in the constituent assembly, the Chartreux dom Gerle, who had a civic certificate from Robespierre himself. When the committees discovered the mysteries of the Mother of God, and her predictions, they believed or pretended to believe that Robespierre made use of her instrumentality to gain over the fanatics, or to announce his elevation. They altered her name of Theot into that of Theos, signifying God; and they craftily insinuated that Robespierre was the Messiah she announced. The aged Vadier, in the name of the committee of general safety, was deputed to bring forward a motion against this new sect. He was vain and subtle; he denounced those who were initiated into these mysteries, turned the worship into derision, implicated Robespierre in it without naming him, and had the fanatics sent to prison. Robespierre wished to save them. The conduct of the committee of general safety greatly irritated him, and in the Jacobin Club he spoke of the speech of Vadier with contempt and anger. He experienced fresh opposition from the committee of public safety, which refused to proceed against the persons he pointed out to them. From that time he ceased to join his colleagues in the government, and was rarely present at the sittings of the convention. But he attended the Jacobins regularly; and from the tribune of that club he hoped to overthrow his enemies as he had hitherto done.

Naturally sad, suspicious, and timid, he became more melancholy and mistrustful than ever. He never went out without being

accompanied by several Jacobins armed with sticks, who were called his body-guard. He soon commenced his denunciations in the popular assembly. "All corrupt men," said he, "must be expelled the convention." This was designating the friends of Danton. Robespierre had them watched with the most minute anxiety. Every day spies followed all their motions, observing their actions, haunts, and conversation. Robespierre not only attacked the Dantonists at the Jacobins; he even arose against the committee itself, and for that purpose he chose a day when Barrère presided in the popular assembly. At the close of the sitting the latter returned home discouraged. "I am disgusted with men," said he to Villate. "What could be his motive for attacking you?" inquired the other. "Robespierre is insatiable," rejoined Barrère; "because we will not do all he wishes, he must break with us. If he talked to us about Thuriot, Guffroi, Rovère, Lecointre, Panis, Cambon, Monestier, and the rest of the Dantonists, we might agree with him; let him even require Tallien, Bourdon de l'Oise, Legendre, Fréron, well; but Duval, Audoin, Leonard Bourdon, Vadier, Vouland—it is impossible to consent." To give up members of the committee of general safety was to expose themselves; accordingly, while fearing, they firmly awaited the attack. Robespierre was very formidable, with respect to his power, his hatred, and his designs; it was for him to begin the combat.

But how could he set about it? For the first time he was the author of a conspiracy; hitherto he had taken advantage of all popular movements. Danton, the Cordeliers, and the faubourgs had made the insurrection of August 10 against the throne; Marat, the Mountain, and the commune had made that of May 31 against the Gironde; Billaud, Saint-Just, and the committees had effected the ruin of the commune and weakened the Mountain. Robespierre remained alone. Unable to procure assistance from the government, since he had declared against the committees, he had recourse to the populace and the Jacobins. The principal conspirators were Saint-Just and Couthon in the committee; Fleuriot, the mayor, and Payan, the national agent, in the commune; Dumas, the president, and Coffinhal, the vice-president, in the revolutionary tribunal; Henriot, the commander of the armed force, and the popular society. On the 15th Messidor, three weeks after the law of Prairial and twenty-four days before the 9th Ther-

midor, the resolution was already taken; at that time and under that date Henriot wrote to the mayor: "You shall be satisfied with me, comrade, and with the way in which I shall proceed; trust me, men who love their country easily agree in directing all their steps to the benefit of public affairs. I would have wished, and I do wish, that the secret of the operation rested with us two; the wicked should know nothing of it. Health and brotherhood."

Saint-Just was on a mission to the army of the north; Robespierre hastily recalled him. While waiting his return he prepared the public mind at the Jacobins. In the sitting of the 3d Thermidor he complained of the conduct of the committees, and of the persecution of the patriots, whom he swore to defend. "There must be no longer traces of crime or faction," said he, "in any place whatever. A few scoundrels disgrace the convention; but it will not allow itself to be swayed by them." He then urged his colleagues, the Jacobins, to present their reflections to the national assembly. This was the transaction of May 31. On the 4th he received a deputation from the department of the Aisne, who came to complain to him of the operations of the government, to which, for a month past, he had been a stranger. "The convention," said Robespierre, in his reply to the deputation, "in the situation in which it now stands, gangrened by corruption, and being wholly unable to recover itself, cannot save the republic—both must perish. The proscription of patriots is the order of the day. As for me, I have one foot in the tomb; in a few days the other will follow it. The rest is in the hands of Providence." He was then slightly indisposed, and he purposely exaggerated his discouragement, his fears, and the dangers of the republic in order to inflame the patriots, and again bind the fate of the revolution with his own.

In the meantime Saint-Just arrived from the army. He ascertained the state of affairs from Robespierre. He presented himself to the committees, the members of which received him coldly; every time he entered they ceased to deliberate. Saint-Just, who, from their silence, a few chance words, and the expression of perplexity or hostility on their countenances, saw there was no time to be lost, pressed Robespierre to act. His maxim was to strike at once, and resolutely. "Dare," said he, "that is the secret of revolutions." But he wished to prevail on Robespierre to take a measure, which was impossible, by urging him to strike his foes without apprising them. The force at his disposal was a force of

revolutionary opinion, and not an organized force. It was necessary for him to seek the assistance of the convention or of the commune, the legal authority of government, or the extraordinary authority of insurrection. Such was the custom, and such must be all *coups d'état*. They could not even have recourse to insurrection until after they had received the refusal of the assembly; otherwise a pretext was wanting for the rising. Robespierre was therefore obliged to commence the attack in the convention itself. He hoped to obtain everything from it by his ascendancy, or if contrary to its custom it resisted, he reckoned on the people, urged by the commune, rising on the 9th Thermidor against the proscribed of the Mountain, and the committee of public safety, as it had risen on May 31 against the proscribed of the Gironde and the commission of twelve. It is almost always by the past that man regulates his conduct and his hopes.

On the 8th Thermidor he entered the convention at an early hour. He ascended the tribunal and denounced the committee in a most skillful speech. "I am come," said he, "to defend before you your authority insulted, and liberty violated. I will also defend myself; you will not be surprised at this; you do not resemble the tyrants you contend with. The cries of outraged innocence do not importune your ears, and you know that this cause is not foreign to your interests." After this opening he complained of those who had calumniated him; he attacked those who sought the ruin of the republic, either by excesses or moderation; those who persecuted pacific citizens, meaning the committees, and those who persecuted true patriots, meaning the Mountaineers. He associated himself with the intentions, past conduct, and spirit of the convention; he added that its enemies were his: "What have I done to merit persecution, if it entered not into the general system of their conspiracy against the convention? Have you not observed that, to isolate you from the nation, they have given out that you are dictators, reigning by means of terror, and disavowed by the silent wishes of all Frenchmen? For myself, what faction do I belong to? to yourselves. What is that faction that, from the beginning of the revolution, has overthrown all factions and got rid of acknowledged traitors? It is you, it is the people, it is principles. That is the faction to which I am devoted, and against which all crimes are leagued. For at least six weeks my inability to do good and to check evil has obliged me absolutely to renounce

my functions as a member of the committee of public safety. Has patriotism been better protected? have factions been more timid? or the country more happy? At all times my influence has been confined to pleading the cause of my country before the national representation and at the tribunal of public opinion." After having attempted to confound his cause with that of the convention, he tried to excite it against the committees by dwelling on the idea of its independence. "Representatives of the people," said he, "it is time to resume the pride and elevation of character which befits you. You are not made to be ruled, but to rule the depositaries of your confidence."

While he thus endeavored to tempt the assembly by the return of its power and the end of its slavery, he addressed the moderate party by reminding them that they were indebted to him for the lives of the seventy-three, and by holding forth hopes of returning order, justice, and clemency. He spoke of changing the devouring and trickster system of finance, of softening the revolutionary government, of guiding its influence, and punishing its prevaricating agents. Lastly, he invoked the people, talked of their necessities, and of their power. And when he had recalled all that could act upon the interests, hopes, or fears of the convention, he added: "We say, then, that there exists a conspiracy against public liberty; that it owes its strength to a criminal coalition which intrigues in the very heart of the convention; that this coalition has accomplices in the committee of general safety; that the enemies of the republic have opposed this committee to the committee of public safety, and have thus constituted two governments; that members of the committee of public safety are concerned in this plot; that the coalition thus formed seeks the ruin both of patriots and of the country. What remedy is there for this evil? Punish the traitors; compose anew the committee of general safety; purify this committee, and make it subordinate to the committee of public safety; purify the latter committee itself; constitute the unity of the government under the supreme authority of the convention; crush every faction under the weight of national authority, and establish on their ruins the power of justice and liberty."

Not a murmur, not a mark of applause welcomed this declaration of war. The silence with which Robespierre was heard continued long after he had ceased speaking. Anxious looks were exchanged in all parts of the doubting assembly. At length Le-

cointre of Versailles arose and proposed that the speech should be printed. This motion was the signal for agitation, discussion, and resistance. Bourdon de l'Oise opposed the motion for printing the speech as a dangerous measure. He was applauded. But Barrère, in his ambiguous manner, having maintained that all speeches ought to be published, and Couthon having moved that it should be sent to all the communes of the republic, the convention, intimidated by this apparent concord of the two opposite factions, decreed both the printing and circulation of the speech.

The members of the two committees thus attacked, who had hitherto remained silent, seeing the Mountain thwarted and the majority undecided, thought it time to speak. Vadier first opposed Robespierre's speech and Robespierre himself. Cambon went further. "It is time," he cried, "to speak the whole truth: one man paralyzed the resolution of the national assembly; that man is Robespierre." "The mask must be torn off," added Billaud-Varennès, "whatever face it may cover; I would rather my corpse should serve an ambitious man for his throne than by my silence to become the accomplice of his crimes." Panis, Bentaïole, Charlier, Thirion, Amar, attacked him in turn. Fréron proposed to the convention to throw off the fatal yoke of the committees. "The time is come," said he, "to revive liberty of opinion; I move that the assembly revoke the decree which gives the committee power to arrest the representatives of the people. Who can speak freely while he fears an arrest?" Some applause was heard; but the moment for the entire deliverance of the convention was not yet arrived. It was necessary to contend with Robespierre from behind the committees, in order subsequently to attack the committees more easily. Fréron's motion was accordingly rejected. "The man who is prevented by fear from delivering his opinion," said Billaud-Varennès, looking at him, "is not worthy the title of a representative of the people." Attention was again drawn to Robespierre. The decree ordering his speech to be printed was recalled, and the convention submitted the speech to the examination of the committees. Robespierre, who had been surprised at this fiery resistance, then said: "What! I had the courage to place before the assembly truths which I think necessary to the safety of the country, and you send my discourse for the examination of the members whom I accuse." He retired, a little discouraged, but hoping to bring back the assembly to his views, or rather, bring

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it into subjection, with the aid of the conspirators of the Jacobins and the commune.

In the evening he repaired to the popular society. He was received with enthusiasm. He read the speech which the assembly had just condemned, and the Jacobins loaded him with applause. He then recounted to them the attacks which had been directed against him, and to increase their excitement he added: "If necessary, I am ready to drink the cup of Socrates." "Robespierre," cried a deputy, "I will drink it with you." "The enemies of Robespierre," cried numbers on all sides, "are the enemies of the country; let them be named and they shall cease to live." During the whole night Robespierre prepared his partisans for the following day. It was agreed that they should assemble at the commune and the Jacobins, in order to be ready for every event, while he, accompanied by his friends, repaired to the assembly.

The committees had also spent the night in deliberation. Saint-Just had appeared among them. His colleagues tried to disunite him from the triumvirate; they deputed him to draw up a report on the events of the preceding day and submit it to them. But instead of that, he drew up an act of accusation, which he would not communicate to them, and said, as he withdrew: "You have withered my heart; I am going to open it to the convention." The committees placed all their hope in the courage of the assembly and the union of parties. The Mountain had omitted nothing to bring about this salutary agreement. They had addressed themselves to the most influential members of the Right and of the Marsh. They had entreated Boissy d'Anglas and Durand Mailane, who were at their head, to join them against Robespierre. They hesitated at first: they were so alarmed at his power, so full of resentment against the Mountain, that they dismissed the Dantonists twice without listening to them. At last the Dantonists returned to the charge a third time, and then the Right and the Plain engaged to support them. There was thus a conspiracy on both sides. All the parties of the assembly were united against Robespierre, all the accomplices of the triumvirs were prepared to act against the convention. In this state of affairs the sitting of the 9th Thermidor began.

The members of the assembly repaired there earlier than usual. About half-past eleven they gathered in the passages, encouraging each other. The Mountaineer Bourdon de l'Oise approaching Du-

rand-Maillane, a moderate, pressed his hand, and said: "The people of the Right are excellent men." Rovère and Tallien came up and mingled their congratulations with those of Bourdon. At twelve they saw, from the door of the hall, Saint-Just ascend the tribune. "Now is the time," said Tallien, and they entered the hall. Robespierre occupied a seat in front of the tribune, doubtless in order to intimidate his adversaries with his looks. Saint-Just began: "I belong," he said, "to no faction; I will oppose them all. The course of things has perhaps made this tribune the Tarpeian rock for him who shall tell you that the members of the government have quitted the path of prudence." Tallien then interrupted Saint-Just and exclaimed violently: "No good citizen can restrain his tears at the wretched state of public affairs. We see nothing but divisions. Yesterday a member of the government separated himself from it to accuse it. To-day another does the same. Men still seek to attack each other, to increase the woes of the country, to precipitate it into the abyss. Let the veil be wholly torn asunder." "It must! it must!" resounded on every side.

Billaud-Varennes spoke from his seat. "Yesterday," said he, "the society of Jacobins was filled with hired men, for no one had a card; yesterday the design of assassinating the members of the national assembly was developed in that society; yesterday I saw men uttering the most atrocious insults against those who have never deviated from the revolution. I see on the Mountain one of those men who threatened the republic; there he is." "Arrest him! arrest him!" was the general cry. The sergeant seized him and took him to the committee of general safety. "The time is come for speaking the truth," said Billaud. "The assembly would form a wrong judgment of events and of the position in which it is placed, did it conceal from itself that it is placed between two massacres. It will perish, if feeble." "No! no! It will not perish!" exclaimed all the members, rising from their seats. They swore to save the republic. The spectators in the gallery applauded, and cried: "*Vive la convention nationale!*" The impetuous Lebas attempted to speak in defense of the triumvirs; he was not allowed to do so, and Billaud continued. He warned the convention of its dangers, attacked Robespierre, pointed out his accomplices, denounced his conduct and his plans of dictatorship. All eyes were directed toward him. He faced them firmly for some time; but

at length, unable to contain himself, he rushed to the tribune. The cry of "Down with the tyrant" instantly became general, and drowned his voice.

"Just now," said Tallien, "I required that the veil should be torn asunder. It gives me pleasure to see that it is wholly sundered. The conspirators are unmasked; they will soon be destroyed, and liberty will triumph. I was present yesterday at the sitting of the Jacobins; I trembled for my country. I saw the army of this new Cromwell forming, and I armed myself with a poignard to stab him to the heart if the national convention wanted courage to decree his impeachment." He drew out his poignard, brandished it before the indignant assembly, and moved, before anything else, the arrest of Henriot, and the permanent sitting of the assembly. Both motions were carried in the midst of cries of "*Vive la république!*" Billaud also moved the arrest of three of Robespierre's most daring accomplices, Dumas, Boulanger, and Dufrèse. Barrère caused the convention to be placed under the guard of the armed sections, and drew up a proclamation to be addressed to the people. Everyone proposed a measure of precaution. Vadier diverted the assembly for a moment from the danger which threatened it, to the affair of Catherine Theos. "Let us not be diverted from the true object of debate," said Tallien. "I will undertake to bring you back to it," said Robespierre. "Let us turn our attention to the tyrant," rejoined Tallien, attacking him more warmly than before.

Robespierre, after attempting to speak several times, ascending and descending the stairs of the tribune, while his voice was drowned by cries of "Down with the tyrant!" and the bell which the president, Thuriot, continued ringing, now made a last effort to be heard. "President of assassins," he cried, "for the last time, will you let me speak?" But Thuriot continued to ring his bell. Robespierre, after glancing at the spectators in the public gallery, who remained motionless, turned toward the Right. "Pure and virtuous men," said he, "I have recourse to you; give me the hearing which the assassins refuse." No answer was returned; profound silence prevailed. Then, wholly dejected, he returned to his place and sank on his seat exhausted by fatigue and rage. He foamed at the mouth and his utterance was choked. "Wretch!" said one of the Mountain, "the blood of Danton chokes thee." His arrest was demanded and supported on all sides. Young Robes-

pierre now arose. "I am as guilty as my brother," said he. "I share his virtues and I will share his fate." "I will not be involved in the opprobrium of this decree," added Lebas; "I demand my arrest too." The assembly unanimously decreed the arrest of the two Robespierres, Couthon, Lebas, and Saint-Just. The latter, after standing for some time at the tribune with unchanged countenance, descended with composure to his place. He had faced this protracted storm without any show of agitation. The triumvirs were delivered to the gendarmerie, who removed them amid general applause. Robespierre exclaimed as he went out: "The republic is lost, the brigands triumph." It was now half-past five, and the sitting was suspended till seven.

During this stormy contest the accomplices of the triumvirs had assembled at the commune and the Jacobins. Fleuriot, the mayor, Payan, the national agent, and Henriot, the commandant, had been at the Hôtel de Ville since noon. They had assembled the municipal officers by the sound of the drum, hoping that Robespierre would be triumphant in the assembly, and that they should not require the general council to decree the insurrection or the sections to sustain it. A few hours after a sergeant of the convention arrived to summon the mayor to the bar of the assembly, to give a report of the state of Paris. "Go, and tell your scoundrels," said Henriot, "that we are discussing how to purge them. Do not forget to tell Robespierre to be firm, and to fear nothing." About half-past four they learned the arrest of the triumvirs and the decree against their accomplices. The tocsin was immediately sounded, the barriers closed, the general council assembled, and the sectionaries called together. The cannoneers were ordered to bring their pieces to the commune, and the revolutionary committees to take the oath of insurrection. A message was sent to the Jacobins, who sat permanently. The municipal deputies were received with the greatest enthusiasm. "The society watches over the country," they were told. "It has sworn to die rather than live under crime." At the same time they concerted together and established rapid communications between these two centers of the insurrection. Henriot, on his side, to arouse the people, ran through the streets, pistol in hand, at the head of his staff, crying "To arms!" haranguing the multitude and instigating all he met to repair to the commune to save the country. While on this errand two members of the convention perceived him in the Rue Saint

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Honoré. They summoned, in the name of the law, a few gendarmes to execute the order for his arrest; they obeyed, and Henriot was pinioned and conveyed to the committee of general safety.

Nothing, however, was decided as yet on either side. Each party made use of its means of power; the convention of its decrees, the commune of the insurrection; each party knew what would be the consequences of defeat, and this rendered them both so active, so full of foresight and decision. Success was long uncertain. From noon till five the convention had the upper hand; it caused the arrest of the triumvirs, Payan, the national agent, and Henriot, the commandant. It was already assembled, and the commune had not yet collected its forces; but from six to eight the insurgents regained their position, and the cause of the convention was nearly lost. During this interval the national representatives had separated, and the commune had redoubled its efforts and audacity.

Robespierre had been transferred to the Luxembourg, his brother to Saint Lazare, Saint-Just to the Ecossais, Couthon to La Bourbe, Lebas to the Conciergerie. The commune, after having ordered the jailors not to receive them, sent municipal officers with detachments to bring them away. Robespierre was liberated first, and conducted in triumph to the Hôtel de Ville. On arriving he was received with the greatest enthusiasm: "Long live Robespierre!" "Down with the traitors!" resounded on all sides. A little before Coffinhal had departed, at the head of two hundred cannoneers, to release Henriot, who was detained at the committee of general safety. It was now seven o'clock, and the convention had resumed its sitting. Its guard, at the most, was a hundred men. Coffinhal arrived, made his way through the outer courts, entered the committee chamber, and delivered Henriot. The latter repaired to the Place du Carrousel, harangued the cannoneers, and ordered them to point their pieces on the convention.

The assembly was just then discussing the danger to which it was exposed. It had just heard of the alarming success of the conspirators, of the insurrectional orders of the commune, the rescue of the triumvirs, their presence at the Hôtel de Ville, the rage of the Jacobins, the successive convocation of the revolutionary council and of the sections. It was dreading a violent invasion every moment, when the terrified members of the committees rushed in,

fleeing from Coffinhal. They learned that the committees were surrounded and Henriot released. This news caused great agitation. The next moment Amar entered precipitately, and announced that the cannoneers, acted upon by Henriot, had turned their pieces upon the convention. "Citizens," said the president, putting on his hat, in token of distress, "the hour is come to die at our posts!" "Yes, yes! we will die there!" exclaimed all the members. The people in the galleries rushed out, crying: "To arms! Let us drive back the scoundrels!" And the assembly courageously outlawed Henriot.

Fortunately for the assembly, Henriot could not prevail upon the cannoneers to fire. His influence was limited to inducing them to accompany him, and he turned his steps to the Hôtel de Ville. The refusal of the cannoneers decided the fate of the day. From that moment the commune, which had been on the point of triumphing, saw its affairs decline. Having failed in a surprise by main force, it was reduced to the slow measures of the insurrection; the point of attack was changed, and soon it was no longer the commune which besieged the Tuileries, but the convention which marched upon the Hôtel de Ville. The assembly instantly outlawed the conspiring deputies and the insurgent commune. It sent commissioners to the sections to secure their aid; named the representative Barras commandant of the armed force, joining with him Fréron, Rouvère, Bourdon de l'Oise, Feraud, Leonard Bourdon, Legendre, all men of decision; and made the committees the center of operation.

The sections, on the invitation of the commune, had assembled about nine o'clock; the greater part of the citizens, in repairing thither, were anxious, uncertain, and but vaguely informed of the quarrels between the commune and the convention. The emissaries of the insurgents urged them to join them, and to march their battalions to the Hôtel de Ville. The sections confined themselves to sending a deputation; but as soon as the commissioners of the convention arrived among them had communicated to them the decrees and invitations of the assembly, and informed them that there was a leader and a rallying point, they hesitated no longer. Their battalions presented themselves in succession to the assembly; they swore to defend it, and they passed in files through the hall amid shouts of enthusiasm and sincere applause. "The moments are precious," said Fréron; "we must act; Barras is gone to take

orders of the committees; we will march against the rebels; we will summon them in the name of the convention to deliver up the traitors, and if they refuse, we will reduce the building in which they are to ashes." "Go," said the president, "and let not day appear before the heads of the conspirators have fallen." A few battalions and some pieces of artillery were placed around the assembly, to guard it from attack, and the sections then marched in two columns against the commune. It was now nearly midnight.

The conspirators were still assembled. Robespierre, after having been received with cries of enthusiasm, promises of devotedness and victory, had been admitted into the general council between Payan and Fleuriot. The Place de Grève was filled with men, and glittered with bayonets, pikes, and cannon. They waited only the arrival of the sections to proceed to action. The presence of their deputies and the sending of municipal commissioners among them had inspired reliance on their aid. Henriot answered for everything. The conspirators looked for certain victory; they appointed an executive commission, prepared addresses to the armies, and drew up various lists. Half-past midnight, however, arrived, and no section had yet appeared, no order had yet been given, the triumvirs were still sitting, and the crowd on the Place de Grève became discouraged by this tardiness and indecision. A report spread in whispers that the sections had declared in favor of the convention, that the commune was outlawed, and that the conventional troops were advancing. The eagerness of the armed multitude had already abated, when a few emissaries of the assembly glided among them and raised the cry: "*Vive la convention!*" Several voices repeated it. They then read the proclamation of outlawry against the commune, and after hearing it the whole crowd dispersed. The Place de Grève was deserted in a moment. Henriot came down a few minutes after, saber in hand, to excite their courage; but finding no one, cried, "What! is it possible? Those rascals of cannoneers, who saved my life five hours ago, now forsake me." He went up again. At that moment the columns of the convention arrived, surrounded the Hôtel de Ville, silently took possession of all its outlets, and then shouted: "*Vive la convention nationale!*" The conspirators, finding they were lost, sought to escape the violence of their enemies by committing violence on themselves. Robespierre shattered his jaw with a

pistol-shot;² Lebas followed his example, but succeeded in killing himself; Robespierre the younger jumped from a window on the third story, but survived the fall; Couthon hid himself under a table; Saint-Just awaited his fate; Coffinhal, after reproaching Henriot with cowardice, threw him from a window into a gutter and fled. Meantime the conventionalists penetrated into the Hôtel de Ville, traversed the desolate halls, seized the conspirators, and carried them in triumph to the assembly. Bourdon entered the hall crying "Victory! victory! the traitors are no more!" "The wretched Robespierre is there," said the president; "they are bringing him on a litter. Doubtless you would not have him brought in." "No! no!" they cried; "carry him to the Place de la Révolution!" He was deposited for some time at the committee of general safety before he was transferred to the Conciergerie; and here, stretched on a table, his face disfigured and bloody, exposed to the looks, the invectives, the curses of all, he beheld the various parties exulting in his fall, and charging upon him all the crimes that had been committed. He displayed much insensibility during his last moments. He was taken to the Conciergerie, and afterward appeared before the revolutionary tribunal, which, after identifying him and his accomplices, sent them to the scaffold. On the 10th Thermidor, about five in the evening, he ascended the death cart, placed between Henriot and Couthon, mutilated like himself. His head was enveloped in linen saturated with blood; his face was livid, his eyes almost visionless. An immense crowd thronged around the cart, manifesting the most boisterous and exultant joy. They congratulated and embraced each other, loading him with imprecations, and pressed near to view him more closely. The gendarmes pointed him out with their sabers. As to him, he seemed to regard the crowd with contemptuous pity; Saint-Just looked calmly at them; the rest, in number

² This is the usual statement but it is a controverted question whether Robespierre shot himself or was shot by Méda. A more responsible opinion would seem to be that he was shot by Méda as the latter entered the room. See Belloc's "Robespierre," especially note iii, in the appendix, where all the evidence on both sides is summarized. Yet Professor J. R. Moreton-Macdonald in the volume on "The French Revolution" in the Cambridge Modern History series, who is the latest writer of eminence upon this subject, says, p. 371: "Robespierre's jaw was shattered by a pistol shot, whether self-inflicted, or the work of a certain Méda, who afterwards claimed the honor, has never been decided." May not Robespierre have tried to shoot one of his associates and bungled, or else the pistol was struck up?

twenty-two, were dejected. Robespierre ascended the scaffold last; when his head fell shouts of applause arose in the air and lasted for some minutes.

With him ended the reign of terror, although he was not the most zealous advocate of that system in his party. If he sought for supremacy, after obtaining it he would have employed moderation; and the reign of terror, which ceased at his fall, would also have ceased with his triumph. I regard his ruin to have been inevitable; he had no organized force; his partisans, though numerous, were not enrolled; his instrument was the force of opinion and of terror; accordingly, not being able to surprise his foes by a strong hand, after the fashion of Cromwell, he sought to intimidate them. Terror not succeeding, he tried insurrection. But as the convention, with the support of the committees, had become courageous, so the section, relying on the courage of the convention, would naturally declare against the insurgents. By attacking the government, he aroused the assembly; by arousing the assembly, he aroused the people; and this coalition necessarily ruined him. The convention on the 9th Thermidor was no longer, as on May 31, divided, undecided, opposed to a compact, numerous, and daring faction. All parties were united by defeat, misfortune, and the proscription ever threatening them, and would naturally become allied in the event of a struggle. It did not, therefore, depend on Robespierre to escape defeat. As little was it in his power to secede from the committees.³ At the point he had attained, one wishes to be sole; one is consumed by one's passions, deceived by one's hopes, and by one's fortune, hitherto successful: and war once declared, peace, repose, the partition of power, are as impossible as justice and clemency when the scaffolds have once been erected. One must then fall by the means by which one has arisen; the man of action must perish by the scaffold, as the conqueror by war.

³ The progress of events from the fall of Danton to the death of Robespierre has been called the "labyrinth of the revolution." No other period is so intricate. Even the actual sequence of events on the 8th and 9th Thermidor is still a debated question. The best authority for the period is Héricault, "*La Révolution de Thermidor*," Paris, 1878. Add Vilate, "*Causes secrètes de la Révolution du IX^e Thermidor*"; Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. IV. pp. 51 ff.; Wallon, "*Le Tribunal révolutionnaire*," vol. V. pp. 179-220; Hamel, "Robespierre," pp. 744-803, is too partisan to be trustworthy. The notes to Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. VI. ch. vi., are valuable.

Chapter XII

THE THERMIDORIAN REACTION.

JULY 28, 1794-MAY 20, 1795

THE 9th Thermidor was the first day of the revolution in which those fell who attacked. This indication alone manifested that the ascendant revolutionary movement had reached its term. From that day the contrary movement necessarily began. The general rising of all parties against one man was calculated to put an end to the compression under which they labored. In Robespierre the committees subdued each other, and the decemviral government lost the prestige of terror which had constituted its strength. The committees liberated the convention, which gradually liberated the entire republic. Yet they thought they had been working for themselves, and for the prolongation of the revolutionary government, while the greater part of those who had supported them had for their object the overthrow of the dictatorship, the independence of the assembly, and the establishment of legal order. From the day after the 9th Thermidor there were, therefore, two opposite parties among the conquerors, that of the committees and that of the Mountain, which was called the Thermidorian party.

The former was deprived of half its forces; besides the loss of its chief, it no longer had the commune, whose insurgent members, to the number of seventy-two, had been sent to the scaffold, and which, after its double defeat under Hébert and under Robespierre, was not again reorganized, and remained without direct influence. But this party retained the direction of affairs through the committees. All its members were attached to the revolutionary system; some, such as Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois, Barrère, Vadier, Amar, saw it was their only safety; others, such as Carnot, Cambon, and the Prieurs, feared the counter-revolution, and the punishment of their colleagues. In the convention it reckoned all the commissioners hitherto sent on missions, several of the Mountain who had signalized themselves on the 9th Thermidor,

and the remnant of Robespierre's party which was called the New Mountain, or more often Crétois (from *la crête*, top of a mountain). Without, the Jacobins were attached to it; and it still had the support of the faubourgs and of the lower class.

The Thermidorian party was composed of the greater number of the conventionalists. All the Center of the assembly, and what remained of the Right, joined the Mountain, who had abated their former exaggeration of views. The coalition of the Moderates, Boissy d'Anglas, Sieyès, Cambacérès, Chénier,¹ Thirbeaudeau, with the Dantonists, Tallien, Fréron, Legendre, Barras, Bourdon de l'Oise, Rovère, Bентаbole, Dumont, and the two Merlins, entirely changed the character of the assembly. After the 9th Thermidor the first step of this party was to secure its empire in the convention. Soon it found its way into the government, and succeeded in excluding the previous occupants. Sustained by public opinion, by the assembly, by the committees, it advanced openly toward its object; it proceeded against the principal Decemvirs and some of their agents. As these had many partisans in Paris, it sought the aid of the young men against the Jacobins, of the sections against the faubourgs. At the same time to strengthen it it recalled to the assembly all the deputies whom the committee of public safety had proscribed: first, the seventy-three who had protested against May 31, and then the surviving victims of that day themselves. The Jacobins exhibited excitement: it closed their club; the faubourgs raised an insurrection: it disarmed them. After overthrowing the revolutionary government it directed its attention to the establishment of another, and to the introduction, under the constitution of the Year III., of a feasible, liberal, regular, and stable order of things, in place of the extraordinary and provisional state in which the convention had been from its commencement until then. But all this was accomplished gradually.

The two parties were not long before they began to differ, after their common victory. The revolutionary tribunal was an especial object of general horror. On the 11th Thermidor it was suspended; but Billaud-Varennes, in the same sitting, had the decree of suspension rescinded. He maintained that the accomplices of Robespierre alone were guilty, that the majority of the judges and jurors being men of integrity, it was desirable to retain them

¹ Marie-Joseph Chénier. His brother André, the poet, had been guillotined on 7th Thermidor.

in their offices. Barrère presented a decree to that effect: he urged that the triumvirs had done nothing for the revolutionary government; that they had often even opposed its measures; that their only care had been to place their creatures in it, and to give it a direction favorable to their own projects; he insisted, in order to strengthen that government, upon retaining the law of suspects and the tribunal, with its existing members, including Fouquier-Tinville. At this name a general murmur rose in the assembly. Fréron, rendering himself the organ of the general indignation, exclaimed: "I demand that the earth be, at length, delivered from that monster, and that Fouquier be sent to hell, there to wallow in the blood he has shed." His proposition was applauded, and Fouquier's accusation decreed.² Barrère, however, did not regard himself as defeated; he still retained toward the convention the imperious language which the old committee had made use of with success; this was at once habit and calculation on his part, for he well knew that nothing is so easily continued as that which has been successful.

But the political tergiversations of Barrère, a man of noble birth, and who was a royalist Feuillant before August 10, did not countenance his assuming this imperious and inflexible tone. "Who is this president of the Feuillants," said Merlin de Thionville, "who assumes to dictate to us the law?" The hall resounded with applause. Barrère became confused, left the tribune, and this first check of the committees indicated their decline in the convention. The revolutionary tribunal continued to exist, but with other members and another organization. The law of the 22d Prairial was abolished on August 1, 1794, and there were now as much deliberation and moderation, as many protecting forms in trials, as before there had been precipitation and inhumanity. This tribunal was no longer made use of against persons formerly suspected, who were still detained in prison, though under milder treatment, and who, by degrees, were restored to liberty on the plan proposed by Camille Desmoulins for his committee of clemency.

On the 13th Thermidor the government itself became the


² This is Mignet's original statement, but it is clear he is confused as to time. The revolutionary tribunal was about the last feature of the terror government to be abolished. Fouquier's trial was in the spring of 1795 (March 28-May 6). He and fifteen others were executed on May 7, and ten days later the tribunal's final sitting took place. It was legislated out of existence on the 31st.

subject of discussion. The committee of public safety was deficient in many members; Hérault de Séchelles had never been replaced; Jean-Bon-Saint-Andre and Prieur de la Marne were on missions; Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just had perished on the scaffold. In the places of these were appointed Tallien, Breard, Eschassériaux, Treilhard, Thuriot, and Laloï, whose accession lessened still more the influence of the old members. At the same time were reorganized the two committees, so as to render them more dependent on the assembly and less so on one another. The committee of public safety was charged with military and diplomatic operations; that of general safety with internal administration. As it was desired, by limiting the revolutionary power, to calm the fever which had excited the multitude, and gradually to disperse them, the daily meetings of the sections were reduced to one in every ten days; and the pay of forty sous a day, lately given to every indigent citizen who attended them, was discontinued.

These measures being carried into effect, on the 11th Fructidor, one month after the death of Robespierre, Lecointre of Versailles denounced Billaud, Collot, Barrère, of the committee of public safety; and Vadier, Amar, and Vouland, of the committee of general safety. The evening before Tallien had vehemently assailed the reign of terror, and Lecointre was encouraged to his attack by the sensation which Tallien's speech had produced. He brought twenty-three charges against the accused; he imputed to them all the measures of cruelty or tyranny which they threw on the triumvirs, and called them the successors of Robespierre. This denunciation agitated the assembly, and more especially those who supported the committees, or who wished that divisions might cease in the republic. "If the crimes Lecointre reproaches us with were proved," said Billaud-Varennes, "if they were as real as they are absurd and chimerical, there is, doubtless, not one of us but would deserve to lose his head on the scaffold. But I defy Lecointre to prove, by documents or any evidence worthy of belief, any of the facts he has charged us with." He repelled the charges brought against him by Lecointre; he reproached his enemies with being corrupt and intriguing men, who wished to sacrifice him to the memory of Danton, an odious conspirator, the hope of all parricidal factions. "What seek these men," he continued, "what seek these men who call us the successors of Robespierre? Citizens, know you what they seek? To destroy liberty

on the tomb of the tyrant." Lecointre's denunciation was premature; almost all the convention pronounced it calumnious. The accused and their friends gave way to outbursts of unrestrained and still powerful indignation, for they were now attacked for the first time; the accuser, scarcely supported by anyone, was silenced. Billaud-Varennes and his friends triumphed for the time.

A few days after, the period for renewing a third of the committee arrived. The following members were fixed on by lot to retire: Barrère, Carnot, Robert Lindet, in the committee of public safety; Vadier, Vouland, Moise Baile, in the committee of general safety. They were replaced by Thermidorians; and Collot d'Herbois, as well as Billaud-Varennes, finding themselves too weak, resigned. Another circumstance contributed still more to the fall of their party, by exciting public opinion against it; this was the publicity given to the crimes of Joseph Lebon and Carrier, two of the proconsuls of the committee. They had been sent, the one to Arras and to Cambrai, the frontier exposed to invasion; the other to Nantes, the limit of the Vendean war. They had signalized their mission by, beyond all others, displaying a cruelty and a caprice of tyranny, which are, however, generally found in those who are invested with supreme human power. Lebon, young and of a weak constitution, was naturally mild. On a first mission he had been humane; but he was censured for this by the committee, and sent to Arras, with orders to show himself somewhat more revolutionary. Not to fall short of the inexorable policy of the committee, he gave way to unheard of excesses; he mingled debauchery with extermination; he had the guillotine always in his presence, and called it holy. He associated with the executioner and admitted him to his table. Carrier, having more victims to strike, surpassed even Lebon; he was bilious, fanatical, and naturally blood-thirsty. He had only awaited the opportunity to execute enormities that the imagination even of Marat would not have dared to conceive. Sent to the borders of an insurgent country, he condemned to death the whole hostile population—priests, women, children, old men, and girls. As the scaffold did not suffice for his cruelty, he substituted a company of assassins, called Marat's company, for the revolutionary tribunal, and, for the guillotine, boats, with false bottoms, by means of which he drowned his victims in the Loire. Cries of vengeance and justice were raised against these enormities. After the 9th Thermidor Lebon was attacked first, because he was more



THE WOUNDED ROBESPIERRE IN THE HALL OF THE CONVENTION, 10TH THERMIDOR OF THE YEAR II (1794)

Painting by M. Lucien Mélingue

especially the agent of Robespierre. Carrier, who was that of the committee of public safety, and of whose conduct Robespierre had disapproved, was prosecuted subsequently.

There were in the prisons of Paris ninety-four people of Nantes, sincerely attached to the revolution and who had defended their town with courage during the attack made on it by the Vendéans. Carrier had sent them to Paris as federalists. It had not been deemed safe to bring them before the revolutionary tribunal until the 9th Thermidor; they were then taken there for the purpose of unmasking, by their trial, the crimes of Carrier. They were tried purposely with prolonged solemnity; their trial lasted nearly a month; there was time given for public opinion to declare itself; and on their acquittal there was a general demand for justice on the revolutionary committee of Nantes, and on the proconsul, Carrier. Legendre renewed Lecointre's impeachment of Billaud, Barrère, Collot, and Vadier, who were generously defended by Carnot, Prieur, and Cambon, their former colleagues, who demanded to share their fate. Lecointre's motion was not attended with any result; and, for the present, they only brought to trial the members of the revolutionary committee of Nantes; but we may observe the progress of the Thermidorian party. This time the members of the committee were obliged to have recourse to defense, and the convention simply passed to the order of the day, on the question of the denunciation made by Legendre, without voting it calumnious, as they had done that of Lecointre.

The revolutionary democrats were, however, still very powerful in Paris: if they had lost the commune, the tribunal, the convention, and the committee, they yet retained the Jacobins and the faubourgs. It was in these popular societies that their party concentrated, especially for the purpose of defending themselves. Carrier attended them assiduously and invoked their assistance; Billaud-Varennes, and Collot d'Herbois also resorted to them; but these, being somewhat less threatened, were circumspect. They were accordingly censured for their silence. "The lion sleeps," replied Billaud-Varennes, "but his waking will be terrible." This club had been expurgated after the 10th Thermidor, and it had congratulated the convention in the name of the regenerated societies on the fall of Robespierre and of tyranny. About this time, as many of its leaders were proceeded against and many Jacobins were imprisoned in the departments, it came in the name of the

united societies "to give utterance to the cry of grief that resounded from every part of the republic, and to the voice of oppressed patriots, plunged in the dungeons which the aristocrats had just left."

The convention, far from yielding to the Jacobins, prohibited, for the purpose of destroying their influence, all collective petitions, branch associations, and correspondence between the parent society and its offsets, and in this way disorganized the famous confederation of the clubs. The Jacobins, rejected from the convention, began to agitate Paris, where they were still masters. Then the Thermidorians also began to convoke their people by appealing to the support of the sections.³ At the same time Fréron called the young men to arms in his journal, *l'Orateur du Peuple*, and placed himself at their head. This new and irregular militia called itself *La jeunesse dorée de Fréron*. All those who composed it belonged to the rich and the middle class; they had adopted a particular costume, called *Costume à la victime*. Instead of the blouse of the Jacobins, they wore a square open coat and very low shoes; the hair, long at the sides, was turned up behind, with tresses called *cadenettes*; they were armed with short sticks, leadened and formed like bludgeons. A portion of these young men and of the sectionaries were royalists; the others followed the impulse of the moment, which was anti-revolutionary. The latter acted without object or ambition, declaring in favor of the strongest party, especially when the triumph of that party promised to restore order, the want of which was generally felt. The other contended under the Thermidorians against the old committees, as the Thermidorians had contended under the old committees against Robespierre; it waited for an opportunity of acting on its own account, which occurred after the entire downfall of the revolutionary party. In the violent situation of the two parties, actuated by fear and resentment, they pursued each other unrelentingly, and often came to blows in the streets to the cry of "*Vive la Montagne!*" or "*Vive la convention!*" The Jeunesse Dorée were powerful in the Palais Royal, where they were supported by the shopkeepers; but the Jacobins were the strongest in the garden of the Tuileries, which was near their club.

These quarrels became more animated every day, and Paris

³ On December 24, 1794, the forty-eight sections of Paris were reduced to twelve, and their local meetings to one every ten days.—Schmidt, "*Tableaux de la Révolution*," vol. II. pp. 228, 254.

was transformed into a field of battle, where the fate of the parties was left to the decision of arms. This state of war and disorder would necessarily have an end; and since the parties had not the wisdom to come to an understanding, one or the other must inevitably carry the day. The Thermidorians were the party in progress, and victory naturally fell to them. On the day following that on which Billaud had spoken of the waking of the lion in the popular society, there was great agitation throughout Paris. It was wished to take the Jacobin Club by assault. Men shouted in the streets: "The great Jacobin conspiracy! Outlaw the Jacobins!" At this period the revolutionary committee of Nantes were being tried. On their defense they pleaded that they had received from Carrier the sanguinary orders they had executed, which led the convention to enter into an examination of his conduct. Carrier was allowed to defend himself before the decree was passed against him. He justified his cruelty by the cruelty of the Vendéans, and the maddening fury of civil war. "When I acted," he said, "the air still seemed to resound with the civic songs of twenty thousand martyrs, who had shouted '*Vive la république!*' in the midst of tortures. How could the voice of humanity, which had died in this terrible crisis, be heard? What would my adversaries have done in my place? I saved the republic at Nantes; my life has been devoted to my country, and I am ready to die for it." Out of 500 voters, 498 were for the impeachment; the other 2 voted for it, but conditionally.

The Jacobins, finding their opponents were going from subaltern agents to the representatives, regarded themselves as lost. They endeavored to rouse the multitude, less to defend Carrier than for the support of their party, which was threatened more and more. But they were kept in check by the Jeunesse Dorée and the sectionaries, who eventually proceeded to the place of their sittings to dissolve the club. A sharp conflict ensued. The besiegers broke the windows with stones, forced the doors, and dispersed the Jacobins after some resistance on their part. The latter complained to the convention of this violence. Rewbel, deputed to make a report on the subject, was not favorable to them. "Where was tyranny organized?" said he. "At the Jacobin Club. Where had it its supports and its satellites? At the Jacobin Club. Who covered France with mourning, threw families into despair, filled the republic with bastiles, made the republican system so

odious that a slave laden with fetters would have refused to live under it? The Jacobins. Who regret the terrible reign we have lived under? The Jacobins. If you have not courage to decide in a moment like this, the republic is at an end, because you have Jacobins." The convention suspended them provisionally, in order to expurgate and reorganize them, not daring to destroy them at once. The Jacobins, setting the decree at defiance, assembled in arms in their usual place of meeting; the Thermidorian troop who had already besieged them there came again to assail them. It surrounded the club with cries of "Long live the convention!" "Down with the Jacobins!" The latter prepared for defense; they left their seats, shouting "Long live the republic!" rushed to the doors, and attempted a sortie. At first they made a few prisoners, but soon yielding to superior numbers, they submitted and traversed the ranks of the victors, who, after disarming them, covered them with hisses, insults, and even blows. These illegal expeditions were accompanied by all the excesses which attend party struggles.

The next day, November 12, 1794, commissioners came to close the club and put seals on its registers and papers, and from that moment the society of the Jacobins ceased to exist. A handful of old members continued the club under another name, *Société du Panthéon*, and even met for a short time in the next year in the original Jacobin convent. That popular body had powerfully served the revolution, when, in order to repel Europe, it was necessary to place the government in the multitude, and to give the republic all the energy of defense; but now it only obstructed the progress of the new order of things.

The situation of affairs was changed; liberty was to succeed the dictatorship, now that the salvation of the revolution had been effected, and that it was necessary to revert to legal order in order to preserve it. An exorbitant and extraordinary power, like the confederation of the clubs, would necessarily terminate with the defeat of the party which had supported it, and that party itself expire with the circumstances which had given it rise.

Carrier, brought before the tribunal, was tried, and condemned to be executed on December 16, 1794, with the majority of his accomplices. During the trial, the seventy-three deputies, whose protest against May 31 had excluded them from the assemblies, were reinstated. Merlin de Douai moved their recall in the name of

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the committee of public safety; his motion was received with applause, and the seventy-three resumed their seats in the convention. The seventy-three, in their turn, tried to obtain the return of the outlawed deputies, but they met with warm opposition. The Thermidorians and the members of the new committees feared that such a measure would be calling the revolution itself into question. They were also afraid of introducing a new party into the convention, already divided, and of recalling implacable enemies, who might cause, with regard to themselves, a reaction similar to that which had taken place against the old committees. Accordingly, they vehemently opposed the motion, and Merlin de Douai went so far as to say: "Do you want to throw open the doors of the Temple?" The young son of Louis XVI. was confined there, and the Girondists, on account of the results of May 31, were confounded with the royalists; besides, May 31 still figured among the revolutionary dates beside August 10 and July 14. The retrograde movement had yet some steps to take before it reached that period. The republican counter-revolution had turned back from the 9th Thermidor, 1794, to October 3, 1793, the day on which the seventy-three had been arrested, but not to June 2, 1793, when the twenty-two were arrested. After overthrowing Robespierre and the committee it had to attack Marat and the Mountain. In the almost geometrical progression of popular movement a few months were still necessary to effect this.

They went on to abolish the decemviral system. The decree against the priests and nobles, who had formed two proscribed classes under the reign of terror, was revoked; the maximum was abolished December 23, 1794, in order to restore confidence by putting an end to commercial tyranny; the general and earnest effort was to substitute the most elevated liberty for the despotic pressure of the committee of public safety. This period was also marked by the independence of the press, the restoration of religious worship, and the return of the property confiscated from the federalists during the reign of the committees.

Here was a complete reaction against the revolutionary government; it soon reached Marat and the Mountain. After the 9th Thermidor it had been considered necessary to oppose a great revolutionary reputation to that of Robespierre, and Marat had been selected for this purpose. To him were decreed the honors of the Pantheon, which Robespierre, while in power, had deferred

granting him. He, in his turn, was now attacked. His bust was in the convention, the theaters, on the public squares, and in the popular assemblies. The Jeunesse Dorée broke that in the Théâtre Feydeau. The Mountain complained, but the convention decreed that no citizen could obtain the honors of the Pantheon, nor his bust be placed in the convention, until he had been dead ten years.

The bust of Marat disappeared from the hall of the convention, and as the excitement was very great in the faubourgs, the sections, the usual support of the assembly, defiled through it. There was, also, opposite the Invalides, an elevated mound, a Mountain, surmounted by a colossal group, representing Hercules crushing a hydra. The section of the Halle-au-blé demanded that this should be removed. The Left of the assembly murmured. "The giant," said a member, "is an emblem of the people." "All I see in it is a mountain," replied another, "and what is a Mountain but an eternal protest against equality." These words were much applauded, and sufficed to carry the petition and overthrow the monument of the victory and domination of a party.

Next were recalled the proscribed conventionalists; already, some time since, their outlawry had been reversed. Isnard and Louvet wrote to the assembly to be reinstated in their rights; they were met by the objection as to the consequences of May 31 and the insurrections of the departments. "I will not," said Chénier, who spoke in their favor, "I will not so insult the national convention as to bring before them the phantom of federalism, which has been preposterously made the chief charge against your colleagues. They fled, it will be said; they hid themselves. This, then, is their crime! would that this, for the welfare of the republic, had been the crime of all! Why were there not caverns deep enough to preserve to the country the meditations of Condorcet, the eloquence to Vergniaud? Why did not some hospitable land, on the 10th Thermidor, give back to light that colony of energetic patriots and virtuous republicans? But projects of vengeance are apprehended from these men, soured by misfortune. Taught in the school of suffering, they have learned only to lament human errors. No, no; Condorcet, Rabaud-Saint-Etienne, Vergniaud, Camille Desmoulins seek not holocausts of blood; their manes are not to be appeased by hecatombs." The Left opposed Chénier's motion. "You are about," cried Bентаbole, "to rouse every passion; if you attack the insurrection of May 31, you attack the eighty thousand men

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who concurred in it." "Let us take care," replied Sieyès, "not to confound the work of tyranny with that of principles. When men, supported by a subaltern authority, the rival of ours, succeeded in organizing the greatest of crimes, on the fatal May 31 and June 2, it was not a work of patriotism, but an outrage of tyranny; from that time you have seen the convention domineered over, the majority oppressed, the minority dictating laws. The present session is divided into three distinct periods; till May 31 there was oppression of the convention by the people; till the 9th Thermidor, oppression of the people of the convention, itself the object of tyranny; and lastly, since the 9th Thermidor, justice, as regards the convention, has resumed its rights." He demanded the recall of the proscribed members, as a pledge of union in the assembly and of security for the republic. Merlin de Douai immediately proposed their return in the name of the committee of public safety; it was granted, and after eighteen months' proscription the twenty-two conventionalists resumed their seats; among them were Isnard, Louvet, Lanjuinais,⁴ Kervelegan, Henri la Rivière, La Réveillière, Lepeaux, and Lesage, all that remained of the brilliant but unfortunate Gironde. They joined the moderate party, which was composed daily more and more of the remains of different parties. For old enemies, forgetting their resentments and their contest for domination, because they had now the same interests and the same objects, became allies. It was the commencement of pacification between those who wished for a republic against the royalists, and a practicable constitution, in opposition to the revolutionists. At this period all measures against the federalists were rescinded, and the Girondists assumed the lead of the republican counter-revolution.

The convention was, however, carried much too far by the partisans of reaction; in its desire to repair all and to punish all it fell into excesses of justice. After the abolition of the decemviral régime, the past should have been buried in oblivion, and the revolutionary abyss closed after a few expiatory victims had been thrown into it. Security alone brings about pacification; and pacification only admits of liberty. By again entering upon a course characterized by passion, they only effected a transference of tyranny, violence, and calamity. Hitherto the bourgeoisie had been sacrificed to the multitude, to the consumers; now it was just the

⁴ Lanjuinais was not an outright Girondist.

reverse. Stock-jobbing was substituted for the maximum, and informers of the middle class altogether surpassed the popular informers. All who had taken part in the dictatorial government were proceeded against with the fiercest determination. The sections, the seat of the middle class, required the disarming and punishment of the members of their revolutionary committees, composed of *sans-culottes*. There was a general hue and cry against the terrorists, and the number included under this denomination was daily increased. The departments denounced all the former proconsuls, thus rendering desperate a numerous party, in reality no longer to be feared, since it had lost all power, by thus threatening it with great and perpetual reprisals.

Dread of proscription and several other reasons disposed them for revolt. The general want was terrible. Labor and its produce had been diminished ever since the revolutionary period, during which the rich had been imprisoned and the poor had governed; the suppression of the maximum had occasioned a violent crisis, which the traders and farmers turned to account, by disastrous monopoly and jobbing. To increase the difficulty, the assignats were falling into discredit, and their value diminished daily. More than eight thousand millions' worth of them had been issued. The insecurity of this paper money, by reason of the revolutionary confiscations, which had depreciated the national property, the want of confidence on the part of the merchants, tradesmen, etc., in the stability of the revolutionary government, which they considered merely provisional, all this had combined to reduce the real value of the assignats to one-fifteenth of their nominal value. They were received reluctantly, and specie was hoarded up with all the greater care, in proportion to the increasing demand for it and the depreciation of paper money. The people, in want of food and without the means of buying it, even when they held assignats, were in utter distress. They attributed this to the merchants, the farmers, the landed and other proprietors, to the government, and dwelt with regret upon the fact that before, under the committee of public safety, they had enjoyed both power and food. The convention had indeed appointed a committee of subsistence to supply Paris with provisions, but this committee had great difficulty and expense in procuring from day to day the supply of fifteen hundred sacks of flour necessary to support this immense city; and the people, who waited in crowds for hours together before the bakers' shops, for

the pound of bad bread distributed to each inhabitant, were loud in their complaints, and violent in their murmurs. They called Boissy d'Anglas, president of the committee of subsistence, Boissy-Famine. Such was the state of the fanatical and exasperated multitude, when its former leaders were brought to trial.

On the 12th Ventose, a short time after the return of the remaining Girondists, the assembly had decreed the arrest of Billaud-Varenes, Collot d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier. Their trial before the convention was appointed to commence on the 3d Germinal. On the 1st (March 20, 1795), the Decade day, when the sections used to assemble, their partisans organized a riot to prevent their being brought to trial; the outer sections of the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau were devoted to their cause. From these quarters they proceeded, half petitioners, half insurgents, toward the convention to demand bread, the constitution of '93, and the liberation of the imprisoned patriots. They met a few young men on their way, whom they threw into the basins of the Tuileries. The news, however, soon spread that the convention was exposed to danger, and that the Jacobins were about to liberate their leaders, and the Jeunesse Dorée, followed by about 5000 citizens of the inner sections, came, dispersed the men of the faubourgs, and acted as a guard for the assembly. The latter, warned by this new danger, revived, on the motion of Sieyès, the old martial law, under the name of Loi de Grande Police.

This rising in favor of the accused having failed, they were brought before the convention on the 3d Germinal. Vadier alone was contumacious. Their conduct was investigated with the greatest solemnity; they were charged with having tyrannized over the people and oppressed the convention. Though proofs were not wanting to support this charge, the accused defended themselves with much address. They ascribed to Robespierre the oppression of the assembly and of themselves; they endeavored to palliate their own conduct by citing the measures taken by the committee and adopted by the convention, by urging the excitement of the period, and the necessity of securing the defense and safety of the republic. Their former colleagues appeared as witnesses in their favor, and wished to make common cause with them. The Crétois (the name then given to the remnant of the Mountain) also supported them warmly. Their trial had lasted nine days, and each sitting had been occupied by the prosecution and the defense. The

sections of the faubourgs were greatly excited. The mobs which had collected every day since the 1st Germinal increased twofold on the 12th (April 1), and a new rising took place, in order to suspend the trial, which the first rising had failed to prevent. The agitators, more numerous and bold on this occasion, forced their way through the guard of the convention and entered the hall, having written with chalk on their hats the words "Bread," "The Constitution of '93," "Liberty for the patriots." Many of the deputies of the Crête declared in their favor; the other members, astounded at the tumult and disorder of this popular invasion, awaited the arrival of the inner sections for their deliverance. All debating was at an end. The toscin, which had been removed from the commune after its defeat and placed on the top of the Tuileries, where the convention sat, sounded the alarm. The committee ordered the drums to beat to arms. In a short time the citizens of the nearest sections assembled, marched in arms to assist the convention, and rescued it a second time. It sentenced the accused, whose cause was the pretext for this rising,⁵ to transportation, and decreed the arrest of seventeen members of the Crête who had favored the insurgents, and might, therefore, be regarded as their accomplices. Among these were Cambon, Ruamps, Leonard Bourdon, Thuriot, Chasles, Amar, and Lecointre, who, since the recall of the Girondists, had returned to the Mountain. On the following day they and the persons sentenced to transportation were conveyed to the castle of Hain.

The events of the 12th Germinal decided nothing. The faubourgs had been repulsed, but not conquered; and both power and confidence must be taken from a party by a decisive defeat before it is effectually destroyed. After so many questions, decided against the democratists, there still remained one of the utmost importance—the constitution. On this depended the ascendancy of the multitude or the bourgeoisie. The supporters of the revo-

⁵ The fact that the rising of 12th Germinal was due to economic and social discontent, and not to political causes, is well brought out by Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. IV. 252 ff. The repeal of the maximum law hastened the crisis. It was used by some of the Mountain, who had been opposed to the restoration of the Girondists, in the hope of procuring a political alternation. The timely arrival of some battalions of the national guard, commanded by Pichegru, saved the constitution. It was this rising which made the convention resolve to stamp out the last vestige of the terror and so bring Fouquier-Tinville to trial. Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, Barrère, and Vadier were also condemned to deportation. The last managed to escape.

lutionary government then fell back on the democratic constitution of '93, which presented to them the means of resuming the authority they had lost. Their opponents, on the other hand, endeavored to replace it by a constitution which would secure all the advantage to them, by concentrating the government a little more, and giving it to the middle class. For a month, both parties were preparing for this last contest. The constitution of 1793, having been sanctioned by the people, enjoyed a great prestige. It was accordingly attacked with infinite precaution. At first its assailants engaged to carry it into execution without restriction; next they appointed a commission of eleven members to prepare the organic laws, which were to render it practicable; by and by they ventured to suggest objections to it on the ground that it distributed power too loosely, and recognized only one assembly dependent on the people, even in its measures of legislation. At last a sectionary deputation went so far as to term the constitution of '93 a decemviral constitution, dictated by terror. All its partisans, at once indignant and filled with fears, organized an insurrection to maintain it. This was another May 31, as terrible as the first, but which, not having the support of an all-powerful commune, not being directed by a general commandant, and not having a terrified convention and submissive sections to deal with, had not the same result.

The conspirators, warned by the failure of the risings of the 1st and 12th Germinal, omitted nothing to make up for their want of direct object and of organization. On the 1st Prairial⁶ (May 20), in the name of the people, insurgent for the purpose of obtaining bread and their rights, they decreed the abolition of the revolutionary government, the establishment of the democratic constitution of '93, the dismissal and arrest of the members of the existing government, the liberation of the patriots, the convocation of the primary assemblies on the 25th Prairial, the convocation of

⁶ Cf. Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. IV. pp. 309-315; Schmidt, "*Tableaux de la Révolution*," vol. II. p. 323 ff. Like that of the 12th Germinal, this rising was also chiefly economic, though there was much more politics in it than in the first. Von Sybel says the daily ration of food distributed was a half-pound of bread and a half-pound of rice. Prices had soared beyond all previous figures between these two insurrections, owing to the resumption of specie export on April 27. As a consequence, the disparity between gold coin and the paper assignats became greater than ever. Schmidt, vol. II. pp. 326-327, cites the case of a louis d'or (20 francs) being offered for sale for 900 francs in April, 1795.

the legislative assembly, destined to replace the convention, on the 25th Messidor, and the suspension of all authority not emanating from the people. They determined on forming a new municipality, to serve as a common center; to seize on the barriers, telegraph,⁷ cannon, tocsins, drums, and not to rest till they had secured repose, happiness, liberty, and means of subsistence for all the French nation. They invited the artillery, gendarmes, horse and foot soldiers, to join the banners of the people, and marched on the convention.

Meantime, the latter was deliberating on the means of preventing the insurrection. The daily assemblages occasioned by the distribution of bread and the popular excitement had concealed from it the preparations for a great rising, and it had taken no steps to prevent it. The committees came in all haste to apprise it of its danger; it immediately declared its sitting permanent, voted Paris responsible for the safety of the representatives of the republic, closed its doors, outlawed all the leaders of the mob, summoned the citizens of the sections to arms, and appointed as their leaders eight commissioners, among whom were Legendre, Henri la Rivière, and Kervelegan. These deputies had scarcely gone when a loud noise was heard without. An outer door had been forced, and numbers of women rushed into the galleries, crying: "Bread and the constitution of '93!" The convention received them firmly. "Your cries," said the president, Vernier. "will not alter our position; they will not accelerate by one moment the arrival of supplies. They will only serve to hinder it." A fearful tumult drowned the voice of the president and interrupted the proceedings. The galleries were then cleared; but the insurgents of the faubourgs soon reached the inner doors, and finding them closed, forced them with hatchets and hammers, and then rushed in amid the convention.

The hall now became a field of battle. The veterans and gendarmes, to whom the guard of the assembly was confided, cried "To arms!" The deputy Auguis, sword in hand, headed them, and succeeding in repelling the assailants, and even made a

⁷ The brothers Claude and Ignace Chappe, born 1763 and 1760, both mechanical engineers, were the creators of the semaphore system of telegraphs. The scheme was presented to the legislative assembly March 2, 1792; on April 4, 1793, the convention voted a sum of money for experiments, and on August 4 ordered the establishment of a line from Paris to Lille.—Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," iii. p. 161, note 1.

few of them prisoners. But the insurgents, more numerous, returned to the charge and again rushed into the house. The deputy Feraud entered precipitately, pursued by the insurgents, who fired some shots in the house. They took aim at Boissy d'Anglas, who was occupying the president's chair, in place of Vernier. Feraud ran to the tribune, to shield him with his body; he was struck at with pikes and sabers, and fell dangerously wounded. The insurgents dragged him into the lobby, and, mistaking him for Fréron, cut off his head and placed it on a pike.

After this skirmish they became masters of the hall. Most of the deputies had taken flight. There remained only the members of the Crête and Boissy d'Anglas, who, calm, his hat on, heedless of threat and insult, protested in the name of the convention against this popular violence. They held out to him the bleeding head of Feraud; he bowed respectfully before it. They tried to force him, by placing pikes at his breast, to put the propositions of the insurgents to the vote; he steadily and courageously refused. But the Crêtois, who approved of the insurrection, took possession of the bureau^s and of the tribune, and decreed, amid the applause of the multitude, all the articles contained in the manifesto of the insurrection. The deputy Romme became their organ. They further appointed an executive commission, composed of Bourbotte Duroy, Duquesnoy, Prieur de la Marne, and a general-in-chief of the armed force, the deputy Soubrany. In this way they prepared for the return of their domination. They decreed the recall of their imprisoned colleagues, the dismissal of their enemies, a democratic constitution, the reëstablishment of the Jacobin Club. But it was not enough for them to have usurped the assembly for a short time; it was necessary to conquer the sections, for it was only with these they could really contend there.

The commissioners dispatched to the sections had quickly gathered them together. The battalions of the Butte des Moulins, Lepelletier, des Piques, de la Fontaine-Grenelle, who were the nearest, soon occupied the Carrousel and its principal avenues. The

^s The bureau was the clerical staff of the convention while in session. It was the duty of these officials to keep a record of the proceedings, count votes, receive notices of motion, proposed laws, etc. For in France then—and now—the deputies speak from a platform—the tribune—and each member wishing to speak sent his name to the bureau. The officials of the bureau thus roughly correspond to the clerks of the House of Representatives and the Senate, with the difference that they are actual members of the house, also.

aspect of affairs then underwent a change; Legendre, Kervelegan, and Auguis besieged the insurgents, in their turn, at the head of the sectionaries. At first they experienced some resistance. But with fixed bayonets they soon entered the hall, where the conspirators were still deliberating, and Legendre cried out: "In the name of the law, I order armed citizens to withdraw." They hesitated a moment, but the arrival of the battalions, now entering at every door, intimidated them, and they hastened from the hall in all the disorder of flight. The assembly again became complete; the sections received a vote of thanks, and the deliberations were resumed. All the measures adopted in the interim were annulled, and fourteen representatives, to whom were afterward joined fourteen others, were arrested for organizing the insurrection, or approving it in their speeches. It was then midnight; at five in the morning the prisoners were already six leagues from Paris. Ten thousand arrests were made.

Despite this defeat the faubourgs did not consider themselves beaten; and the next day they advanced *en masse* with their cannon against the convention. The sections, on their side, marched for its defense. The two parties were on the point of engaging; the cannons of the faubourg, which were mounted on the Place du Carrousel, were directed toward the château, when the assembly sent commissioners to the insurgents. Negotiations were begun. A deputy of the faubourgs, admitted to the convention, first repeated the demand made the preceding day, adding: "We are resolved to die at the post we now occupy, rather than abate our present demands. I fear nothing! My name is Saint-Leger. *Vive la république! Vive la convention!* if it is attached to principles, as I believe it to be." The deputy was favorably received, and they came to friendly terms with the faubourgs, without, however, granting them anything positive. The latter having no longer a general council of the commune to support their resolutions, nor a commander like Henriot to keep them under arms till their propositions were decreed, went no further. They retired after having received an assurance that the convention would assiduously attend to the question of provisions, and would soon publish the organic laws of the constitution of '93. That day showed that immense physical force and a decided object are not the only things essential to secure success; leaders and an authority to support and direct the insurrection are also necessary.

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The convention was the only remaining legal power: the party which it held in favor triumphed.

Six democratic Mountaineers, Goujon, Bourbotte, Romme, Duroy, Duquesnoy, and Soubrany, were brought before a military commission. They behaved firmly, like men fanatically devoted to their cause, and almost all free from excesses. The Prairial movement was the only thing against them; but that was sufficient in times of party strife, and they were condemned to death. They all stabbed themselves with the same knife, which was transferred from one to the other, exclaiming, "*Vive la république!*" Romme, Goujon, and Duquesnoy were fortunate enough to wound themselves fatally; Duroy and Bourbotte went to the scaffold, June 17, 1795.

Meantime, the faubourgs, though repelled on the 1st, and diverted from their object on the 2d of Prairial, still had the means of rising. An event of much less importance than the preceding riots occasioned their final ruin. The murderer of Feraud was discovered, condemned, and on the 4th, the day of his execution, a mob succeeded in rescuing him. There was a general outcry against this attempt, and the convention ordered the faubourgs to be disarmed. They were encompassed by all the interior sections. After attempting to resist they yielded, giving up some of their leaders, their arms, and artillery. The democratic party had lost its chiefs, its clubs, and its authorities; it had nothing left but an armed force, which rendered it still formidable, and institutions by means of which it might yet regain everything. After the last check the inferior class was entirely excluded from the government of the state, the revolutionary committees which formed its assemblies were destroyed; the cannoneers forming its armed force were disarmed; the constitution of '93, which was its code, was abolished; and here the rule of the multitude terminated.

From the 9th Thermidor to the 1st Prairial the Mountaineer was treated as the Girondist party had been treated from June 2 to the 9th Thermidor. Seventy-six of its members were sentenced to death or arrest. In its turn it underwent the destiny it had imposed on the other; for in times when the passions are called into play, parties know not how to come to terms, and seek only to conquer. Like the Girondists, they resorted to insurrection, in order to regain the power which they had lost; and like them,

they fell. Vergniaud, Brissot, Guadet, were tried by a revolutionary tribunal; Bourbotte, Duroy, Soubrany, Romme, Goujon, Duquesnoy, by a military commission. They all died with the same courage: which shows that all parties are the same, and are guided by the same maxims, or, if you please, by the same necessities. From that period the middle class resumed the management of the revolution without, and the assembly was as united under the Girondists as it had been, after June 2, under the Mountaineers.

Chapter XIII

THE CLOSE OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION MAY 20-OCTOBER 26, 1795

THE exterior prosperity of the revolution chiefly contributed to the fall of the dictatorial government and of the Jacobin party. The increasing victories of the republic to which they had very greatly contributed by their vigorous measures, and by their enthusiasm, rendered their power superfluous. The committee of public safety, by crushing with its strong and formidable hand the interior of France, had developed resources, organized armies, found generals, and commanded victories which ultimately secured the triumph of the revolution with respect to Europe. A prosperous position no longer required the same efforts; its mission was accomplished, the peculiar province of such a dictatorship being to save a country and a cause, and to perish by the very safety it had secured. Internal events have prevented our rapidly describing the impulse which the committee of public safety gave to the armies after May 31, and the results which it obtained from it.

The levy *en masse* that took place in the summer of 1793 formed the troops of the Mountain. The leaders of that party soon selected from the secondary ranks Mountaineer generals to replace the Girondist generals. Those generals were Jourdan, Pichegru, Hoche, Moreau, Westermann, Dugommier, Marceau, Joubert, and Kléber. Carnot, by his admission to the committee of public safety, became minister of war and major general of all the republican armies. Instead of scattered bodies, acting without concert upon isolated points, he proceeded with strong masses, concentrated on one object. He commenced the practice of a great plan of warfare, which he tried with decided success at Wattignies, in his capacity of commissioner of the convention. This important victory, at which he assisted in person, drove the allied generals, Clairfait and the Prince of Coburg, behind the Sambre and raised the siege of Maubeuge. During the winter of

1793 and 1794 the two armies continued in presence of each other without undertaking anything.

The revolution had disorganized the army. The national assembly had suppressed the provincial militia. The army of the line had been depleted by desertions, by the emigration of the officers, and was ill-disciplined and mutinous. The military reforms included the suppression of the old militia and the dismissal of the troops of the *Maison du Roi*, together with those of the foreign regiments. The plan of reorganization included (1) an active army of 150,000 men voluntarily enlisted for four years; (2) a reserve army of 100,000; (3) a national guard composed of all active citizens between eighteen and fifty years of age. The regiments ceased to be designated after the old form, but were known by numbers. New measures, such as fixed rules for promotion, the abolition of merely nominal posts of command, the establishment of courts-martial with a jury, and the adoption of a new military code, entirely reorganized the army.

At the first threat of war the national assembly had had the thought of using the national guard. In June, 1791, the assembly ordered a volunteer enrollment of men of twenty-one or over in each department; on August 17 it called for 101,000 volunteers—the “Volunteers of '91.” They were formed into battalions. The officers were elected by popular vote of the soldiers, and among the first are to be found Davout, Kléber, Hoche, Massena, and Marceau. The volunteers of 1792 were similarly called, and organized in battalions of *fédérés*, but did not make as good soldiers as those of '91, who had become a disciplined and hardened soldiery. This was owing to the fact that there were yet enough of the trained officers of the ancient régime to leaven the mass. Under-officers of the old line filled the places vacated by their superiors and trained the raw recruits. The French artillery was the best in Europe. The first volunteers were superior to the second group. But all alike were filled with a magnificent patriotism. The “*Marseillaise*”—to-day the national song of France—was the expression of popular feeling at this time.

The great losses of the summer of 1793 had brought matters to a crisis in the army. The levy of 300,000 had not been effective. There was not enough cohesion between the old and the new troops. There was a new emigration of officers, of moderate royalist sentiments, after the execution of the king, and the army

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
became disorganized. Moreover, there was friction between the generals and the administration. They were spied upon, their orders changed, deposed, imprisoned, by the deputies on mission, to such an extent that a place of high command became almost equivalent to a death-warrant.

Evidently great modifications must be made or the army would dissolve in anarchy. "Amalgamation" became the new order of the day. On June 19, 1793, the convention ordered the consolidation of all the heterogeneous elements—regiments of the ancient service, volunteers of '91, fédérés of '92. One battalion of infantry of the line was combined with two battalions of volunteers to form a demi-brigade; there were ninety-six such regiments. The cavalry were organized in a similar way, by regiments and squadrons. Eight regiments of mounted artillery were created. Two brigades formed a division, an army corps of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, composed of twelve battalions, eight squadrons, and a battery of six to eight cannon. These changes made the great levy *en masse* of August 23, 1793, a success. It created the army capable of the victories of 1793-1794. In June, 1793, the effective army was 477,000 men; in December it was 628,000, and in 1794 over a million, of whom 750,000 were actually facing the enemy!

Simultaneously with the new composition of the armies a new sort of tactics was introduced. Carnot recommended the commanders-in-chief to direct the hottest fire at one point and break the enemies' lines in two. This new policy of concentrating fire became the basis of Napoleon's victories. At the same time, the soldiers were allowed more freedom than under the iron régime of Frederick the Great, and individual effort came to count for more. Fired by a vivid patriotism, the offensive movements of the French became irresistible. In storming intrenchments or battery-positions, as at Woerth in December, 1793, the bayonet became a terribly effective weapon.

Moreover, a new generation of field officers was coming up—of men capable of commanding, loving their troops and loved by them. The barrier of caste between private and superior vanished with the revolution. The generals who commanded in 1792, Lafayette, Luckner, Rochambeau, had disappeared from the scene. Those who supplanted them, like Dumouriez, Custine, Montesquiou, were little better, for they, too, had been schooled in the

Seven Years' War or under the ancient régime. Finally came the genuine sons of Mars—the generation of 1792, composed first of subordinate officers raised to rank, like Kléber, Kellermann, Scherer; then the young graduates of military schools, like Bonaparte, Davout, Desaix, Clarke, Macdonald, Grouchy, Marmont; finally, new recruits who had risen by sheer merit, such as Lazare Hoche, son of a soldier, born at Versailles, a stable-boy getting the rudiments of education from the curé, working after hours to earn the wherewithal to purchase books; a volunteer in the national guard, a volunteer of '92, he fought in the army of the Ardennes



and in Belgium, when he became aide-de-camp of General Veneur, who recommended his promotion for merit at the siege of Dunkirk. In October, 1793, he was put in command of the army of the Moselle. He saved Alsace, but was unjustly cashiered—and imprisoned in April, 1794, by Saint-Just, then deputy on mission to the army, for not taking Trèves; he was released after Thermidor.

At the opening of the campaign of 1793-1794 each side conceived a plan of invasion. The Austrian army advanced upon the towns on the Somme, Peronne, Saint-Quentin, Arras, and threatened Paris, while the French army again projected the conquest of Belgium. The plan of the committee of public safety was com-

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bined in a very different way to the vague design of the coalition. Pichegru, at the head of 50,000 men of the army of the north, entered Flanders, resting on the sea and the Scheldt. On his right, Moreau advanced with 20,000 men upon Menin and Courtray. General Souham, with 30,000 men, remained under Lille to sustain the extreme right of the invading army against the Austrians; while Jourdan, with the army of the Moselle, directed his course toward Charleroi by Arlon and Dinant, to join the army of the north.

The Austrians, attacked in Flanders and threatened with a surprise in the rear by Jourdan, soon abandoned their positions on the Somme. Clairfait and the Duke of York allowed themselves to be beaten at Courtray and Hooghlede by the army of Pichegru; Coburg at Fleurus by that of Jourdan, who had just taken Charleroi. The two victorious generals rapidly completed the invasion of the Netherlands. The Anglo-Dutch army fell back on Antwerp, and thence upon Breda, and from Breda to Bois-le-Duc, receiving continual checks. It crossed the Waal and fell back upon Holland. The Austrians endeavored, with the same want of success, to cover Brussels and Maestricht; they were pursued and beaten by the army of Jourdan, which since its union had taken the name of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, and which did not leave them behind the Roër, as Dumouriez had done, but drove them beyond the Rhine. Jourdan made himself master of Cologne and Bonn, and communicated by his left with the right of the army of the Moselle, which had advanced into the country of Luxemburg, and which, conjointly with him, occupied Coblenz. A general and concerted movement of all the French armies had taken place, all of them marching toward the Rhenish frontier. At the time of the defeats the lines of Weissenburg had been forced. The committee of public safety employed in the army of the Rhine the expeditious measures peculiar to its policy. The commissioners, Saint-Just and Lebas, gave the chief command to Hoche, made terror and victory the order of the day; and Generals Brunswick and Wurmser were very soon driven from Haguenau on the lines of the Lauter, and not being able even to maintain that position, passed the Rhine at Philipsburg. Spire and Worms were retaken. Hoche was deprived of his command by Saint-Just on April 8, 1794, under orders from Carnot, who was angered because of his not endeavoring to take Trèves. He was imprisoned and not re-

leased until after 9th Thermidor. The republican troops, everywhere victorious, occupied Belgium, that part of Holland situated on the left of the Meuse, and all the towns on the Rhine, except Mayence and Mannheim, which were closely beset.

The army of the Alps did not make much progress in this campaign. It tried to invade Piedmont, but failed. On the Spanish frontier the war had commenced under ill auspices; the two armies of the eastern and western Pyrenees, few in number and badly disciplined, were constantly beaten; one had retired under Perpignan, the other under Bayonne. The committee of public safety turned its attention and efforts but tardily on this point, which was not the most dangerous for it. But as soon as it had introduced its system, generals, and organization into the two armies, the appearance of things changed. Dugommier, after repeated successes, drove the Spaniards from the French territory and entered the peninsula by Catalonia. Moncey also invaded it by the valley of Bastan, the other opening of the Pyrenees, and became master of Saint Sebastian and Fontarabia. The coalition was everywhere conquered, and some of the allied powers began to repent of their too confiding adhesion.

In the meantime news of the revolution of the 9th Thermidor reached the armies. They were entirely republican, and they feared that Robespierre's fall would lead to that of the popular government; and they, accordingly, received this intelligence with marked disapprobation; but as the armies were submissive to the civil authority, none of them rebelled. The insurrections of the army only took place from July 14 to May 31; because, being the refuge of the conquered parties, their leaders had at every crisis the advantage of political precedence, and contended with all the ardor of compromised factions. Under the committee of public safety, on the contrary, the most renowned generals had no political influence, and were subject to the terrible discipline of parties. While occasionally thwarting the generals, the convention had no difficulty in keeping the armies in obedience.

A short time afterward the movement of invasion was prolonged in Holland and in the Spanish peninsula. The United Provinces were attacked in the middle of winter, and on several sides, by Pichegru, who summoned the Batavian patriots to liberty. The party opposed to the stadtholderate seconded the victorious efforts of the French army, and the revolution and conquest took place

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simultaneously at Leyden, Amsterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. The stadtholder took refuge in England; his authority was abolished, and the assembly of the states-general proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and constituted the Batavian republic, which formed a close alliance with France, to which it ceded, by the Treaty of Paris, of May 16, 1795, Dutch Flanders, Maestricht, Venloo, and their dependencies. The navigation of the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Meuse was left free to both nations. Holland by its wealth powerfully contributed toward the continuance of the war against the coalition. This important conquest at the same time deprived the English of a powerful support, and compelled Prussia, threatened on the Rhine and by Holland, to conclude at Basel with the French republic a peace for which its reverses and the affairs of Poland had long rendered it disposed.¹

The fact of having secured an equivalent in Poland for her losses was the decisive factor with Prussia. The peace with Prussia was signed April 5, 1795. The articles guaranteed France the left bank of the Rhine, so far as Prussia was concerned, but a secret article provided for future indemnification of Prussia through secularization of certain ecclesiastical states. A neutral line running due east through Germany was marked out, the states north of it, as Saxony and Hesse, being guaranteed protection from French aggrandizement, since they were regarded as under the wing of Prussia.

The South German states continued to adhere to Austria and were marked for conquest by the directory. It is interesting to notice that patriotic France, in three years, had accomplished more than all the armies of Louis XIV. What with Nice and Savoy, the left bank of the Rhine and Holland, the most extravagant advocate of "natural frontiers" ought to have been satisfied. Figuières and the fortress of Rosas had been taken, and Perignon was advancing into Catalonia, while Moncey, after becoming master of Villa Réal, Bilbao, and Vittoria, marched against the Spaniards, who had retired to the frontiers of Old Castile. The cabinet of Madrid demanded peace. Saint Sebastian and Fontarabia were taken by the French in August, 1794. This was followed by an invasion of

¹Historians are divided in opinion as to responsibility for the breach between the Prussian and the Austrian armies which took place at this time. The eminent German historian, Von Sybel, champions the conduct of Prussia and throws the blame upon Austria. On the other hand, the Austrian historians, Videnot and Huffer, make Prussia responsible for the division.

the Basque provinces, so that Spain had no other course. She fenced diplomatically for a long time, for the sake of the dauphin, for Spanish honor regarded the Family Compact as sacred. Final settlement was made at Basel, July 22, 1795. It recognized the French republic, who restored its conquests, and who received in exchange the portion of Saint Domingo possessed by Spain. The two disciplined armies of the Pyrenees joined the army of the Alps, which by this means soon overran Piedmont, and entered Italy—Tuscany only having made peace with the republic on February 9, 1795.

These partial pacifications and the reverses of the coalesced troops gave another direction to the efforts of England and the emigrant party. The time had arrived for making the interior of France the fulcrum of the counter-revolutionary movement. In 1791, when unanimity existed in France, the royalists placed all their hopes in foreign powers; now dissensions at home and the defeat of their allies in Europe left them no resource but in conspiracies. Unsuccessful attempts, as we have seen, never make vanquished parties despair: victory alone wearies and enervates, and sooner or later restores the dominion of those who wait.

The events of Prairial and the defeat of the Jacobin party had decided the counter-revolutionary movement. At this period, the reaction, hitherto conducted by moderate republicans, became generally royalist. The partisans of monarchy were still as divided as they had been from the opening of the states-general to August 10. In the interior, the old constitutionalists, who had their sittings in the sections, and who consisted of the wealthy middle classes, had not the same views of monarchy with the absolute royalists. They still felt the rivalry and opposition of interest natural to the middle against the privileged classes. The absolute royalists themselves did not agree; the party beaten in the interior had little sympathy with that enrolled among the armies of Europe; but besides the divisions between the emigrants and Vendéans, dissensions had arisen among the emigrants from the date of their departure from France. Meantime, all these royalists of different opinions, not having yet to contend for the reward of victory, came to an agreement to attack the convention in common. The emigrants and the priests, who for some months past had returned in great numbers, took the banner of the sections, quite certain, if they carried the day by means of the middle class, to establish their own

government; for they had a leader, and a definite object, which the sectionaries had not.

This reaction, of a new character, was restrained for some time in Paris, where the convention, a strong and neutral power, wished to prevent the violence and usurpation of both parties. While overthrowing the sway of the Jacobins, it suppressed the vengeance of the royalists. Then it was that the greater part of the Jeunesse Dorée deserted its cause, that the leaders of the sections prepared the bourgeoisie to oppose the assembly, and that the confederation of the journalists succeeded that of the Jacobins. La Harpe, Richer, de Sérizy, Poncelin, Tronçon du Condray, and Marchéna became the organs of this new opinion, and were the literary clubists. The active but irregular troops of this party assembled at the Théâtre Feydeau, the Boulevard des Italiens, and the Palais Royal, and began the chase of the Jacobins, while they sang the "*Reveil du Peuple*." The word of proscription at that time was terrorist, in virtue of which an honest man might all conscientiously attack a revolutionist. The terrorist class was extended at the will or the passions of the new reactors, who wore their hair *à la victime*, and who, no longer fearing to avow their intentions, for some time past had adopted the Chouan uniform—a gray turned-back coat with a green or black collar.

But this reaction was much more ardent in the departments, where there was no authority to interpose in the prevention of bloodshed. Here there were only two parties, that which had dominated and that which had suffered under the Mountain. The intermediate class was alternately governed by the royalists and by the democrats. The latter, foreseeing the terrible reprisals to which they would be subject if they fell, held out as long as they could; but their defeat at Paris led to their downfall in the departments. Party executions then took place, similar to those of the proconsuls of the committee of public safety. The south was, more especially, a prey to wholesale massacres and acts of personal vengeance. Nearly all the South had its September 2. The power in the convention had shifted from the Left to the Right, but the Thermidorians, the moderates, and the Girondists, who dominated in the convention, now perceived that from being threatened by revolutionists, they were now threatened by counter-revolutionists. After the 9th Thermidor there had been a large influx of the emigrants into France. The royalists again became a force in the

country. In the west of France bands of royalist brigands appeared, who called themselves chauffeurs. The Companies of Jehu and of the Sun infested the public roads, robbed travelers and merchants, and even pillaged whole towns. Lyons, Marseilles, Aix, and Tarascon were even entered by them.² At Lyons, after the first revolutionary massacres, the members of the companies hunted out those who had not been taken; and when they met one, without any other form than the exclamation, "There's a Matavon" (the name given to them), they slew and threw him into the Rhone. At Tarascon, they threw them from the top of the tower on a rock on the bank of the Rhone. During this new reign of terror and this general defeat of the revolutionists England and the emigrants attempted the daring enterprise of Quiberon.

The Vendéans were exhausted by their repeated defeats, but they were not wholly reduced. Their losses, however, and the divisions between their principal leaders, Charette and Stofflet, rendered them an extremely feeble succor. Charette had even consented to treat with the republic, and a sort of pacification had been concluded between him and the convention at Jusnay. The Marquis de Puisaye, an enterprising man, but volatile and more capable of intrigue than of vigorous party conceptions, intended to replace the almost expiring insurrection of La Vendée by that of Brittany. Since the enterprise of Wimpfen, in which Puisaye had a command, there already existed, in Calvados and Morbihan, bands of Chouans, composed of the remains of parties, adventurers, men without employment, and daring smugglers, who made expeditions, but were unable to keep the field like the Vendéans. Puisaye had recourse to England to extend the Chouanerie, leading it to hope for a general rising in Brittany, and thence in the rest of France, if it would land the nucleus of an army, with ammunition and guns.

The ministry of Great Britain, deceived as to the coalition, desired nothing better than to expose the republic to fresh perils, while it sought to revive the courage of Europe. It confided in Puisaye, and in the spring of 1795 prepared an expedition, in which the most energetic emigrants took a share, nearly all the officers of the former navy, and all who, weary of the part of exiles and of

² Mahan, "Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution," vol. I. 175 ff., is good upon this "White Terror." The reaction in the southern mainland was watched with deep concern from the decks of English vessels.

the distresses of a life of wandering, wished to try their fortune for the last time.

The English fleet landed on the peninsula of Quiberon 1500 emigrants, 6000 republican prisoners who had embraced the cause of the emigrants to return to France, 60,000 muskets, and the full equipment for an army of 40,000 men. Fifteen hundred Chouans joined the army on its landing, and it was soon attacked by General Hoche. His attack proved successful; the republican prisoners who were in the ranks deserted, and it was defeated after a most energetic resistance. In the mortal warfare between the emigrants and the republic, the vanquished, being considered as outlaws, were mercilessly massacred. Their loss inflicted a deep and incurable wound on the emigrant party. Hoche conquered La Vendée by a systematic "rounding-up" of the population and complete disarmament. This success had been followed by that at Quiberon, June 27, 1795. Tallien, who was deputy on mission in his army, forced him, much against his will, to shoot 690 of the royalists and Vendéans, at Arglos. Having had hard experience of deputies on mission, he complied. This royalist reaction, combined with the death of the dauphin, in the same month, on June 10, ruined the faintest hopes of a monarchical constitution.³

The hopes founded on the victories of Europe, on the progress of insurrection and the attempt of the emigrants, being thus overthrown, recourse was had to the discontented sections. It was hoped to make a counter-revolution by means of the new constitution decreed by the convention on August 22, 1795. The constitution was, indeed, the work of the moderate republican party; but as it restored the ascendancy of the middle class, the royalist leaders thought that by it they might easily enter the legislative body and the government.

This constitution was the best, the wisest, the most liberal, and the most provident that had as yet been established or projected: it contained the result of six years' revolutionary and legislative experience. At this period the convention felt the necessity of organizing power, and of rendering the people settled, while the first assembly, from its position, felt only the necessity of weakening royalty and agitating the nation. All had been exhausted, from the throne to the people: existence now depended on recon-

³ On the prison-life of this child, the most innocent victim of the revolution, see the note in Fletcher's Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. III. pp. 189-190.

structing and restoring order, at the same time keeping the nation in great activity. The new constitution accomplished this. It differed but little from that of 1791, with respect to the exercise of sovereignty, but greatly in everything relative to government. It confided the legislative power to two councils, that of the Cinq-cents and that of the Anciens, and the executive power to a directory of five members. It restored the two degrees of elections destined to retard the popular movement, and to lead to a more enlightened choice than immediate elections. The wise but moderate qualifications with respect to property, required in the members of the primary assemblies and the electoral assemblies, again conferred political importance on the middle class, to which it became imperatively necessary to recur after the dismissal of the multitude and the abandonment of the constitution of '93.

In order to prevent the despotism or the servility of a single assembly, it was necessary to place somewhere a power to check or defend it. The division of the legislative body into two councils, which had the same origin, the same duration, and differed only in functions, attained the twofold object of not alarming the people by an aristocratic institution, and of contributing to the formation of a good government. The council of five hundred, whose members were required to be thirty years old, was alone intrusted with the initiative and the discussion of laws. The council of ancients composed of 250 members, who had completed their fortieth year, was charged with adopting or rejecting them.

In order to avoid precipitation in legislative measures, and to prevent a compulsory sanction from the council of ancients in a moment of popular excitement, they could not come to a decision until after three readings, at a distance of five days at least from each other. In urgent cases this formality was dispensed with; and the council had the right of determining such urgency. This council acted sometimes as a legislative power, when it did not thoroughly approve a measure, and made use of the form "*Le Conseil des anciens ne peut pas adopter*," and sometimes as a conservative power, when it only considered a measure in its legal bearing, and said "*La Constitution annule*." For the first time partial re-elections were adopted, and the renewing of half of the council every two years was fixed, in order to avoid that rush of legislators who came with an immoderate desire for innovation, and suddenly changed the spirit of an assembly.

The executive power was distinct from the councils, and no longer existed in the committees. Monarchy was still too much feared to admit of a president of the republic being named. They, therefore, confined themselves to the creation of a directory of five members, nominated by the council of ancients, at the recommendation of that of the five hundred. The directors might be brought to trial by the councils, but could not be dismissed by them. They were intrusted with a general and independent power of execution, but it was wished also to prevent their abusing it, and especially to guard against the danger of a long habit of authority leading to usurpation. They had the management of the armed force and of the finances, the nomination of functionaries, the conducting of negotiations, but they could do nothing of themselves; they had ministers and generals, for whose conduct they were responsible. Each member was president for three months, holding the seals and affixing his signature. Every year one of the members was to go out. It will be seen by this account that the functions of royalty as they were in 1791 were shared by the council of ancients, who had the veto, and the directory, which held the executive power. The directory had a guard, a national palace, the Luxembourg, for a residence, and a kind of civil list. The council of the ancients, destined to check the encroachments of the legislative power, was invested with the means of restraining the usurpations of the directory; it could change the residence of the councils and of the government.

But this foresight has another aspect. In their effort to avoid the exorbitant concentration of powers which the terror government had enjoyed, the framers of the constitution went to the other extreme. As in the constitution of 1791, there was so great a separation of the functions of government that, in case of conflict, only an appeal to force was possible. The provisions that one director should retire each year soon divided the executive against itself—a condition which brought about the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor (September 4, 1797). The truth is, the directory held its place only through negative forces. Since the death of the dauphin and the royalist fiasco at Quiberon a monarchy was impossible. A republican form of government, with a single executive, was impossible, for who could be president? Then, again, much of the nation was too tired of politics to be interested. The directory, from the first, was a makeshift govern-

ment, and was accepted because nothing else was possible. More than any other class, the army was representative of France—a state of things which logically led to Napoleon. And yet the directory was partially inclined to peace, as the exchange of Madame Royale, the sister of the dauphin, shows. But it dared not disband the armies after Basel, lest their home-coming increase the army of unemployed and discontented, and to pay them aggression had to continue. The soldiery of Napoleon were paid out of the loot of Italy.⁴

The members of the commission of eleven, who, previous to the events of Prairial, had no other mission than to prepare the organic laws of the constitution of '93, and who, after those events, made the constitution of the year III., were at the head of the conventional party. This party belonged neither to the old Girondin nor to the old Mountain. Neutral up to May 31, subject till the 9th Thermidor, it had been in the possession of power since that period, because the twofold defeat of the Girondists and the Mountain had left it the strongest. The men of the extreme sides, who had begun the fusion of parties, joined it. Merlin de Douai represented the party of that mass which had yielded to circumstances, Thibaudeau, the party that continued inactive, and Daunou the courageous party. The latter had declared himself opposed to all *coups d'état*, ever since the opening of the assembly, both January 21 and to May 31, because he wished for the régime of the convention, without party violence and measures. After the 9th Thermidor he blamed the fury displayed toward the chiefs of the revolutionary government, whose victim he had been as one of the seventy-three. He had obtained great ascendancy, as men gradually approached toward a legal system. His enlightened attachment to the revolution, his noble independence, the solidity and extent of his ideas, and his imperturbable fortitude rendered him one of the most influential actors of this period. He was the chief author of the constitution of the year III., and the convention deputed him, with some others of its members, to undertake the defense of the republic during the crisis of Vendémiaire.

The reaction gradually increased; it was indirectly favored by the members of the Right, who, since the opening of that assembly, had only been incidentally republican. They were not prepared to repel the attacks of the royalists with the same energy as that of the revolutionists. Among this number were Boissy d'Anglas,

⁴ See Sorel, "*L'Europe et la Révolution française*," vol. IV. p. 453 ff.

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Lanjuinais, Henri la Rivière, Saladin, and Aubry; they formed in the assembly the nucleus of the sectionary party. Old and ardent Mountaineers, such as Rovère and Bourdon de l'Oise, carried away by the counter-revolutionary movement, suffered the reaction to be prolonged, doubtless in order to make their peace with those whom they had so violently combated.

But the conventional party, reassured with respect to the democrats, set itself to prevent the triumph of the royalists. It felt that the safety of the republic depended on the formation of the councils, and that the councils being elected by the middle class, which was directed by royalists, would be composed on counter-revolutionary principles. It was important to intrust the guardianship of the régime they were about to establish to those who had an interest in defending it. In order to avoid the error of the constituent assembly, which had excluded itself from the legislature that succeeded it, the convention decided by a decree that two-thirds of its members should be reëlected. By this means it secured the majority of the councils and the nomination of the directory; it could accompany its constitution into the state, and consolidate it without violence. This reëlection of two-thirds was not exactly legal, but it was politic, and the only means of saving France from the rule of the democrats or counter-revolutionists. The convention granted itself a moderate dictatorship, by the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor (August 22 and 30, 1795), one of which established the reëlection, and the other fixed the manner of it. But these two exceptional decrees were submitted to the ratification of the primary assemblies at the same time as the constitutional act.

The royalist party was taken by surprise by the decrees of Fructidor. It hoped to form part of the government by the councils, of the councils by elections, and to effect a change of system when once in power. It inveighed against the convention. The royalist committee of Paris, whose agent was an obscure man, named Lemaitre, the journalists, and the leaders of the sections coalesced. They had no difficulty in securing the support of public opinion, of which they were the only organs; they accused the convention of perpetuating its power and of assailing the sovereignty of the people. The chief advocates of the two-thirds, Louvet, Daunou, and Chénier, were not spared, and every preparation was made for a grand movement. The Faubourg Saint Germain, lately almost deserted, gradually filled; emigrants flocked in, and the

conspirators, scarcely concealing their plans, adopted the Chouan uniform.

The convention, perceiving the storm increase, sought support in the army, which, at that time, was the republican class, and a camp was formed at Paris. The people had been disbanded and the royalists had secured the bourgeoisie. In the meantime the primary assemblies met on the 20th Fructidor, to deliberate on the constitutional act and the decrees of the two-thirds, which were to be accepted or rejected together. The Lepelletier section (formerly Filles Saint Thomas) was the center of all the others. On a motion made by that section, it was decided that the power of all constituent authority ceased in the presence of the assembled people. The Lepelletier section, directed by Richer de Serizy, La Harpe, Lâcretelle junior, and Vaublanc, turned its attention to the organization of the insurrectional government, under the name of the central committee. This committee was to replace in Vendémiaire, against the convention, the committee of August 10 against the throne, and of May 31 against the Girondists. The majority of the sections adopted this measure, which was annulled by the convention, whose decree was in its turn rejected by the majority of the sections. The struggle now became open; and in Paris they separated the constitutional act, which was adopted, from the decrees of reëlection, which were rejected.

On the 1st Vendémiaire the convention proclaimed the acceptance of the decrees by the greater number of the primary assemblies of France. The sections assembled again to nominate the electors who were to choose the members of the legislature. On the 10th they determined that the electors should assemble in the Théâtre Français (it was then situated on the left bank of the Seine); that they should be accompanied there by the armed force of the sections, after having sworn to defend them till death. On the 11th, accordingly, the electors assembled under the presidency of the Duke de Nivernois, and the guard of some detachments of chasseurs and grenadiers.

The convention, apprised of the danger, sat permanently, stationed round its place of sitting the troops of the camp of Sablons, and concentrated its powers in a committee of five members, who were intrusted with all measures of public safety. These members were Colombel, Barras, Daunou, Le Tourneur, and Merlin de Douai. For some time the revolutionists had ceased to be feared,

and all had been liberated who had been imprisoned for the events of Prairial. They enrolled, under the name of battalion of patriots of '89, about 1500 or 1800 of them, who had been proceeded against, in the departments or in Paris, by the friends of the reaction. In the evening of the 11th the convention sent to dissolve the assembly of electors by force, but they had already adjourned to the following day.

During the night of the 11th the decree which dissolved the college of electors, and which armed the battalion of patriots of '89, caused the greatest agitation. Drums beat to arms; the Lepelletier section declaimed against the despotism of the convention, against the return of the reign of terror, and during the whole of the 12th prepared the other sections for the contest. In the evening, the convention, scarcely less agitated, decided on taking the initiative by surrounding the conspiring section and terminating the crisis by disarming it. Menou, general of the interior, and Leporte, the representative, were intrusted with this mission. The convent of the Filles Saint Thomas was the headquarters of the sectionaries, before which they had 700 or 800 men in battle array. These were surrounded by superior forces, from the boulevards on each side and the Rue Vivienne opposite. Instead of disarming them the leaders of the expedition began to parley. It was agreed that both parties should withdraw; but the conventional troops had no sooner retired than the sectionaries returned reinforced. This was a complete victory for them, which being exaggerated in Paris, as such things always are, increased their number and gave them courage to attack the convention the next day.

About eleven at night the convention learned the issue of the expedition and the dangerous effect which it had produced; it immediately dismissed Menou, and gave the command of the armed force to Barras, the general in command on the 9th Thermidor. Barras asked the committee of five to appoint as his second in command a young officer who had distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon, but had been dismissed by Aubry of the reaction party; a young man of talent and resolution, calculated to do good service to the republic in a moment of peril. This young officer was Bonaparte.⁵ He appeared before the committee, but there was nothing

⁵ Napoleon Bonaparte was born on August 15, 1769, at Ajaccio in Corsica, in the very year when the island passed to France. The family originally came from Tuscany. His father was a lawyer, who died before the revolution.

in his appearance that announced his astonishing destiny. Not a man of party, summoned for the first time to this great scene of action, his demeanor exhibited a timidity and a want of assurance, which disappeared entirely in the preparations for battle and in the heat of action. He immediately sent for the artillery of the camp of Sablons, and disposed them, with the 5000 men of the conventional army, on all the points from which the convention could be assailed. At noon on the 13th Vendémiaire the enclosure of the convention had the appearance of a fortified place, which could only be taken by assault. The line of defense extended, on the left side of the Tuileries along the river, from the Pont Neuf to the Pont Louis XV.; on the right, in all the small streets opening on the Rue Saint Honoré, from the Rues de Rohan, de l'Echelle and the Cul-de-sac Dauphin, to the Place de la Révolution. In front, the Louvre, the Jardin de l'Infante, and the Carrousel were planted with cannon; and behind, the Pont Tournant and the Place de la Révolution formed a park of reserve. In this position the convention awaited the insurgents.

The latter soon encompassed it on several points. They had about 40,000 men under arms, commanded by Generals Danican, Duhoux, and the ex garde-du-corps, Lafond. The thirty-two sec-

His mother, Laetitia Ramolino, survived her famous son. Napoleon was the second member of the family. The eldest brother was Joseph, afterward King of Spain, and the three younger were Lucien, Louis, and Jerome. There were three sisters also, Elisa, Caroline, and Pauline. In 1778 Napoleon was sent to a college in Autun, through the benefaction of Marbeuf, the governor of Corsica. Thence he passed to a military school in Brienne, and later to Paris. He showed a remarkable aptitude for scientific studies. He became an officer of artillery in the regiment of La Fere, and lived in garrison at Valence, Douai, and Auxonne. At this time he had no love for France, indeed was bitterly hostile toward his adopted country. He sided with the revolution, but took no active part in its movements until late in its course. After the fall of the monarchy, in September, 1792, he became a captain in the fourth regiment of artillery. During the terror he was an advocate of Robespierre and his name has been found upon a list of members of the Jacobin Club. After the 9th Thermidor he fell under suspicion, like all the terrorists, and lost his place in the army. He refused to serve under Hoche in the Vendean war, and was contemplating going to Constantinople with the hope of entering the army of the sultan, when the insurrection of the 13th Vendémiaire brought him again into fame. For this service he was made a general of division in the army of the interior, and soon afterward married Josephine, the widow of General Beauharnais, who had been guillotined during the revolution. When the triple campaign against Austria was planned Napoleon was given command of the army of Italy, and thenceforth his career was European in its importance.

tions which formed the majority had supplied their military contingent. Of the other sixteen, several sections of the faubourgs had their troops in the battalion of '89. A few, those of the Quinze-vingts and Montreuil, sent assistance during the action; others, though favorably disposed, as that of Popincourt, could not do so; and lastly, others remained neutral, like that of L'Indivisibilité. From two to three o'clock, General Carteaux, who occupied the Pont Neuf with 4000 men and two four-pounders, was surrounded by several columns of sectionaries, who obliged him to fall back on the Louvre. This advantage emboldened the insurgents, who were strong on all points. General Danican summoned the convention to withdraw its troops, and disarm the terrorists. The officer intrusted with the summons was led into the assembly blindfolded, and his message occasioned some agitation, several members declaring in favor of conciliatory measures. Boissy d'Anglas advised a conference with Danican; Gamon proposed a proclamation in which they should call upon the citizens to retire, promising then to disarm the battalion of '89. This address excited violent murmurs. Chénier rushed to the tribune. "I am surprised," said he, "that the demands of sections in a state of revolt should be discussed here. Negotiation must not be heard of; there is only victory or death for the national convention." Lanjuinais wished to support the address, by dwelling on the danger and misery of civil war; but the convention would not hear him, and on the motion of Fermond, passed to the order of the day. The debates respecting measures of peace or war with the sections were continued for some time, when about half-past four several discharges of musketry were heard, which put an end to all discussion. Seven hundred guns were brought in, and the convention took arms as a body of reserve.

The conflict had now commenced in the Rue Saint Honoré, of which the insurgents were masters. The first shots were fired from the Hôtel de Noailles, and a murderous fire extended the whole length of this line. A few moments afterward, on the other side, two columns of sectionaries, about 4000 strong, commanded by the Count de Maulevier, advanced by the quays and attacked the Pont Royal. The action then became general, but it could not last long; the place was too well defended to be taken by assault. After an hour's fighting the sectionaries were driven from Saint Roche and the Rue Saint Honoré by the cannon of the convention

and the battalion of patriots. The column of the Pont Royal received three discharges of artillery in front and on the side, from the bridge and the quays, which put it entirely to flight. At seven o'clock the conventional troops, victorious on all sides, took the offensive; by nine o'clock they had dislodged the sectionaries from the Théâtre de la République and the posts they still occupied in the neighborhood of the Palais Royal. They prepared to make barricades during the night, and several volleys were fired in the Rue de la Loi (Richelieu) to prevent the works. The next day, the 14th, the troops of the convention disarmed the Lepelletier section and compelled the others to return to order.⁶

The assembly, which had only fought in its own defense, displayed much moderation. The 13th Vendémiaire was the August 10 of the royalists against the republic, except that the convention resisted the bourgeoisie much better than the throne resisted the faubourgs. The position of France contributed very much to this victory. Men now wished for a republic without a revolutionary government, a moderate régime without a counter-revolution. The convention, which was a mediatory power, pronounced alike against the exclusive domination of the lower class, which it had thrown off in Prairial, and the reactionary domination of the bourgeoisie, which it repelled in Vendémiaire, seemed alone capable of satisfying this twofold want, and of putting an end to the state of warfare between the two parties, which was prolonged by their alternate entrance into the government. This situation, as well as its own dangers, gave it courage to resist and secured its triumph. The sections could not take it by surprise, and still less could they take it by assault.

After the events of Vendémiaire the convention occupied itself with forming the councils and the directory. The third part, freely elected, had been favorable to reaction. A few conventionalists, headed by Tallien, proposed to annul the elections of this third, and wished to suspend, for a longer time, the conventional government. Thibaudeau exposed their design with much courage and eloquence. The whole conventional party adopted his opinion. It rejected all superfluous arbitrary sway, and showed itself impatient to leave the provisional state it had been in for the last

⁶ The royalists lost about two hundred men. Upon this revolt the following references may be consulted: Von Sybel, "French Revolution," vol. IV. p. 412-426; Thiers, "French Revolution," vol. III. pp. 312-332; Buchez et Roux, "*Histoire Parlementaire*," vol. XXXVI. pp. 405-484.

three years. The convention established itself as a national electoral assembly, in order to complete the two-thirds from among its members. It then formed the councils; that of the ancients, of 250 members, who according to the new law had completed forty years; that of five hundred, from among the others. The councils met in the Tuileries. They then proceeded to form the government.

The attack of Vendémiaire was quite recent; and the republican party, especially dreading the counter-revolution, agreed to choose the directors only from the conventionalists, and further from among those of them who had voted for the death of the king. Some of the most influential members, among whom was Daunou, opposed this view, which restricted the choice and continued to give the government a dictatorial and revolutionary character; but it prevailed. The conventionalists thus elected were La Réveillère-Lepeaux, invested with public confidence on account of his courageous conduct on May 31, for his probity and his moderation; Sieyès, the man who of all others enjoyed the greatest celebrity of the day; Rewbel, possessed of great administrative ability; Le-Tourneur, one of the members of the commission of five during the last crisis; and Barras, chosen for his two pieces of good fortune of Thermidor and Vendémiaire. Sieyès, who had refused to take part in the legislative commission of the eleven, also refused to enter under the directory. It is difficult to say whether this reluctance arose from calculation or an insurmountable antipathy for Rewbel. He was replaced by Carnot, the only member of the former committee whom they were disposed to favor, on account of his political purity and his great share in the victories of the republic. Such was the first composition of the directory. On the 4th Brumaire the convention passed a law of amnesty, in order to enter on legal government; changed the name of the Place de la Révolution into Place de la Concorde, and declared its session closed.

The convention lasted three years, from September 21, 1792, to October 26, 1795 (4th Brumaire, year IV.). It took several directions. During the six first months of its existence it was drawn into the struggle which arose between the legal party of the Gironde and the revolutionary party of the Mountain. The latter had the lead from May 31, 1793, to the 9th Thermidor, year II., July 26, 1794. The convention then obeyed the committee of

public safety, which first destroyed its old allies of the commune and of the Mountain, and afterward perished through its own divisions. From the 9th Thermidor to the month of Brumaire, year IV., the convention conquered the revolutionary and royalist parties and sought to establish a moderate republic in opposition to both.

During this long and terrible period the violence of the situation changed the revolution into a war, and the assembly into a field of battle. Each party wished to establish its sway by victory and to secure it by founding its system. The Girondist party made the attempt, and perished; the Mountain made the attempt, and perished; the party of the commune made the attempt, and perished; Robespierre's party made the attempt, and perished. They could only conquer, they were unable to found a system. The property of such a storm was to overthrow everything that attempted to become settled. All was provisional; dominion, men, parties, and systems, because the only thing real and possible was—war. A year was necessary to enable the conventional party, on its return to power, to restore the revolution to a legal position; and it could only accomplish this by two victories—that of Prairial and that of Vendémiaire. But the convention having then returned to the point whence it started, and having discharged its true mission, which was to establish the republic after having defended it, disappeared from the theater of the world which it had filled with surprise. A revolutionary power, it ceased as soon as legal order recommenced. Three years of dictatorship had been lost to liberty, but not to the revolution.

The convention is the only legislative body of the revolutionary epoch any portion of whose work was really of a constructive character. As the political ideas and institutions of many states in Europe may be to-day traced to the revolution, so some of the less noticeable institutions of everyday life owe their origin to the legislation of the convention.

The metric system of weight and measures was decreed upon the report of Arbogast, August 1, 1795. According to this system the metre (39.37 inches) with its sub-divisions by tenths, was applied to all measures of length, surface, capacity and weight. The most important reform of the convention, however, was in the matter of public education. To quote its own words, "There shall be created and organized a system of public instruction, common and

free to all citizens, in those parts of education indispensable to all men." In conformity with this programme three sorts of schools were created. First, primary schools in every commune, where reading, writing, and arithmetic were taught, proficiency in which was required for one's name to be inscribed upon the public registers.

Unfortunately, the lack of resources obliged the convention to forego the immediate establishment of many of these schools, but the purpose of the assembly became the realization of France ere many years. Second, central or secondary schools, intended to replace the old colleges. On an average there was to be one for each department, but in Paris two were immediately organized; that of the Quatre Nations, in the Palais Mazarin, and that of the Panthéon, now the Lycée Henri Quatre. In these schools pupils over twelve years of age were received and were taught the ancient languages, mathematics, and the sciences, and a certain amount of philosophy. As with the former class, the idea of the convention was too great to be achieved. Third, special schools or *écoles supérieures*, notably the medical schools of Paris, Strasburg, and Montpellier, the veterinary colleges of Lyons and Alfort, the school of Oriental languages, designed to be of practical utility, but above all the École Normale and the École Polytechnique, created for the education of teachers and destined to exercise a greater influence upon the intellectual development of France than probably any other two educational institutions.

Other educational institutions, famous throughout France and the world to-day, also owe their authorship to the convention: the Conservatory of Music, the Museum of Natural History, the Jardin des Plantes, the Observatory of Astronomical Studies, the Conservatory of Arts and Inventions, the Military Museum, the National Institute for Deaf Mutes, and the Institution of the Blind.

The Bibliothèque Nationale, begun by Charles V., was increased through the operation of a law requiring the deposit with it of two copies of every work printed in France, as well as by the confiscation of the libraries of the suppressed convents, so that it attained at one bound its rank as the largest collection of books in the world. The Archives Nationales received most of the documents formerly dispersed in feudal châteaux and monasteries. The palace of the Louvre, which at the outbreak of the revolution in 1789 was in a

semi-abandoned state, was completely changed by the convention and converted into a great art gallery and museum. The Louvre was enriched by collections of the royal palace, confiscations, and finally by the magnificent donations made to it by Napoleon as the result of his conquests. The organization of the Institute of France by the union of the French Academy, the Academy of Inscriptions, and the Academy of Arts and Sciences, under the name of the Institut National, was also due to the assembly.

PART V

THE DIRECTORY. OCTOBER 26, 1795-
NOVEMBER 10, 1799

Chapter XIV

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DIRECTORY. OCTOBER

26, 1795-SEPTEMBER 5, 1797

THE French Revolution, which had destroyed the old government and thoroughly overturned the old society, had two wholly distinct objects: that of a free constitution and that of a more perfect state of civilization. The six years we have just gone over were the search for government by each of the classes which composed the French nation. The privileged classes wished to establish their régime against the court and the bourgeoisie, by preserving orders and the states-general; the bourgeoisie sought to establish its régime against the privileged classes and the multitude, by the constitution of 1791; and the multitude wished to establish its régime against all the others by the constitution of 1793. Not one of these governments could become consolidated, because they were all exclusive. But during their attempts each class, in power for a time, destroyed of the higher classes all that was intolerant or calculated to oppose the progress of modern civilization.

When the directory succeeded the convention the struggle between the classes was greatly weakened. The higher ranks of each formed a party which still contended for the possession and for the form of government; but the mass of the nation, which had been so profoundly agitated from 1789 to 1795, longed to become settled again, and to arrange itself according to the new order of things. This period witnessed the end of the movement for liberty and the beginning of the movement toward civilization. The revolution now took its second character, its character of order, foundation, repose, after the agitation, the immense toil, and system of complete demolition of its early years.

This second period was remarkable, inasmuch as it seemed a kind of abandonment of liberty. The different parties being no longer able to possess it in an exclusive and durable manner, became discouraged and fell back from public into private life. This

second period divided itself into two epochs: it was liberal under the directory and at the commencement of the consulate, and military at the close of the consulate and under the empire. The revolution daily grew more materialized; after having made a nation of sectaries it made a nation of working men, and then it made a nation of soldiers.

Many illusions were already destroyed; men had passed through so many different states, had lived so much in so few years, that all ideas were confounded and all creeds shaken. The reign of the middle class and that of the multitude had passed away like a rapid phantasmagoria. They were far from that France of July 14, with its deep conviction, its high morality, its assembly exercising the all-powerful sway of liberty and of reason, its popular magistracies, its citizen-guard, its brilliant, peaceable, and animated exterior, wearing the impress of order and independence. They were far from the more somber and more tempestuous France of August 10, when a single class held the government and society, and had introduced therein its language, manners, and costume, the agitation of its fears, the fanaticism of its ideas, the distrust of its position. Then private life entirely gave place to public life; the republic presented, in turn, the aspect of an assembly and of a camp; the rich were subject to the poor; the creed of democracy combined with the gloomy and ragged administration of the people. At each of these periods men had been strongly attached to some idea: first to liberty and constitutional monarchy, afterward to equality, fraternity, and the republic. But at the beginning of the directory there was belief in nothing; in the great shipwreck of parties all had been lost, both the virtue of the bourgeoisie and the virtue of the people.

Men arose from this furious turmoil weakened and wounded, and each, remembering his political existence with terror, plunged wildly into the pleasures and relations of private life which had so long been suspended. Balls, banquets, debauchery, splendid carriages became more fashionable than ever; this was the reaction of the ancient régime. The reign of the sans-culottes brought back the dominion of the rich; the clubs, the return of the salons. For the rest, it was scarcely possible but that the first symptom of the resumption of modern civilization should be thus irregular. The directorial manners were the product of another society, which had to appear again before the new state of society could regulate

its relations and constitute its own manners. In this transition luxury would give rise to labor, stock-jobbing to commerce, salons bring parties together who could not approximate except in private life; in a word, civilization would again usher in liberty.

The situation of the republic was discouraging at the installation of the directory. There existed no element of order or administration. There was no money in the public treasury; couriers were often delayed for want of the small sum necessary to enable them to set out. In the interior anarchy and uneasiness were general; paper currency, in the last stage of discredit, destroyed confidence and commerce; the dearth became protracted, everyone refusing to part with his commodities, for it amounted to giving them away; the arsenals were exhausted or almost empty. Without the armies were destitute of baggage-wagons, horses, and supplies; the soldiers were in want of clothes, and the generals were often unable to liquidate their pay of eight francs a month in specie, an indispensable supplement, small as it was, to their pay in assignats; and lastly, the troops, discontented and undisciplined, on account of their necessities, were again beaten and on the defensive.

Things were at this state of crisis after the fall of the committee of public safety. This committee had foreseen the dearth, and prepared for it, both in the army and in the interior, by the requisitions and the maximum. No one had dared to exempt himself from this financial system, which rendered the wealthy and commercial classes tributary to the soldiers and the multitude, and at that time provisions had not been withheld from the market. But since violence and confiscation had ceased, the people, the convention, and the armies were at the mercy of the landed proprietors and speculators, and terrible scarcity existed, a reaction against the maximum. The system of the convention had consisted, in political economy, in the consumption of an immense capital, represented by the assignats. This assembly had been a rich government, which had ruined itself in defending the revolution. Nearly half the French territory, consisting of domains of the crown, ecclesiastical property, or the estates of the emigrant nobility, had been sold, and the produce applied to the support of the people, who did little labor, and to the external defense of the republic by the armies. More than eight thousand millions of assignats had been issued before the 9th Thermidor, and since that period thirty thousand millions had been added to that sum, already

so enormous. Such a system could not be continued; it was necessary to begin the work again and return to real money.

The men deputed to remedy this great disorganization were, for the most part, of ordinary talent; but they set to work with zeal, courage, and good sense. "When the directors," said Bailleul,¹ "entered the Luxembourg there was not an article of furniture. In a small room, at a little broken table, one leg of which was half eaten away with age, on which they placed some letter-paper and a calumet standish, which they had fortunately brought from the committee of public safety, seated on four straw-bottom chairs, opposite a few logs of dimly-burning wood, the whole borrowed from Dupont, the porter; who would believe that it was in such a condition that the members of the new government, after having investigated all the difficulties, nay, all the horror of their position, resolved that they would face all obstacles, and that they would either perish or rescue France from the abyss into which she had fallen? On a sheet of writing-paper they drew up the act by which they ventured to declare themselves constituted, an act which they immediately dispatched to the legislative chambers."

The directors then proceeded to divide their labors, taking as their guide the grounds which had induced the constitutional party to select them. Rewbel, possessed of great activity, a lawyer versed in government and diplomacy, had assigned to him the departments of law, finance, and foreign affairs. His skill and commanding character soon made him the acting man of the directory in all civil matters. Barras had no special knowledge; his mind was mediocre, his resources few, his habits indolent. In an hour of danger his resolution qualified him to execute sudden measures, like those of Thermidor or Vendémiaire. But being, on ordinary occasions, adapted only for the surveillance of parties, the intrigues of which he was better acquainted with than anyone else, the police department was allotted to him. He was well suited for the task, being supple and insinuating, without partiality for any political sect, and having revolutionary connections by his past life, while his birth gave him access to the aristocracy. Barras took on himself the representation of the directory and established a sort of republican regency at the Luxembourg. The pure and moderate La Réveillère, whose gentleness tempered with courage, whose sincere

¹ "Examen Critique des Considérations de Madame de Staël, sur la Révolution Française," by M. J. Ch. Bailleul, vol. II. pp. 275-281.

attachment for the republic and legal measures had procured him a post in the directory with the general consent of the assembly and public opinion, had assigned to him the moral department, embracing education, the arts, sciences, and manufactures. Le Tourneur, an ex-artillery officer, member of the committee of public safety at the latter period of the convention, had been appointed to the war department. But when Carnot was chosen, on the refusal of Sieyès, he assumed the direction of military operations, and left to his colleague Le Tourneur the navy and the colonies. His high talents and resolute character gave him the upper hand in the directory. Le Tourneur attached himself to him, as La Réveillère to Rewbel, and Barras was between the two. At this period the directors turned their attention with the greatest concord to the improvement and welfare of the state.

The directors frankly followed the route traced out for them by the constitution. After having established authority in the center of the republic they organized it in the departments, and established, as well as they could, a correspondence of design between local administrations and their own. Placed between the two exclusive and dissatisfied parties of Prairial and Vendémiaire, they endeavored, by a decided line of conduct, to subject them to an order of things, holding a place midway between their extreme pretensions. They sought to revive the enthusiasm and order of the first years of the revolution. "You, whom we summon to share our labors," they wrote to their agents, "you who have, with us, to promote the progress of the republican constitution, your first virtue, your first feeling, should be that decided resolution, that patriotic faith, which has also produced its enthusiasts and its miracles. All will be achieved when, by your care, that sincere love of liberty which sanctified the dawn of the revolution, again animates the heart of every Frenchman. The banners of liberty floating on every house, and the republican device written on every door, doubtless form an interesting sight. Obtain more; hasten the day when the sacred name of the republic shall be graven voluntarily on every heart."

In a short time the wise and firm proceedings of the new government restored confidence, labor, and plenty. The circulation of provisions was secured, and at the end of a month the directory was relieved from the obligation to provide Paris with supplies, which it effected for itself. The immense activity created by the

revolution began to be directed toward industry and agriculture. A part of the population quitted the clubs and public places for workshops and fields; and then the benefit of a revolution, which, having destroyed corporations, divided property, abolished privileges, increased fourfold the means of civilization, and was destined to produce prodigious good to France, began to be felt. The directory encouraged this movement in the direction of labor by salutary institutions. It reestablished public exhibitions of the produce of industry and improved the system of education decreed under the convention. The national institute, primary, central, and normal schools formed a complete system of republican institutions. La Réveillère, the director intrusted with the moral department of the government, then sought to establish, under the name of Theophilanthropie, the deistical religion which the committee of public safety had vainly endeavored to establish by the *fête* of the Supreme Being. He provided temples, hymns, forms, and a kind of liturgy for the new religion; but such a faith could only be individual, could not long continue public. The theophilanthropists, whose religion was opposed to the political opinions and the unbelief of the revolutionists, were much ridiculed. Thus, in the passage from public institutions to individual faith all that had been liberty became civilization, and what had been religion became opinion. Deists remained, but theophilanthropists were no longer to be met with.

The directory, pressed for money and shackled by the disastrous state of the finances, had recourse to measures somewhat extraordinary. It had sold or pledged the most valuable articles of the wardrobe in order to meet the greatest urgencies. National property was still left, but it sold badly and for assignats. The directory proposed a compulsory loan, which was decreed by the councils. This was a relic of the revolutionary measures with regard to the rich; but, having been irresolutely adopted, and executed without due authority, it did not succeed. The directory then endeavored to revive paper money; it proposed the issue of *mandats territoriaux*, which were to be substituted for the assignats then in circulation, at the rate of thirty for one, and to take the place of money. The councils decreed the issue of *mandats territoriaux* to the amount of two thousand four hundred millions. They had the advantage of being exchangeable at once and upon presentation for the national domains which represented them.

They caused the sale of a large extent of these, and in this way completed the revolutionary mission of the assignats, of which they were the second period. They procured the directory a momentary resource; but they also lost their credit, and led insensibly to bankruptcy, which was the transition from paper to specie.

The military situation of the republic was not a brilliant one; at the close of the convention there had been an abatement of victories. The equivocal position and weakness of the central authority, as much as the scarcity, had relaxed the discipline of the troops. The generals, too, disappointed that they had distinguished their commands by so few victories, and were not spurred on by an energetic government, became inclined to insubordination. The convention had deputed Pichegru and Jourdan, one at the head of the army of the Rhine, the other with that of the Sambre-et-Meuse, to surround and capture Mayence, in order that they might occupy the whole line of the Rhine. Pichegru made this project completely fail: although possessing the entire confidence of the republic, and enjoying the greatest military fame of the day, he formed counter-revolutionary schemes with the Prince de Condé; but they were unable to agree. Pichegru urged the emigrant prince to enter France with his troops, by Switzerland or the Rhine, promising to remain inactive, the only thing in his power to do in favor of such an attempt. The prince required as a preliminary that Pichegru should hoist the white flag in his army, which was, to a man, republican. This hesitation, no doubt, injured the projects of the reactionists, who were preparing the conspiracy of Vendémiaire. But Pichegru wishing, one way or the other, to serve his new allies and to betray his country, allowed himself to be defeated at Heidelberg, compromised the army of Jourdan, evacuated Mannheim, raised the siege of Mayence with considerable loss, and exposed that frontier to the enemy.

The directory found the Rhine open toward Mayence; the war of La Vendée rekindled; the coasts of France and Holland threatened with a descent from England; lastly, the army of Italy destitute of everything, and merely maintaining the defensive under Scherer and Kellermann. France was really not in a condition to wage offensive war, torn as the country was by political faction and fierce reaction, with its commerce destroyed and agriculture almost at a standstill. The responsibility for the continuation of the war is to be laid upon England and Austria. Both of these powers

believed that France was so exhausted that it would be easily possible to crush out the last vestiges of Jacobinism.²

Carnot prepared a new plan of campaign, which was to carry the armies of the republic to the very heart of the hostile states. Bonaparte, appointed general of the interior after the events of Vendémiaire, was placed at the head of the army of Italy, Jourdan retained the command of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, and Moreau had that of the army of the Rhine, in place of Pichegru. The latter, whose treason was suspected by the directory, though not proved, was offered the embassy to Sweden, which he refused, and retired to Arbois, his native place. The three great armies, placed under the orders of Bonaparte, Jourdan, and Moreau, were to attack the Austrian monarchy by Italy and Germany, combine at the entrance of the Tyrol, and march upon Vienna in echelon. The generals prepared to execute this vast movement, the success of which would make the republic mistress of the headquarters of the coalition on the Continent.

The directory gave to General Hoche the command of the coast, and deputed him to conclude the Vendean war. Hoche changed the system of warfare adopted by his predecessors. La Vendée was disposed to submit. Its previous victories had not led to the success of its cause; defeat and ill-fortune had exposed it to plunder and conflagration. The insurgents, irreparably injured by the disaster of Savenay, by the loss of their principal leader and their best soldiers, by the devastating system of the infernal columns, now desired nothing more than to live on good terms with the republic. The war now depended only on a few chiefs, upon Charette, Stofflet, and others. Hoche saw that it was necessary to wean the masses from these men by concessions and then to crush them. He skillfully separated the royalist cause from the cause of religion and employed the priests against the generals by showing great indulgence to the Catholic religion. He had the country scoured by four powerful columns, took their cattle from the inhab-

² Grenville wrote (to Eden, April 17, 1795): "We can never hope that the circumstances, as far as they regard the state of France, can be more favorable than they are now."—Quoted in Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. p. 98, note. As Fyffe points out in three excellent pages (97-99), it would have been well if every power in Europe had accepted the situation, for the territory gained by France at the treaty of Basel was not more than the balance of power justified, considering the recent partitions of Poland. But Austria and England made an error of judgment at the psychological moment, and on a high wave of militarism Napoleon rode to power.

itants, and only restored them in return for their arms. He left no repose to the armed party, defeated Charette in several encounters, pursued him from one retreat to another, and at last made him prisoner. Stofflet wished to raise the Vendean standard again on his territory, but it was given up to the republicans. These two chiefs, who had witnessed the beginning of the insurrection, were present at its close. They died courageously, Stofflet at Angers, Charette at Nantes, after having displayed character and talents worthy of a larger theater. Hoche likewise tranquilized Brittany. Morbihan was occupied by numerous bands of Chouans, who formed a formidable association, the principal leader of which was Georges Cadoudal. Without entering on a campaign they were mastering the country. Hoche directed all his force and activity against them, and before long had destroyed or exhausted them. Most of their leaders quitted their arms and took refuge in England. The directory on learning these fortunate pacifications formally announced to both councils, on the 28th Messidor (June, 1796), that this civil war was definitely terminated.

In this manner the winter of the year IV. passed away. But the directory could hardly fail to be attacked by the two parties, whose sway was prevented by its existence, the democrats and the royalists. The former constituted an inflexible and enterprising sect. For them the 9th Thermidor was an era of pain and oppression: they desired to establish absolute equality, in spite of the state of society, and democratic liberty, in spite of civilization. This sect had been so vanquished as effectually to prevent its return to power. On the 9th Thermidor it had been driven from the government, on the 2d Prairial from society, and it had lost both power and insurrections. But though disorganized and also proscribed, it was far from having disappeared. After the unfortunate attempt of the royalists in Vendémiaire it arose through their abasement.

The democrats reestablished their club at the Pantheon, which the directory tolerated for some time. They had for their chief "Gracchus" Babœuf, who styled himself the "Tribune of the people." He was a daring man, of an exalted imagination, an extraordinary fanaticism of democracy, and with great influence over his party. In his journal he prepared the reign of general happiness. The society at the Pantheon daily became more numerous, and more alarming to the directory, who at first en-

deavored to restrain it. But the sittings were soon protracted to an advanced hour of the night; the democrats repaired thither in arms and proposed marching against the directory and the councils. The directory determined to oppose them openly. On the 8th Ventôse, year IV. (February, 1796), it closed the society of the Pantheon and on the 9th by a message informed the legislative body that it had done so.

The democrats, deprived of their place of meeting, had recourse to another plan. They seduced the police force, which was chiefly composed of deposed revolutionists, and in concert with it they were to destroy the constitution of the year III. The directory, informed of this new maneuver, disbanded the police force, causing it to be disarmed by other troops on whom it could rely. The conspirators, taken by surprise a second time, determined on a project of attack and insurrection: they formed an insurrectionary committee of public safety, which communicated by secondary agents with the lower orders of the twelve communes of Paris. The members of this principal committee were Babœuf,² the chief of the conspiracy, ex-conventionalists, such as Vadier, Amar, Choudieu, Ricord, the representative Drouet, the former generals of the decemviral committee, Rossignol, Parrein, Fyon, Lami. Many cashiered officers, patriots of the departments, and the old Jacobin mass, composed the army of this faction. The chiefs often assembled in a place they called the Temple of Reason; here they sang lamentations on the death of Robespierre and deplored the slavery of the people. They opened a negotiation with the troops of the camp of Grenelle, admitted among them a captain of that camp, named Grisel, whom they supposed their own, and concerted every measure for the attack.

Their plan was to establish common happiness, and for that purpose to make a distribution of property, and to cause the government of true, pure, and absolute democrats to prevail; to create a convention composed of sixty-eight Mountaineers, the remnant of the numbers proscribed since the reaction of Thermidor, and to join with these a democrat for each department; lastly, to start from the different quarters in which they had distributed themselves, and

² Babœuf was a native of Artois and was of Protestant ancestry. At one time in life he was an engraver. In 1791 he became a member of the directory of the department of the Somme, but was convicted of dishonesty. For a short time during the revolution he published a newspaper known as *Le Tribun du Peuple*.

march at the same time against the directory and against the councils. On the night of the insurrection they were to fix up two placards; one, containing the words, "the constitution of 1793! liberty! equality! common happiness!" the other, containing the following declaration, "Those who usurp the sovereignty ought to be put to death by free men." All was ready, the proclamations printed, the day appointed, when they were betrayed by Grisel as generally happens in conspiracies.

On the 21st Floréal (May), the eve of the day fixed for the attack, the conspirators were seized in their conventicle. In the house of Babœuf were found a plan of the plot and all the documents connected with it. The directory apprised the councils of it by a message and announced it to the people by proclamation. This strange attempt, savoring so strongly of fanaticism, and which could only be a repetition of the insurrection of Prairial, without its means and its hopes of success, excited the greatest terror. The public mind was still terrified with the recent domination of the Jacobins.

Babœuf, like a daring conspirator, prisoner as he was, proposed terms of peace to the directory.

"Would you consider it beneath you, citizen directors," he wrote to them, "to treat with me, as power with power? You have seen what vast confidence centers in me; you have seen that my party may well balance equally in the scale your own; you have seen its immense ramifications. I am convinced you have trembled at the sight." He concluded by saying: "I see but one wise mode of proceeding: declare there has been no serious conspiracy. Five men, by showing themselves great and generous, may now save the country. I will answer for it, that the patriots will defend you with their lives; the patriots do not hate you; they only hated your unpopular measures. For my part, I will give you a guarantee as extensive as is my perpetual franchise." The directors, instead of this reconciliation, published Babœuf's letter and sent the conspirators before the high court of Vendôme.

Their partisans made one more attempt. On the 13th Fructidor (August), about eleven at night, they marched, to the number of six or seven hundred, armed with sabers and pistols, against the directory, whom they found defended by its guard. They then repaired to the camp of Grenelle, which they hoped to gain over by means of a correspondence which they had established with it.

The troops had retired to rest when the conspirators arrived. To the sentinel's cry of "*Qui vive?*" they replied: "*Vive la républicaine! Vive la constitution de '93!*" The sentinels gave the alarm through the camp. The conspirators, relying on the assistance of a battalion from Gard, which had been disbanded, advanced toward the tent of Malo, the commander-in-chief, who gave orders to sound to arms, and commanded his half-dressed dragoons to mount. The conspirators, surprised at this reception, feebly defended themselves; they were cut down by the dragoons or put to flight, leaving many dead and prisoners on the field of battle. This ill-fated expedition was almost the last of the party; with each defeat it lost its force, its chiefs, and acquired the secret conviction that its reign was over. The Grenelle enterprise proved most fatal to it; besides the numbers slain in the fight, many were condemned to death by the military commissions, which were to it what the revolutionary tribunals had been to its foes. The commission of the camp of Grenelle, in five sittings, condemned thirty-one conspirators to death, thirty to transportation, and twenty-five to imprisonment.

Shortly afterward the high court of Vendôme tried Babœuf and his accomplices, among whom were Amar, Vadier, and Darthé, formerly secretary to Joseph Lebon. They none of them belied themselves; they spoke as men who feared neither to avow their object nor to die for their cause. At the beginning and the end of each sitting they sang the "*Marseillaise*." This old song of victory and their firm demeanor struck the public mind with astonishment and seemed to render them still more formidable. Their wives accompanied them to the trial. Babœuf at the close of his defense turned to them and said: "They should accompany them even to Calvary, because the cause of their punishment would not bring them to shame." The high court condemned Babœuf and Darthé to death; as they heard their sentence they both stabbed themselves with a poignard. Babœuf was the last leader of the old commune and the committee of public safety, which had separated previous to Thermidor, and which afterward united again. This party decreased daily. Its dispersion and isolation more especially date from this period. Under the reaction it still formed a compact mass; under Babœuf it maintained the position of a formidable association. From that time democrats existed, but the party was broken up.

In the interim between the Grenelle enterprise and Babœuf's condemnation the royalists also formed their conspiracy. The projects of the democrats produced a movement of opinion contrary to that which had been manifested after Vendémiaire, and the counter-revolutionists in their turn became emboldened. The secret chiefs of this party hoped to find auxiliaries in the troops of the camp of Grenelle, who had repelled the Babœuf faction. This party, impatient and unskillful, unable to employ the sectionary mass, as in Vendémiaire, or the mass of the councils, as at a later period on the 18th Fructidor, made use of three men without either name or influence; the Abbé Brothier, the ex-counselor of parlement, La Vilheurnois, and a sort of adventurer, named Dunan. They applied at once, in all simplicity, to Malo for the camp of Grenelle, in order by its means to restore the ancient régime. Malo delivered them up to the directory, who transferred them to the civil tribunals, not having been able, as he wished, to have them tried by military commissioners. They were treated with much consideration by judges of their party, elected under the influence of Vendémiaire, and the sentence pronounced against them was only a short imprisonment. At this period a contest arose between all the authorities, appointed by the sections, and the directory, supported by the army, each taking its strength and judges wherever its party prevailed; the result was that the electoral power placing itself at the disposition of the counter-revolution, the directory was compelled to introduce the army in the state, which afterward gave rise to serious inconvenience.

The directory, triumphant over the two dissident parties, also triumphed over Europe. The new campaign opened under the most favorable auspices. Bonaparte on arriving at Nice signalized his command by one of the most daring of invasions. Hitherto his army had hovered idly on the side of the Alps; it was destitute of everything,³ and scarcely amounted to 30,000 men; but it was well provided with courage and patriotism; and by their means Bonaparte then commenced that world-astonishment in which he carried all before him for twenty years. He broke up the cantonments, and entered the valley of Savona, in order to march into Italy between the Alps and the Apennines. There were before him 65,000 coalesced troops commanded in the center by Argentaui,

³ The correspondence of Napoleon during the campaign in Italy is eloquent testimony to the truth of this assertion.

by Colli, commander of the Piedmontese troops, on the left, and Beaulieu on the right. This was the line of the Maritime Alps and of the Apennines from Stura to Bochetta. This immense army was dispersed in a few days by prodigies of genius and courage. Napoleon made a feint of attacking Genoa, thus forcing his enemies to strengthen their wings to the disadvantage of the center, through which he drove at the battle of Montenotte, April 12, 1796, which crushed the Austrians, and the day following, at Millesimo, he entirely divided the Sardinian from the Austrian army, and defeated the Piedmontese at Diego, thus achieving the separation of the allies. They hastened to defend Turin and Milan, the capitals of their domination. Before pursuing the Austrians the republican general threw himself on the left to cut off the Sardinian army. The fate of Piedmont was decided at Mondovi, and the terrified court of Turin hastened to submit. At Cherasco an amnesty was concluded, which was soon afterward followed by a treaty of peace, signed at Paris, on May 15, 1796, between the republic and the King of Sardinia, who ceded Savoy and the countries of Nice and Tenda. The occupation of Alexandria, which opened the Lombard country; the demolition of the fortresses of Susa and of Brunette, on the borders of France; the abandonment of the country of Nice, and of the Savoy, and the rendering available the other army of the Alps, under Kellermann, was the reward of a fortnight's campaign and six victories. Savoy was also forced to pay a money indemnity and to engage to take no part in any league against France.

War being over with Piedmont, Bonaparte marched against the Austrian army, to which he left no repose. He passed the Po at Piacenza, May 6, and the Adda at Lodi, May 10, 1796. The latter victory opened the gates of Milan, May 14, and secured him the possession of Lombardy. General Beaulieu was driven into the defiles of the Tyrol by the republican army, which invested Mantua (in June) and appeared on the mountains of the empire. General Wurmser came to replace Beaulieu, and a new army was sent to join the wrecks of the conquered one. Wurmser advanced to deliver Mantua, and once more make Italy the field of battle; but he was overpowered, like his predecessor, by Bonaparte, who, after having raised the blockade of Mantua, in order to oppose this new enemy, renewed it with increased vigor, and resumed his positions in the Tyrol. The plan of invasion was executed with much union

1796

and success. While the army of Italy threatened Austria by the Tyrol, the two armies of the Meuse and Rhine entered Germany; Moreau, supported by Jourdan on his left, was ready to join Bonaparte on his right. The two armies had passed the Rhine at Neuwied and Strasburg, and had advanced on a front drawn up in echelons to the distance of sixty leagues, driving back the enemy, who, while retreating before them, strove to impede their march and break their line. They had almost attained the aim of their enterprise; Moreau had entered Ulm and Augsburg, crossed the Lech, and his advanced guard was on the extreme of the defiles of the Tyrol, when Jourdan, who had beaten the Austrians at Altenkirchen, in Rhenish Prussia, in June, 1796, and then marched by way of Frankfort, Wurzburg, and Bamberg into south Germany, with the intention of joining Moreau, who had crossed the Rhine, beaten the Archduke Charles at Rastatt and Baden and at Nerscheim in Wurtemberg, passed beyond the line, was attacked by the Archduke Charles and completely routed. If Jourdan and Moreau could have united, the archduke would have been lost, but in his extremity the Austrian commander performed a daring maneuver. At the risk of allowing Moreau to advance into Bavaria and so unite with Napoleon, who was expected to strike Germany through the Tyrol, the archduke left only a small detachment to oppose the advance of Moreau, and uniting the bulk of his army to that of Wartensleben, he threw himself upon Jourdan with double the forces of the French. Jourdan had no other recourse but retreat. Rid of the danger of Jourdan, the archduke turned again upon Moreau, in Bavaria, who, for fear of being cut off from France, was obliged to retreat. For twenty-six days the French fell back through the Black Forest, and ultimately crossed the Rhine. The repulse of Jourdan was a capital one: it prevented the success of this vast plan of campaign and gave respite to the Austrian government.

The cabinet of Vienna, which had lost Belgium in this war, and which felt the importance of preserving Italy, defended it with the greatest obstinacy. Wurmser, after a new defeat, was obliged to throw himself into Mantua with the wreck of his army. General Alvinczy, at the head of 50,000 Hungarians now came to try his fortune, while his lieutenant made a detour around the Lake of Garda, to the west, in order to cut off the retreat of the French. Bonaparte profited by this division of his enemies; reasoning that

he could beat the two armies one after the other, he raised the siege of Mantua, defeated Quasdanovitch in two engagements (July 30, August 4, 1796), and then fell upon Wurmser at Castiglione, before the two opposing armies had time to unite, and forced Wurmser to recross the Mincio and to retire to the Tyrol. The French army, before the battle of Castiglione, August 5, 1796, was in so critical a condition that Napoleon called a council of war—the only one which he is said ever to have consulted. All of his staff, even Massena, advised a retreat. Augereau alone was in favor of attacking the enemy at daybreak. Napoleon, after listening to all his officers, said to the latter: "*Eh bien! Je resterai avec toi,*" and dismissed the conference. The checkmate of Jour-



dan and Moreau in Germany had enabled Austria to send reinforcements to Wurmser, under Alvinczy, who descended the Adige with 40,000 men, while another general, Provera, with 20,000, planned to effect a junction with Wurmser, who had returned from the Tyrol and been able to throw himself into Mantua on September 12. The resulting actions, Arcole (November 15-17, 1796), Rivoli (January 14-15, 1797), between Lake Garda and the Adige, were almost decisive. Napoleon had 56,000 men, not all of whom were available, however, since many were engaged in the siege of Mantua. But by managing to keep his enemies separated from one another, Napoleon was enabled to crush them in detail, and all the efforts of Austria to relieve Mantua failed. Finally, after having been reduced to the necessity of killing his horses for food, Wurmser capitulated on February 2, 1797, surrendering Mantua with 13,000 prisoners and 350 pieces of artillery. It was this dis-

aster that opened the way to Vienna and forced the capitulation of Leoben.

The army of Italy accomplished in Europe the work of the French Revolution. This wonderful campaign was owing to the union of a general of genius and an intelligent army. Bonaparte had for lieutenants generals capable of commanding themselves, who knew how to take upon themselves the responsibility of a movement or a battle, and an army of citizens all possessing cultivated minds, deep feeling, strong emulation of all that is great; passionately attached to a revolution which aggrandized their country, preserved their independence under discipline, and which afforded an opportunity to every soldier of becoming a general. There is nothing which a leader of genius might not accomplish with such men. He must have regretted, at this recollection of his earlier years, that he ever centered in himself all liberty and intelligence, that he ever created mechanical armies, and generals only fit to obey. Bonaparte began the third epoch of the war. The campaign of 1792 had been made on the old system, with dispersed corps acting separately without abandoning their fixed line. The committee of public safety concentrated the corps, made them operate no longer merely on what was before them, but at a distance; it hastened their movement and directed them toward a common end. Bonaparte did for each battle what the committee had done for each campaign. He brought all these corps on the determinate point, and destroyed several armies with a single one by the rapidity of his measures. He disposed of whole masses of troops at his pleasure, moved them here or there, brought them forward or kept them out of sight, had them wholly at his disposition, when, where, and how he pleased, whether to occupy a position or to gain a battle. His diplomacy was as superior as his military science.

Napoleon's military successes are largely due to the fact that he utilized new conditions of warfare for a new strategy. He rarely wasted time in sieges. He never made but two in his life, at Mantua and at St. Jean d'Acre; he did not handle his army in separated columns, but on the contrary concentrated his forces; for, as he says in a "*Rapport sur la Position des Armées du Piémont et d'Espagne*," of 1794, the essential is not to scatter attacks, but to concentrate them. His purpose almost invariably was to throw all his forces upon a given point and break it through, and then,

after attacking the main army, to attack and disperse the wings. This strategy, of which Bonaparte has much to say in his writings and in reported conversations, was revolutionary of the art of war, hitherto grounded upon the practices of Frederick the Great. His four maxims of warfare were: "Scatter to forage; concentrate to fight; unity of command is essential; time is everything."

These tactics were applied in Italy in 1796-1797, and Napoleon rarely departed from them. A notable exception is at Marengo, June 14, 1800, where there were really two battles fought, the first, which Napoleon lost, the second, which Desaix won.

All the Italian governments, except Venice and Genoa, had adhered to the coalition, but the people were in favor of the French republic. Bonaparte relied upon the latter. He abolished Piedmont, which he could not conquer; transformed the Milanese, hitherto dependent on Austria, into the Cisalpine republic; he weakened Tuscany and the petty principalities of Parma and Modena by contributions, without dispossessing them; the Pope, who had signed a truce on Bonaparte's first success against Beau-lieu, and who did not hesitate to infringe it on the arrival of Wurmser, bought peace by yielding Romagna, Bologna, and Ferrara,⁴ which were joined to the Cisalpine republic; lastly, the aristocracy of Venice and Genoa having favored the coalition, and raised an insurrection in the rear of the army, their government was changed, and Bonaparte made it democratic in order to oppose the power of the people to that of the nobility. In this way the revolution penetrated into Italy.

Napoleon's double dealing with reference to Venice is one of the most notorious examples of his policy. He flattered the Venetian senate at the very minute he was planning its destruction. "I shall do everything in my power," he wrote to the seignory, "to give you proof of the great desire I have to see your liberty take root and to see this unhappy Italy, freed from the rule of the stranger, at length take its place with glory on the world's stage and resume among the great nations the rank to which nature, destiny, and its own position call it." At the same time he wrote to the home government, on May 26, 1797: "Venice, which has been

⁴ After the fall of Mantua, the Pope, who hitherto had been hostile to the French, sued for peace. Napoleon granted it at Tolentino, upon the payment of 30,000,000 francs, the cession of Avignon to France, and that of Bologna, Ferrara, Ancona, and the entire Romagna, to form the Cisalpine republic, February 19, 1797. Cf. the remarks of Fyffe, "Modern Europe," pp. 135-136.

in decline since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the rise of Trieste and Ancona, can scarcely survive the blows we have just struck. With a cowardly and helpless population, in no way fit for liberty, without territory and without rivers, it is but natural that she should go to those to whom we give the mainland."

Austria, by the preliminaries of Leoben, ceded Belgium to France and recognized the Lombard republic. All the confederate powers had laid down their arms, and England asked to treat; France, peaceable and free at home, had without attained her natural limits, and was surrounded by rising republics, which, such as Holland, Lombardy, and Liguria, guarded its sides and extended its system in Europe. The coalition was little disposed to assail anew a revolution all the governments of which were victorious: that of anarchy after August 10, of the dictatorship after May 31, and of legal authority under the directory; a revolution which at every new hostility advanced a step further upon European territory. In 1792 it had only extended to Belgium; in 1794 it had reached Holland and the Rhine; in 1796 had reached Italy and entered Germany. If it continued its progress the coalition had reason to fear that it would carry its conquests further. Everything seemed prepared for general peace.

But the situation of the directory was materially changed by the elections of the year V. (May, 1797). These elections, by introducing in a legal way the royalist party into the legislature and government, brought again into question what the conflict of Vendémiaire had decided. Up to this period a good understanding had existed between the directory and the councils. Composed of conventionalists, united by a common interest, and the necessity of establishing the republic, after having been blown about by the winds of all parties, they had manifested much good will in their intercourse, and much union in their measures. The councils had yielded to the various demands of the directory; and with the exception of a few slight modifications they had approved its projects concerning the finance and the administration, its conduct with regard to the conspiracies, the armies, and Europe. The anti-conventional minority had formed an opposition in the councils; but this opposition, while waiting the reinforcement of a new third, had but cautiously contended against the policy of the directory. At its head were Barbé-Marbois, Pastoret, Vaublanc, Dumas, Portalis, Siméon, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Dupont de Nemours, most

of them members of the Right in the legislative assembly, and some of them avowed royalists. Their position soon became less equivocal and more aggressive by the addition of the elected of the year V.

The royalists formed a formidable and active confederation, having its leaders, agents, budgets, and journals. They excluded republicans from the elections, influenced the masses, who always follow the most energetic party, and whose banner they momentarily assume. They would not even admit patriots of the first epoch, and only elected decided counter-revolutionists or equivocal constitutionalists. The republican party was then placed in the government and in the army, the royalist party in the electoral assemblies and the councils.

On the 1st Prairial, year V. (May 20), the two councils opened their sittings. From the beginning they manifested the spirit which actuated them. Pichegru, whom the royalists transferred on to the new field of battle of the counter-revolution, was enthusiastically elected president of the council of the five hundred. Barbé-Marbois⁵ had given him, with the same eagerness, the presidency of the elder council. The legislative body proceeded to appoint a director to replace Le Tourneur, who on the 30th Floréal had been fixed on by ballot as the retiring member. Their choice fell on Barthélemy, the ambassador to Switzerland, whose moderate views and attachment to peace suited the councils and Europe, but who was scarcely adapted for the government of the republic, owing to his absence from France during all the revolution.

These first hostilities against the directory and the conventional party were followed by more actual attacks. Its administration and policy were now attacked without scruple. The directory had done all it had been able to do by a legal government in a situation still revolutionary. It was blamed for continuing the war and for the disorder of the financial department. The legislative majority skillfully turned its attention to the public wants; it supported the entire liberty of the press, which allowed journalists to attack the directory, and to prepare the way for another system; it supported peace because it would lead to the disarming of the republic, and lastly, it supported economy.

⁵ Barbé-Marbois was secretary of the French legation in the United States during the American Revolution. He rose to the position of minister of finance under Napoleon, who intrusted to him the negotiations culminating in the sale of Louisiana to the United States during the administration of Jefferson.

These demands were in one sense useful and national. France was weary and felt the need of all these things in order to complete its social restoration; accordingly, the nation half adopted the views of the royalists, but from entirely different motives. It saw with rather more anxiety the measures adopted by the councils relative to priests and emigrants. A pacification was desired; but the nation did not wish that the conquered foes of the revolution should return triumphant. The councils passed the laws with regard to them with great precipitation. They justly abolished the sentence of transportation or imprisonment against priests for matters of religion or incivism; but they wished to restore the ancient prerogatives of their form of worship; to render Catholicism, already reëstablished, outwardly manifest by the use of bells, and to exempt priests from the oath of public functionaries. Camille Jordan, a young Lyonnese deputy, full of eloquence and courage, but professing unreasonable opinions, was the principal panegyrist of the clergy in the younger council. The speech which he delivered on this subject excited great surprise and violent opposition. The little enthusiasm that remained was still entirely patriotic, and all were astonished at witnessing the revival of another enthusiasm, that of religion: the last century and the revolution had made men entirely unaccustomed to it, and prevented them from understanding it. This was the moment when the old party revived its creed, introduced its language, and mingled them with the creed and language of the reform party, which had hitherto prevailed alone. The result was, as is usual with all that is unexpected, an unfavorable and ridiculous impression against Camille Jordan, who was nicknamed "Jordan-Carillon, Jordan-les-Cloches." The attempt of the protectors of the clergy did not, however, succeed; and the council of five hundred did not venture as yet to pass a decree for the use of bells or to make the priests independent. After some hesitation the moderate party joined the directorial party and supported the civic oath with cries of "*Vive la république!*"

Meantime hostilities continued against the directory, especially in the council of five hundred, which was more zealous and impatient than that of the ancients. All this greatly emboldened the royalist faction in the interior. The counter-revolutionary reprisals against the patriots and those who had acquired national property were renewed. Emigrant and dissentient priests returned

in crowds, and being unable to endure anything savoring of the revolution, they did not conceal their projects for its overthrow. The directorial authority, threatened in the center and disowned in the departments, became wholly powerless.

But the necessity of defense, the anxiety of all men who were devoted to the directory, and especially to the revolution, gave courage and support to the government. The aggressive progress of the councils brought their attachment to the republic into suspicion; and the mass, which had at first supported, now forsook them. The constitutionalists of 1791 and the directorial party formed an alliance. The club of Salm, established under the auspices of this alliance, was opposed to the club of Clichy, which for a long time had been the rendezvous of the most influential members of the councils. The directory, while it had recourse to opinion, did not neglect its principal force—the support of the troops. It brought near Paris several regiments of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, commanded by Hoche. The constitutional radius of six myriamètres (twelve leagues), which the troops could not legally pass, was violated; and the councils denounced this violation to the directory, which feigned an ignorance, wholly disbelieved, and made very weak excuses.

The two parties were watching each other. One had its posts at the directory, at the club of Salm, and in the army; the other, in the councils, at Clichy, and in the salons of the royalists. The mass were spectators. Each of the two parties was disposed to act in a revolutionary manner toward the other. An intermediate constitutional and conciliatory party tried to prevent the struggle, and to bring about a union, which was altogether impossible. Carnot was at its head: a few members of the younger council, directed by Thibaudeau, and a tolerably large number of the ancients, seconded his projects of moderation. Carnot, who at that period was the director of the constitution, with Barthélemy, who was the director of the legislature, formed a minority in the government. Carnot, very austere in his conduct and very obstinate in his views, could not agree either with Barras or with the imperious Rewbel. To this opposition of character was then added difference of system. Barras and Rewbel, supported by La Réveillère, were not at all averse to a *coup d'état* against the councils, while Carnot wished strictly to follow the law. This great citizen, at each epoch of the revolution, had perfectly seen the mode

of government which suited it, and his opinion immediately became a fixed idea. Under the committee of public safety the dictatorship was his fixed system, and under the directory, legal government. Recognizing no difference of situation, he found himself placed in an equivocal position; he wished for peace in a moment of war; and for law, in a moment of *coups d'état*.

The councils, alarmed at the preparations of the directory, seemed to make the dismissal of a few ministers, in whom they placed no confidence, the price of reconciliation. These were Merlin de Douai, the minister of justice; Lacroix, minister of foreign affairs, and Ramel, minister of finance. On the other hand, they desired to retain Petiet as minister of war, Bénésech as minister of the interior, and Cochon de l'Apparent as minister of police. The legislative body in default of directorial power wished to make sure of the ministry. Far from falling in with this wish, which would have introduced the enemy into the government, Rewbel, La Réveillère, and Barras dismissed the ministers protected by the councils, and retained the others. Bénésech was replaced by François de Neufchateau, Petiet by Hoche, and soon afterward by Scherer; Cochon de l'Apparent by Lenoir-Laroche, and Lenoir-Laroche, who had too little decision, by Sotin. Talleyrand likewise formed part of this ministry. He had been struck off the list of emigrants from the close of the conventional session, as a revolutionist of 1791, and his great sagacity, which always placed him with the party having the greatest hope of victory, made him at this period a directorial republican. He held the portfolio of Lacroix, and he contributed very much by his counsels and his daring to the events of Fructidor.

War now appeared more and more inevitable. The directory did not wish for a reconciliation, which, at the best, would only have postponed its downfall and that of the republic to the elections of the year VI. It caused threatening addresses against the councils to be sent from the armies. Bonaparte had watched with an anxious eye the events which were preparing in Paris. Though intimate with Carnot, and corresponding directly with him, he had sent Lavalette, his aide-de-camp, to furnish him with an account of the divisions in the government, and the intrigues and conspiracies with which it was beset. Bonaparte had promised the directory the support of his army in case of actual danger. He sent Augereau to Paris with addresses from his troops. "Tremble,

royalists!" said the soldiers. "From the Adige to the Seine is but a step. Tremble! Your iniquities are numbered; and their recompense is at the end of our bayonets."—"We have observed with indignation," said the staff, "the intrigues of royalty threatening liberty. By the *manes* of the heroes slain for our country, we have sworn implacable war against royalty and royalists. Such are our sentiments; they are yours, and those of all patriots. Let the royalists show themselves, and their days are numbered." The councils protested, but in vain, against these deliberations of the army. General Richepanse, who commanded the troops arrived from the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, stationed them at Versailles, Meudon, and Vincennes.

The councils had been assailants in Prairial, but as the success of their cause might be put off to the year VI., when it might take place without risk or combat, they kept on the defensive after Thermidor (July, 1797). They, however, then made every preparation for the contest; they gave orders that the constitutional circles should be closed, with a view to getting rid of the club of Salm; they also increased the powers of the commission of inspectors of the hall, which became the government of the legislative body, and of which the two royalist conspirators, Willot and Pichegru, formed part. The guard of the councils, which was under the control of the directory, was placed under the immediate orders of the inspectors of the hall. At last, on the 17th Fructidor, the legislative body thought of procuring the assistance of the militia of Vendémiaire, and it decreed, on the motion of Pichegru, the formation of the national guard. On the following day, the 18th (September 4, 1797), this measure was to be executed, and the councils were by a decree to order the troops to remove to a distance. They had reached a point that rendered a new victory necessary to decide the great struggle of the revolution and the ancient system. The impetuous General Willot wished them to take the initiative, to decree the impeachment of the three directors, Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère; to cause the other two to join the legislative body; if the government refused to obey, to sound the tocsin, and march with the old sectionaries against the directory; to place Pichegru at the head of this legal insurrection, and to execute all these measures promptly, boldly, and at midday. Pichegru is said to have hesitated; and the opinion of the undecided prevailing, the tardy course of legal preparations was adopted.

It was not, however, the same with the directory. Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère determined instantly to attack Carnot, Barthélemy, and the legislative majority. The morning of the 18th was fixed on for the execution of this *coup d'état*. During the night the troops encamped in the neighborhood of Paris entered the city under the command of Augereau. It was the design of the directorial triumvirate to occupy the Tuileries with troops before the assembling of the legislative body, in order to avoid a violent expulsion; to convoke the councils in the neighborhood of the Luxembourg, after having arrested their principal leaders, and by a legislative measure to accomplish a *coup d'état* begun by force. It was in agreement with the minority of the councils and relied on the approbation of the mass. The troops reached the Hôtel de Ville at one in the morning and spread themselves over the quays, the bridges, and the Champs Elysées, and before long 12,000 men and forty pieces of cannon surrounded the Tuileries. At four o'clock the alarm-shot was fired, and Augereau presented himself at the gate of the Pont Tournant.

The guard of the legislative body was under arms. The inspectors of the hall, apprised the night before of the movement in preparation, had repaired to the national palace (the Tuileries) to defend the entrance. Ramel, commander of the legislative guard, was devoted to the councils, and he had stationed his 800 grenadiers in the different avenues of the garden, shut in by gates. But Pichegru, Willot, and Ramel could not resist the directory with this small and uncertain force. Augereau had no need even to force the passage of the Pont Tournant: as soon as he came before the grenadiers he cried out: "Are you republicans?" The latter lowered their arms and replied: "*Vive Augereau! Vive la direction!*" and joined him. Augereau traversed the garden, entered the hall of the councils, arrested Pichegru, Willot, Ramel, and all the inspectors of the hall, and had them conveyed to the Temple.

The members of the councils, convoked in haste by the inspectors, repaired in crowds to their place of sitting; but they were arrested or refused admittance by the armed force. Augereau announced to them that the directory, urged by the necessity of defending the republic from the conspirators among them, had assigned the Odéon and the School of Medicine for the place of their sittings. The greater part of the deputies present exclaimed

against military violence and the dictatorial usurpation, but they were obliged to yield.

At six in the morning this expedition was terminated. The people of Paris on waking found the troops still under arms, and the walls placarded with proclamations announcing the discovery of a formidable conspiracy. The people were exhorted to observe order and confidence. The directory had printed a letter of General Moreau, in which he announced in detail the plots of his predecessor Pichegru with the emigrants, and another letter from the Prince de Condé to Imbert Colomés, a member of the ancients. The entire population remained quiet; a mere spectator of an event brought about without the interference of parties, and by the assistance of the army only, it displayed neither approbation nor regret.

The directory felt the necessity of legalizing, and more especially of terminating, this extraordinary act. As soon as the members of the five hundred and of the ancients were assembled at the Odéon and the School of Medicine in sufficient numbers to debate, they determined to sit permanently. A message from the directory announced the motive which had actuated all its measures. "Citizens legislators," ran the message, "if the directory had delayed another day, the republic would have been given up to its enemies. The very place of your sittings was the rendezvous of the conspirators; from there they yesterday distributed their plans and orders for the distribution of arms; from there they corresponded last night with their accomplices; lastly, from there, or in the neighborhood, they again endeavored to raise clandestine and seditious assemblies, which the police at this moment is employed in dispersing. We should have compromised the public welfare, and that of its faithful representatives, had we suffered them to remain confounded with the foes of the country in the den of conspiracy." The younger council appointed a commission, composed of Sieyès, Poulain-Granpré, Villers, Chazal, and Boulay de la Meurthe, deputed to present a law of public safety. The law was a measure of ostracism; only transportation was substituted for the scaffold in this second revolutionary and dictatorial period.

The members of the five hundred sentenced to transportation were: Aubri, J. J. Aimé, Bayard, Blain, Boissy d'Anglas, Borne, Bourdon de l'Oise, Cadroy, Couchery, Delahaye, Delarue, Duméne, Dumolard, Duplantier, Gibert, Desmolières, Henri la Ri-

vière, Imbert Colomés, Camille Jordan, Jourdan (des Bouches du Rhône) Gall, La Carrière, Lemarchand-Gomicourt, Lemérer, Mer-san, Madier, Maillard, Noailles, André, Mac-Cartin, Pavie, Pas-toret, Pichegru, Polissard, Prairie-Montaud, Quatremère-Quency, Saladin, Siméon, Vauvilliers, Vienot-Vaublanc, Villaret-Joyeuse, Willot. In the council of ancients: Barbé-Marbois, Dumas, Fer-raud-Vaillant, Lafond-Ladebat, Laumont, Muriare, Murinais, Paradis, Portalis, Rovère, Tronçon-Ducoudray. In the directory: Carnot and Barthélemy. They also condemned the Abbé Brothier, La Villeheurnois, Dunan, ex-minister of police Cochon; ex-agent of the police Dossonville, Generals Miranda and Morgan; the journalist, Suard; the ex-conventionalist Mailhe; and the commander Ramel. A few of the proscribed succeeded in evading the decree of exile; Carnot was among the number. Most of them were transported to Cayenne, but a great many did not leave the Isle of Ré.

The directory greatly extended this act of ostracism. The publishers of thirty-five journals were included in the sentence of transportation. It wished to strike at once all the avenues of the republic in the councils, in the press, in the electoral assemblies, the departments, in a word, wherever they had introduced themselves. The elections of forty-eight departments were annulled, the laws in favor of priests and emigrants were revoked, and soon after-ward the disappearance of all who had swayed in the departments since the 9th Thermidor raised the spirits of the cast-down repub-lican party. The *coup d'état* of Fructidor was not purely central; like the victory of Vendémiaire, it ruined the royalist party, which had only been repulsed by the preceding defeat. But, by again replacing the legal government by the dictatorship, it rendered another revolution necessary, of which we shall presently speak.

We may say that on the 18th Fructidor of the Year V. it was necessary that the directory should triumph over the counter-revo-lution by decimating the councils; or that the councils should triumph over the republic by overthrowing the directory. The question thus stated, it remains to inquire, first, if the directory could have conquered by any other means than a *coup d'état*; second, whether it misused its victory.⁶

The government had not the power of dissolving the councils.

⁶ Upon the 18th Fructidor, see Lanfrey, "Life of Napoleon," vol. I. pp. 211-232; Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. pp. 143-152.

At the termination of a revolution, whose object was to establish the extreme Right, they were unable to invest a secondary authority with the control of the sovereignty of the people, and in certain cases to make the legislature subordinate to the directory. This concession of an experimental policy not existing, what means remained to the directory of driving the enemy from the heart of the state? No longer able to defend the revolution by virtue of the law, it had no resource but the dictatorship; but in having recourse to that, it broke the conditions of its existence; and while saving the revolution, it soon fell itself.

As for its victory, it sullied it with violence by endeavoring to make it too complete. The sentence of transportation was extended to too many victims; the petty passions of men mingled with the defense of the cause, and the directory did not manifest that reluctance to arbitrary measures which is the only justification of *coups d'état*. To attain its object it should have exiled the leading conspirators only; but it rarely happens that a party does not abuse the dictatorship, and that, possessing the power, it believes not in the dangers of indulgence. The defeat of the 18th Fructidor was the fourth of the Royalist party; two took place in order to dispossess it of power, those of July 14 and August 10; two to prevent its resuming it, those of the 13th Vendémiaire and 18th Fructidor. This repetition of powerless attempts and protracted reverses did not a little contribute to the submission of this party under the consulate and the empire.

Chapter XV

FALL OF THE DIRECTORY

SEPTEMBER 5, 1797-NOVEMBER 10, 1799

THE chief result of the 18th Fructidor was a return, with slight mitigation, to the revolutionary government. The two ancient privileged classes were again excluded from society; the dissentient priests were again banished. The Chouans and former fugitives, who occupied the field of battle in the departments, abandoned it to the old republicans: those who had formed part of the military household of the Bourbons, the superior officers of the crown, the members of the parlements, commanders of the order of the Holy Ghost and Saint Louis, the Knights of Malta, all those who had protested against the abolition of nobility, and who had preserved its titles, were to quit the territory of the republic. The *ci-devant* nobles, or those ennobled, could only enjoy the rights of citizens, after a term of seven years, and after having gone through a sort of apprenticeship as Frenchmen. This party by desiring sway restored the dictatorship.

At this period the directory attained its maximum of power; for some time it had no enemies in arms. Delivered from all internal opposition, it imposed the continental peace on Austria by the Treaty of Campo-Formio (October, 1797), and on the empire by the congress of Rastatt. The provisions of the Treaty of Campo-Formio included the following: (1) Austria ceded Belgium to France. (2) In return for this cession France gave Austria the conquered territory of Venice, with Istria and Dalmatia, but retaining (3) the Ionian Islands. (4) Austria recognized the Cisalpine republic, and (5) agreed to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine from Basel to Andernach with free French navigation of the river. (6) A congress to be called at Rastatt was to settle the details of this peace. It was understood, just as in the treaty of 1795, that the losing Rhine princes were to receive indemnification in Germany for secularization, and there was a secret agreement that France was to use her influence at the conference to secure to Austria Salzburg and the Bavarian Tyrol, in order to increase

Austria's new acquisitions of territory as much as those of Prussia and Russia through the partition of Poland.

The events in Italy gave a new face to things. To the just demands and legitimate reprisals made in the beginning of the war were added the conquest and exploitation of a conquered country. By arbitrarily distributing the territory of Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, the directory set the bad example of this traffic in nations since but too much followed. Besides, the Austrian dominion would sooner or later extend in Italy, through this imprudent cession of Venice. To France, war had become both a means of existence and a source of profit. The armies increased the depleted resources of the directory and hence had acquired an enormous influence in the state. Military service, by reason of its profits and its excitement, had ceased to be the fulfillment of a patriotic duty, and had become a profession all too cynically pursued. The correspondence between the directory and Napoleon affords ample evidence of the truth of this statement.

The coalition of 1792 and 1793 was dissolved; England was the only remaining belligerent power. The cabinet of London was not at all disposed to cede to France, which it had attacked, in the hope of weakening it, Belgium, Luxembourg, Porentruy, Nice, Savoy, the protectorate of Piedmont, Genoa, Milan, and Holland. But finding it necessary to appease the English opposition, and reorganize its means of attack, it made propositions of peace; it sent Lord Malmesbury as plenipotentiary, first to Paris, then to Lille. But the offers of Pitt not being sincere, the directory did not allow itself to be deceived by his diplomatic stratagems. The negotiations were twice broken off, and war continued between the two powers. While England negotiated at Lille, she was preparing at St. Petersburg the triple alliance, or second coalition.¹

¹England was the soul of the coalition. Upon the Continent she supported the war by subsidies furnished to the enemies of France. On sea she blockaded the French ports and preyed upon French commerce, besides seizing the French colonies of the Antilles, and the Dutch colonies in the East Indies; after the naval defeats of St. Vincent (February 14, 1797), and Camperdown (October 11, 1797) French sea-power was annihilated, and the directory was forced to have recourse to other means of retaliation. The most notable of these was French encouragement of the rebellion in Ireland between 1796 and 1798. In December, 1796, Hoche made an unsuccessful attempt to land in Ireland, being prevented by contrary winds. A new attempt was made in 1797, when 1500 men were landed in Ireland under General Humbert; but within twelve days Humbert was obliged to capitulate, and the whole Irish enterprise ended in failure (September 3).

The directory, on their side, without finances, without any party in the interior, having no support but the army, and no eminence save that derived from the continuation of its victories, was not in a condition to consent to a general peace. It had increased the public discontent by the establishment of certain taxes and the reduction of the debt to a consolidated third, payable in specie only, which had ruined the fundholders. It became necessary to maintain itself by war. The immense body of soldiers could not be disbanded without danger. Besides, being deprived of its power and being placed at the mercy of Europe, the directory had attempted a thing never done without creating a shock, except in times of great tranquillity, of great ease, abundance, and employment. The directory was driven by its position to the invasion of Switzerland and the expedition into Egypt.

Bonaparte had then returned to Paris. The conqueror of Italy and the pacificator of the Continent was received with enthusiasm, constrained on the part of the directory, but deeply felt by the people. Honors were accorded him never yet obtained by any general of the republic. A patriotic altar was prepared in the Luxembourg, and he passed under an arch of standards won in Italy on his way to the triumphal ceremony in his honor. He was harangued by Barras, president of the directory, who, after congratulating him on his victories, invited him to crown so noble a life by a conquest which the great country owed to its insulted dignity. This was the conquest of England. Everything seemed in preparation for a descent, while the invasion of Egypt was really the enterprise in view.

Such an expedition suited both Bonaparte and the directory. The independent conduct of that general in Italy, his ambition, which, from time to time, burst through his studied simplicity, rendered his presence dangerous. He, on his side, feared by his inactivity to compromise the already high opinion entertained of his talents: for men always require from those whom they make great more than they are able to perform. Thus, while the directory saw in the expedition to Egypt the means of keeping a formidable general at a distance, and a prospect of attacking the English by India, Bonaparte saw in it a gigantic conception, an employment suited to his taste, and a new means of astonishing mankind. Napoleon's Egyptian campaign, like the futile attack upon Ireland, was made with the intention of overcoming the sea-

power of England by indirect means. Fantastic as the scheme seems at first glance, it is an error so to consider it, for it really has a direct connection with the traditional policy of France in the eastern Mediterranean and in Asia. In the first place, there was hope of founding in Egypt a new French colony, and through it entirely to dominate the eastern Mediterranean, where for centuries France had had so many interests. Secondly, there was a possibility, in this event, of Egypt being made the basis of operations against the English in India, not only in a military way, but in a commercial as well. Even if this latter portion of the project should prove unsuccessful, Napoleon felt sure, owing to the weak condition of the Turkish empire, of being able to flank Europe in the southeast. Those who so desire may attach whatever importance they wish to the idea ascribed to Napoleon that he was emulous of the career of Alexander the Great. He sailed from Toulon on the 30th Floréal, in the year VI. (May 19, 1798), with a fleet of four hundred sail and a portion of the army of Italy; he steered for Malta, of which he made himself master, and thence to Egypt.²

The directory, who violated the neutrality of the Ottoman Porte in order to attack the English, had already violated that of Switzerland in order to expel the emigrants from its territory. French opinions had already penetrated into Geneva and the Pays de Vaud; but the policy of the Swiss confederation was counter-revolutionary, from the influence of the aristocracy of Berne. They had driven from the cantons all the Swiss who had shown themselves partisans of the French republic. Berne was the headquarters of the emigrants, and it was there that all the plots against the revolution were formed. The directory complained, but did not receive satisfaction. The Vaudois, placed by old treaties under the protection of France, invoked her help against the tyranny of Berne. This appeal of the Vaudois, its own grievances, its desire to extend the directorial republican system to Switzerland, much more than the temptation of seizing the little amount of treasure in Berne, as some have reproached it with, determined the directory. Some conferences took place, which led to no result, and

² In sailing from Toulon Napoleon had been fortunate in avoiding the fleet of Nelson, which was on watch for his own, but which had been obliged to put to sea on account of heavy weather. Malta was the property of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and was occupied on June 10. The French fleet dropped anchor in Aboukir Bay on July 2.

1798

war began. The Swiss defended themselves with much courage and obstinacy, and hoped to resuscitate the times of their ancestors, but eventually succumbed. Geneva was united to France, and Switzerland exchanged its ancient constitution for that of the year III. From that time two parties existed in the confederation, one of which was for France and the revolution, the other for the counter-revolution and Austria. Switzerland ceased to be a common barrier, and became the high road of Europe.

The portion of Switzerland annexed to France made two departments: Mulhausen and the bishopric of Basel formed the department of Mont Terrible; the canton of Geneva was formed into the department of Lemane. This annexation was made between April and August, 1798. In the conquest of Switzerland the directory had made a pretext of an insurrection of the Vaudois against the aristocratic senate of Berne. A democratic revolution was urged on in Zurich, Lucerne, and Schaffhausen, which resulted in a revolutionary diet being convened which promulgated a democratic constitution modeled upon that of France on April 12, 1798. Switzerland has itself to blame, in some degree, however, for this overthrow.

This revolution had been followed by that of Rome. General Duphot was killed at Rome in a riot; and in punishment of this assassination, which the pontifical government had not interfered to prevent, Rome was changed into a republic. At Rome Rossignol and other Jacobins, secretly backed by the French minister, Joseph Bonaparte, instigated the Roman population, already discontented owing to the heavy taxes imposed upon them as the result of the Treaty of Tolentino, to rebellion. General Duphot was killed in a riot on December 28, 1797. This was a pretext for intervention. The directory sent General Berthier to Rome with 18,000 men, who proclaimed the Roman republic on February 15, 1798. The new republican government was an absurd revival of classical forms. The directors were called consuls, the divisions of the Roman legislature were known as the senate and the tribunate, and the civil and criminal courts of justice respectively known as the prætorship and the quæstorship. A demand had been made upon the Pope to renounce his temporal power, and when this was refused the Vatican was occupied by French troops, the Pope himself being exiled beyond the Alps to Valence, where he died in the next year. All this combined to complete the system of the direc-

tory and make it preponderant in Europe; it was now at the head of the Helvetian, Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, and Roman republics, all constructed on the same model. The conquest of Belgium had been a stepping-stone to that of Holland. During the severe winter of 1794 Pichegru had been able to drag his artillery along the frozen canals of Holland and had entered Amsterdam on January 20, 1795. The capture of the Dutch fleet off the Texel followed. The stadtholder, William V., fled to England, whereupon the revolutionary party in Holland proclaimed the Batavian republic and signed a treaty of alliance with France on May 16, 1795. This treaty guaranteed France the possession of Dutch Flanders, with Maestricht, the right of maintaining garrisons at important points, free navigation of the rivers of Holland and access to its ports, and a war indemnity of one hundred millions. But while the directory extended its influence abroad, it was again menaced by internal parties.

The elections of Floréal in the year VI. (May, 1798) were by no means favorable to the directory; the returns were quite at variance with those of the year V. Since the 18th Fructidor the withdrawal of the counter-revolutionists had restored all the influence of the exclusive republican party, which had reëstablished the clubs under the name of Constitutional Circles. This party dominated in the electoral assemblies, which, most unusually, had to nominate 437 deputies, 298 for the council of five hundred, 139 for that of the ancients. When the elections drew near the directory exclaimed loudly against the anarchists. But its proclamations having been unable to prevent democratic returns, it decided upon annulling them in virtue of a law by which the councils, after the 18th Fructidor, had granted it the power of judging the operations of the electoral assemblies. It invited the legislative body by a message to appoint a commission of five members for that purpose. On the 22d Floréal the elections were for the most part annulled. At this period the directorial party struck a blow at the extreme republicans, as nine months before it had aimed at the royalists.

The directory wished to maintain the political balance which had been the characteristic of its first two years; but its position was much changed. Since its last *coup d'état* it could no longer be an impartial government, because it was no longer a constitutional government. With these pretensions of isolation, it dis-

satisfied everyone. Yet it lived on in this way till the elections of the year VII. It displayed much activity, but an activity of a narrow and shuffling nature. Merlin de Douai and Treilhard, who had replaced Carnot and Barthélemy, were two political lawyers. Rewbel had in the highest degree the courage without having the enlarged views of a statesman. La Réveillère was too much occupied with the act of the theophilanthropists for a government leader. As to Barras, he continued his dissipated life and his directorial regency; his palace was the rendezvous of gamesters, women of gallantry, and stock-jobbers of every kind. The administration of the directors betrayed their character, but more especially their position, to the embarrassments of which was added war with all Europe.

While the republican plenipotentiaries were yet negotiating for peace with the empire at Rastatt, the second coalition began the campaign. The Treaty of Campo-Formio had only been for Austria a suspension of arms. England had no difficulty in gaining her to a new coalition; with the exception of Spain and Prussia, most of the European powers formed part of it. The subsidies of the British cabinet, and the attraction of the west, decided Russia; the Porte and the states of Barbary acceded to it because of the invasion of Egypt; the empire, in order to recover the left bank of the Rhine, and the petty princes of Italy, that they might destroy the new republics. At Rastatt they were discussing the treaty relative to the empire, the concession of the left bank of the Rhine, the navigation of that river, and the demolition of some fortresses on the right bank, when the Russians entered Germany, and the Austrian army began to move. The French plenipotentiaries, taken by surprise, received orders to leave in twenty-four hours; they obeyed immediately, and set out, after having obtained safe conduct from the generals of the enemy. At a short distance from Rastatt they were stopped by some Austrian hussars, who, having satisfied themselves as to their names and titles, assassinated them; Bonnier and Riberjot were killed; Jean Debry was left for dead. This unheard-of violation of the right of nations, this premeditated assassination of three men invested with a sacred character, excited general horror. The legislative body declared war, and declared it with indignation against the governments on whom the guilt of this enormous crime fell.

Hostilities had already commenced in Italy and on the Rhine.

The directory, apprised of the march of the Russian troops, and suspecting the intentions of Austria, caused the councils to pass a law for recruiting. The military conscription placed 200,000 young men at the disposal of the republic. This law, which was attended with incalculable consequences, was the result of a more regular order of things. Levies *en masse* had been the revolutionary service of the country; the conscription became the legal service.³

The most impatient of the powers, those which formed the advanced guard of the coalition, had already commenced the attack. The King of Naples had advanced on Rome, and the King of Sardinia had raised troops and threatened the Ligurian republic. As they had not sufficient power to sustain the shock of the French armies, they were easily conquered and dispossessed. The Austrian General Mack, whom the military experts of the coalition regarded as the ablest commander in Europe, had forced the French to evacuate Rome on November 29, 1798, but receiving immediate reinforcements, General Championet recovered the city on December 15, and having reestablished French rule there marched upon Naples, which was easily taken and the Parthenopean republic was proclaimed January 23, 1799. General Joubert occupied Turin, and the whole of Italy was in the hands of the French when the new campaign began.

The coalition was superior to the republic in effective force and in preparation. It attacked it by the three great openings of Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. It planned to furnish 360,000 men, of which 240,000 were contributed by Austria, being thus distributed: 85,000 commanded by the Archduke Charles in Bavaria and upon the upper Danube; 25,000 under Marshal Hotze in the Vorarlberg; 45,000 under Bellegarde in the Tyrol; 75,000 with Marshal Kray on the banks of the Adige River. In addition there were 40,000 Russians under Suvarov, whose instructions were to unite with Kray; 30,000 with Korsakov, who was to occupy the Lake of Con-

³ The law of the conscription was voted on September 5, 1798, in compliance with a report rendered by Jourdan. Every Frenchman between twenty and twenty-five years of age was required to do military service. The five years formed five classes. There was no exemption except for physical infirmity. This is the third form practiced with reference to the recruiting of the French army since the revolution began. In 1791-1792 there were voluntary enrollments. In 1793 the process was technically requisition, not conscription. Only in 1799 was conscription adopted. The first call was for 200,000 men.

stance, while 30,000 English and Russians were to operate in Holland and 20,000 English and Russians in south Italy. The directory put 170,000 men in the field, divided into five armies: the army of Holland, under General Brune, 10,000 men; the army of Germany, under Jourdan, 40,000; the army of Massena in Switzerland, 30,000; that of Italy, under Scherer, 50,000; and that of Naples, under Macdonald, 30,000. The line of battle was 1500 miles long. A strong Austrian army debouched in the duchy of Mantua, and was soon joined by the bizarre and hitherto victorious Suvarov. Scherer was repulsed near Verona and at Legnano (April 5, 1799). In his retreat he abandoned the lines of the Mincio and the Oglio, and retired behind the Adda in order to protect Milan. Moreau replaced Scherer, and was beaten at Cassano and forced to take refuge in the territory between the Po and the Tanaro. He retreated toward Genoa in order to keep the barrier of the Apennines and to join the army of Naples, commanded by Macdonald, which was overpowered at Trebbia. The battle of the Trebbia was a three-days' engagement (June 17-19, 1799), in which the French lost half of their army, or 15,000 men. Nevertheless, by frightful exertions, Macdonald succeeded in crossing the Apennines and uniting the fragments of his army to that of Moreau in Genoa.

The Austro-Russians then directed their chief forces upon Switzerland. Jourdan had crossed the Rhine on March 1 and pushed into the region of the upper Danube, but had suffered a defeat on March 22 at the hands of the Archduke Charles, at Ostrach and three days later another at Stockach, which forced him to recross the Rhine. At the same time Massena had attempted to drive the Austrian out of Switzerland, and had penetrated the valley of the Inn River, but was forced to retire upon the appearance of the victorious Archduke Charles, and was not even able to hold Zurich, which was evacuated early in June. The Duke of York had landed in north Holland on August 26, and after seizing the Dutch fleet, had beaten Brune on the Zuyder Zee, September 10. The small republics which protected France were invaded, and a few more victories would have enabled the confederates to penetrate even to the scene of the revolution.

In the midst of these military disasters and the discontent of parties the election of the Floréal in the Year VII. (May, 1799) took place; they were republican, like those of the preceding year. The directory was no longer strong enough to contend with public

misfortunes and the rancor of parties. The retirement of Rewbel, who was replaced by Sieyès, caused it to lose the only man able to face the storm, and brought into its bosom the most avowed antagonists of this compromised and worn-out government. Hitherto the victories of the armies had obscured the rottenness of the directory, but now that defeat was staring France in the face the directory was discredited. After the elections of Floréal, the directory, feeling that "coming events cast their shadows before," proposed an annulment of a portion of the elections. The proposal was met by the demands of the moderate party and extreme republicans for an account of the internal and external situation of the republic. The councils sat permanently. Barras abandoned his colleagues. The fury of the councils was directed solely against Treilhard, Merlin, and La Réveillère, the last supports of the old directory. They deposed Treilhard because an interval of a year had not elapsed between his legislative and his directoral functions, as the constitution required. The ex-minister of justice, Gohier, was immediately chosen to replace him.

The orators of the councils then warmly attacked Merlin and La Réveillère, whom they could not dismiss from the directory. The threatened directors sent a justificatory message to the councils and proposed peace. On the 30th Prairial the republican Bertrand (du Calvados) ascended the tribune, and after examining the offers of the directors exclaimed: "You have proposed union; and I propose that you reflect if you yourselves can still preserve your functions. If you love the republic you will not hesitate to decide. You are incapable of doing good; you will never have the confidence of your colleagues, that of the people or that of the representatives, without which you cannot cause the laws to be executed. I know that, thanks to the constitution, there already exists in the directory a majority which enjoys the confidence of the people and that of the national representation. Why do you hesitate to introduce unanimity of desires and principles between the two first authorities of the republic? You have not even the confidence of those vile flatterers who have dug your political tomb. Finish your career by an act of devotion, which good republican hearts will be able to appreciate."

Merlin and La Réveillère, deprived of the support of the government by the retirement of Rewbel, the dismissal of Treilhard, and the desertion of Barras, urged by the councils and by patriotic

motives, yielded to circumstances and resigned the directorial authority. This victory gained by the republican and moderate parties combined turned to the profit of both. The former introduced General Moulins into the directory; the latter Roger Ducos. The 30th Prairial (June 18), which witnessed the breaking up of the old government of the year III., was an act of reprisal on the part of the councils against the directory for the 18th Fructidor and the 22d Floréal. At this period the two great powers of the state had each in turn violated the constitution: the directory by decimating the legislature, the legislature by expelling the directory. This form of government, which every party complained of, could not have a protracted existence.

Sieyès after the success of the 30th Prairial labored to destroy what yet remained of the government of the year III., in order to establish the legal system on another plan. He was whimsical and systematic; but he had the faculty of judging surely of situations. He reëntered upon the scene of the revolution at a singular epoch with the intention of strengthening it by a definitive constitution. After having coöperated in the principal changes of 1789 by his motion of June 17, which transformed the states-general into a national assembly, and by his plan of internal organization, which substituted departments for provinces, he had remained passive and silent during the subsequent interval. He waited till the period of public defense should again give place to institutions. Appointed under the directory to the embassy at Berlin, the neutrality of Prussia was attributed to his efforts. On his return he accepted the office of director, hitherto refused by him because Rewbel was leaving the government, and he thought that parties were sufficiently weary to undertake a definitive pacification and the establishment of liberty. With this object he placed his reliance on Roger Ducos in the directory, on the council of ancients in the legislature, and without on the mass of moderate men and the middle class, who after desiring laws merely as a novelty now desired repose as a novelty. This party sought for a strong and secure government, which should have no past, no enmities, and which thenceforward might satisfy all opinions and interests. As all that had been done from July 14 till the 9th Thermidor by the people in connection with a part of the government had been done since the 13th Vendémiaire by the soldiers, Sieyès was in want of a general. He cast his eyes upon Joubert, who was put at the head of the army of

Italy, in order that he might gain by his victories and by the deliverance of Italy a great political importance.

The constitution of the year III. was, however, still supported by the two directors, Gohier and Moulins, the council of five hundred, and without by the party of Manege. The decided republicans had formed a club that held its sittings in that hall where had sat the first of the assemblies. The new club, formed from the remains of that of Salm, before the 18th Fructidor; of that of the Pantheon, at the beginning of the directory; and of the old society of the Jacobins, enthusiastically professed republican principles, but not the democratic opinions of the inferior class. Each of these parties also had a share in the ministry, which had been renewed at the same time as the directory. Cambacérès had the department of justice; Quinette, the home department; Reinhard, who had been temporarily placed in office during the ministerial interregnum of Talleyrand, was minister of foreign affairs; Robert Lindet was minister of finance, Bourbon (de Vatry) of the navy, Bernadotte, of war; Bourguignon, soon afterward replaced by Fouché (of Nantes), of police.

This time Barras remained neutral between the two divisions of the legislature, of the directory, and of the ministry. Seeing that matters were coming to a more considerable change than that of the 30th Prairial, he, an ex-noble, thought that the decline of the republic would lead to the restoration of the Bourbons, and he treated with the pretender, Louis XVIII. It seems that in negotiating the restoration of the monarchy by his agent, David Monnier, he was not forgetful of himself. Barras espoused nothing from conviction and always sided with the party which had the greatest chance of victory. A democratic member of the Mountain on May 31, a reactionist Mountainist on the 9th Thermidor, a revolutionary director against the loyalists on the 18th Fructidor, extreme republican director against his old colleagues on the 30th Prairial, he now became a royalist director against the government of the year III.

The faction disconcerted by the 18th Fructidor and the peace of the continent had also gained courage. The military successes of the new coalition, the law of compulsory loans and that of hostages, which had compelled every emigrant family to give guarantees to government, had made the royalists of the south and west again take up arms. They reappeared in bands, which daily became

more formidable, and revived the petty but disastrous warfare of the Chouans. They awaited the arrival of the Russians and looked forward to the speedy restoration of the monarchy. This was a moment of fresh competition with every party. Each aspired to the inheritance of the dying constitution, as they had done at the close of the convention. In France people are warned by a kind of political odor that a government is dying, and all parties rush to be in at the death.

Fortunately for the republic, the war changed its aspect on the two principal frontiers of the Upper and Lower Rhine. The allies, after having acquired Italy, wished to enter France by Switzerland and Holland; but Generals Massena and Brune arrested their hitherto victorious progress. Massena advanced against Korsakov and Suvarov. During twelve days of great combinations and consecutive victories, hastening in turns from Constance to Zurich, he repelled the efforts of the Russians, forced them to retreat, and disorganized the coalition. Brune won the victories of Bergen (September 19), Alkmaar (October 2), and Castricum (October 6). The Duke of York, whose army had been reduced by disease and battle, capitulated on October 18. French fortune was favored by dissension among the allies. Paul I. of Russia had no mind to have his army used as a catspaw of Vienna, and neither the Austrian officers nor soldiers got along well with Russians. The Austrian government tried to mend matters by arranging that the Russians should have a clear field in Switzerland, leaving Italy and Germany to its own armies. It was a false move, militarily speaking, by which Massena profited. His position was a very precarious one, for he had been caught between the army of the Archduke Charles on the north and the united armies of Korsakov and Suvarov on the east and south. But the new order from Vienna forbade Charles to move farther in Switzerland, and Massena was able to slip away before the Russians could overtake him. When Korsakov made the attempt to capture the French in Zurich he lost 13,000 men, a good one-half of his troops (September 25), and was obliged to beat a hasty retreat to the Rhine, so hasty indeed that he abandoned his baggage and one hundred pieces of artillery. Meantime Suvarov had crossed the Saint Gothard in the hope of making a flank movement against the French, whom he expected to find hard pressed by the Russians, but the ill luck of his lieutenant embarrassed him, and he was forced to fight a costly, though not losing, battle on Septem-

ber 26. At last, after fearful privations and having suffered enormous losses, Suvarov succeeded in making his way into Bavaria. But furious at the discomfiture of his best general, Paul I. withdrew from the coalition. France had lost Italy, but still retained Switzerland and Holland, and the peril of invasion had vanished. The army of Italy alone had been less fortunate. It had lost its general, Joubert, killed at the battle of Novi while leading a charge on the Austro-Russians. But this frontier, which was at a distance from the center of action, despite the defeat of Novi, was not crossed, and Championet ably defended it. It was soon to be repassed by the republican troops, who, after each resumption of arms, having been for a moment beaten, soon regained their superiority and recommenced their victories. Europe by giving additional exercise to the military power, by its repeated attacks, rendered it each time more triumphant.

But at home nothing was changed. Divisions, discontent, and anxiety were the same as before. The struggle between the moderate republicans and the extreme republicans had become more determined. Sieyès pursued his projects against the latter. In the Champs de Mars on August 10 he assailed the Jacobins. Lucien Bonaparte, who had much influence in the council of five hundred, from his character, his talents, and the military importance of the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, drew in that assembly a fearful picture of the reign of terror, and said that France was threatened with its return. About the same time Sieyès caused Bernadotte to be dismissed, and Fouché, in concert with him, closed the meetings of the Manege. The multitude, to whom it is only necessary to present the phantom of the past to inspire it with fear, sided with the moderate party, dreading the return of the reign of terror; and the extreme republicans failed in their endeavor to declare the country in danger, as they had done at the close of the legislative assembly. But Sieyès, after having lost Joubert, sought for a general who could enter into his designs and who would protect the republic without becoming its oppressor. Hoche had been dead more than a year. Moreau had given rise to suspicion by his equivocal conduct to the directory before the 18th Fructidor and by the sudden denunciation of his friend Pichegru, whose treason he had kept secret for a whole year; Massena was not a political general; Bernadotte and Jourdan were devoted to the party of the Manege; Sieyès was compelled to postpone his scheme for want of a suitable agent.

Bonaparte had learned in the east from his brother Lucien and a few other friends the state of affairs in France and the decline of the directorial government. His expedition had been brilliant, but without results. The Battle of the Pyramids was fought July 21, 1798, and was followed by the French occupation of Cairo. Desaix pursued Mourad-Bey southward and defeated him at the battle of Sediman, October 7, but he managed to escape into Upper Egypt.

Napoleon left Egypt late in January, 1799, with 13,000 men, and after traversing the Mediterranean seaboard began the siege of Saint Jean d'Acre on March 19. For sixty days the combined troops of England and Turkey resisted every effort of the French. On May 20 Napoleon gave it up. It was the second siege and the last he ever attempted, and was of decisive importance. He never forgot the humiliation he experienced at Acre, and was wont to allude to it as "that miserable hole which came between me and my destiny."⁴

The failure of the siege of Saint Jean d'Acre compelled Napoleon to return to his first conquest. There, after defeating an Ottoman army on the coast of Aboukir, so fatal to the French fleet the preceding year,⁵ when Nelson had gained the victory in the Battle of the Nile, he decided on leaving that land of exile and fame in order to turn the new crisis in France to his own elevation. Napoleon had been left for months in the east without information or instructions from the directory, too much engaged in its own affairs to watch over the interests of its general. He now learned of the political situation in France through some French newspapers which were sent to him by Sir Sidney Smith, the English commander, during an exchange of prisoners. He left General Kléber to command the army of the east and crossed the Mediterranean, then covered with English ships, in a frigate. He disembarked at Fréjus on the 7th Vendémiaire, year VIII. (October 9, 1799), nineteen days after the battle of Bergen, gained by Brune over the Anglo-Russians under the Duke of York, and fourteen days after that of Zurich, gained by Massena over the Austro-Russians under Korsakov and Suvarov. He traversed France, from the shore of the Mediterranean to Paris, in triumph. His expedition, almost fabulous, had struck the public mind with surprise and had

⁴ For the famous massacre of the prisoners at Jaffa by Napoleon consult Ropes, "Napoleon," and Lanfrey, "Life of Napoleon," who give opposite views.

⁵ Fought on August 1, 1798.

still more increased the great renown he had acquired by the conquest of Italy. These two enterprises had raised him above all the other generals of the republic. The distance of the theater upon which he had fought enabled him to begin his career of independence and authority. A victorious general, an acknowledged and obeyed negotiator, a creator of republics, he had treated all interests with skill, all creeds with moderation. Preparing afar off his ambitious destiny, he had not made himself subservient to any system, and had managed all parties so as to work his elevation with their assent. He had entertained this idea of usurpation since his victories in Italy. On the 18th Fructidor, had the directory been conquered by the councils, he purposed marching against the latter with his army and seizing the protectorate of the republic. After the 18th Fructidor, finding the directory too powerful and the inactivity of the continent too dangerous for him, he accepted the expedition to Egypt, that he might not fall and might not be forgotten. At the news of the disorganization of the directory, on the 30th Prairial, he repaired with haste to the scene of events.

His arrival excited the enthusiasm of the moderate masses of the nation. He received general congratulations and every party contended for his favor. Generals, directors, deputies, and even the republicans of the Manege waited on and tried to sound him. *Fêtes* and banquets were given in his honor. His manners were grave, simple, cool, and observing; he had already a tone of condescending familiarity and involuntary habits of command. Notwithstanding his want of earnestness and openness, he had an air of self-possession, and it was easy to read in him an afterthought of conspiracy. Without uttering his design, he allowed it to be guessed; because a thing must always be expected in order to be accomplished. He could not seek supporters in the republicans of the Manege, as they neither wished for a *coup d'état* nor for a dictator; and Sieyès justly feared that he was too ambitious to fall in with his constitutional views; accordingly Sieyès hesitated to open his mind to him, but, urged by their mutual friends, they at length met and concerted together. On the 15th Brumaire they determined on their plan of attack on the constitution of the year III. Sieyès undertook to prepare the councils by the commissions of inspectors, who placed unlimited confidence in him. Bonaparte was to gain the generals and the different corps of troops stationed in Paris, who displayed much enthusiasm for him and much attachment to

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his person. They agreed to convoke an extraordinary meeting of the moderate members of the councils, to describe the public danger to the ancients, and by urging the ascendancy of Jacobinism to demand the removal of the legislative body to Saint Cloud, and the appointment of General Bonaparte to the command of the armed force as the only man able to save the country; and then, by means of the new military power, to obtain the dismissal of the directory and the temporary dissolution of the legislative body. The enterprise was fixed for the morning of the 18th Brumaire (November 9).

During these three days the secret was faithfully kept. Barras, Moulins, and Gohier, who formed the majority of the directory, of which Gohier was then president, might have frustrated the *coup d'état* of the conspirators by forestalling them, as on the 18th Fructidor. But they gave them credit for hopes only, and not for any decided projects. On the morning of the 18th the members of the ancients were convoked in an unusual way by the inspectors; they repaired to the Tuileries, and the debate was opened about seven in the morning under the presidentship of Lemercir. Cornudet, Le Brun, and Fargues, the three most influential conspirators in the council, drew a most alarming picture of the state of public affairs, protesting that the Jacobins were flocking in crowds to Paris from all the departments, that they wished to reëstablish the revolutionary government, and that a reign of terror would once more desolate the republic if the council had not the courage and wisdom to prevent its return. Another conspirator, Régnier de la Meurthe, required of the ancients, already moved, that in virtue of the right conferred on them by the constitution they should transfer the legislative body to Saint Cloud, and depute Bonaparte, nominated by them to the command of the seventeenth military division, to superintend the removal. Whether all the members of the council were accomplices of this maneuver, or whether they were terrified by so hasty convocation and by speeches so alarming, they instantly granted what the conspirators required.

Bonaparte awaited with impatience the result of this deliberation at his house in the Rue Chantereine; he was surrounded by generals, by Lefèvre, the commander of the guard of the directory, and by three regiments of cavalry which he was about to review. The decree of the council of ancients was passed about eight and brought to him at half-past eight by a state messenger. He received

the congratulations of all around him; the officers drew their swords as a sign of fidelity. He put himself at their head and they marched to the Tuileries; he appeared at the bar of the ancients, took the oath of fidelity, and appointed as his lieutenant Lefèvre, chief of the directorial guard.

This was, however, only a beginning of success. Bonaparte was at the head of the armed force; but the executive power of the directory and the legislative power of the councils still existed. In the struggle which would infallibly ensue it was not certain that the great and hitherto victorious force of the revolution would not triumph. Sieyès and Roger Ducos went from the Luxembourg to the legislative and military camp of the Tuileries and gave in their resignation. Barras, Moulins, and Gohier, apprised on their side, but a little too late, of what was going on, wished to employ their power and make themselves sure of their guard; but the latter, having received from Bonaparte information of the decree of the ancients, refused to obey them. Barras, discouraged, sent in his resignation and departed for his estate of Gros-Bois. The directory was, in fact, dissolved, and there was one antagonist less in the struggle. The five hundred and Bonaparte alone remained opposed.

The decree of the council of ancients and the proclamations of Bonaparte were placarded on the walls of Paris. The agitation which accompanies extraordinary events prevailed in that great city. The republicans, and not without reason, felt serious alarm for the fate of liberty. But when they showed alarm respecting the intentions of Bonaparte, in whom they beheld a Cæsar or a Cromwell, they were answered in the general's own words: "Bad parts, wornout parts, unworthy a man of sense, even if they were not so of a good man. It would be sacrilege to attack the representative government in this age of intelligence and freedom. He would be but a fool who, with lightness of heart, could wish to cause the loss of the stakes of the republic against royalty after having supported them with some glory and peril." Yet the importance he gave himself in his proclamations was ominous. He reproached the directory with the situation of France in a most extraordinary way. "What have you done," said he, "with that France that I left so flourishing in your hands? I left you peace, I find you at war; I left you victories, I find nothing but reverses; I left you the millions of Italy, I find nothing but plundering laws and misery. What have you done with the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew, my

companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot last; in less than three years it would lead us to despotism." This was the first time for ten years that a man had ventured to refer everything to himself, and to demand an account of the republic as of his own property. It is a painful surprise to see a newcomer of the revolution introduce himself thus into the inheritance, so laboriously acquired, of an entire people.

On the 19th Brumaire the members of the councils repaired to Saint Cloud; Sieyès and Roger Ducos accompanied Bonaparte to this new field of battle; they went thither with the intention of supporting the designs of the conspirators: Sieyès, who understood the tactics of revolutions, wished to make sure of events by provisionally arresting the leaders and only admitting the moderate party into the councils; but Bonaparte refused to accede to this. He was no party man; having hitherto acted and conquered with regiments only, he thought he could direct legislative councils like an army, by the word of command. The gallery of Mars had been prepared for the ancients, the Orangery for the five hundred. A considerable armed force surrounded the seat of the legislature, as the multitude on June 2 had surrounded the convention. The republicans, assembled in groups in the grounds, waited the opening of the sittings; they were agitated with a generous indignation against the military brutalism that threatened them, and communicated to each other their projects of resistance. The young general, followed by a few grenadiers, passed through the courts and apartments, and prematurely yielding to his character, he said, like the twentieth king of a dynasty: "I will have no more factions; there must be an end to this; I absolutely will not have any more of it." About two o'clock in the afternoon the council assembled in their respective halls, to the sound of instruments which played the "*Marseillaise*."

As soon as the business of the sitting commenced Emile Gaudin, one of the conspirators, ascended the tribune of the five hundred. He proposed a vote of thanks to the council of ancients for the measures it had taken, and to request it to expound the means of saving the republic. This motion was the signal for a violent tumult; cries arose against Gaudin from every part of the hall. The republican deputies surrounded the tribune and the bureau, at which Lucien Bonaparte presided. The conspirators, Cabanis, Boulay (de la Meurthe), Chazal, Gaudin, and Lucien, turned pale on their

seats. After a long scene of agitation, during which no one could obtain a hearing, calm was restored for a few moments, and Delbred proposed that the oath made to the constitution of the year III. should be renewed. As no one opposed this motion, which at such a juncture was of vital importance, the oath was taken with an enthusiasm and unanimity which was dangerous to the conspiracy.

Bonaparte, learning what had passed in the five hundred, and in the greatest danger of desertion and defeat, presented himself at the council of ancients. All would have been lost for him had the latter, in favor of the conspiracy, been carried away with the enthusiasm of the younger council. "Representatives of the people," said he, "you are in no ordinary situation; you stand on a volcano. Yesterday, when you summoned me to inform me of the decree for your removal, and charged me with its execution, I was tranquil. I immediately assembled my comrades; we flew to your aid! Well, now I am overwhelmed with calumnies! They talk of Cæsar, Cromwell, and military government! Had I wished to oppress the liberty of my country I should not have attended to the orders which you gave me; I should not have had any occasion to receive this authority from your hands. Representatives of the people! I swear to you, that the country has not a more zealous defender than I am; but its safety rests with you alone! There is no longer a government; four of the directors have given in their resignation, the fifth (Moulin) has been placed under surveillance for his own security; the council of five hundred is divided; nothing is left but the council of ancients. Let it adopt measures; let it but speak; I am ready to execute. Let us save liberty; let us save equality!" Linglet, a republican, then arose and said: "General, we applaud what you say: swear with us to obey the constitution of the year III., which alone can maintain the republic." All would have been lost for him had this motion met with the same reception which it had found in the five hundred. It surprised the council, and for a moment Bonaparte was disconcerted. But he soon resumed: "The constitution of the year III. has ceased to exist; you violated it on the 18th Fructidor; you violated it on the 22d Floréal; you violated it on the 30th Prairial. The constitution is invoked by all factions, and violated by all; it cannot be a means of safety for us, because it no longer obtains respect from anyone; the constitution being violated, we must have another compact, new guaran-

tees." The council applauded these reproaches of Bonaparte and rose in sign of approbation.

Bonaparte, deceived by his easy success with the ancients, imagined that his presence alone would suffice to appease the stormy council of the five hundred. He hastened thither at the head of a few grenadiers, whom he left at the door, but within the hall, and he advanced alone, hat in hand. At the sight of the bayonets the assembly arose with a sudden movement. The legislators, conceiving his entrance to be a signal for military violence, uttered all at once the cry of "Outlaw him! Down with the dictator!" Several members rushed to meet him; and the republican Bigonet, seizing him by the arm, exclaimed: "Rash man! what are you doing? Retire; you are violating the sanctuary of the laws." Bonaparte, pale and agitated, receded and was carried off by the grenadiers who had escorted him there.

His disappearance did not put a stop to the agitation of the council. All the members spoke at once; all proposed measures of public safety and defense. Lucien Bonaparte was the object of general reproach; he attempted to justify his brother, but with timidity. After a long struggle he succeeded in reaching the tribune, and urged the assembly to judge his brother with less severity. He protested that he had no designs against their liberty, and recalled his services. But several voices immediately exclaimed: "He has lost all their merit. Down with the dictator! Down with the tyrants!" The tumult now became more violent than ever, and all demanded the outlawry of General Bonaparte. "What," said Lucien, "do you wish me to pronounce the outlawry of my brother?" "Yes! yes! outlawry! It is the reward of tyrants!" In the midst of the confusion a motion was made and put to the vote that the council should sit permanently; that it should instantly repair to its palace at Paris; that the troops assembled at Saint Cloud should form a part of the guard of the legislative body; that the command of them should be given to General Bernadotte. Lucien, astounded by these propositions, and by the outlawry, which he thought had been adopted with the rest, left the president's chair and, ascending the tribune, said, in the greatest agitation: "Since I cannot be heard in this assembly, I put off the symbols of the popular magistracy with a deep sense of insulted dignity." And he took off his cap, robe and scarf.

Bonaparte, meantime, on leaving the council of the five hun-

dred, had found some difficulty in regaining his composure. Unaccustomed to scenes of popular tumult, he had been greatly agitated. His officers came around him; and Sieyès, having more revolutionary experience, besought him not to lose time and to employ force. General Lefèvre immediately gave an order for carrying off Lucien from the council. A detachment entered the hall, advanced to the chair which Lucien now occupied again, placed him in their ranks, and returned with him to the troops. As soon as Lucien came out he mounted a horse by his brother's side, and although divested of his legal character, harangued the troops as president. In concert with Bonaparte, he invented the story, so often repeated since, that poignards had been drawn on the general in the council of five hundred, and exclaimed: "Citizen soldiers, the president of the council of five hundred declares to you that the large majority of that council is at this moment kept in fear by the daggers of a few representatives, who surround the tribune, threaten their colleagues with death, and occasion the most terrible deliberations. General, and you, soldiers and citizens, you will only recognize as legislators of France those who follow me. As for those who remain in the Orangery, let force expel them. Those brigands are no longer representatives of the people, but representatives of the poignard." After this violent appeal, addressed to the troops by a conspirator president, who, as usual, calumniated those he wished to proscribe, Bonaparte spoke: "Soldiers," said he, "I have led you to victory; may I rely on you?" "Yes! yes! *Vive le Général!*" "Soldiers, there were reasons for expecting that the council of five hundred would save the country; on the contrary, it is given up to intestine quarrels; agitators seek to excite it against me. Soldiers, may I rely on you?" "Yes! yes! *Vive Bonaparte!*" "Well, then I will bring them to their senses!" And he instantly gave orders to the officers surrounding him to clear the hall of the five hundred.

The council, after Lucien's departure, had been a prey to great anxiety and indecision. A few members proposed that they should leave the place in a body and go to Paris to seek protection amid the people. Others wished the national representatives not to forsake their posts, but to brave the outrages of force. In the meantime a troop of grenadiers entered the hall by degrees, and the officer in command communicated to the council the order for their dispersion. The deputy Prudhon reminded the officer and his soldiers of the respect due to the representatives of the people; General

Jourdan also represented to them the enormity of such a measure. For a moment the troops hesitated, but a reinforcement now arrived in close column. General Leclerc exclaimed: "In the name of General Bonaparte, the legislative body is dissolved; let all good citizens retire. Grenadiers, forward!" Cries of indignation arose from every side, but these were drowned by the drums. The grenadiers advanced slowly across the whole width of the Orangery, and presenting bayonets. In this way they drove the legislators before them, who continued shouting "*Vive la république!*" as they left the place. At half-past five, on the 19th Brumaire of the year VIII. (November 10, 1799), there was no longer a representation.⁶

Thus this violation of the law, this *coup d'état* against liberty, was accomplished. Force began to sway. The 18th Brumaire was the May 31 of the army against the representation, except that it was not directed against a party, but against the popular power. But it is just to distinguish the 18th Brumaire from its consequences. It might then be supposed that the army was only an auxiliary of the revolution as it had been on the 13th Vendémiaire and the 18th Fructidor, and that this indispensable change would not turn to the advantage of a man—a single man, who would soon change France into a regiment, and cause nothing to be heard of in a world hitherto agitated by so great a moral commotion save the tread of his army and the voice of his will.

⁶ Much new light has been thrown upon the history of the directory, and especially upon the events of the 18th Brumaire, by the recent work of Albert vandal, "*L'Avènement de Bonaparte.*" The book is the most recent and the most critical estimate of Napoleon at this important stage in his life.

Chapter XVI

THE FINANCES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

BEFORE proceeding to the events in sequence on the 18th Brumaire it is well to consider what was the economic and financial condition of this France to whose responsibilities Napoleon succeeded. From the meeting of the states-general in 1789 to the fall of the directory the financial difficulty of the nation had remained the great question, obscured from time to time, but not obliterated in the progress of the revolution.

Mirabeau, before the prospect of bankruptcy, "horrible, hideous bankruptcy," put forth a plan for the issue of treasury notes secured by church lands, and moved the confiscation of the church estates on October 12. On November 2, 1789, the assembly declared the church property to be at the disposal of the state, and then immediately Mirabeau moved his plan, that the administration of the national debt be intrusted to a distinct board, which, he said, would put into circulation paper notes resting on good security, and thereby effect the liquidation of the deficit. This proposition was defeated by Lafayette and Necker, who were momentarily drawn together through their mutual antagonism to Mirabeau.

It was at this juncture that Necker brought forth his idea of a national bank, with a circulation secured by the confiscated lands of the church. But the paper money idea had taken hold of the assembly, and it would have nothing to do with the national bank. One of the speakers in the assembly argued as follows: "Men ascribe this disorder to the revolution. It is completely independent of it. It would have arisen just as well at another time. The origin of the evil is to be found, in reality, in the 'Bank of Discount.' It inundates the country with a most dangerous species of paper money, since the fabrication of this money rests in the hands of a company in no way accountable to the government. This money, which is forced upon the people of France by law and which

is not convertible on presentation, is without value in the foreign markets. We are not able to buy except for cash. They will not accept our paper, for on presentation for payment they would be paid in notes of the Bank of Discount. For these reasons wealth must depart from France, even to the last crown, if this is not remedied. Again, the need of grain and the necessity for paying for it in gold will precipitate the same result." Mirabeau argued against Necker's scheme that if the state had no credit its guarantee of the circulation of the Bank of Discount would be worthless, and that if it did have credit it did not need the help of the bank.

"But," said Pétion of Villeneuve, on December 10, 1789, "why are we not able ourselves to hypothecate that wealth of which the necessity is acknowledged? Are we not able to give it ourselves the confidence of which it has need in order to circulate in all parts of the realm? We have at our disposal ecclesiastical domains. Let us create obligations to order. Let us make them bear a certain interest. Let us assign to them a certain payment. Shall we give to the bank the apparent advantage of these deeds? Let us give to our true creditors the interest which we would give to the bank."

The committee on finance brought in a report, through its chairman, Montesquiou, in which it stated that the debt of the state already due was 950 millions, and then added, in the same breath, that there was a surplus of 33 millions in the revenue. It made no objection to a loan from the Bank of Discount, but insisted on a sale of clerical lands to the amount of 400 millions. On this proposition there followed a long discussion, in which the merits and demerits of the issuing of assignats were discussed. Allarde and Gouy supported the scheme of issuing 400 millions of assignats against the church property on the ground that it was "securing resources without paying interest."

On March 6 Necker was obliged to bring into the assembly a report stating that he would need, in addition to the revenue, 280 to 310 millions. However, he said that he would be able to raise it by surplus income, fresh anticipations, and a final loan from the Bank of Discount. But the assembly and Paris were impatient to strike the final blow against the church and take possession of its property. Therefore, on March 10, Bailly, the mayor of Paris, proposed that Paris should purchase from the state all the monastic property situated within the city limits—valued at 150 millions—and sell it again, and be satisfied with 16 mil-

lions as a commission for making the sale. So on March 17, 1790, it was decreed that church property to the amount of 400 millions should be turned over to the municipality and sold on a commission of one-sixteenth. After stormy debates on April 14-17, 1790, the assembly decreed the payment of the expenses of the church, the confiscation of all the church property, the immediate sale of 400 millions, and the issue of assignats to that amount.

Therefore the assignats were devised simply to anticipate the sales and by relieving the stress to furnish money with which the people might purchase the lands. The face value of each assignat was guaranteed by an equivalent amount of the confiscated lands of the clergy, and each assignat was to be destroyed when that amount of land was sold by the government. Mirabeau was conscious of the two-edged character of this financial proposition, but he knew no choice of means. This was the beginning of that assignat mischief which was to end in total bankruptcy. His intention was to clear the road of the obstructions that it was indispensable to get out of the way if a strong government was to be established. Those who came after him used the assignats as a handy means for disposing of the necessity of reconstructing the economical basis of the commonwealth. The assembly accepted what to him was only a regrettable but necessary means to the attainment of a great end, and made it impossible for him to use it for such a means, and therefore also impossible to attain the end.

The assignat fever had seized hard hold of the members of the national assembly. The committee on finance had reported: "It is time to repudiate the principles of our ancient financial methods. We shall offer you a new resource, a bold operation, but simple. It is time to lay the foundation of a credit truly national. Let us show to entire Europe that we know our resources and that we shall shortly retake the highroad of our liberation."

One speaker said: "What is an assignat? It is a letter of exchange, of which the cash value is guaranteed by the nation. It is a better means of reanimating the circulation of money and of traversing the difficult passage from an administration remarkable for depredation and disorder to one just and wise."¹ "Further," he continues, "are 400 millions enough? The anticipations and present expenses amount to 1559 millions; you will receive only 450 millions. Therefore there are still 1109 millions unprovided for.

¹ *Moniteur*, vol. IV, p. 87.

The 400 millions proposed are insufficient. I think there should be decreed enough assignats to reimburse the public debt."

The theory upon which the first issue of assignats was put forth was this; That, if the state could, by means of the church property, pay its immense debt and restore public credit and at the same time put that much more money into circulation, it would at once relieve the stringency in the money market and restore prosperity. The state had confiscated church lands variously estimated to be worth from 1200 to 2000 millions. To throw this immense amount of property on the market at a time when specie had disappeared and the country was held in the double grasp of hard times—almost bankruptcy—and famine, meant to sacrifice it at much less than its value, if it were possible to dispose of it at all.

But from the outset a serious miscalculation was made. The Jansenists and disciples of Voltaire hated the convents, and the finance committee began with them. The pensions required for the 20,000 inmates were about 16,000,000. The theory was: previous income per year, 70,000,000. Value of real estate is thirty-three times yearly rental. Therefore, 2,300,000,000 will be realized, of which the clergy were to receive 100,000,000. These calculations were a mistake. Of this 70 millions, 20 belonged to Maltesian Knights, schools, and hospitals. Moreover, 33 was too high a figure for most of the land. The results were that church property sold for 1,250,000,000, instead of 2,300,000,000. Morris, writing to Washington in January, 1790, says:

"It is proposed and determined to sell about ten or twelve millions sterling of the crown and church lands, . . . but as it is clear that these lands will not sell well just now, they have appointed a treasurer to receive what they will sell for hereafter, and they issue a kind of order upon this treasurer, which is to be called an assignat, and is to be paid (out of the sales) one, two, and three years hence. They expect that on these assignats they can borrow money to face the engagements of the Bank of Discount, and they are at the same time to pay some of the more pressing debts with the same assignats. Now this plan must fail, as follows: First, there will be some doubt about the title of these lands, at least till the revolution is completed. Secondly, the representative of lands must always (for a reason which will presently appear) sell for less than a representative of money, and therefore, until public confidence is so far restored as that the five per cents.

are above par, these assignats, bearing five per cent., must be below par; money, therefore, cannot be raised upon them but at a considerable discount. Thirdly, the lands to be disposed of must sell a great deal below their value, for there is not money to buy them in this country, and the proof is that they never obtained money on loan at a legal interest, but always upon a premium . . . and as the revolution has greatly lessened the mass of money, the effect of the scarcity must be greater. But further, there is a solecism in the plan which escapes most of them and which is nevertheless very palpable. The value of lands in Europe is, you know, estimated by the income. To dispose of public lands, therefore, is to sell public revenue, and, therefore, taking the legal rate of interest at five per cent., land renting for 100*l.* ought to sell for 2000*l.*; but they expect that these lands will sell for 3000*l.*, and that thereby not only public credit will be restored, but a great saving will be made, as the 3000*l.* will redeem an interest of 150*l.*”²

To add to their other errors, the advocates of the new financial measures took no account of the fact that the revenues, always hard to collect, were now reduced to half their former sum. In other words, they forgot altogether August 4. Since that day more than 170 millions of taxes had been voluntarily given up, and much of what remained was uncollectable, owing to the state of the country.

Necker estimated that the redemption of the offices abolished by August 4 would cost the state 350 millions. Ramel estimated it at 492 millions, the national assembly at 800 millions. All these renunciations had been left out of consideration in the theory of the assignats. True, it was intended that they should be used only for the liquidation of the existing public debt, but here theory and practice failed to coincide. Of the first 1200 millions of assignats issued only 108 millions were used toward reducing the public debt. A larger share of the first issue was consumed in current expenses.

Within six months the government found itself again in distress. The assignats were exhausted and the tide had again turned against the government. Immediately there went up from all over the land, and from the assembly, the cry of the thoughtless for more assignats. There, however, the more thoughtful people, both in the assembly and outside of it, began to be alarmed. Many of the members who had favored the first issue under the restrictions placed upon it now began to doubt. A few of the schemers of the

² Morris, “Diary and Letters,” vol. I., p. 284-285.

assembly were outspoken for another issue. It would effect the sale of the lands more quickly, they said, by making money plentier. In vain Maury, Cazalès, Necker, Le Brun, and others opposed it with all their strength. Le Brun said: "All will change itself to paper. Will you pay the soldiers with paper? Will you equip the waiting vessels on the sea with paper? They say that these 'belle' operations will save the revolution. As for me, I say they will kill the revolution and this assembly."

Necker, discouraged and fatigued, resigned September 3, 1790. Mirabeau's speech carried all with it, and on September 29-October 12 the assembly voted to increase the assignats to 1200 millions, with the solemn pledge that the total should never exceed this amount, and that as fast as they were paid into the treasury in return for land they should be burned.

It remains to be shown now what the assignats proved to be in practice. How they failed in realizing the prosperity and abundance predicted by their advocates before their issue. The same causes that swallowed up the first issue of 400 millions were still in operation and were increasing in destructive force in a geometric ratio as time advanced. On September 29, 1790, the emission of 800 millions of assignats was determined upon, with the provision that the amount in existence at any time should not be more than 1200 millions. The excise taxes were given up, and hence 382 millions had to be raised from real estate, making a crushing burden. The yearly budget presented a deficit of 220 millions. In three-quarters of a year the 800 millions had been used up! After this issue all felt that the proper plan to pursue would be to run the finances for 1791 on a close, systematic basis, and in accordance with this idea the finance committee brought in a budget of 640 millions for 1791. These figures, however, from a desire to conceal the fact that the government under the assembly was costing more than under the ancient régime, were underestimated to the amount of more than 150 millions. But taking the total as reported by the committees, it soon became evident from a study of the ways in which they propose to raise the amount that there will be, on their own estimate, a deficit of 220 millions. Moreover, as this deficit increased so did the national debt, but of this no mention was made in the budget. Since August 4, 1789, there was a total new debt of nearly 1500 millions, bearing an annual interest of 72 millions. It was for the payment of this debt that the assignats

had been issued, and yet, of the entire 1200 millions, as before mentioned, less than 200 millions were applied to this purpose. Thus the lands were gone, and still the debt remained.

The result of this issue on France at large in a commercial way was very evident. Owing to the abundance of money everything "boomed" for a time. Foreign merchants, owing to the difference in exchange, hastened to place orders of all kinds with French manufactories. It was simply the difference in exchange, however, not any true, permanent want, that created this demand, and as soon as exchange was equalized it ceased. Specie began to disappear from circulation, prices rose, owing to the abundance of paper money, and soon there broke forth again the cry, "lack of circulating medium." This cry resulted in the evasion of the solemn pledges to keep the issue of assignats down by burning all that were received in payment for lands. The treasury, instead, reissued 100 millions again, in the form of small notes. This, however, served only as a drop in the bucket, and on June 19, 1791, nine months after the last issue, 600 millions more were authorized, and the extreme limit again fixed at 1800 millions. From this time forth France was committed wholly and thoroughly to the paper-money idea, and issue follows issue with frightful rapidity.

At the time of the second issue, October, 1790, the assignats had depreciated to 92 per cent., while in June, 1791, at the third issue, they fell to 87 per cent. With this third issue began that greatest of evils, the issue of the smaller bills. By February, 1792, silver, and even copper, had disappeared from circulation, and church bells were melted down.

In order to bolster up the price of their paper money the assembly decreed the sequestration of the estates of the emigrants. It did not raise the price of assignats a single sou. In spite of the abundance of money, and in spite of the high prices, wages did not rise. One manufactory after another was closed. All that tariffs and custom-houses could do was done to prevent the closing of factories, but all in vain. Soon there were thousands of idle workmen all over France. It was no longer safe for the government to transport specie. Bread riots broke out all over the country. The national assembly voted millions for public workshops; 100,000 men found employment in the army.

In order to assist the woollen manufacturers the assembly, in February, 1792, forbade the exportation of wool, and in March a

duty of fifty per cent. was placed upon cotton to keep it out of the country. The same troubles that beset the manufacturers appeared among the agricultural classes. The property-holders had not increased much in number. Land had just been differently grouped, and had changed owners. Owing to the long terms on which the government sold the land many of the peasantry had taken up as much land as they could raise money to make first payments on, and as a result the majority had no capital left with which to work the land, and it soon fell into the hands of speculators and capitalists. Then, too, many speculators would make a small advance on the land, and then, having stripped it of its timber and whatever else of value could be moved away, would default on any further payments. Landowners, as the yields diminished and assignats depreciated, soon abolished money-rents and received their rent in corn, which they stored up in hope of a better price. Soon the prohibition of the export of wool showed its effect: breeding of sheep came to an end. Then came more complaints of the scarcity of wool.

The state of opinion in the assembly as their troubles thickened cannot better be shown than by an extract from the report of the committee on finance, on July 31, 1792. It explains that a further issue of assignats is impossible, and then asks for 300 millions more. It asserts that the sale of the emigrants' land would depress rather than raise the value of paper, and yet it does not conceal a desire to see such a rich source of money made accessible. It warns against taking the state forests, and then begs to be allowed to take them.

At the opening of the convention, September 23, 1792, Cambon reported as follows: "There is no other financial resource except assignats. All the taxes are exhausted; the government is neither able to borrow nor to lay taxes. Therefore it is necessary to recur to the assignat, and as security to hasten the sale of national goods and properties." He adds that the urgency is great and that the paper is all ready for the issue, awaiting only the decree of the convention. From this time on the finance committee had but two aims: one was to keep up in the issue with the demands of the state; the other was to try, by all means possible, to make their sale progress naturally by the accruing of property, each day, through decrees of confiscation that grew more and more severe.

The measures adopted by the terror to maintain the value of this inflated currency were violent. A first decree forbade the sale

of specie in France or any of the countries held by the armies of France, on pain of six years in prison. All transactions were ordered to be exclusively effected in assignats. Anyone convicted of proposing or decreeing two different prices for things, depending on payments in assignats or in specie, was also liable to six years' imprisonment. All persons refusing to receive assignats were compelled to receive them and condemned to a fine equal to the sum refused. (Decree of April 11-16, 1793.) After August 1, 1793, the fine was 3000 livres and three months' imprisonment, a repetition of the offense making the offender liable to twenty years' imprisonment. On September 5, 1793, the convention decreed that all persons convicted of having refused to receive assignats in payment, of having given or received them at any reduction whatever, or of having held any conversation tending to discredit them, would be punished by death or with confiscation of goods. In May, 1794, the law of suspects was made to include (1) all persons suspected of having bought or sold specie; (2) all persons suspected of having decreed different prices in specie or assignats; (3) all persons suspected of having held conversation tending to discredit assignats; (4) all persons suspected of having refused assignats in payment; (5) all persons suspected of having given or received any reduction whatever, or of having asked before the conclusion or at the beginning of a purchase, "in what money the payment should be made." All such persons were to be immediately brought before the revolutionary tribunal and punished by death. No appeal was allowed, and confiscation of goods was to follow conviction. (May 10-20, 1794.)

Cambon, meanwhile, proposed to effect a rise in the value of assignats by three measures: first, to proceed against the bankers; second, to suppress the Bank of Discount; and third, by a withdrawal of the king's face from the assignats. This last measure resulted in a virtual repudiation of over 200 millions of assignats which bore the king's portrait.

By far the most noteworthy measure adopted, however, to maintain the value of the assignats was the Law of Maximum. Early in 1793 a law had been passed fixing the maximum price for corn (May 3). This was variable for the different departments. Now, however, in the fall of this same year a maximum price for corn and meal was fixed for the entire republic. These articles were only to be sold at fairs and markets and under the

regulation of the municipal body. Nearly all articles of consumption, together with most raw materials, were also subject to a maximum price, which was fixed at one-third more than the price of the article in September, 1790. All people were forbidden to lay in stores of goods, and shopkeepers had to expose over their doors a list of the goods they had in stock. The government compelled all persons to sell to it the war supplies it needed, under requisition, at the maximum price, and paid for the goods in assignats at the nominal value. A maximum was also fixed for wages, the most the workman could receive being the wages he received in 1790. Such measures as these, with assignats at $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. of their nominal value, worked untold hardships throughout all parts of the country and among all classes of citizens; and still the value of the assignats kept on declining.

The directory, upon one occasion, emitted three milliards of assignats at one time. In the first four months of its authority no less than twenty milliards were issued. An assignat of 100 livres was valued at 18 livres in the middle of the year 1795; it fell to .87 at the end of this year, then to .54 and even to .29. On February 19, 1796, Ramel announced to the councils that the various governments of the revolution had issued 45,581,411,018 livres in paper currency! A law of the 2d Nivose, year IV., forbade their emission, and the press was broken to pieces.

To such extremities was the directory brought at one time that a strike of printers threatened to stop all the machinery of the government by cutting off the supply of assignats. The printers were kept at work from 6 A. M. until 8 P. M. every day. A conspiracy among the printers was discovered in 1796, and immediately four workmen were arrested on the charge of "arousing the workmen employed in fabricating assignats to cease work, thus making all offices bankrupt, and causing the overthrow of the republic!" By a decree of the 18th Brumaire, year IV., the directory ordered the erection of a new paper mill, in order that there might be on hand a sufficient supply of paper for the rapid fabrication of assignats.³

The end of this state of things is admirably expressed in the following paragraph:

"Nothing but bankruptcy could end this state of things; it

³ The following table, from Stourm, "*Les Finances de l'ancienne régime et de la Révolution*," vol. II., p. 311, shows the issues of assignats under the

cost you 800 francs to drive across Paris and 1000 francs to get a decent meal at a restaurant. But the double bankruptcy of 1797 (February 4 and September 30) was made in the most cynical manner. First, the law of February 4 demonetized 35 milliards of notes which the state had expressly pledged itself to redeem in cash; then the Faillit du Tiers Consolidé consummated the ruin of the hapless creditor who had carefully preserved his credentials of shares in the national debt: for the 119 millions then inscribed on the Grand Livre (so-called) of 1793 the directory simply took its bill and wrote 43, thus striking out an annual debt of 76, or a capital of 1500 millions. By the same law of September 30 the annuities and pensions were also reduced by two-thirds, and thereby 400 millions added to the bankruptcy. Thus, in the spring, France failed for thirty-five milliards and in the autumn for almost two milliards more.⁴

various governments, and their values, as compiled from the best-known sources in 1797:

	Amount issued	Value on date	
		Named	Per Cent.
The Constituent Assembly, 1800 millions . . .		1790, Jan.,	96
		1796, July,	95
		1791, Jan.,	91
		1791, July,	87
Legislative Assembly, 900 millions		1791, Oct.,	84
		1792, Jan.,	72
		1792, July,	61
The National Convention, 7278 millions . . .		1792, Sept.,	72
		1793, Jan.,	51
		1793, July,	23
		1794, Jan.,	40
		1794, July,	34
		1795, Jan.,	18
The Directory, 35,603 millions		1795, July 2,	2.97
		1795, Nov. 3,	.87
		1796, Jan. 1,	.54
		1796, Feb. 1,	.44
		1796, Feb. 22,	.29

⁴ J. R. Moreton-Macdonald, "The Debt and Deficit and the Financial Conditions of France, 1789-1795"; appendix to Fletcher's edition of Carlyle, "French Revolution," vol. III. p. 341. Other admirable accounts of the assignats and mandates of the French Revolution are Andrew D. White: "Fiat Money Inflation in France: How it Came, what it Brought, and how it Ended." N. Y., D. Appleton & Co., 1896; Levasseux: "*Histoire des classes ouvrières avant 1789*," vol. I. ch. 6. Von Sybel is excellent upon all financial and economic questions, but his treatment is scattered throughout many pages.

PART VI

THE EPOCH OF NAPOLEON. NOVEMBER 10,
1799-JUNE 18, 1815

Chapter XVII

NAPOLEON AND THE CONSULATE. NOVEMBER 10,
1799-DECEMBER 2, 1804

THE 18th Brumaire had immense popularity. People did not perceive in this event the elevation of a single man above the councils of the nation; they did not see in it the end of the great movement of July 14, which had commenced the national existence.

The 18th Brumaire assumed an aspect of hope and restoration. Although the nation was much exhausted and little capable of enduring a sovereignty oppressive to it, and which had even become the object of its ridicule, since the lower class had exercised it, yet it considered despotism so improbable that no one seemed to it to be in a condition to reduce it to a state of subjection. All felt the need of being restored by a skillful hand, and Napoleon Bonaparte, as a great man and a victorious general, seemed suited for the task.

On this account almost everyone, except the directorial republicans, declared in favor of the events of that day. Violation of the laws and *coups d'état* had occurred so frequently during the revolution that people had become accustomed to no longer judge them by their legality, but by their consequences. From the party of Sieyès down to the royalists of 1788 everyone congratulated himself on the 18th Brumaire and attributed to himself the future political advantages of this change. The moderate constitutionalists believed that definitive liberty would be established; the royalists fed themselves with hope by inappropriately comparing this epoch of the revolution with the epoch of 1660 in the English Revolution, with the hope that Bonaparte was assuming the part of Monk, and that he would soon restore the monarchy of the Bourbons; the mass, possessing little intelligence and desirous of repose, relied on the return of order under a powerful protector; the proscribed classes and ambitious men expected from him their amnesty or elevation. During the three months which followed the 18th Brumaire approbation and expectation were general. A provisional government had been

appointed, composed of three consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger-Ducos, with two legislative commissioners, intrusted to prepare the constitution and a definite order of things. Talleyrand was minister of foreign affairs, Cambacérès minister of justice, Gaudin minister of finance, General Berthier minister of war, the Admiral Forfait minister of marine, and Laplace minister of the interior.

The consuls and the two commissioners were installed on the 21st Brumaire. This provisional government abolished the law respecting hostages and compulsory loans; it permitted the return of the priests proscribed since the 18th Fructidor; it released from prison and sent out of the republic the emigrants who had been shipwrecked on the coast of Calais and who for four years were captives in France and were exposed to the heavy punishment of the emigrant army. The civil constitution of the clergy was replaced by the requirement of an oath of fidelity to the state. Other politic acts included the accord of funeral honors to Pius VI., who had died at Valence, and the complete pacification of La Vendée through the mediation of the Abbé Bernier. All these measures were very favorably received. But public opinion revolted at a proscription put in force against the extreme republicans. Thirty-six of them were sentenced to transportation to Guiana and twenty-one were put under surveillance in the department of Charante-Inférieure, merely by a decree of the consuls on the report of Fouché, minister of police. The public viewed unfavorably all who attacked the government; but at the same time it exclaimed against an act so arbitrary and unjust. The consuls accordingly recoiled before their own act; they first commuted transportation into surveillance, and soon withdrew surveillance itself.

It was not long before a rupture broke out between the authors of the 18th Brumaire. During their provisional authority it did not create much noise, because it took place in the legislative commissions. The new constitution was the cause of it. Sieyès and Bonaparte could not agree on this subject: the former wished to institute France, the latter to govern it as a master.

The constitution of Sieyès, which was distorted in the consular constitution of the year VIII., deserves to be known, were it only in the light of a legislative curiosity. Sieyès distributed France into three political divisions: the commune, the province or department, and the state. Each had its own powers of administration and judicature, arranged in hierarchical order: the first, the municipi-

palities and tribunaux de paix and de première instance; the second, the popular prefectures and courts of appeal; the third, the central government and the court of cassation. To fill the functions of the commune, the department, and the state there were three budgets of notability, the members of which were only candidates nominated by the people.

The executive power was vested in the proclamateur electeur, a superior functionary, perpetual, without responsibility, deputed to represent the nation without and to form the government in a deliberating state-council and a responsible ministry. The proclaimer-general selected from the list of candidates, judges from the tribunals of peace to the court of cassation; administrators, from the mayors to the ministers. But he was incapable of governing himself; power was directed by the state-council, exercised by the ministry.

The legislature departed from the form hitherto established; it ceased to be a deliberative assembly to become a judicial court. Before it the council of state, in the name of the government, and the tribunate in the name of the people, pleaded their respective projects. Its sentence was law. It would seem that the object of Sieyès was to put a stop to the violent usurpations of party, and while placing the sovereignty in the people to give it limits in itself; this design appears from the complicated works of his political machine. The primary assemblies, composed of the tenth of the general population, nominated the local list of communal candidates; electoral colleges, also nominated by them, selected from the communal list the superior list of provincial candidates, and from the provincial list the list of national candidates. In all which concerned the government there was a reciprocal control. The proclaimer-general selected his functionaries from among the candidates nominated by the people; and the people could dismiss functionaries, by not keeping them on the list of candidates, which were renewed, the first every two years, the second every five years, the third every ten years. But the proclaimer-general did not interfere in the nomination of tribunes and legislators, whose attributes were purely popular.

Yet, to place a counterpoise in the heart of this authority itself, Sieyès separated the initiative and the discussion of the law, which was invested in the tribunate, from its adoption, which belonged to the legislative assembly. But besides these different prerogatives,

the legislative body and the tribunate were not elected in the same manner. The tribunate was composed by right of the first hundred members of the national list, while the legislative body was chosen directly by the electoral colleges. The tribunes, being necessarily more active, bustling, and popular, were appointed for life, and by a protracted process, to prevent their arriving in a moment of passion, with destructive and angry projects, as had hitherto been the case in most of the assemblies. The same dangers not existing in the other assembly, which had only to judge calmly and disinterestedly of the law, its election was direct and its authority transient.

Lastly, there existed, as the complement of all the other powers, a conservatory body, incapable of ordering, incapable of acting; intended solely to provide for the regular existence of the state. This body was the constitutional jury, or conservatory senate; it was to be for the political law what the court of cassation was to the civil law. The tribunate, or the council of state, appealed to it when the sentence of the legislative body was not conformable to the constitution. It had also the faculty of calling into its own body any leader of the government who was too ambitious, or a tribune who was too popular, by the "*droit d'absorption*," and when senators they were disqualified from filling any other function. In this way it kept a double watch over the safety of the whole of the republic by maintaining the fundamental law and protecting liberty against the ambition of individuals.¹

Whatever may be thought of this constitution, which seems too finely complicated to be practicable, it must be granted that it is the production of considerable strength of mind, and even great practical information. Sieyès paid too little regard to the passions of men; he made them too reasonable as human beings and too obedient as machines. He wished by skillful inventions to avoid the abuses of human constitutions, and excluded death, that is to say, despotism, from whatever quarter it might come. But I have very little faith in the efficacy of constitutions; in such moments I believe only in the strength of parties in their domination and, from time to time, in their reconciliation. But I must also admit that if ever a constitution was adapted to a period it was that of Sieyès for France in the year VIII.

After an experience of ten years, which had only shown exclu-

¹ This description of the constitution of the year VIII. is one of the famous examples of Mignet's writing.

sive dominations, after the violent transition from the constitutionalists of 1789 to the Girondists, from the Girondists to the Mountainists, from the Mountainists to the reactionists, from the reactionists to the directory, from the directory to the councils, from the councils to the military force, there could be no repose or public life save in it. People were weary of wornout constitutions; that of Sieyès was new; exclusive men were no longer wanted, and by elaborate voting it prevented the sudden accession of counter-revolutionists, as at the beginning of the directory, or of ardent democrats, as at the end of this government. It was a constitution of moderate men, suited to terminate a revolution and to settle a nation. But precisely because it was a constitution of moderate men, precisely because parties had no longer sufficient ardor to demand a law of domination, for that very reason there would necessarily be found a man stronger than the fallen parties and the moderate legislators who would refuse this law, or, accepting, abuse it, and this was what happened.


Napoleon took part in the deliberations of the constituent committee; with his instinct of power he seized upon everything in the ideas of Sieyès which was calculated to serve his projects and caused the rest to be rejected. Sieyès intended for him the functions of grand elector, with a revenue of six millions of francs and a guard of three thousand men, the palace of Versailles for a residence and the entire external representation of the republic. But the actual government was to be invested in two consuls, one of war, the other of peace, functionaries unthought of by Sieyès in the year III. but adopted by him in the year VIII., in order, no doubt, to suit the idea of the times. This insignificant magistracy was far from suiting Napoleon. "How could you suppose," said he, "that a man of any talent and honor could resign himself to the part of fattening like a hog on a few millions a year?" From that moment it was not again mentioned; Roger-Ducos and the greater part of the committee declared in favor of Bonaparte; Sieyès, who hated discussion, was either unwilling or unable to defend his ideas. He saw that laws, men, and France itself were at the mercy of the man whose elevation he had promoted.

On December 24, 1799 (Nivose, year VIII.), forty-five days after the 18th Brumaire, was published the constitution of the year VIII.; it was composed of the wrecks of that of Sieyès, now become a constitution of servitude. The government was placed in the

hands of the first consul, who was supported by two others, having a deliberative voice. The senate, primarily selected by the consuls, chose the members of the tribunal and legislative body from the list of the national candidates. The government alone had the initiative in making the laws. Accordingly, there were no more bodies of electors who appointed the candidates of different lists, the tribunes and legislators; no more independent tribunes earnestly pleading the cause of the people before the legislative assembly; no legislative assembly arising directly from the bosom of the nation and accountable to it alone—in a word, no political nation. Instead of all this there existed an all-powerful consul, disposing of armies and of power, a general and a dictator; a council of state destined to be the advance guard of usurpation; and lastly, a senate of eighty members whose only function was to nullify the people and to choose tribunes without authority and legislators who should remain mute. Life passed from the nation to the government. The constitution of Sieyès served as a pretext for a bad order of things. It is worth notice that up to the year VIII. all the constitutions had emanated from the Contrat-social, and that subsequently, down to 1814, from the constitution of Sieyès.

The new government was immediately installed. Napoleon was first consul, and he united with him as second and third consuls Cambacérès, a lawyer and formerly a member of the Plain in the convention, and Le Brun, formerly a coadjutor of the Chancellor Maupeou. By their means he hoped to influence the revolutionists and moderate royalists. With the same object the ex-nobleman, Talleyrand, and the ex-Mountainist, Fouché, were appointed to the posts of minister of foreign affairs and minister of police. Sieyès felt much repugnance at employing Fouché, but Napoleon willed it. "We are forming a new epoch," said he; "we must forget all the ill of the past and remember only the good." He cared very little under what banner men had hitherto served, provided they now enlisted under his and summoned thither their old associates in royalism and in revolution.

The two new consuls and the retiring consuls nominated sixty senators without waiting for the lists of eligibility; the senators appointed a hundred tribunes and three hundred legislators; and the authors of the 18th Brumaire distributed among themselves the functions of the state as the booty of their victory. It is, however, just to say that the moderate liberal party prevailed in this partition,



NAPOLEON CROSSING THE SAINT BERNARD FOR THE INVASION OF ITALY

Painting by Paul Delaroche

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and that as long as it preserved any influence Bonaparte governed in a mild, advantageous, and republican manner. The constitution of the year VIII. was approved by 3,011,007 citizens. The negative vote was only 1567. That of 1793 had obtained 1,801,918 suffrages, and that of the year III. 1,057,390. The new law satisfied the moderate masses, who sought tranquillity rather than guarantees; while the code of '93 had only found partisans among the lower class; and that of the year III. had been equally rejected by the royalists and democrats. The constitution of 1791 alone had obtained general approbation; and, without having been subjected to individual acceptance, had been sworn to by all France.

The first consul, in compliance with the wishes of the republic, made offers of peace to England, which were refused. He naturally wished to assume an appearance of moderation, and, previous to treating, to confer on his government the luster of new victories. Napoleon wrote two letters in person, one to the emperor, the other to the regent for George III. in England, proposing peace. But England was desirous of continuing the war, not merely because of her ancient hostility to France, but at this time in the hope of acquiring more of the colonies of France and Holland. Paul I. of Russia withdrew from the coalition, Prussia remained neutral, and this also was the inclination of Spain. Austria alone of the great powers adhered to the English alliance.

English historians, however, are skeptical of the sincerity of Napoleon's overtures for a peace at this time, pointing out that "the forces of Austria and southern Germany had held their own on the Rhine, and had driven the French from all Italy except Genoa and its coast-line; while British squadrons had taken Minorca, were on the point of reducing Malta by blockade, and kept a French army imprisoned in the sands of Egypt. Peace under such conditions could only have been damaging to the prestige of Bonaparte's new rule; but the sending of these overtures for peace—and again to George III. after Marengo—enabled him to pose as the would-be pacifier of a world weary of strife, while their rejection speedily rallied around him the warlike enthusiasm of France."² The continuance of the war was therefore decided on, and the consuls made a remarkable proclamation, in which they appealed to sentiments new to the nation. Hitherto it had been called to arms in defense of liberty; now they began to excite it in the name of honor: "Frenchmen, you wish for peace. Your gov-

² Rose, "Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era," p. 124.

ernment desires it with still more ardor: its foremost hopes, its constant efforts, have been in favor of it. The English ministry rejects it; the English ministry has betrayed the secret of its horrible policy. To rend France, to destroy its navy and ports, to efface it from the map of Europe, or reduce it to the rank of a secondary power, to keep the nations of the Continent at variance, in order to seize on the commerce of all, and enrich itself by their spoils: these are the fearful successes for which England scatters its gold, lavishes its promises, and multiplies its intrigues. It is in your power to command peace; but to command it, money, the sword, and soldiers are necessary; let all, then, hasten to pay the tribute they owe to their common defense. Let our young citizens arise; they no longer take arms for factions, or for the choice of tyrants, but for the security of what they hold most dear; it is for the honor of France, and for the sacred interests of humanity."

Holland and Switzerland had been sheltered during the preceding campaign, for the victories of Massena in Switzerland and of Brune in Holland had prevented the invasion of France without disarming the coalition. The first consul assembled all his force on the Rhine and the Alps. He gave Moreau the command of the army of the Rhine, and he himself marched into Italy. He set out on the 16th Floréal, year VIII. (May 6, 1800), for that brilliant campaign which lasted only forty days. Bonaparte's plan of campaign was as follows: to drive the Austrians out of Italy and southern Germany, sending Moreau down the valley of the Danube in order to beat back the Austrian Marshal Kray and prevent all communication with Italy through Switzerland, while he himself, having rapidly organized an army in east central France, between Chalons-sur-Saone and Lyons, in order to leave the Austrians uncertain until the last moment whether he intended to strike them through Switzerland or through Italy, planned, by a sudden crossing of the Saint Bernard, to crush the Austrian army of Mélas between his own and that of Massena in Genoa. It was important that he should not be long absent from Paris at the beginning of his power, and especially not to leave the war in a state of indecision. Field Marshal Mélas had 130,000 men under arms; he occupied all Italy. The republican army opposed to him amounted to only 60,000 men, for the unfortunate army of Massena was shut up in Genoa. Mélas left the Field Marshal Lieutenant Ott with 30,000 men before Genoa, and marched against the corps

of General Suchet. He entered Nice, prepared to pass the Var, and to enter Provence. It was then that Napoleon crossed the Great Saint Bernard at the head of an army of 40,000, descended into Italy in the rear of Mélas, entered Milan on the 16th Prairial (June 2), and placed the Austrians between Suchet and himself. Mélas, whose line of operation was broken, quickly fell back upon Nice and thence on to Turin; he established his headquarters at Alexandria, and decided on reopening his communications by a battle. Ott encountered Lannes, in command of 12,000 men, on June 9 at Montebello and was beaten. Two days later Desaix joined him, having come from Egypt, and occupied Novi in order to block the road to Genoa. Massena and Soult made a desperate but unsuccessful resistance, and at last, on the verge of starvation, were forced to surrender Genoa on June 4, ten days before Napoleon's victory at Marengo changed the whole situation.

It was on the plain of Marengo, on June 14 (25th Prairial), that the fate of Italy was decided; the Austrians were overwhelmed. Mélas had 40,000 troops, and planned to join battle in the plains of Alexandria, in order that he would be able to use his cavalry to advantage. Napoleon had only 28,000 men, because he had been obliged to detach many of them in order to block the various passes through which the enemy might advance. The disparity in numbers and the great extent of the field covered forced Napoleon, for one of the few times in his history, to depart from his favorite military tactics, that of concentrating all his strength upon one single point of the enemy, and instead he spread the French army in a long, thin line in the face of the Austrians. The result was that the French line was broken so completely that the oversanguine Mélas believed that victory was in his grasp and actually sent a courier off to Vienna, reporting the fact; but just at this desperate moment Desaix, who had heard the cannonading from Novi, came up with 6000 French and pulled victory out of the fire, though he himself was mortally wounded. Marengo is one of the few battles in which Napoleon was truly defeated. However, young as he was yet, he had too much pride to admit it, and altered or suppressed every account of the real facts of the battle.

Unable to force the passage of the Bormida by a victory, the Austrians were placed without opportunity of retreat between the army of Suchet and that of the first consul. On the 15th they ob-

tained permission to fall behind Mantau, on condition of restoring all the places of Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations; and the victory of Marengo thus secured possession of all Italy.

Eighteen days after, Napoleon returned to Paris. He was received with all the evidence of admiration that such decided victories and prodigious activity could excite; the enthusiasm was universal. There was a spontaneous illumination, and the crowd hurried to the Tuileries to see him. The hope of speedy peace redoubled the public joy. On the 25th Messidor the first consul was present at the anniversary *fête* of July 14. When the officers presented him the standards taken from the enemy, he said to them: "When you return to your camps, tell your soldiers that the French people expect for the 1st Vendémiaire, when we shall celebrate the anniversary of the republic, either the proclamation of peace, or, if the enemy raise invincible obstacles, fruits of new victories." Peace, however, was yet to be delayed some time.

The French garrison at Malta did not capitulate until September, 1800. In Egypt, Kléber, to whom Bonaparte had left command upon his departure for France, had arranged with Sir Sidney Smith for an honorable evacuation of the country and the return of the French soldiers in English vessels. But the English government refused to ratify the arrangements, and the Turkish army of 80,000 men invaded Egypt. Kléber defeated them in the battle of Heliopolis March 20, 1800, but was himself assassinated by a Mohammedan fanatic at Cairo on June 14, the very day that his old comrade in arms, Desaix, was killed at Marengo. The command fell to the incompetent General Ménou, who was beaten by a combined force of English and Turks in the spring of 1801. Cairo surrendered in June and Alexandria capitulated in September, 1801. The French troops were taken back to France by the English.

In the interim between the victory of Marengo and the general pacification, the first consul turned his attention chiefly to settling the people, and to diminishing the number of malcontents, by employing the displaced factions in the state. He was very conciliatory to those parties who renounced their systems, and very lavish of favors to those chiefs who renounced their parties. As it was a time of selfishness and indifference, he had no difficulty in succeeding. The proscribed of the 18th Fructidor were already recalled, with the exception of a few royalist conspirators, such as Pichegru and Willot. Napoleon even employed those of the ban-

ished who, like Portalis, Siméon, Barbé-Marbois, had shown themselves more anti-conventionalists than counter-revolutionists. A *senatus consultum* of April 16, 1802, recalled 150,000 emigrants. Exception was made, however, of those bishops who had been "recalcitrant," and members of the Bourbon house, and any who held rank in foreign armies. The alienations of the revolution remained irrevocable, but those whose property had not yet been sold recovered it, save the forests, which became a portion of the domain of the state. He had also gained over opponents of another description. The late leaders of La Vendée, the famous Bernier, curé of Saint-Lo, who had assisted in the whole insurrection, Chatillon, D'Autichamp, and Suzannet, had come to an accommodation by the Treaty of Mont Luçon (January 17, 1800). He also addressed himself to the leaders of the Breton bands, Georges Cadoudal, Frotté, Laprévelaye, and Bourmont. The two last alone consented to submit. Frotté was surprised and shot; Georges Cadoudal, defeated at Grand Champ by General Brune, refused to submit and retired to England. The western war was thus definitively terminated.

But the Chouans, who had taken refuge in England and whose only hope was in the death of him who now concentrated the power of the revolution, projected his assassination. A few of them disembarked on the coast of France and secretly repaired to Paris. As it was not easy to reach the first consul, they decided on a conspiracy truly horrible. On the 3d Nivose, at eight in the evening, Napoleon was to go to the Opera by the Rue Saint-Nicaise. The conspirators placed a barrel of powder on a little truck, which obstructed the carriage way, and one of them, named Saint Regent, was to set fire to it as soon as he received a signal of the first consul's approach. At the appointed time, Napoleon left the Tuileries, and crossed the Rue Nicaise. His coachman was skillful enough to drive rapidly between the truck and the wall; but the match was already alight, and the carriage had scarcely reached the end of the street when the infernal machine exploded, covered the quarter Saint Nicaise with ruins, shaking the carriage and breaking its windows.

The police, taken by surprise, though directed by Fouché, attributed this plot to the democrats, against whom the first consul had a much more decided antipathy than against the Chouans. Many of them were imprisoned, and a hundred and thirty were

transported by a simple *senatus consultum*, asked and obtained during the night. At length they discovered the true authors of the conspiracy, some of whom were condemned to death. On this occasion the consul caused the creation of special military tribunals. The constitutional party separated still further from him, and began its energetic but useless opposition. Lanjuinais, Gregoire, who had courageously resisted the extreme party in the convention, Garat, Lambrechts, Lenoir-Laroche, and Cabanis, opposed, in the senate, the illegal proscription of a hundred and thirty democrats; and the tribunes Isnard, Daunou, Chénier, Benjamin Constant, Bailleul, and Chazal, opposed the special courts. But a glorious peace threw into the shade this new encroachment of power.

The Austrians, conquered at Marengo and defeated in Germany by Moreau, determined to lay down arms. Moreau had crossed the Rhine on May 1 and after four engagements reached Augsburg, driving the Austrians upon Ulm and thereby making it impossible for them to communicate with Italy. This was the moment when Napoleon drew away 18,000 of his troops. But for fear of getting too deep into the enemy's country, Moreau retraced his steps, crossed the Danube above Ulm, and defeated the enemy at Hochstadt, on almost the same spot where Marlborough defeated the French in 1704, and then signed an armistice with the Austrians, pending the settlement of terms of peace if possible. At the beginning of the campaign Austria had undertaken not to make terms of peace without the consent of England, and the latter power now proposed conditions which France refused to accept. Hostilities were renewed on November 28. Moreau was at Munich with 50,000 men, awaiting the advance of the Austrians under the Archduke John, younger brother of the Archduke Charles. The battle of Hohenlinden was fought on December 3—the most brilliant victory in the military career of Moreau. The Austrians lost 8000 men, killed or wounded, with 12,000 prisoners, 300 wagons, and 87 cannon. The way was opened to Vienna, and the imperial government signed the armistice of Steyer on December 25.

On January 8, 1801, the republic, the cabinet of Vienna, and the empire concluded the Treaty of Luneville. Austria ratified all the conditions of the Treaty of Campo-Formio, and also ceded Tuscany to the young Duke of Parma. The empire recognized the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisal-

pine republics. The terms of Luneville are the true groundwork of modern Germany. The revolution now displays itself, as in France before, as a movement destructive of feudalism and yet as a force of real constructiveness as well, in the formation of the modern states of Germany. Napoleon's German policy is here marked out in its large lines. First, to increase Prussia on the Baltic, in order to counterbalance Austria; second, to cut off Austria from central and western Europe; third, to create a block of small German states in the south and west, in order to check both Austria and Prussia and aggrandize France on the Rhine.³ Napoleon's mastery of the situation on the Continent is manifested in the following extract from the official instructions: "You are forbidden to entertain any proposition relating to the King of Sardinia or to the stadtholder or to the internal affairs of Batavia, Helvetia, or the Republic of Italy." Secularization of ecclesiastical states and mediatisation, the euphemistic term to express the political destruction of the petty German states, was the order of the day at Luneville. The arrangements broadly concluded at Luneville were erected into law by the imperial diet at Frankfort, where the protracted negotiations were as shameful as those which had prevailed at Rastatt. Germany was transformed. Of the preëxisting ecclesiastical estates there were left only the Elector of Mainz, and the grand masters of the order of Saint John and the Teutonic knights: forty-two imperial cities lost their liberty, only Lubeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfort, Augsburg, and Nuremberg being left. All other ecclesiastical states, even the electorates of Trèves and Cologne, were abolished. In their place four new electors appeared, morally dependent upon France for their dignities: Baden, Wurtemberg, Salzburg, and Hesse-Cassel. By secularization and mediatisation Bavaria was enlarged by the bishoprics of Wurtemberg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and Freising; Baden by that portion of the Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine, including Heidelberg and Mannheim, with portions of the bishoprics of Constance, Basel, Strasburg, and Spire; Wurtemberg received all imperial cities, abbeys, and monasteries within its limits. The favor of Prussia was bought by gift of the bishoprics of Paderborn, Hildesheim, and the Thuringian portion of the old archbishopric of Mainz, together with the abbeys of Münster and Quedlinburg; Oldenburg was given the bishopric of Lubeck; Hesse was enriched by the gift of Darmstadt and Cassel and former portions of Mainz,

³ See Fisher, "Napoleonic Germany." 1903.

Trèves, and Cologne, on the right bank of the Rhine. Nassau received the secularized abbey of Osnabruck. For the losses in Italy which the Hapsburg princes suffered the Duke of Tuscany received Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, the Italian duchy passing to Parma; and the Duke of Modena was given the Breisgau, in exchange for which Austria received the secularized bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. The emperor and the empire consented to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France. Germany lost 25,180 square miles (including Belgium) and three and a half millions of inhabitants.

The pacification soon became general, by the Treaty of Florence (February 18, 1801) with the King of Naples, who ceded the Isle of Elba and the principality of Piombino, by the Treaty of Madrid (September 29, 1801), by which Spain ceded Louisiana to France in exchange for the kingdom of Etruria in Italy, which was given to the Spanish Bourbon prince, and further engaged to compel Portugal to renounce her alliance with England; by the Treaty of Paris (October 8, 1801) with the Emperor of Russia; and, lastly, by the preliminaries (October 9, 1801) with the Ottoman Porte. The Continent, by ceasing hostilities, compelled England to a momentary peace. Pitt, Dundas, and Lord Grenville, who had maintained these sanguinary struggles with France, went out of office when their system ceased to be followed. The opposition replaced them; and, on March 25, 1802, the Treaty of Amiens completed the pacification of the world. England consented to all the continental acquisitions of the French republic, recognized the existence of the secondary republics, and restored the French colonies.

Aside from being deserted by her continental allies, there were internal conditions which influenced England to make peace. Hard times prevailed, owing to a bad harvest and the enormous expenses of the war. The public debt had increased since 1793 to 280,000,000*l*. Moreover, England's point of view had partially changed. She had now a new colonial empire to compensate her for the commercial losses caused by the French occupation of Belgium and Holland and other points in Europe. Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and Trinidad, were rich rewards for her losses. It is doubtful, though, if England ever would have consented to this peace had Pitt still been at the helm. But Pitt had retired from the ministry in February, 1801, because the British govern-

ment had failed to keep its word, after the union of Ireland and Great Britain, in the matter of Catholic exclusion from office.⁴

During the maritime war with England the French navy had been almost entirely ruined. Three hundred and forty ships had been taken or destroyed, and the greater part of the colonies had fallen into the hands of the English. Saint Domingo, the most important of them all, after throwing off the yoke of the whites, had continued the American Revolution, which, having commenced in the English colonies, was to end in those of Spain, and change the colonies of the new world into independent states. The blacks of Saint Domingo wished to maintain, with respect to the mother country, the freedom which they had acquired from the colonists, and to defend themselves against the English. They were led by a man of color, the famous Toussaint L'Ouverture. France ought to have consented to this revolution, which had already cost so dearly to humanity. The metropolitan government could no longer be restored at Saint Domingo; and it became necessary to obtain the only real advantage which Europe could now derive from America, by strengthening the commercial ties with the old colony. Instead of this prudent policy, Bonaparte attempted an expedition to reduce the island to subjection. The French landed in Saint Domingo in January, 1802. By May the island was conquered, but 15,000 men had died of fever in two months and the army was reduced to 10,000, and within a year the whole island was lost again to the French, save the capital city, in which they were able to hold out for no less than seven years. At the end of that time Dessalines, a lieutenant of Toussaint L'Ouverture, took the city and proclaimed himself emperor under the name of James I.

After the loss of her fleets the French endeavors to injure the maritime power of England embraced three policies: first, from 1796 to 1798 it endeavored to foment the rebellion of Ireland; second, from 1798 to 1801 the Egyptian expedition attempted to compass the same end; third, after the failure of that attempt the League of Neutrals was formed in the north of Europe as a species of commercial retaliation upon England. The idea of this league was not originally Napoleon's, though he was quick to see the advantage to be afforded by it. During the American Revolution

⁴ See Fyffe, "Modern Europe," vol. I. p. 240; vol. II. pp. 39-40; Bourgeois, "*Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère*," vol. II. p. 220. It was the Addington ministry which negotiated the Peace of Amiens.

Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia formed the northern convention, which asserted armed neutrality at sea in order to protect the commerce of these states from English coercion. Later, Portugal, Spain, and France became parties to the convention, and Holland would have joined if she had not been prevented by the threat of declaration of war on the part of England. Now in 1800 the former condition of things had again arisen. In order to smite France, England had adopted the policy of coercing the commerce of all other states, the United States included. This led to a revival of the old northern convention, under the name of the League of Neutrals, which asserted the inviolability of neutral commerce on the seas, under the three following heads: (1) free passage of neutral ships from port to port and along the coast of those countries engaged in war; (2) neutrality of flag to cover merchandise, save contraband of war; (3) a blockade to be binding only when effective. This action on the part of the northern powers, of itself alone, even though it had been of no benefit to France, was sufficient to anger England, which, in the spring of 1801, sent a fleet to bombard Copenhagen (April 2, 1801), and forced Denmark, at least, to retire from the league.

Napoleon now turned all his attention to the internal prosperity of the republic and the organization of power. The old privileged classes of the nobility and the clergy had returned into the state without forming particular classes. Dissident priests, on taking an oath of obedience, might conduct their modes of worship and receive their pensions from the government. An act of pardon had been passed in favor of those accused of emigration; there only remained a list of about a thousand names of those who remained faithful to the family and the claims of the pretender. The work of pacification was at an end. Napoleon, knowing that the surest way of commanding a nation is to promote its happiness, encouraged the development of industry, and favored external commerce, which had so long been suspended. He united higher views with his political policy, and connected his own glory with the prosperity of France; he traveled through the departments, caused canals and harbors to be dug, bridges to be built, roads to be repaired, monuments to be erected, and means of communication to be multiplied. He especially strove to become the protector and legislator of private interests. The civil, penal, and commercial codes which he formed, whether at this period or at a later

period, completed, in this respect, the work of the revolution, and regulated the internal existence of the nation in a manner somewhat more conformable to its real condition. Notwithstanding political despotism, France, during the domination of Napoleon, had a private legislation superior to that of any European society; for with absolute government, most of them still preserved the civil condition of the Middle Ages. General peace, universal toleration, the return of order, the restoration, and the creation of an administrative system soon changed the appearance of the republic. Attention was turned to the construction of roads and canals. Civilization became developed in an extraordinary manner; and the consulate was, in this respect, the perfected period of the directory, from its commencement to the 18th Fructidor.

The administrative organization of France, made by Napoleon during the consulate, remains to this day the basis of the French government. The administrative genius of Napoleon in forming it is contrasted with his wonderful military talent. The beginning of the system may be said to be found in the decree of the 28th Pluviose, year VIII., which centralized the departmental system. These grand administrative divisions were divided into arrondissements, and these in turn into cantons and communes. Each department was governed by a prefect, aided by a council of prefectures composed of five members, and a more general council; the arrondissement was governed by a sub-prefect, who also had a council; and each commune by a mayor and council. The canton had no separate administration, being governed as a commune after the manner of townships. The members of all these different administrations were nominated by the first consul.

The judicial organization is noteworthy. Every canton had a justice of the peace, every arrondissement a civil court of first instance. The consolidation of several of these tribunals formed a superior court, above which were twenty-nine courts of appeal. The jury system prevailed in criminal processes. The supreme court of France was the cour de cassation, which heard both civil and criminal causes.

More than any other administrative institution, however, the famous Code Civil or Code Napoleon is the monument of Bonaparte's administrative genius. The beginning of this great code is, however, due to the convention. Their unfinished labors were taken up by the first consul, who appointed a commission of four to

complete the work. The whole was discussed at length, section by section, by the council of state, over which Napoleon himself, or Cambacérès, presided. In these labors Napoleon astonished everybody by the originality and depth of his knowledge. At the end of three years the code was presented to the tribunate and the legislative corps and finally promulgated on March 21, 1804.

Napoleon revised the whole financial administration of France. Inheriting a bankrupt government and a dilapidated financial administration, he introduced order and efficiency into the system of public accounts. He appointed a receiver-general in each department and a deputy official in each arrondissement. Besides these, there were 840 inspectors to supervise accounts and make suggestions as to revision of methods of taxation.

Not the least of Napoleon's successes was to have been able to reign for fifteen years without ever resorting to the use of paper currency. He was the founder of the Bank of France, as well as the present money system of the country. In 1801 the national debt was reorganized, and put upon the present basis of administration.

The unfinished educational scheme of the convention was also taken up by Napoleon and perfected. The entire system of education was made dependent upon the government and organized as the University of France. Primary instruction was provided in the communes, but not everywhere. With secondary education the case was different. Thirty-two *lycées* were established, under a semi-military discipline. Instruction included the ancient languages and modern languages and literature, with history and the sciences; 6400 scholarships were created in favor of the sons of soldiers and public officials, besides 4000 other scholarships disposed of by the first consul as he wished. In higher education there were ten schools of law and six schools of medicine, besides the Collège de France and the Sorbonne, rechristened the University of Paris—the old name being applied technically only to the theological school. Besides all these there were various technical schools and the École Normale and the École Supérieure.

Even the famous academies of France did not escape reorganization, and the unfinished work of the convention was completed in the establishment of the Institut de France. It is impossible to more than allude to the work of Napoleon as a builder, and especially as the maker of the new Paris.

1799-1804

It was more especially after the Peace of Amiens that Napoleon raised the foundation of his future power. He himself says, in the memoirs published under his name,⁵ "The ideas of Napoleon were fixed, but to realize them he required the assistance of time and circumstances. The organization of the consulate had nothing in contradiction with these; it accustomed the nation to unity, and that was a first step. This step taken, Napoleon was indifferent to the forms and denominations of the different constituted bodies. He was a stranger to the revolution. It was his wisdom to advance from day to day, without deviating from the fixed point, the polar star, which directed Napoleon how to guide the revolution to the port whither he wished to conduct it."

In the beginning of 1802 he was at one and the same time forming three great projects, tending to the same end. He sought to organize religion and to establish the clergy, which as yet had only a religious existence; to create, by means of the Legion of Honor, a permanent military order in the army; and to secure his own power, first for his life, and then to render it hereditary. Napoleon was installed at the Tuileries, where he gradually resumed the customs and ceremonies of the old monarchy. He already thought of placing intermediate bodies between himself and the people. For some time past he had opened a negotiation with Pope Pius VII. on matters of religious worship. The famous concordat, which created ten archbishoprics, fifty bishoprics, with the institution of chapters, which established the clergy in the state, and again placed it under the external monarchy of the Pope, was signed at Paris on July 16, 1801, and ratified at Rome on August 15, 1801.

The concordat was negotiated by Cardinal Gonsalvi and Joseph Bonaparte, with the assistance of Cretet, councilor of state, and the Vendean priest, Bernier. The principal other articles were as follows: (1) The church was to recognize the laws of the state and no papal bull could be published and no council held without the authorization of the government. (2) The ordination of priests was conditioned upon age, fortune, and the number of those already officiating. Those engaged in an educational capacity were required to accept the Gallican decrees of 1682. (3) Sunday and the frequent religious festivals of the church were recognized by

⁵ "Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de France sous Napoléon, écrits à Sainte Hélène," vol. I. p. 248.

the government as days of rest. (4) The civil marriage was required in advance of any religious ceremony, and indeed the religious marriage was made optional.

The same policy was followed by the government with reference to the Protestant cults, both the Lutheran and the Calvinist. Their churches were grouped into consistories, and the nomination of their pastors had to be approved by the government, which paid the salaries of all clergy, Protestant and Catholic. In 1808 this practice was extended also to the Jewish congregations.

Napoleon, who had destroyed the liberty of the press, created exceptional tribunals, and who had departed more and more from the principles of the revolution, felt that before he went further it was necessary to break entirely with the liberal party of the 18th Brumaire. In Ventose, year X (March, 1802), the most energetic of the tribunes were dismissed by a simple operation of the senate. The tribunate was reduced to eighty members, and the legislative body underwent a similar purgation. About a month after, the 15th Germinal (April 6, 1802), Bonaparte, no longer apprehensive of opposition, submitted the concordat to these assemblies, whose obedience he had thus secured, for their acceptance. They adopted it by a great majority. The Sunday and four great religious festivals were reëstablished, and from that time the government ceased to observe the system of decades. This was the first attempt at renouncing the republican calendar. Napoleon hoped to gain the sacerdotal party, always most disposed to passive obedience, and thus deprive the royalist opposition of the clergy, and the coalition of the Pope.

The concordat was inaugurated with great pomp in the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame. The senate, the legislative body, the tribunate, and the leading functionaries were present at this new ceremony. The first consul repaired thither in the carriages of the old court, with the etiquette and attendants of the old monarchy; salvos of artillery announced this return of privilege, and this essay at royalty. A pontifical mass was performed by Caprara, the cardinal-legate, and the people were addressed by proclamation in a language to which they had long been unaccustomed. "Reason and the example of ages," ran the proclamation, "command us to have recourse to the sovereign pontiff to effect unison of opinion and reconciliation of hearts. The head of the church has weighed

in his wisdom and for the interest of the church, propositions dictated by the interest of the state."

In the evening there was an illumination and a concert in the gardens of the Tuileries. The soldiery reluctantly attended at the inauguration ceremony, and expressed their dissatisfaction aloud. On returning to the palace Napoleon questioned General Delmas on the subject. "What did you think of the ceremony?" said he. "A fine mummery," was the reply. "Nothing was wanting but a million of men slain in destroying what you reëstablish."

A month after, on the 25th Floréal, year X. (May 15, 1802), he presented the project of a law respecting the creation of a Legion of Honor. This legion was to be composed of fifteen cohorts, dignitaries for life, disposed in hierarchical order, having a center, an organization, and revenues. The first consul was the chief of the legion. Each cohort was composed of 7 grand officers, 20 commanders, 30 officers, and 350 legionaries. Napoleon's object was to originate a new nobility. He thus appealed to the ill-suppressed sentiment of inequality. While discussing this projected law in the council of state, he did not scruple to announce his aristocratic design. Berlier, counselor of state, having disapproved an institution so opposed to the spirit of the republic, said that: "Distinctions were the playthings of a monarchy." "I defy you," replied the first consul, "to show me a republic, ancient or modern, in which distinctions did not exist; you call them toys; well, it is by toys that men are led. I would not say as much to a tribune, but in a council of wise men and statesmen we may speak plainly. I do not believe that the French love liberty and equality. The French have not been changed by ten years of revolution; they have but one sentiment—*honor*. That sentiment, then, must be nourished; they must have distinctions. See how the people prostrate themselves before the ribbons and stars of foreigners; they have been surprised by them; and they do not fail to wear them. All has been destroyed; the question is, how to restore all. There is a government, there are authorities; but the rest of the nation, what is it? Grains of sand. Among us we have the old privileged classes, organized in principles and interests, and knowing well what they want. I can count our enemies. But we, ourselves, are dispersed, without system, union, or contact. As long as I am here, I will answer for the republic; but we must provide for the future. Do you think the republic is definitively

established? If so, you are greatly deceived. It is in our power to make it so; but we have not done it; and we shall not do it if we do not hurl some masses of granite on the soil of France.”⁶ By these words Napoleon announced a system of government opposed to that which the revolution sought to establish, and which the change in society demanded.

Yet, notwithstanding the docility of the council of state, the purgation undergone by the tribunal and the legislative body, these three bodies vigorously opposed a law which revived inequality. In the council of state the Legion of Honor had only 14 votes against 10; in the tribunal, 38 against 56; in the legislative body, 166 against 110. Public opinion manifested a still greater repugnance for this new order of knighthood. Those first invested seemed almost ashamed of it, and received it with a sort of contempt. But Napoleon pursued his counter-revolutionary course without troubling himself about a dissatisfaction no longer capable of resistance.

He wished to confirm his power by the establishment of privilege, and to confirm privilege by the duration of his power. On the motion of Chabot de l’Allier, the tribunal resolved: “That the first consul, General Bonaparte, should receive a signal mark of national gratitude.” In pursuance of this resolution, on May 6, 1802, an organic *senatus consultum* appointed Napoleon consul for an additional period of ten years.

But Bonaparte did not consider the prolongation of the consulate sufficient; and two months after, on August 2, the senate, on the decision of the tribunate and the legislative body, and with the consent of the people, consulted by means of the public registers, passed the following decree:

“I. The French people nominate, and the senate proclaim, Napoleon Bonaparte first consul for life.

“II. A statue of Peace, holding in one hand a laurel of victory, and in the other, the decree of the senate, shall attest to posterity the gratitude of the nation.

“III. The senate will convey to the first consul the expression of the confidence, love, and admiration of the French people.”

⁶ This passage is extracted from M. Thibaudeau’s “*Mémoires of the Consulate*.” There are in these memoirs, which are extremely curious, some political conversations of Napoleon, concerning his internal government and the principal sittings of the council of state, which throw much light upon this epoch.

This revolution was complete by adapting to the consulship for life, by a simple *senatus consultum*, the constitution, already sufficiently despotic, of the temporary consulship. "Senators," said Cornudet, on presenting the new law, "we must forever close the public path to the Gracchi. The wishes of the citizens, with respect to the political laws they obey, are expressed by the general prosperity; the guarantee of social rights absolutely places the dogma of the exercise of the sovereignty of the people in the senate, which is the bond of the nation. This is the only social doctrine." The senate admitted this new social doctrine, took possession of the sovereignty, and held it as a deposit till a favorable moment arrived for transferring it to Napoleon.

The constitution of the 16th Thermidor, year X. (August 4, 1802), excluded the people from the state. The public and administrative functions became fixed, like those of the government. The electors were for life. The first consul could increase their number. The senate had the right of changing institutions, suspending the functions of the jury, of placing the departments out of the constitution, of annulling the sentences of the tribunals, of dissolving the legislative body and the tribunate. The council of state was reinforced; the tribunate, already reduced by dismissals, was still sufficiently formidable to require to be reduced to fifty members.

Such, in the course of two years, was the terrible progress of privilege and absolute power. Toward the close of 1802 everything was in the hands of the consul for life, who had a class devoted to him in the clergy; a military order in the Legion of Honor; an administrative body in the council of state; a machinery for decrees in the legislative assembly; a machinery for the constitution in the senate. Not daring, as yet, to destroy the tribunate, in which assembly there arose, from time to time, a few words of freedom and opposition, he deprived it of its most courageous and eloquent members that he might hear his will declared with docility in all the assemblies of the nation.

This interior policy of usurpation was extended beyond the country. On August 26 Napoleon united the Island of Elba, and on September 11, 1802, Piedmont, to the French territory. On October 9 he took possession of the states of Parma, left vacant by the death of the duke; and lastly, on October 21, he marched into Switzerland an army of 30,000 men, to support a federative act

which regulated the constitution of each canton, and which had caused disturbances. It is fair to say that Switzerland herself furnished Napoleon the opportunity, by making overtures to him. It was erected into a federal republic of nineteen cantons. He thus furnished a pretext for a rupture with England, which had not sincerely subscribed to the peace. This great extension of the power of France to a country the neutrality of which had been guaranteed since 1648 angered England. Napoleon retaliated by demanding the English withdrawal from Malta. A violent conflict was waged between the English newspapers and the *Moniteur*, the articles of which were inspired by Napoleon, and some of them perhaps even of his authorship. The French government even accused England of protecting the would-be assassins of the first consul. From the beginning of 1803 it was apparent that the Peace of Amiens soon was to be broken. On February 18 a violent interview took place between Napoleon and the British ambassador, Lord Whitworth, in which Napoleon declared: "I would rather see you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta." The irritation of England was doubly great because of the continued occupation of Elba and Piedmont by France, and the revolution wrought in Germany by the French. The British cabinet had only felt the necessity of a momentary suspension of hostilities, and a short time after the Treaty of Amiens it arranged a third coalition, composed of England, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Naples, as it had done after the Treaty of Campo-Formio and at the time of the Congress of Rastatt. The interest and situation of England were alone of a nature to bring about a rupture, which was hastened by the union of states effected by Napoleon, and the influence which he retained over the neighboring republics, called to complete independence by the recent treaties. Napoleon, on his part, eager for the glory gained on the field of battle, wishing to aggrandize France by conquests, and to complete his own elevation by victories, could not rest satisfied with repose; he had rejected liberty, and war became a necessity.

The two cabinets exchanged for some time very bitter diplomatic notes. At length, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, left Paris on the 25th Floréal, year XI. (May 13, 1803). Peace was now definitely broken: preparations for war were made on both sides. On May 26 the French troops entered the electorate of Hanover. Hanover was a continental possession of the reigning

house of England. At the same time the French troops occupied Holland, the Italian republics, the kingdom of Naples, and closed their ports to English trade, while in compliance with the treaties lately made Napoleon also demanded the closure of the Portuguese and Spanish ports to the governments concerned. This is the first attempt at the famous continental blockade. The Germanic empire, on the point of expiring, raised no obstacle. The emigrant Chouan party, which had taken no steps since the affair of the infernal machine and the continental peace, were encouraged by this return of hostilities. The opportunity seemed favorable, and it formed in London, with the assent of the British cabinet, a conspiracy headed by Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal. The conspirators disembarked secretly on the coast of France and repaired with the same secrecy to Paris. They communicated with General Moreau, who had been induced by his wife to embrace the republican party. Just as they were about to execute their project most of them were arrested by the police, who had discovered the plot, and traced them.

Moreau was a sturdy republican and opposed to Napoleon's monarchical ambitions. He had been interviewed by Pichegru, who had escaped from French Guiana, but there is doubt of Moreau's actual support of the conspiracy. At his trial Moreau would admit nothing, because, he said, he knew nothing, and he refused to attempt to clear himself of any accusation made without proof. Pichegru was found strangled in prison on the morning of April 6, 1804. It is not known whether he committed suicide or was secretly put to death in this manner. Moreau was condemned to two years' imprisonment, which was commuted to banishment. For some time he lived in the United States, but returned in 1813 and joined the coalition against Napoleon. He was mortally wounded at the battle of Dresden. Georges Cadoudal was executed.

This conspiracy, discovered in the middle of February, 1804, rendered the person of the first consul, whose life had been thus threatened, still dearer to the masses of the people; addresses of congratulation were presented by all the bodies of the state and all the departments of the republic. About this time he sacrificed an illustrious victim. On March 15, the Duke d'Enghien⁷ was

⁷ The Duke d'Enghien was son of the Duke de Bourbon and grandson of the Prince de Condé. His execution was probably the most debated act of Napoleon's career. There are few apologists for it among historians.

carried off by a squadron of cavalry from the castle of Ettenheim, in the grand duchy of Baden, a few leagues from the Rhine. The first consul believed, from the reports of the police, that this prince had directed the recent conspiracy. The Duke d'Enghien was conveyed hastily to Vincennes, tried, in a few hours, by a military commission, and shot in the trenches of the château. This crime was not an act of policy or usurpation, but a deed of violence and wrath. The royalists might have thought on the 18th Brumaire that the first consul was studying the part of General Monk; but for four years he had destroyed that hope. He had no longer any necessity for breaking with them in so outrageous a manner, nor for reassuring, as it has been suggested, the Jacobins, who no longer existed. Those who remained devoted to the republic dreaded at this time despotism far more than a counter-revolution. There is every reason to think that Napoleon, who thought little of human life or of the rights of nations, having already formed the habit of an expeditious and hasty policy, imagined the prince to be one of the conspirators, and sought, by a terrible example, to put an end to conspiracies, the only peril that threatened his power at that period.

The war with Great Britain and the conspiracy of Cadoudal and Pichegru were the stepping-stones by which Napoleon ascended from the consulate to the empire. On the 6th Germinal, year XII. (March 27, 1804), the senate, on receiving intelligence of the plot, sent a deputation to the first consul. The president, François de Neufchâteau, expressed himself in these terms: "Citizen first consul, you are founding a new era, but you ought to perpetuate it: splendor is nothing without duration. We do not doubt but this great idea has had a share of your attention; for your creative genius embraces all and forgets nothing. But do not delay: you are urged on by the times, by events, by conspirators, and by ambitious men; and in another direction, by the anxiety which agitates the French people. It is in your power to enchain time, master events, disarm the ambitious, and tranquilize the whole of France by giving it institutions which will cement your edifice, and prolong for our children what you have done for their fathers. Citizen first consul, be assured that the senate here speaks to you in the name of all citizens."

On the 5th Floréal, year XII. (April 25, 1804), Napoleon replied to the senate from Saint Cloud, as follows: "Your address

has occupied my thoughts incessantly; it has been the subject of my constant meditation. You consider that the supreme magistracy should be hereditary, in order to protect the people from the plots of our enemies, and the agitation which arises from rival ambitions. You also think that several of our institutions ought to be perfected, to secure the permanent triumph of equality and public liberty, and to offer the nation and government the twofold guarantee which they require. The more I consider these great objects, the more deeply do I feel that in such novel and important circumstances, the councils of your wisdom and experience are necessary to enable me to come to a conclusion. I invite you, then, to communicate to me your ideas on the subject." The senate, in its turn, replied on the 14th Floréal (May 3): "The senate considers that the interests of the French people will be greatly promoted by confiding the government of the republic to Napoleon Bonaparte, as hereditary emperor." By this preconcerted scene was ushered in the establishment of the empire.

The tribune Curée opened the debate in the tribunate by a motion on the subject. He dwelt on the same motives as the senators had done. His proposition was carried with enthusiasm. Carnot alone had the courage to oppose the empire: "I am far," said he, "from wishing to weaken the praises bestowed on the first consul; but whatever services a citizen may have done to his country, there are bounds which honor, as well as reason, imposes on national gratitude. If this citizen has restored public liberty, if he has secured the safety of his country, is it a reward to offer him the sacrifice of that liberty; and would it not be destroying his own work to make his country his private patrimony? When once the proposition of holding the consulate for life was presented for the votes of the people, it was easy to see that an afterthought existed. A crowd of institutions evidently monarchical followed in succession; but now the object of so many preliminary measures is disclosed in a positive manner; we are called to declare our sentiments on a formal motion to restore the monarchical system, and to confer imperial and hereditary dignity on the first consul.

"Has liberty, then, only been shown to man that he might never enjoy it? No, I cannot consent to consider this good, so universally preferred to all others, without which all others are as nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is attainable; that its régime is easier and more stable than any arbi-

trary government. I voted against the consulate for life; I now vote against the restoration of the monarchy; as I conceive my quality as tribune compels me to do."

But he was the only one who thought thus; and his colleagues rivaled each other in this opposition to the opinion of the only man who alone among them remained free. In the speeches of that period we may see the prodigious change that had taken place in ideas and language. The revolution had retrograded to the political principles of the ancient régime; the same enthusiasm and fanaticism existed; but it was the enthusiasm of flattery, the fanaticism of servitude. The French rushed into the empire as they had rushed into the revolution; in the age of reason they referred everything to the enfranchisement of nations; now they talked of nothing but the greatness of a man, and of the age of Napoleon; and they now fought to make kings, as they had formerly fought to create republics.

The tribunate, the legislative body, and the senate voted the empire, which was proclaimed at Saint Cloud on the 28th Floréal, year XII. (May 18, 1804). On the same day a *senatus consultum* modified the constitution, which was adapted to the new order of things. The empire required its appendages, and French princes, high dignitaries, marshals, chamberlains, and pages were given to it. All publicity was destroyed. The liberty of the press had already been subjected to censorship;⁸ only one tribune remained, and that became mute. The sittings of the tribunate were secret, like those of the council of state; and from that day, for a space of ten years, France was governed with closed doors. Joseph and Louis Bonaparte were recognized as French princes. Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Massena, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davout, Bessières, Kellermann, Lefèvre, Pérignon, and Serrurier, were named marshals of the empire. The departments sent up addresses, and the clergy compared Napoleon to a new Moses, a new Matthew, a new Cyrus. They saw in his elevation "the finger of God," and said that "submission was due to him as dominating over all; to his ministers as sent by him, because such was the order of Providence." Pope Pius VII. came to Paris to consecrate the new dynasty. The coronation took place on Sunday, December 2, in the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame.

⁸ Upon Napoleon's dealings with the press see Guillois, "Napoleon," Tome II., pp. 368-448.

Preparations had been making for this ceremony for some time, and it was regulated according to ancient customs. The emperor repaired to the metropolitan church with the Empress Josephine, in a coach surmounted by a crown, drawn by eight white horses, and escorted by his guard. The Pope, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, and all the great bodies of the state were awaiting him in the cathedral, which had been magnificently decorated for this extraordinary ceremony. He was addressed in an oration at the door; and then, clothed with the imperial mantle, the crown on his head and the scepter in his hand, he ascended a throne placed at the end of the church. The high almoner, a cardinal, and a bishop came and conducted him to the foot of the altar for consecration. The Pope poured the three fold unction on his head and hands, and delivered the following prayer: "O Almighty God, who didst establish Hazael to govern Syria, and Jehu king of Israel, by revealing unto them thy purpose by the mouth of the prophet Elias; who didst also shed the holy unction of kings on the head of Saul and of David, by the ministry of thy prophet Samuel, vouchsafe to pour, by my hands, the treasures of thy grace and blessing on thy servant Napoleon, who, notwithstanding our own unworthiness, we this day consecrate emperor in thy name."

The Pope led him solemnly back to the throne, and after he had sworn on the Testament the oath prescribed by the new constitution, the chief of the heralds at arms cried in a loud voice: "The most glorious and most august Emperor of the French is crowned and enthroned! Long live the emperor!" The church instantly resounded with the cry, salvos of artillery were fired, and the Pope commenced the *Te Deum*. For several days there was a succession of *fêtes*; but these *fêtes* by command, these *fêtes* of absolute power, did not breathe the frank, lively, popular, and unanimous joy of the first federation of July 14; and, exhausted as the people were, they did not welcome the beginning of despotism as they had welcomed that of liberty.

The consulate was the last period of the existence of the republic. The revolution was coming to man's estate. During the first period of the consular government Napoleon had gained the proscribed classes by recalling them, he found a people still agitated by every passion, and he restored them to tranquillity by labor, and to prosperity by restoring order. Finally he compelled Europe, conquered for the third time, to acknowledge his elevation.

Till the Treaty of Amiens, he revived in the republic victory, concord, and prosperity, without sacrificing liberty. He might then, had he wished, have made himself the representative of that great age, which sought for that noble system of human dignity the consecration of far-extended equality, wise liberty, and more developed civilization. The nation was in the hands of the great man or the despot; it rested with him to preserve it free or to enslave it. He preferred the realization of his selfish projects, and preferred himself to all humanity. Brought up in tents, coming late into the revolution, he understood only its material and interested side; he had no faith in the moral wants which had given rise to it, nor in the creeds which had agitated it, and which, sooner or later, would return and destroy him. He saw an insurrection approaching its end, an exhausted people at his mercy, and a crown on the ground within his reach. It is to be noted how completely changed are conditions at this time (1804). Napoleon is no longer the child of the revolution, nor attempting to enforce its ideas, but rather is seeking to establish his personal domination over Europe.⁹

⁹ A character study of the great conqueror might well be made at this point. Suggestive reading is the following: Rose, "Napoleon"; Lord Rosebery, "The Last Phase"; Guillois, "Napoleon," Tome I., Book I.; Taine: "Modern Régime," I. Book I.

Chapter XVIII

THE EMPIRE. 1804-1814

AFTER the establishment of the empire power became more arbitrary, and society reconstructed itself on an aristocratic principle. The great movement of recomposition which had commenced on the 9th Thermidor went on increasing. The convention had abolished classes; the directory defeated parties; the consulate gained over men; and the empire corrupted them by distinctions and privileges. The second period was the opposite of the first. Under the one, we saw the government of the committees exercised by men elected every three months, without guards, honors, or representations, living on a few francs a day,¹ working eighteen hours together on common wooden tables; under the other, the government of the empire, with all its paraphernalia of administration, its chamberlains, gentlemen, prætorian guard, hereditary rights, its immense civil list, and dazzling ostentation. The national activity was exclusively directed to labor and war. All material interests, all ambitious passions, were hierarchically arranged under one leader, who, after having sacrificed liberty by establishing absolute power, destroyed equality by introducing nobility.

The directory had erected all the surrounding states into republics; Napoleon wished to constitute them on the model of the empire. He began with Italy. The council of state of the Cisalpine republic determined on restoring hereditary monarchy in favor of Napoleon. Its vice-president, Melzy, came to Paris to communicate to him this decision. On the 26th Ventose, year XIII.

¹ The original text is preserved. But in his allegiance to the revolution Mignet shows himself incapable of appreciating the great constructive work of Napoleon. As for "living on a few francs a day," Von Sybel gives ample evidence of the waste and extravagance of the revolutionary government. The actual wages of the various committees exceeded 590,000,000 francs per annum, more than the entire budget of the ancient régime. Von Sybel, "History of the French Revolution," vol. III. p. 310. The commune spent 12,000 francs per diem in the endeavor to keep down prices under the maximum law.

(March 17, 1805), he was received with great solemnity at the Tuileries. Napoleon was on his throne, surrounded by his court and all the splendor of sovereign power, in the display of which he delighted. Melzy offered him the crown, in the name of his fellow-citizens. "Sire," said he, in conclusion, "deign to gratify the wishes of the assembly over which I have the honor to preside. Interpreter of the sentiments which animate every Italian heart, it brings you their sincere homage. It will inform them with joy that by accepting, you have strengthened the ties which attach you to the preservation, defense, and prosperity of the Italian nation. Yes, sire, you wished the existence of the Italian republic, and it existed. Desire the Italian monarchy to be happy, and it will be so."

The emperor went to take possession of this kingdom, and on May 26, 1805, he received at Milan the Iron Crown of the Lombards. He appointed his adopted son, Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, viceroy of Italy, and repaired to Genoa, which also renounced its sovereignty. On June 4, 1805, its territory was united to the empire, and formed the three departments of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. The small republic of Lucca was included in this monarchical revolution. At the request of its gonfalonier, it was given in appanage to the Prince of Piombino and his princess, a sister of Napoleon. The latter, after this royal progress, recrossed the Alps and returned to the capital of his empire; he soon after departed for the camp at Boulogne, where a great maritime expedition against England was preparing.

This project of descent which the directory had entertained after the Peace of Campo-Formio, and the first consul, after the Peace of Luneville, had been resumed with much ardor since the new rupture. At the commencement of 1805 a flotilla of two thousand small vessels, manned by 16,000 sailors, carrying an army of 160,000 men, 9000 horses, and a numerous artillery, had assembled in the ports of Boulogne, Étaples, Wimereux, Ambleteuse, and Calais. In this endeavor to make a direct conquest of England Napoleon was true to the traditional policy of France, for Louis XIV. had thus conceived of establishing James II. upon the throne, and no later than 1796 Hoche had failed in Ireland in a similar endeavor. As the soul of the coalition, the conquest of England, if achieved, would have placed all Europe under Napoleon's heel. Elaborate preparations were made at Boulogne,

where, in August, 1805, an army of 150,000 men was gathered and artillery to the amount of 2300 small cannon and 3500 of larger caliber. There were vessels sufficient to embark 30,000 men within a few hours. Boulogne was the central point of embarkation, where Soult was in command. The advance guard under Lannes and Oudinot was to sail from Wimereux. The right wing of the army, under Davout, was at Ambleteuse, and the left, under Ney, at Étaples. Napoleon's confidence is expressed in his words: "If we are masters twelve hours after landing, England is vanquished."

Aside from favorable weather, the success of the expedition was dependent upon the movements of the French and English fleets. In order to make himself master of the Channel it was planned that Admiral Villeneuve was to sail from Toulon, pick up the Spanish fleet in Cadiz harbor, and then sail, on a southwest course toward the West Indies for the purpose of meeting two other French squadrons, the commanders of which had been instructed to sail from Brest and Rochefort as if going to the Antilles. The united fleet was then to double on its course, eluding, if possible, the English fleet sent in pursuit of the two squadrons sailing from the western harbors of France, and sweep up the Channel to protect the French in crossing from Boulogne. Unfortunately for the success of this plan, however, though Villeneuve had united the Spanish fleet with his own, the other two squadrons were kept in harbor by the English. An attempt to penetrate the Channel was prevented by the English Admiral Calder in an indecisive combat on July 22, 1805. The French fleet was forced to return to Cadiz for repairs, and Napoleon, despairing of success, broke up the camp at Boulogne on August 27. Two months later the united French and Spanish fleets, numbering thirty-three vessels, were destroyed by Nelson in the battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805. Both Nelson and the Spanish admiral were killed in the engagement, and Villeneuve surrendered. He committed suicide when court-martialed for his conduct.

The emperor was hastening by his presence the execution of this project, when he learned that England, to avoid the descent with which it was threatened, had prevailed on Austria to come to a rupture with France, and that all the forces of the Austrian monarchy were in motion. There were four armies directed against France: (1) An Anglo-Russian-Swedish force of 43,-

ooo men, to come by way of Hanover and Holland; (2) the Austrian army of 80,000, on the upper Danube, under Mack and the Archduke Ferdinand, who were to be reinforced by 60,000 Russians; (3) another Austrian army of 100,000, under the Archduke Charles, intended for the invasion of Italy; (4) a combined English and Russian force was to be landed in Naples. Pitt, who had returned to power after the weak administration of the Addington ministry, seems to have made an error of judgment similar to that of 1796, when he overestimated the strength of Austria; for this time the illusion of Napoleon's loss of energy apparently deceived him. The terms of the compact between England and other members of the coalition provided that no peace was to be made with France without common consent and that there should be no settlement of conquests until final peace was made by a European congress. The establishment of the kingdom of Italy, the annexation of Genoa and Piedmont to France, the open influence of the emperor over Holland and Switzerland, had again aroused Europe, which now dreaded the ambition of Napoleon as much as it had formerly feared the principles of the revolution. The treaty of alliance between the British ministry and the Russian cabinet had been signed on April 11, 1805, and Austria had acceded to it on August 9.

Napoleon left Boulogne, returned hastily to Paris, repaired to the senate on September 23, obtained a levy of 80,000 men, and set out the next day to begin the campaign. He passed the Rhine on October 1 and entered Bavaria on the 6th with an army of 160,000 men. Massena stopped Prince Charles in Italy, and the emperor carried on the war in Germany at full speed. In a few days he passed the Danube, entered Munich, gained the victory of Wertingen, and forced General Mack to lay down his arms at Ulm. Mack had made the error of advancing so far that he was unable to coöperate with the Russian force. The Austrians surrendered 30,000 prisoners, and had already lost almost an equal number in killed or wounded in seven previous engagements precipitated by desperate efforts of the Austrians to break the French circle of arms. This capitulation disorganized the Austrian army. Napoleon pursued the course of his victories, entered Vienna on November 13, and marched into Moravia to meet the Russians, round whom the defeated troops had rallied.

On December 2, 1805, the anniversary of the coronation, the

two armies met in the plains of Austerlitz. The enemy amounted to 95,000 men, the French to 80,000. On both sides the artillery was formidable. The battle began at sunrise; these enormous masses began to move; the Russian infantry could not stand against the impetuosity of the French and the maneuvers of their general. The enemy's left was first cut off; the Russian imperial guard came up to reestablish the communication, and was entirely overwhelmed. The center experienced the same fate, and at one o'clock in the afternoon the most decisive victory had completed this wonderful campaign. The battle of Austerlitz is often called the "Battle of the three emperors." The allies lost 15,000 men, killed, wounded, or drowned, 20,000 prisoners, 180 cannon, and 40 standards. The French loss was 7000. Napoleon ever regarded the battle of Austerlitz as the greatest day in his history, and was wont frequently to refer to it. On the evening before the battle, with almost fatalistic belief in his "star of destiny," in an address to the soldiers he took them all into his confidence by actually telling them what his strategy and tactics were to be on the morrow! The following day the emperor congratulated the army in a proclamation on the field of battle itself. "Soldiers," said he, "I am satisfied with you. You have adorned your eagles with immortal glory. An army of 100,000 men, commanded by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, in less than four days has been cut to pieces or dispersed; those who escaped your steel have been drowned in the lakes. Forty flags, the standards of the Russian imperial guard, a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, twenty generals, more than twenty thousand prisoners, are the result of this ever memorable day. This infantry, so vaunted and so superior in numbers, could not resist your shock, and henceforth you have no more rivals to fear. Thus, in two months, this third coalition has been defeated and dissolved." A truce was concluded with Austria; and the Russians, who might have been cut to pieces, obtained permission to retire by fixed stages.²

The Peace of Presburg followed the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz; it was signed on December 26. The house of Austria, which had lost its external possessions, Flanders and the Milanese, was now assailed in Germany itself. It gave up the provinces of Dalmatia and Albania to the kingdom of Italy; the territory of

² The accounts of the General-baron Lejeune and General Ségur, to be found in their memoirs (English translations), are astonishing word-pictures of this day, by eye-witnesses.

the Tyrol, the town of Augsburg, the principality of Eichstett, a part of the territory of Passau, and all its possessions in Suabia, Breisgau, and Ortenau to the electorates of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, which were transformed into kingdoms. The grand duchy of Baden also profited by its spoils. The Treaty of Presburg completed the humiliation of Austria, commenced by the Treaty of Campo-Formio, and continued by that of Luneville. At the beginning of the war of the third coalition Napoleon had declared that Austria would not be spared, as had been done hitherto; for, except for loss of prestige, Austria had suffered very little hitherto. Campo-Formio had deprived her of the Netherlands, but given her Venetia in return; Luneville had substituted French for Austrian influence in southern and western Germany. Austria lost influence there, but not territory. But the Treaty of Presburg (December 26, 1805) cut Austria off from Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhine, and deprived her of 28,000 square miles of territory and 3,000,000 subjects. The following cessions were made: Piedmont, Piacenza, and Parma to France; Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia to the kingdom of Italy; the Tyrol, Passau, Trent, Brixen, Eichstadt, and the free city of Augsburg passed to Bavaria; Wurtemberg and Baden were enriched by Austria's upper Rhine lands, the last remnants of the possessions of Rudolph of Hapsburg, and were recognized as kingdoms. The Holy Roman Empire never recovered from the blow of Austerlitz, and on August 6, 1806, Francis II. laid down a title as old as Charlemagne's and the Roman Cæsars'. So completely was Napoleon master of central and western Europe that a stroke of the pen could dethrone the Bourbons of Naples. From the imperial villa at Schoenbrunn the famous order went forth: "*La dynastie de Naples a cessé de régner.*" Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples, and the court of the Bourbons was moved to Palermo, where it was safe under the shadow of English guns.


It remains to speak of the policy of Prussia at this time. Of all the powers united against France at the beginning of the revolution Prussia was the least injured by the first conquests of the convention and the first to make peace with France. After the Treaty of Basel in April, 1795, Prussia had remained neutral and with secret satisfaction had looked upon the disasters of Austria, its great rival in Germany. This status was continued during the war of the second coalition (1798-1802). In the League of

Neutrals Prussia sustained the French policy, and though, at the beginning of the third coalition, she was inclined to hold aloof from France, Austerlitz and Presburg convinced her of the expediency of at least continuing her pacific relations with France. This action of Prussia was largely due to the treasonable conduct of the Prussian minister, Haugwitz. But when Napoleon discovered that Haugwitz could be corrupted, he daringly bought the alliance of Prussia by offering her Hanover in return for her support (December 15, 1806). The agreement was a doubly shameless one, because, after the death of Pitt, a coalition ministry had succeeded, at the head of which was Charles James Fox, the strongest advocate of French policy in Great Britain. Fox made overtures of peace to Napoleon, conditional upon the French withdrawal from Hanover. Napoleon beguiled the English ministry by peace overtures which he never meant to keep, while he bought the alliance of Prussia. As a piece of double dealing Napoleon's policy with Hanover is notorious.³ The emperor, on his return to Paris crowned with so much glory, became the object of such general and wild admiration that he was himself carried away by the public enthusiasm and intoxicated at his fortune. The different bodies of the state contended among themselves in obedience and flatteries. He received the title of Great, and the senate passed a decree dedicating to him a triumphal monument.

Napoleon became more confirmed in the principle he had espoused. The victory of Marengo and the Peace of Luneville had sanctioned the consulate; the victory of Austerlitz and the Peace of Presburg consecrated the empire. The last vestiges of the revolution were abandoned. On January 1, 1806, the Gregorian calendar definitely replaced the republican calendar, after an existence of fourteen years. The Pantheon was again devoted to purposes of worship, and soon even the tribunate ceased to exist. But the emperor aimed especially at extending his dominion over the Continent. Ferdinand, King of Naples, having during the last war violated the treaty of peace with France, had his states invaded, and Joseph Bonaparte on March 30 was declared king of the two Sicilies. Soon after (June 5, 1806) Holland was converted into a kingdom, and received as monarch Louis Bonaparte, another brother of the emperor. None of the republics created by the con-

³ See Fyffe, "Modern Europe," pp. 309-317; Bourgeois, "*Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère*," vol. II. pp. 270-272.

vention or the directory now existed. Napoleon, in nominating secondary kings, restored the military hierarchical system and the titles of the Middle Ages. He erected Dalmatia, Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conégliano, Trévisé, Feltra, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo into duchies, great fiefs of the empire. Marshal Berthier was invested with the principality of Neufchâtel, the minister Talleyrand with that of Benevento, Prince Borghese



and his wife with that of Gustalla, Murat with the grand duchy of Berg and Clèves. Napoleon, not venturing to destroy the Swiss republic, styled himself its mediator, and completed the organization of his military empire by placing under his dependence the ancient Germanic body. On July 12, 1806, fourteen princes of the south and west of Germany united themselves into the Confederation of the Rhine, and recognized Napoleon as their protector. On August 1 they signified to the diet of Ratisbon their separation from the

Germanic body. The empire of Germany ceased to exist, and Francis II. abdicated the title by proclamation. By a convention signed at Vienna, on December 15, Prussia exchanged the territories of Anspach, Clèves, and Neufchâtel for the electorate of Hanover. Napoleon had all the west under his power. The purpose of Napoleon in 1806 was to create a "Greater France," with a swarm of vassal states: Louis Bonaparte in Holland; Murat, his brother-in-law, in Naples, and Eugène Beauharnais in Germany and Italy. The actual extent of the empire, exclusive of these vassal states, was enormous. The eastern frontier began at Lubeck on the Baltic, ran southwesterly to the Rhine at Wesel, followed up the Rhine to Lake Geneva, crossed the Alps, and so down the Po River to Mantua, and struck the Mediterranean at Terricena. There were 130 departments in the empire at its height, with 45,000,000 inhabitants. Absolute master of France and Italy, as emperor and king, he was also master of Spain, by the dependence of that court; of Naples and Holland, by his two brothers; of Switzerland, by the act of mediation; and in Germany he had at his disposal the kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg and the Confederation of the Rhine against Austria and Prussia. After the Peace of Amiens, by supporting liberty he might have made himself the protector of France and the moderator of Europe, but having sought glory in domination, and made conquest the object of his life, he condemned himself to a long struggle which would inevitably terminate in the dependence of the Continent or in his own downfall.

This encroaching progress gave rise to the fourth coalition. Prussia, neutral since the Peace of Basel, had, in the last campaign, been on the point of joining the Austro-Russian coalition. The rapidity of the emperor's victories had alone restrained her; but now, alarmed at the aggrandizement of the empire, and encouraged by the fine condition of her troops, she leagued with Russia to drive the French from Germany. The cabinet of Berlin required that the French troops should recross the Rhine, or war would be the consequence. At the same time it sought to form in the north of Germany a league against the confederation of the south. The emperor, who was in the plenitude of his prosperity and of national enthusiasm, far from submitting to the ultimatum of Prussia, immediately marched against her.

The immediate cause of Prussia's hostility to France was
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the discovery by Frederick William III. of the duplicity of Napoleon regarding Hanover. The emperor really had no more intention of giving it to Prussia than to England, but used it as a means to lure Prussia and to wheedle Fox. Additional causes were the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, the establishment of which Prussia regarded as a menace to the integrity of the German kingdom; the French seizure of Verden and Essen; and in the popular mind the execution of the Nuremberg bookseller, Palm, for selling an anonymous pamphlet entitled, "Germany in its Deep Humiliation." But Prussia was ill prepared for war. Since Frederick the Great's death in 1786 she had been living upon her past reputation. The administrative system was antiquated and inefficient; the country poor; the army a shell; the soldiers were in a wretched condition, while the officers were superannuated veterans of the Seven Years' War or mere sprigs of gentility. Moreover, Prussia had no allies save Saxony and distant Russia.

The campaign opened early in October. Napoleon, as usual, overwhelmed the coalition by the promptitude of his marches and the vigor of his measures. On October 14 he destroyed at Jena the military monarchy of Prussia by a decisive victory; on the 16th 14,000 Prussians threw down their arms at Erfurt; on the 27th the French army entered Berlin, and the close of 1806 was employed in taking the Prussian fortresses and marching into Poland against the Russian army. Such fortresses as Spandau, Erfurt, Stettin, and Küstrin had fallen like card-houses. The collapse of Prussia, as complete as it was unexpected, changed the extent of Napoleon's demands. When the war began he had resolved to require the cession of the west bank of the Elba with Magdeburg. Now he was determined to force Prussia out of Germany, compelling the Hohenzollern house to renounce Brandenburg and to retire beyond the Vistula River. The surrender of Königsberg, Dantzic, Thorn on the lower Vistula, and Breslau in Silesia was demanded for the purpose of establishing a strong French frontier along this line. Even the weak Frederick William III. rejected such terms. The campaign in Poland was less rapid, but as brilliant as that of Prussia. Russia, for the third time, measured its strength with France. Conquered at Zurich and Austerlitz, it was also defeated at Eylau (February 7-8, 1807) and Friedland (June 14, 1807). Eylau was fought mainly against the Prussians, only a detachment of Russians being present in the

battle, most of whom, on account of the winter, were not able to come so early to the relief of Prussia. It was one of the most murderous battles that Napoleon ever fought, the horror of the carnage being increased by the fact that a blinding snowstorm prevailed at the time. Marshal Ney was conspicuous for his bravery on this day. Friedland, like Austerlitz, was a day Napoleon loved to remember. After these memorable battles the Emperor Alexander entered into a negotiation, and concluded at Tilsit, on June 21, 1807, an armistice which was followed by a definitive treaty on July 7.

The Peace of Tilsit increased the French domination on the Continent. Prussia was reduced to half its extent. In the south of Germany Napoleon had instituted the two kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurtemberg against Austria; farther to the north he created the two feudatory kingdoms of Saxony and Westphalia against Prussia. That of Saxony, composed of the electorate of that name, and Prussian Poland, called the grand duchy of Warsaw, was given to the King of Saxony; that of Westphalia comprehended the states of Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Fulda, Paderborn, and the greater part of Hanover, and was given to Jerome Bonaparte. The Emperor Alexander, acceding to all these arrangements, evacuated Moldavia and Wallachia. Russia, however, though conquered, was the only power unencroached upon. Napoleon followed more than ever in the footsteps of Charlemagne; at his coronation he had had the crown, sword, and scepter of the Frankish king carried before him. A Pope had crossed the Alps to consecrate his dynasty, and he modeled his states on the vast empire of that conqueror. The revolution sought the establishment of ancient liberty; Napoleon restored the military hierarchy of the Middle Ages. The former had made citizens; the latter made vassals. The one had changed Europe into republics; the other transformed it into fiefs. Great and powerful as he was, coming immediately after a shock which had exhausted the world by its violence, he was enabled to arrange it for a time according to his pleasure. The grand empire rose internally by its system of administration, which replaced the government of assemblies; its special courts, its lyceums, in which military education was substituted for the republican education of the central schools; its hereditary nobility, which in 1808 completed the establishment of inequality; its civil discipline, which rendered all France like

an army obedient to the word of command; and externally by its secondary kingdoms, its confederate states, its great fiefs, and its supreme chief. Napoleon, no longer meeting resistance anywhere, could command from one end of the continent to the other.

At this period all the emperor's attention was directed to England, the only power that could secure itself from his attacks. Pitt had been dead a year, but the British cabinet followed with much ardor and pertinacity his plans with respect to France. After having vainly formed a third and a fourth coalition it did not lay down arms. It was a war to the death. Great Britain had declared France in a state of blockade, and furnished the emperor with the means of cutting off its continental intercourse by a similar measure. The continental blockade, which began in 1807, was the second period of Napoleon's system. In order to attain universal and uncontested supremacy, he made use of arms against the Continent and the cessation of commerce against England. But in forbidding to the continental states all communication with England he was preparing new difficulties for himself, and soon added to the animosity of opinion excited by his despotism, and the hatred of states produced by his conquering domination, the exasperation of private interests and commercial suffering occasioned by the blockade. The germ of the idea of the famous "continental system" is to be found in the doctrine of the "natural frontiers of France," as far back as the time of the directory, whose policy it was to overcome England's sea power by shutting out her trade from the Continent. In 1795 Cambacérès, Merlin of Douai, Boissy d'Anglas, and Sieyès were ardent advocates of natural frontiers. "The republic," said Cambacérès, "has its natural limits in the Alps and the Pyrennes. . . . But on the north it is contiguous with foreign possessions, the delimitation of which and the jealous governments of which have been the source of centuries of war. . . . You will examine if the wisdom of the nation and the experience of centuries does not require that you conduct the negotiations with reference to the limits of the French republic with a sure hand; if the execution of this great design be not the basis of and the true guaranty of universal peace." Dubois-Crancie had before this proposed to form Holland into a republic in imitation of that of France, and to give Hanover to Prussia in compensation for its Rhenish possessions. As early as 1798 we find the thought of the establishment of the Confederation

of the Rhine under French protection in the mind of the directory, and the crowding of Prussia and Austria eastward in order that France might acquire control of the mouths of the Elbe and Weser Rivers and so close the seaboard to England.⁴

Napoleon felt, in the exuberance of victory after the battle of Jena, that the time had come for putting his plans for excluding England from the Continent into execution. Prussia in occupying Hanover had issued a proclamation excluding British trade, March 28, 1806. England immediately declared the mouths of the Ems, Weser, Elbe, and Trave in a state of blockade (April 8). This was followed by the more comprehensive blockade announced in the first document which was sent to all the representatives of neutral powers then at London. The policy of England served Napoleon as an excuse for his Berlin Decree, although he was undoubtedly actuated by other motives in issuing it. January 7, 1807, England answered with an order in council prohibiting coast trade between the ports of the enemy or of his allies. This was deemed insufficient after the ministry had learned of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, and three orders were issued November 11, establishing an undisguised "paper" blockade. The vague, cumbrous phraseology of these decrees became notorious, and it was necessary to issue supplementary and explanatory orders, five of which appeared November 25. One of these established the rule that licenses had to be procured from the English government by neutral traders. Napoleon replied with the Milan Decree, and the President of the United States ordered the first embargo December 22, 1807. Later decrees were issued by Napoleon in enforcing his system; for example that of Bayonne (April 17, 1808) ordered the customs officials to confiscate all American vessels in French ports. That of the Trianon (August 5, 1810) was directed against smuggling and that of Fontainebleau (October 18, 1810) ordered all English goods which could be seized to be publicly burned. Finally the annexation of the coast of the North Sea in December, 1810, was justified upon the ground that England had rendered the measure necessary by her commercial policy.⁵

⁴ See Jalliffier, "*Histoire Contemporaine*," p. 175, note, and Bourgeois, "*Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère*," vol. II., ch. xi.

⁵ The documents relating to the continental system have been gathered together and published in translation by the department of history of the University of Pennsylvania, "*Translations and Reprints*," vol. II., No. 2. The two

England was placed under the ban of continental Europe at the peace. Russia and Denmark in Northern Seas; France, Spain, and Holland, in the Mediterranean and the ocean, were obliged to declare against it. This period was the height of the imperial sway. Napoleon employed all his activity and all his genius in creating maritime resources capable of counterbalancing the forces of England, which had then eleven hundred ships of war of every class. He caused ports to be constructed, coasts to be fortified, ships to be built and prepared, everything for combating in a few years upon this new battlefield. But before that moment arrived, he wished to secure the Spanish peninsula, and to found his dynasty there, for the purpose of introducing a firmer and more favorable policy. The expedition of Portugal in 1807, and the invasion of Spain in 1808, began for him and for Europe a new order of events.

Portugal had for some time been a complete English colony. The emperor, in concert with the Bourbons of Madrid, decided by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, of October 27, 1807, that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. A French army, under the command of Junot, entered Portugal. The prince regent embarked for Brazil, and the French took possession of Lisbon on November 30, 1807. Napoleon's motive in seizing Portugal was to deprive England of a foothold upon the Continent. The French occupation of Spain logically followed. As far back as April 23, 1800, Napoleon had written to Talleyrand: "Why, since Portugal refuses to make peace, does not Spain seize on several provinces of that kingdom which might be exchanged, at the general peace, for Minorca?" This invasion was only an approach toward Spain. In October, 1807, the emperor had made the Spanish king and his minister, Godoy, acquainted with his purposes against Portugal, but he did not tell them that he already harbored the idea of ruining the Spanish Bourbons as he had the house of Braganza. The French minister in Madrid provided the means, and Eugene Beauharnais encouraged Prince Ferdinand to intrigue against his father. On October 12, 1807, the former wrote to Napoleon asking for the hand of an imperial princess. The plots prevailing in the Spanish royal house afforded Napoleon an opportunity to intervene in

most important decrees are those of Berlin, November 21, 1806, and of Milan, December 17, 1807. The conduct of England in retaliation bore heavily upon the American neutral trade and occasioned Jefferson's famous embargo policy.

Spain without divulging his purposes. On October 28, 1807, however, Charles discovered proof of his son's treason, but did not know of his relations with Napoleon, and in consequence walked right into the trap by himself invoking French aid. Within a fortnight the French general Clarke, who was minister of war, received orders to move forward the army of the Gironde to the Spanish frontier, and to fortify the strong places. In double consternation Ferdinand now revealed the nature of his intrigues with France, and Charles, in order to save himself from the impending intervention, pardoned his son. But Napoleon was not to be balked. On November 13 Napoleon informed Charles IV. that he intended to increase the French army in Portugal, but instead of so doing the new detachments were quartered in various Spanish provinces. By February, 1809, there were three army corps of 12,000 men each in Catalonia, another in Navarre, while the occupation of Pampeluna and Barcelona at either end of the Pyrennees was evidence that the French occupation of Spain was an accomplished fact.

No doubt at this time he formed the project of putting one of his brothers on the throne of Spain; he thought he could easily overturn a divided family, an expiring monarchy, and obtain the consent of a people whom he would restore to civilization. Under the pretext of the maritime war and the blockade, his troops entered the peninsula, occupied the coasts and principal places, and encamped near Madrid. It was then suggested to the royal family to retire to Mexico, after the example of the house of Braganza. But the people rose against this departure; Godoy, the object of public hatred, was in great risk of losing his life, and the Prince of the Asturias was proclaimed king, under the title of Ferdinand VII. The emperor took advantage of this court revolution to bring about his own. The French entered Madrid (March 23) and he himself proceeded to Bayonne, whither he summoned the Spanish princes. Ferdinand restored the crown to his father, who in his turn resigned it in favor of Napoleon; the latter had it decreed on his brother Joseph by a supreme junta, by the council of Castile, and the municipality of Madrid. Ferdinand was sent to the Château de Valençay, and Charles IV. fixed his residence at Compiègne. Napoleon called his brother-in-law, Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to the throne of Naples, in the place of Joseph.

At this period began the first opposition to the domination of

the emperor and the continental system. The reaction manifested itself in three countries, hitherto allies of France, and it brought on the fifth coalition. The court of Rome was dissatisfied; the peninsula was wounded in its national pride by having imposed upon it a foreign king; in its usages, by the suppression of convents, of the Inquisition, and of the *grandees*; Holland suffered in its commerce from the blockade, and Austria supported impatiently its losses and subordinate condition. England, watching for an opportunity to revive the struggle on the Continent, excited the resistance of Rome, the Peninsula, and the cabinet of Vienna. The Pope had been cold toward France since 1805; he had hoped that his pontifical complaisance in reference to Napoleon's coronation would have been recompensed by the restoration to the ecclesiastical domain of those provinces which the directory had annexed to the Cisalpine republic. Deceived in this expectation, he joined the European counter-revolutionary opposition, and from 1807 to 1808 the Roman states became the rendezvous of English emissaries.

After some warm remonstrances the emperor ordered General Miollis to occupy Rome; the Pope threatened him with excommunication, and Napoleon seized on the legations of Ancona, Urbino, Macérata, and Camerino, which became part of the Italian kingdom. The legate left Paris on April 3, 1808, and the religious struggle for temporal interests commenced with the head of the church, whom Napoleon should either not have recognized or not have despoiled.

The war with the peninsula was still more serious. On May 2, 1808, the people of Madrid, without reflecting an instant upon the great disproportion between their forces and those of the French, without regarding the fact that Murat had 25,000 men against 3000 Spanish troops, with cavalry in addition and nine pieces of artillery, attacked the French with the fury of a mob. It was the signal for the revolt of all Spain. The Spaniards recognized Ferdinand VII. as king, in a provincial junta held at Seville on May 27, 1808, and they took arms in all the provinces which were not occupied by French troops. The Portuguese also rose at Oporto on June 16. These two insurrections were at first attended with the happiest results; in a short time they made rapid progress. On May 30 the two representatives of the Spanish junta embarked on board a Jersey merchantman and on June

6 landed at Falmouth. An English naval officer accompanied them to London. Lord Wellesley Pool could hardly believe his ears when he learned that in a remote corner of the impoverished kingdom of Spain war had actually been engaged in against the French. The English minister of foreign affairs, Canning, from the first was deeply impressed with the nature of the uprising, and on June 15 the English government voted to form an offensive and defensive alliance between England and Spain. General Dupont laid down arms at Baylen in the province of Cordova, July 21, 1808, and surrendered 17,000 men. This first reverse of the French arms excited the liveliest hope and enthusiasm among the Spaniards. The disaster of Cintra followed, where Junot also surrendered, August 30, 1808. But these were not the sole reverses of the French arms during this summer. Within three months, in addition to what happened at Baylen and Cintra, Joseph left Madrid, where Ferdinand VII. was proclaimed, and retired beyond the Ebro; Moncey was beaten in Valencia; Verdier was checked before Saragossa; Duhemse was repulsed at Gerona; and many of the Italian troops had deserted to the Spanish.

Napoleon was largely to blame for the reverses in Spain. In his ignorance of the nature of the country and the character of the Spanish people he had based his tactics upon a rapid and complete occupation of Madrid. It seemed to him that, with Madrid and the road open between it and Pampeluna or Barcelona, he would be master of Spain. He did not know that Spain was richer, more populous and stronger in its provinces than in the capital; he did not know that Madrid was an artificial creation and that its influence over the peninsula was infinitely less than that of Paris, Berlin, or Vienna in their respective countries. The four provinces of Andalusia in 1808 had a population of nearly two millions, and the Spanish troops there numbered 35,000 men. By June the junta had raised 60,000 men. Better acquainted with the condition of things than the emperor, the Marshal Moncey had estimated that at least 40,000 men would be required for the subjugation of Andalusia.

Napoleon gave General Dupont but half that number of men, and 2500 of these were Swiss and Spanish of doubtful fidelity. Accordingly the English general Wellington was able to take possession of this kingdom with 25,000 men. Meanwhile, the Pope was declaring against Napoleon; the Spanish insurgents were enter-

ing Madrid; the English were again setting foot on the Continent; the King of Sweden avowed himself an enemy of the European imperial league; and Austria was making considerable armaments and preparing for a new struggle.

Fortunately for Napoleon, Russia remained faithful to the alliance and engagements of Tilsit. The Emperor Alexander had at that time a fit of enthusiasm and affection for this powerful and extraordinary mortal. Napoleon wishing to be sure of the north, before he conveyed all his forces to the peninsula had an interview with Alexander at Erfurt, on September 27, 1808. The two masters of the north and west guaranteed to each other the repose and submission of Europe. Napoleon marched into Spain, and Alexander undertook Sweden. The presence of the emperor soon changed the fortune of the war in the peninsula. He brought with him 80,000 veteran soldiers, just come from Germany. Several victories made him master of most of the Spanish provinces. He made his entry into Madrid and presented himself to the inhabitants of the peninsula, not as a master, but as a liberator. "I have abolished," he said to them, "the tribunal of the Inquisition, against which the age and Europe protested. Priests should direct the conscience, but ought not to exercise any external or corporal jurisdiction over the citizens. I have suppressed feudal rights; and everyone may set up inns, ovens, mills, fisheries, and give free impulse to his industry. The selfishness, wealth, and prosperity of a few did more injury to your agriculture than the heats of the extreme summer. As there is but one God, one system of justice only should exist in a state. All private tribunals were usurped and opposed to the rights of the nation. I have suppressed them. The present generation may change its opinion; too many passions have been brought into play; but your grandchildren will bless me as your regenerator; they will rank among their memorable days those in which I appeared among you, and from those days will Spain date its prosperity."

Such was indeed the part of Napoleon in the peninsula, which could only be restored to a better state of things, and to liberty, by the revival of civilization. The establishment of independence cannot be effected all at once, any more than anything else; and when a country is ignorant, poor, and behindhand, its social condition must be reconstructed before liberty can be thought of. Napoleon, the oppressor of civilized nations, was a real regenerator

for the peninsula. But the two parties of civil liberty and religious restitution, that of the cortes and that of the monks, though with far different aims, came to an understanding for their common defense. The one was at the head of the upper and the middle classes, the other of the populace; and they vied with each other in exciting the Spaniards to enthusiasm with the sentiments of independence or religious fervor.

Napoleon had engaged in a long and dangerous enterprise, in which his whole system of war was at fault. Victory here did not consist in the defeat of an army and the possession of a capital, but in the entire occupation of the territory, and, what was still more difficult, the submission of the public mind. Napoleon, however, was preparing to subdue this people with his irresistible activity and inflexible determination, when the fifth coalition called him again to Germany.

Austria had turned to advantage his absence, and that of his troops. It made a powerful effort, and raised 550,000 men, comprising the Landwehr, and took the field in the spring of 1809. The Tyrol rose, and King Jerome was driven from his capital by the Westphalians; Italy wavered; and Prussia only waited till Napoleon met with a reverse, to take arms. Poland had revolted under Poniatowsky. But the emperor was still at the height of his power and prosperity. He hastened from Madrid in the beginning of February, and directed the members of the confederation to keep their contingents in readiness. On April 2 he left Paris. As so many times before, this campaign was fought both in Germany and Italy. The Archduke John twice defeated Prince Eugene near the Adige, but the chief operations of the Austrians were in Germany, where the Archduke Charles, the ablest commander the allies had yet found, crossed the Inn River on April 9, 1809, and entered Bavaria, where the French army under Berthier was spread over the country in order to maintain its subjection. In order to prevent its consolidation the success of the Archduke Charles depended upon the rapidity of his movements. But he dallied for six precious days on the Iser River, in the hope of being able to attack the strongest French army corps, that of Davout. The delay was fatal, for in the interval Napoleon arrived from Paris, concentrated his forces and took the offensive with the hope of cutting the archduke off from his line of retreat, won the battles of Eckmühl (April 22), Aspern-Essling (May 21-22), and

Wagram (July 6), and for the second time occupied Vienna, after a campaign of four months. While he was pursuing the Austrian armies the English landed on the Island of Walcheren and appeared before Antwerp; but a levy of national guards sufficed to frustrate the expedition of the Scheldt. The Peace of Vienna, of October 11, 1809, deprived the house of Austria of several more provinces, and compelled it again to adopt the continental system.

Austria ceded Croatia, Carniola, Trieste, and most of Carinthia to the French empire; the grand duchy of Warsaw was increased by the cession of West and New Galicia, the portion of Austria's share of the Polish partition of 1795, and Cracow. Even the czar received a slice of Austrian territory. Austria lost four and one-half millions of subjects, her maritime provinces, and agreed to pay an indemnity of \$17,000,000.

This period was remarkable for the new character of the struggle. It began the reaction of Europe against the empire, and announced the alliance of dynasties, people, nations, the priesthood, and commerce. All whose interests were injured made an attempt at resistance, which at first was destined to fail. Napoleon, since the Peace of Amiens, had entered on a career that must necessarily terminate in the possession or hostility of all Europe. Carried away by his character and position, he had created against the people a system of administration of unparalleled benefit to power; against Europe, a system of secondary monarchies and grand fiefs, which facilitated his plans of conquest; and, lastly, against England, the blockade which suspended its commerce, and that of the Continent. Nothing impeded him in the realization of those immense but insensate designs. Portugal opened a communication with the English: he invaded it. The royal family of Spain, by its quarrels and vacillations, compromised the extremities of the empire: he compelled it to abdicate, that he might reduce the peninsula in a bolder and less wavering policy. The Pope kept up relations with the enemy: his patrimony was diminished. He threatened excommunication: the French entered Rome. He realized his threat by a bull: he was dethroned as a temporal sovereign in 1809. Finally, after the battle of Wagram, and the Peace of Vienna, Holland became a depot for the English merchandise, on account of its commercial wants, and the emperor dispossessed his brother Louis of that kingdom, which on July 1, 1810, became in-

1810-1811

corporated with the empire. He shrank from no invasion, because he would not endure opposition or hesitation from any quarter. All were compelled to submit, allies as well as enemies, the chief of the church as well as kings, brothers as well as strangers; but, though conquered this time, all who had joined this new league only waited an opportunity to rise again.

Meantime, after the Peace of Vienna, Napoleon still added to the extent and power of the empire. Sweden having undergone an internal revolution, and the king, Gustavus Adolphus IV., having been forced to abdicate, admitted the continental system. Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, was elected by the states-general hereditary Prince of Sweden, and King Charles XIII. adopted him for his son. The blockade was observed throughout Europe; and the empire, augmented by the Roman states, the Illyrian provinces, Valais, Holland, and the Hansa towns, had a hundred and thirty departments, and extended from Hamburg and Dantzic to Trieste and Corfu. Napoleon, who seemed to follow a rash but inflexible policy, deviated from his course about this time by a second marriage. He divorced Josephine that he might give an heir to the empire, and married, on April 1, 1810, Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria. This was a decided error. He quitted his position and his post as a parvenu and revolutionary monarch, opposing in Europe the ancient courts as the republic had opposed the ancient governments. He placed himself in a false situation with respect to Austria, which he ought either to have crushed after the victory of Wagram, or to have reinstated in its possessions after his marriage with the archduchess. Solid alliances only repose on real interests, and Napoleon could not remove from the cabinet of Vienna the desire or power of renewing hostilities. This marriage also changed the character of his empire, and separated it still further from popular interests; he sought out old families to give luster to his court, and did all he could to amalgamate together the old and the new nobility as he mingled old and new dynasties. Austerlitz had established the plebeian empire; after Wagram was established the noble empire. The birth, on March 20, 1811, of a son, who received the title of King of Rome, seemed to consolidate the power of Napoleon by securing to him a successor.

The war in Spain was prosecuted with vigor during the years 1810 and 1811. The territory of the peninsula was defended inch

by inch, and it was necessary to take several towns by storm. Suchet, Soult, Mortier, Ney, and Sebastiani made themselves masters of several provinces; and the Spanish junta, unable to keep their post at Seville, retired to Cadiz, which the French army began to blockade. The new expedition into Portugal was less fortunate. Massena, who directed it, at first obliged Wellington to retreat, and took Oporto and Olivenza; but the English general having entrenched himself in the strong position of Torres-Vedras, Massena, unable to force it, was compelled to evacuate the country.

While the war was proceeding in the peninsula with advantage, but without any decided success, a new campaign was preparing in the north. Russia perceived the empire of Napoleon approaching its territories. Shut up in its own limits, it remained without influence or acquisitions, suffering from the blockade, without gaining any advantage by the war. This cabinet, moreover, endured with impatience a supremacy to which itself aspired, and which it had pursued slowly but without interruption since the reign of Peter the Great. Recent researches have shown that the ultimate dream of Napoleon probably was the French occupation of Constantinople and the overthrow of the Turkish empire; and this single fact is sufficient to explain the new hostility of Russia. This supreme purpose is the key to Napoleon's long and complicated negotiations with the czar, for his purposes here ran counter to the cherished tradition of the Russian state. After Tilsit all arrangements were completed between Alexander and Napoleon for a joint enterprise against Egypt (March 18, 1808), and the partition of Turkey was sketched out. But Caulaincourt and Roumantsov, the representatives of the two rulers, were unable to arrange a satisfactory compromise with reference to Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Napoleon proposed a personal interview with the Czar, but Alexander refused if he was not promised Constantinople. In spite of the alliance at Tilsit Napoleon and Alexander remained divided with reference to the partition of Turkey. Talleyrand and Fouché did not sympathize with this policy of Napoleon, and from 1808 secretly worked to defeat his purposes. There is no doubt to-day of Talleyrand's absolute treason to his sovereign and of his treacherous relations with Metternich. Austria's determination to resort to war again in 1809 was partially influenced by the hope of preventing

Napoleon from becoming dominant in the Balkan peninsula.⁶ About the close of 1810, Russia increased its armies, renewed its commercial relations with Great Britain, and did not seem indisposed to a rupture. The year 1811 was spent in negotiations which led to nothing, and preparations for war were made on both sides. The emperor, whose armies were before Cadiz, and who relied on the coöperation of the west and north against Russia,

⁶ The following is the celebrated letter which Napoleon wrote to the Czar of Russia on February 2, 1808:

“Paris, 2nd February, 1808.

“SIR, MY BROTHER,—General Savary has just arrived, I have spent hours speaking with him about your majesty. . . . You have seen the debates in the English parliament, and the decision to carry on the war. I have written to Caulaincourt on this subject, and if your majesty will condescend to speak with him he will acquaint you with my opinion. It is only by large and vast measures that we shall be able to arrive at peace and consolidate our system. Let your majesty augment and fortify your army. I will give you all the help I can: no feeling of jealousy animates me against Russia: I desire her glory, prosperity, and extension. Will your majesty allow a person tenderly and truly devoted to you to give you a bit of advice? Your majesty should drive the Swedes to a greater distance from his capital. Extend your frontiers on this side as much as you like (*id est*, give up all idea of Constantinople).

“An army of 50,000 men—Russians, French, and perhaps Austrians—marching upon Asia by way of Constantinople would no sooner have reached the Euphrates than England would tremble and go down upon her knees. I am ready in Dalmatia: your majesty is ready on the Danube. A month after coming to terms an army could be on the Bosphorus. The blow would reëcho through India and England would be subdued. I shall refuse none of the preliminary stipulations necessary to attain so great an end. But the reciprocal interest of our two countries should be combined and balanced. This can only be settled in an interview with your majesty, or after sincere conferences between Romanzov and Caulaincourt, and a dispatch here of a man favorable to the system. Count Tolstoy is an excellent man, but he is prejudiced against and distrusts France, and is far from being on a par with the events of Tilsit and the new position in which the close friendship between your majesty and myself have placed the universe. Everything can be signed and decided before March 15. On May 1 our troops can be in Asia, and at the same epoch the troops of your majesty at Stockholm. Then the English, threatened in India, driven from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of events with which the atmosphere is laden. Your majesty and myself would have preferred the pleasures of peace, and to pass our lives in the midst of our vast empires, engaged in vivifying them and rendering them happy by means of arts and a beneficent administration. The enemies of the world object to this. We must become greater in spite of ourselves. It is both wise and politic to do what destiny orders, and to go where the irresistible march of events leads us. Then this cloud of pigmies will yield and will follow the movement which your majesty and I shall order, and the Russian people will be content with the glory, the wealth, and the fortune which will be the result of these great events.

“Napoleon.”

From Bingham's "Letters and Dispatches of Napoleon," vol. II. pp. 364-365.

made with ardor preparations for an enterprise which was intended to reduce the only power as yet untouched, and to carry his victorious eagles even to Moscow. He obtained the assistance of Prussia and Austria, which engaged by the treaties of February 24 and March 14, 1812, to furnish auxiliary bodies, one of 20,000 and the other of 30,000 men. All the unemployed forces of France were immediately on foot. A *senatus consultum* divided the national guard into three bodies for the home service, and appropriated a hundred cohorts of the first ban (nearly 100,000 men) to active military service. On March 9 Napoleon left Paris on this vast expedition. During several months he fixed his court at Dresden, where the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and all the sovereigns of Germany came to bow before his high fortune. On June 22 war was declared against Russia.

In this campaign Napoleon was guided by the maxims he had always found successful. He had terminated all the wars he had undertaken by the rapid defeat of the enemy, the occupation of his capital, and concluded the peace by parceling out his territory. His project was to reduce Russia by creating the kingdom of Poland, as he had reduced Austria by forming the kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, after Austerlitz; and Prussia, by organizing those of Saxony and Westphalia, after Jena. With this object he had stipulated with the Austrian cabinet by the treaty of March 14 to exchange Galicia for the Illyrian provinces. The establishment of the kingdom of Poland was proclaimed by the diet of Warsaw, but in an incomplete manner, and Napoleon, who, according to his custom, wished to finish all in one campaign, advanced at once into the heart of Russia, instead of prudently organizing the Polish barrier against it. His army amounted to about 500,000 men. The causes of the war with Russia may be said to be Russia's refusal to sustain the continental system; her fear lest Napoleon would destroy Poland; the deposition of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of the czar, which Alexander regarded as a personal affront; and finally, Russia's opposition to Napoleon's projects in Turkey. He passed the Niemen on June 24. A halt was made at Wilna from June 28 to July 16. It was here that Napoleon made his first great blunder. Until this time the Poles had constantly looked forward to the restoration of the kingdom of Poland. Napoleon's failure to do this roused them to hostility and created an enemy in his rear. He defeated the Russians at

Witepsk, Astrowno, Polotsk, Mohilev, Smolensk (August 18), at the Moskova, known as the battle of Borodino, and on September 14 made his entry into Moscow.

The Russian cabinet did not only rely for its defense upon its troops, but on its vast territory, and on its climate. As the conquered armies retreated before the French, they burned all the towns, devastated the provinces, and thus prepared great difficulties for the foe in the event of reverses or retreat. According to this plan of defense, Moscow was burned by its governor, Rostopchin, as Smolensk, Dorigoboui, Viama, Gjhat, Mojaisko, and a great number of other towns and villages had already been. The emperor ought to have seen that this war would not terminate as the others had done; yet conqueror of the foe, and master of his capital, he conceived hopes of peace which the Russians skillfully encouraged. Winter was approaching, and Napoleon prolonged his stay at Moscow for six weeks. He delayed his movements on account of the deceptive negotiations of the Russians, and did not decide on a retreat till October 20. This retreat was disastrous, and began the downfall of the empire. Napoleon could not have been defeated by the hand of man, for what general could have triumphed over this incomparable chief? what army could have conquered the French army? But his reverses were to take place in the remote limits of Europe, in the frozen regions which were to end his conquering domination. He lost, with the close of this campaign, not by a defeat, but by cold and famine, in the midst of Russian snows and solitude, his old army, and the prestige of his fortune.⁷

The retreat was effected with some order as far as the Beresina, where it became one vast rout, November 26-29. After the passage of this river Napoleon, who had hitherto accompanied his army, started in a sledge for Paris, in great haste, a conspiracy having broken out there during his absence. General Mallet, with a few others, had conceived the design of overthrowing this colossus of power. His enterprise was daring, and as it was grounded on a false report of Napoleon's death, it was necessary to deceive too many for success to be probable. Besides, the empire was still firmly established, and it was not a plot, but a slow and general defection to destroy it. Mallet's plot failed and its leaders were executed. The emperor on his return found the nation astounded

⁷ Upon the Russian campaign see the recent work of H. B. George, "The Russian Campaign of 1812."

at so unusual a disaster. But the different bodies of the state still manifested implicit obedience. He reached Paris on December 18, obtained a levy of 300,000 men, inspired a spirit of sacrifice, re-equipped in a short time, with his wonderful activity, a new army, and took the field again on April 15, 1813.

But since the retreat of Moscow, Napoleon had entered on a new series of events. It was in 1812 that the decline of his empire manifested itself. The weariness of his domination became general. All those by whose consent he had risen took part against him. The priests had conspired in secret since his rupture with the Pope. Eight state prisons had been created in an official manner against the dissentients of his party. The national masses were as tired of conquest as they had formerly been of factions. They had expected from him consideration for private interests, the promotion of commerce, respect for men; and they were oppressed by conscriptions, taxes, the blockade, provost courts, and duties which were the inevitable consequences of this conquering system. He had no longer for adversaries the few who remained faithful to the political object of the revolution, and whom he styled idealogists, but all who, without definite ideas, wished for the material advantages of better civilization. Without, whole nations groaned beneath the military yoke, and the fallen dynasties aspired to rise again. The whole world was ill at ease; and one check served to bring about a general rising. "I triumphed," says Napoleon himself, speaking of the preceding campaigns, "in the midst of constantly reviving perils. I constantly required as much address as voice. Had I not conquered at Austerlitz, all Prussia would have been upon me; had I not triumphed at Jena, Austria and Spain would have attacked my rear; had I not fought at Wagram, which action was not a decided victory, I had reason to fear that Russia would forsake, Prussia rise against me, and the English were before Antwerp." Such was his condition; the further he advanced in his career, the greater need he had to conquer more and more decisively. Accordingly, as soon as he was defeated, the kings he had subdued, the kings he had made, the allies he had aggrandized, the states he had incorporated with the empire, the senators who had so flattered him, and even his comrades in arms successively forsook him. The field of battle extended to Moscow in 1812, drew back to Dresden in 1813, and to Paris in 1814; so rapid was the reverse of fortune.

There is an ominous change in the spirit of France in 1812—a loss of conviction on the part of the people and a diminishing of spirit in the army. There was also an alteration in the spirit of the great military leaders, resulting in a coldness and even estrangement between Napoleon and his older officers. But, as Seeley points out: "To desert Napoleon at that moment was indeed impossible to France, for no other government could be thought of and he alone could be expected to save the nation in a danger he himself had brought on it." Seeley goes on to say that Napoleon's resources were still great, the Confederation of the Rhine did not dissolve, nor for some time was there even a defection from it, and that "the defection of Austria from his cause did not take place until a later time when all the circumstances were altered."

The unique position of Prussia at this moment is to be noticed, for owing to the exhaustion of Russia and the silence of Austria, Prussia was in a position to dictate. "Commanding some 18,000 Prussian troops in excellent condition, he [Yorck] was really in a manner the arbiter of the situation."⁸ The great fact in favor of Prussia, however, was that her government had been completely reorganized since Tilsit, chiefly through the efforts of two men: Stein, who was born in Nassau, but had been in the Prussian civil service since 1780, and in 1804 became minister of finance; Scharnhorst, who had formerly been an officer in the Hanoverian army, but in 1801 became a lieutenant colonel in Prussia and through whose agency the army was thoroughly reorganized. The work done by these two great men in Prussia was precisely that which the revolution had accomplished in France and in the states of southern Germany. The judicial and financial administrations were reorganized and brought up to date. Serfdom was abolished, industry and commerce liberated, and the army put upon a thoroughly modern basis. Universal military service was adopted and promotion was made according to merit. But the regeneration of Prussia was more than a material improvement. The deep moral nature of the people of north Germany was awakened to a patriotic fervor by the utterances of Fichte and Schleiermacher, the poetry of Arndt and Körner, while even the scientific labors of the great scholars, Humboldt and Niebuhr, awakened enthusiasm. It is not a mere accident that the founding of the University of Berlin (1810) coincides with the birth of the German spirit of liberation.

The cabinet of Berlin began the defections. On March 1,

⁸ Seeley, "Life of Stein," vol. III. p. 26.

1813, it joined Russia and England, which were forming the sixth coalition. Sweden acceded to it soon after; yet the emperor, whom the confederate powers thought prostrated by the last disaster, opened the campaign with new victories. The battle of Lutzen, won by conscripts on May 2, the occupation of Dresden, the victory of Bautzen, May 20-21, and the war carried to the Elbe, astonished the coalition. Austria, which since 1810 had been on a footing of peace, was resuming arms and already meditating a change of alliance. She now proposed herself as mediatrix between the emperor and the confederates. Her mediation was accepted; an armistice was concluded at Plesswitz on June 4, and a congress assembled at Prague July 21 to negotiate peace. It was impossible to come to terms. Napoleon would not consent to diminished grandeur; Europe would not consent to remain subject to him. The confederate powers, joined by Austria, required that the limits of the empire should be to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Meuse. The negotiators separated without coming to an agreement. Austria joined the coalition June 27, and war, the only means of settling this great contest, was resumed.

The emperor had only 280,000 men against 520,000; he wished to force the enemy to retire behind the Elbe, and to break up, as usual, this new coalition by the promptitude and vigor of his blows. Victory seemed, at first, to second him. At Dresden, August 26-27, he defeated the combined forces; but the defeats of his lieutenants deranged his plans. Macdonald was conquered in Silesia; Ney near Berlin; Vandamme at Kulm. Unable to obstruct the enemy, pouring on him from all parts, Napoleon thought of retreating. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine chose this moment to desert the cause of the empire. A vast engagement took place around Leipsic between the two armies. Leipsic was the center of the struggle, but the battlefield included the whole surrounding country. It was fought during five days (October 14-19, 1813). The retreat of the French was made more disastrous because of the error of a French subaltern who blew up the wrong bridge over the river. The carnage of these days was terrible. The French lost over 50,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the allies lost even more. The Saxons and Wurtembergers passed over to the enemy on the field of battle. This defection to the strength of the coalesced powers, who had learned a more compact and skillful mode of warfare, obliged Napoleon to retreat

after a struggle of three days. The army advanced with much confusion toward the Rhine, where the Bavarians, who had also deserted, attempted to prevent its passage. But it overwhelmed them at Hanau, and reëntered the territory of the empire on October 30, 1813. The close of this campaign was as disastrous as that of the preceding one. France was threatened in its own limits, as it had been in 1799; but the enthusiasm of independence no



longer existed, and the man who deprived it of its rights found it, at this great crisis, incapable of sustaining him or defending itself. The servitude of nations is, sooner or later, ever avenged.

Napoleon returned to Paris on November 9, 1813. He obtained from the senate a levy of 300,000 men, and made with great ardor preparations for a new campaign. He convoked the legislative body to associate it in the common defense; he communicated to it the documents relative to the negotiations of Prague,

and asked for another and last effort in order to secure a glorious peace, the general wish of France. But the legislative body, hitherto silently obedient, chose this period to resist Napoleon.

He shared the common exhaustion, and without desiring it, was under the influence of the royalist party, which had been secretly agitating ever since the decline of the empire had revived its hopes. A commission, composed of Lainé, Raynouard, Gallois, Flaugergues, Maine de Biran, drew up a very hostile report censuring the course adopted by the government, and demanding that all conquests should be given up, and liberty restored. This wish, so just at any other time, could then only favor the invasion of the foe. Though the confederate powers seemed to make the evacuation of Europe the condition of peace, they were disposed to push victory to extremity. Napoleon, irritated by this unexpected and harassing opposition, suddenly dismissed the legislative body. This commencement of resistance announced internal defections. After passing from Russia to Germany, they were about to extend from Germany and Italy to France. But now, as before, all depended on the issue of the war, which the winter had not interrupted. Napoleon placed all his hopes on it, and started from Paris on January 25 for this immortal campaign.

The empire was invaded in all directions. The Austrians entered Italy; the English, having made themselves masters of the peninsula during the last two years, had passed the Bidassoa, under General Wellington, and appeared on the Pyrenees. Three armies pressed on France to the east and north. The great allied army, amounting to 150,000 men, under Schwartzemberg, advanced by Switzerland; the army of Silesia of 130,000, under Blücher, by Frankfort; and that of the north, of 100,000, under Bernadotte, had seized on Holland and entered Belgium. The enemies, in their turn, neglected the fortified places, and taking a lesson from the conqueror, advanced on the capital. When Napoleon left Paris the two armies of Schwartzemberg and Blücher were on the point of effecting a junction in Champagne. Deprived of the support of the people, who were only lookers on, Napoleon was left alone against the whole world with a handful of veterans and his genius, which had lost nothing of its daring and vigor. At this moment he stands out nobly, no longer an oppressor, no longer a conqueror, but defending, inch by inch, with new victories, the soil of his country, and at the same time, his empire and renown.

He marched into Champagne against the two great hostile armies. General Maison was charged to intercept Bernadotte in Belgium; Augereau, the Austrians, at Lyons; Soult, the English, on the Spanish frontier. Prince Eugène was to defend Italy; and the empire, though penetrated to the very center, still stretched its vast arms into the depths of Germany by its garrisons beyond the Rhine. Napoleon did not despair of driving these swarms of foes from the territory of France by means of a powerful military reaction, and again planting his standards in the countries of the enemy. He placed himself skillfully between Blücher, who was descending the Marne, and Schwartzberg, who descended the Seine; he hastened from one of these armies to the other, and defeated them alternately (February 10, 1814). The Russian division under Olssouviev was beaten at Champ-Aubert, February 10, 1814; the Prussian Field Marshal Yorck was repulsed at Château Thierry, February 12; and Blücher at Vauchamps, February 13. In six days the army of Silesia lost 40,000 men and 100 cannon. When his army was destroyed Napoleon returned to the Seine, defeated the Austrians at Montereau, February 18, and drove them before him. His combinations were so strong, his activity so great, his measures so sure, that he seemed on the point of entirely disorganizing these two formidable armies, and with them annihilating the coalition.

Napoleon's military genius probably never was more conspicuous than just at this time. Three great armies were advancing upon Paris, and Napoleon had only the remnants of the army of Germany to oppose them, hardly 70,000 men. His best troops were far from the scene, or outside of France entirely. More than 100,000 were in Spain under Soult and Suchet; 40,000 were in Italy under Eugène, and 120,000 were scattered in various cities throughout Germany, notably at Hamburg, Dresden, Stettin, and Dantzic. It is nothing short of marvelous that the emperor was able not merely to prevent his enemies from uniting their forces, but actually to defeat them. Under these blows the allies wavered at Châtillon and offered Napoleon the possession of France with the boundaries of 1792, but the emperor refused the terms.

But if he conquered wherever he came, the foe triumphed wherever he was not. The English had entered Bordeaux, where a party had declared for the Bourbon family; the Austrians occupied Lyons; the Belgian army had joined the remnant of that of

Blücher, which reappeared on Napoleon's rear. Defection now entered his own family, and Murat had just followed, in Italy, the example of Bernadotte, by joining the coalition. The grand officers of the empire still served him, but languidly, and he only found ardor and fidelity in his subaltern generals and indefatigable soldiers. Napoleon had again marched on Blücher, who had escaped from him thrice: on the left of the Marne, by a sudden frost, which hardened the muddy ways among which the Prussians had involved themselves, and were in danger of perishing; on the Aisne, through the defection of Soissons, which opened a passage to them, at a moment when they had no other way of escape; at Craonne (March 7), by the fault of the Duke of Ragusa, who prevented a decisive battle by suffering himself to be surprised by night. After so many fatalities, which frustrated the surest plans, Napoleon, ill sustained by his generals, surrounded by the coalition, conceived the bold design of transporting himself to Saint Dizier, on the Marne River, and then to crush his enemies between his own army and Paris. But the faint-heartedness of Joseph Bonaparte and Marmont, upon whom the safety of Paris rested, ruined his project. It is true that the position of Paris was little short of desperate, but it was a sort of desperation out of which Napoleon might have snatched victory. This daring march, so full of genius, startled for a moment the confederate generals, from whom it cut off all retreat; but, excited by secret encouragements, without being anxious for their rear, they advanced on Paris.

This great city, the only capital of Europe which had not been the theater of war, suddenly saw all the troops of Europe enter its plains, and was on the point of undergoing the common humiliation. It was left to itself. The empress, appointed regent a few months before, had just left it to repair to Blois. Napoleon was at a distance. There was not that despair and that movement of liberty which drive a people to resistance; war was no longer made on nations, but on governments, and the emperor had centered all the public interest in himself, and placed all his means of defense in mechanical troops. The exhaustion was great; a feeling of pride, of very just pride, alone made the approach of the stranger painful, and oppressed every Frenchman's heart at seeing his native land trodden by armies so long vanquished. But this sentiment was not sufficiently strong to raise the masses of the population against the enemy; and the measures of the royalist party, at the head of which

the Prince of Benevento placed himself, called the allied troops to the capital. An action took place, however, on March 30, under the walls of Paris; but on the 31st the gates were opened to the confederate forces, who entered in pursuance of a capitulation. The senate consummated the great imperial defection by forsaking its old master; it was influenced by Talleyrand, who for some time had been out of favor with Napoleon. This voluntary actor in every crisis of power had just declared against him. With no attachment to party, of a profound political indifference, he foresaw from a distance with wonderful sagacity the fall of a government; withdrew from it opportunely; and when the precise moment for assailing it had arrived, joined in the attack with all his talents, his influence, his name, and his authority, which he had taken care to preserve. In favor of the revolution, under the constituent assembly; of the directory, on the 18th Fructidor; for the consulate, on the 18th Brumaire; for the empire, in 1804, he was for the restoration of the royal family in 1814; he seemed grand master of the ceremonies for the party in power, and for the last thirty years it was he who had dismissed and installed the successive governments. The senate, influenced by him, appointed a provisional government, and declared Napoleon deposed from his throne, the hereditary rights of his family abolished, the people and army freed from their oath of fidelity. It proclaimed him tyrant whose despotism it had facilitated by its adulation. Meantime, Napoleon, urged by those about him to succor the capital, had abandoned his march on Saint Dizier, and hastened to Paris at the head of 50,000 men, in the hope of preventing the entry of the enemy. On his arrival (April 1) he heard of the capitulation of the preceding day, and fell back on Fontainebleau, where he learned the defection of the senate and his deposition. Then finding that all gave way around him in his ill fortune, the people, the senate, generals and courtiers, he decided on abdicating in favor of his son. He sent Caulaincourt, Marshal Ney, and Marshal Macdonald as plenipotentiaries to the confederates; on their way they were to take with them Marmont, who covered Fontainebleau with a corps.

Napoleon, with his fifty thousand men and strong military position, could yet oblige the coalition to admit the claim of his son. But the Duke of Ragusa forsook his post, treated with the enemy, and left Fontainebleau exposed. Napoleon was then obliged to submit to the conditions of the allied powers; their pretensions

increased with their power. At Prague they ceded to him the empire, with the Alps and the Rhine for limits; after the invasion of France, they offered him at Châtillon the possessions of the old monarchy only; later they refused to treat with him except in favor of his son; but now, determined on destroying all that remained of the revolution with respect to Europe, its conquest and dynasty, they compelled Napoleon to abdicate absolutely. On April 1, 1814, he renounced for himself and children the thrones of France and Italy, and received in exchange for his vast sovereignty, the limits of which had extended from Cadiz to the Baltic Sea, the little Island of Elba. On the 20th, after an affecting farewell to his old soldiers, he departed for his new principality.

Thus fell this man, who alone, for fourteen years, had filled the world. His enterprising and organizing genius, his power of life and will, his love of glory, and the immense disposable force which the revolution placed in his hands, have made him the most gigantic being of modern times. That which would have rendered the destiny of another extraordinary, scarcely counts in his. Rising from an obscure to the highest rank; from a simple artillery officer becoming the chief of the greatest of nations, he dared to conceive the idea of universal monarchy, and for a moment realized it. After having obtained the empire by his victories, he wished to subdue Europe by means of France, and reduce England by means of Europe, and he established the military system against the Continent, the blockade against Great Britain. This design succeeded for some years; from Lisbon to Moscow he subjected people and potentates to his word of command as general, and to the vast sequestration which he prescribed. But in this way he failed in discharging his restorative mission of the 18th Brumaire. By exercising on his own account the power he had received, by attacking the liberty of the people by despotic institutions, the independence of states by war, he excited against himself the opinions and interests of the human race; he provoked universal hostility. The nation forsook him, and after having been long victorious, after having planted his standard on every capital, after having during ten years augmented his power, and gained a kingdom with every battle, a single reverse combined the world against him, proving by his fall how impossible in our days is despotism.

Yet Napoleon, amid all the disastrous results of his system, gave a prodigious impulse to the Continent; his armies carried with

them the ideas and customs of the more advanced civilization of France. European societies were shaken on their old foundations; nations were mingled by frequent intercourse; bridges thrown across boundary rivers; high roads made over the Alps, Apennines, and Pyrenees brought territories nearer to each other; and Napoleon effected for the material condition of states what the revolution had done for the minds of men. The blockade completed the impulse of conquest; it improved continental industry, enabling it to take the place of that of England, and replaced colonial commerce by the produce of manufactures. Thus Napoleon, by agitating nations, contributed to their civilization. His despotism rendered him counter-revolutionary with respect to France; but his spirit of conquest made him a regenerator with respect to Europe, of which many nations, in torpor till he came, will live henceforth with the life he gave them. But in this Napoleon obeyed the dictates of his nature. The child of war—war was his tendency, his pleasure; domination his object; he wanted to master the world, and circumstances placed it in his hand, in order that he might make use of it.

Napoleon has presented in France what Cromwell presented for a moment in England: the government of the army, which always establishes itself when a revolution is contended against; it then gradually changes, and from being civil, as it was at first, becomes military. In Great Britain, internal war not being complicated with foreign war, on account of the geographical situation of the country, which isolated it from other states, as soon as the enemies of reform were vanquished, the army passed from the field of battle to the government. Its intervention being premature, Cromwell, its general, found parties still in the fury of their passions, in all the fanaticism of their opinions, and he directed against them alone his military administration. The French Revolution taking place on the Continent saw the nations disposed for liberty, and sovereigns leagued from a fear of the liberation of their people. It had not only internal enemies, but also foreign enemies to contend with; and while its armies were repelling Europe, parties were overthrowing each other in the assemblies. The military intervention came later; Napoleon, finding factions defeated and opinions almost forsaken, obtained obedience easily from the nation, and turned the military government against Europe.

This difference of position materially influenced the conduct and character of these two extraordinary men. Napoleon, disposing of immense force and of uncontested power, gave himself up in security to the vast designs and the part of a conqueror. While Cromwell, deprived of the assent which popular exhaustion accords, incessantly attacked by factions, was reduced to neutralize them one by the other, and was to the last the military dictator of parties. The one employed his genius in undertaking; the other in resisting. Accordingly, the former had the frankness and decision of power; the other, the craft and hypocrisy of opposed ambition. This situation would destroy their sway. All dictatorships are transient; and however strong or great, it is impossible for anyone long to subject parties or long to retain kingdoms. It is this that, sooner or later, would have led to the fall of Cromwell (had he lived longer), by internal conspiracies;⁹ and that brought on the downfall of Napoleon, by the rising of Europe. Such is the fate of all powers which, arising from liberty, do not continue to abide with her. In 1814 the empire had just been destroyed; the revolutionary parties had ceased to exist since the 18th Brumaire. All the governments of this political period had been exhausted. The senate recalled the old royal family. Already unpopular on account of its past servility, it ruined itself in public opinion by publishing a constitution, tolerably liberal, but which placed on the same footing the pensions of senators and the guarantees of the nation. The Count d'Artois, who had been the first to leave France, was the first to return, in the character of lieutenant general of the kingdom. He signed, on April 23, the convention of Paris, which reduced the French territory to its limits of January 1, 1792, and by which Belgium, Savoy, Nice, and Geneva, and immense military stores ceased to belong to France. Louis XVIII. landed at Calais on April 24, and entered Paris with solemnity on May 3, 1814, after having on the 2d made the declaration of Saint Omar, which fixed the principles of the representative government, and which was followed on June 2 by the promulgation of the charter.

At this epoch a new series of events begins. The year 1814 was the term of the great movement of the preceding twenty-five

⁹ This estimate of Cromwell preserves the eighteenth century tradition of him. Carlyle's "Cromwell's Letters," Gardiner's "England under the Commonwealth and Protectorate," and Firth's "Oliver Cromwell," have proved the true moral as well as political and military greatness of the Protector.

years. The revolution had been political, as directed against the absolute power of the court and the privileged classes, and military, because Europe had attacked it. The reaction which arose at that time only destroyed the empire, and brought about the coalition in Europe, and the representative system in France; such was to be its first period. Later, it opposed the revolution, and produced the Holy Alliance against the people, and the government of a party against the charter. This retrograde movement necessarily had its course and limits. France can only be ruled in a durable manner by satisfying the twofold need which made it undertake the revolution. It requires real political liberty in the government; and in society, the material prosperity produced by the continually progressing development of civilization.

Chapter XIX

THE HUNDRED DAYS. MARCH-JUNE, 1815

THE measures which resulted in the elevation of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France were taken by the allied governments during the months of April and May, 1814. They were all agreed as to the deposition of Napoleon, but divided as to the policy to be pursued. To give the crown to the King of Rome under the regency of his mother, Marie Louise, would have given Austria too great an ascendancy; Alexander wanted Bernadotte, formerly one of Napoleon's marshals, and now King of Sweden, to be made king, and had proposed such a plan even before Napoleon's fall, in January. But no one else took kindly to the suggestion, and the Bourbons alone remained to be considered. But the voice of the French nation was silent, and the powers had resolved not to impose a government upon France—at least not in appearance. It was therefore necessary to organize a movement that would have, at any rate, the semblance of natural feeling in favor of the Bourbons. Talleyrand and Metternich undertook the delicate task. On March 31, when the allies made their entrance into Paris, shouts of "*vive le roi!*"—the voices of some carefully selected agents of Talleyrand—began the "demonstration" in favor of the exiled dynasty. Already the senators had been provided for, through the foresight of Talleyrand, after the fall of Napoleon. The senate had hastily compiled a constitution, the purpose of which was to save the senators, deputies, and other governmental officials from the anger of the powers, assure peaceable enjoyment of their property to purchasers of the national domain, and pacify the fears of the government's creditors. Talleyrand quieted the anxiety and at the same time purchased the support of the senate by protecting it. The senators became peers under the restoration, and all officials of the imperial régime held over. In return the senate, on April 6, by a vote of 142 to 63, and the chamber by one of 143 to 77, declared that "the French people freely calls Louis of France, brother of the late king, to the throne." But Louis XVIII., in

order to save his sovereignty, rejected the proposed constitution, so far as recognizing the right of the senate in the matter was concerned, although he accepted it in form and ordained it as a measure emanating from his own authority. Thus was the charter put into operation. On April 23 the allies signed an armistice with the Count d'Artois, the sole provision of which was that France renounced every conquest made since 1792.


The definitive treaty of peace remained to be made. The negotiations were delayed by the wish of the Russian emperor to exile Napoleon to Elba. By the terms agreed upon France returned to the boundaries it had possessed in 1792, with the exception of Savoy, Sarrelouis, and Landau; the Isle of France, Tabago, and Sainte-Lucia were ceded to England; no war indemnity was demanded by the powers, but Prussia for a time insisted upon compensation for the moneys Napoleon had wrung from them. The treaty was signed on May 30, 1814.

The skill of Talleyrand had saved France from being penalized to a greater degree by victorious Europe. Meanwhile, bitter antagonism had developed among the powers. The great difficulty was with reference to Poland and Saxony. Russia and Prussia wanted to let Alexander have Poland, and to give Saxony to Prussia, indemnifying the Saxon king by a gift of territory upon the Rhine; but Austria opposed the plan, for fear Prussia would become too strong in Germany, and England was unwilling to see the czar establish his power so firmly in central Europe. Accordingly Russia and Prussia made common cause together, and Austria and England united policies. Talleyrand profited by the dissension to group the minor states around him and invoked the principle of "legitimacy"—the policy of restoring things to the status of 1789. While this policy was hard on the little states, for it united Belgium to Holland, Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, and reestablished Austrian Lombardy, it saved France from greater humiliation.

The work of the Congress of Vienna was not completed when Napoleon returned to France. The new order of things in France had been far from pleasing to the people. It is true that the country was tired of war and of Bonaparte's arbitrary government. But Louis XVIII. had stirred up the resentment of the people: to pretend that he was king by the grace of God when, as was wittily said, "he had been brought back in the baggage of the allies," and to talk about "the twenty-fifth year of our reign" was an

offensive affectation. There were lesser grievances also: the abolition of the tricolor and the return of the white cockade; the reduction of the officers to half-pay; the *octroi*.

Napoleon profited by the discontent, and aided by Fouché, who formed an imperialist party, he returned to France. Avoiding the royalist region of the Rhone valley, he came straight to Paris. The peasantry, the liberals, the imperials flocked to his



standards. Marshal Ney, whom the government sent to arrest him, yielded to the influence of his old chief over him. Meanwhile the Congress of Vienna, having outlawed Napoleon by a joint declaration on March 13, 1815, hastened to conclude its labors. The pen of the diplomat was laid aside for the sword of the soldier.

In Paris Napoleon made herculean preparations for conflict. Most of the old marshals, Macdonald, for example, had refused to

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take up arms again. Only Ney, Soult, Suchet, Brune, and Davout espoused his cause. Marmont accepted a command against the emperor. Aiming to prevent England from supporting the other allies, Napoleon took the offensive and crossed the Sambre at Charleroi with 128,000 men. The allied army numbered about 200,000, that of Austria operating in Italy against Murat. Napoleon's plan was to attack his enemies separately, and prevent the union of the English and the Prussians. The battle of Waterloo was really several separate engagements. On June 16th the French, after a furious fight at Ligny, near Fleurus, put the Prussian army under Blücher to rout. Then ordering Grouchy to pursue the Prussians in the direction of Namur, the emperor himself turned against the English coming from Brussels. Ney, with a slight number of troops at his disposal, on this first day had been unable to stop the English progress, a misfortune which was aggravated by a false maneuver, which left a whole army corps, under Drouet d'Erlon, inactive between the two armies. In consequence the English penetrated as far as Waterloo, where they entrenched themselves upon the plateau of Mont St. Jean (June 18.) About 70,000 men on each side, of whom 15,000 were cavalry, were pitted against each other on this famous day. Napoleon planned to take the English advance position, and then to crush their left wing, in order to cripple the side of the army nearest to the Prussians. But the rain had fallen in torrents during the night, and owing to the mud the French could not begin the battle until nearly noon. The loss of time was of serious consequence. The English, at first overwhelmed by the heavy artillery fire from the height of La Belle Alliance, where the emperor had taken up his position, were driven back upon Hougomont by the infantry of Reille and Drouet d'Erlon. But on the summit of the plateau the English made a heroic and successful stand against the furious charges of Ney's cavalry. Twice the English cannon were taken and their lines broken. It seemed as if the last ounce of effort had been expended on either side. Napoleon had anxiously sent courier after courier ordering Grouchy to come; just as anxiously Wellington watched for Blücher. Late in the day a new cannonading was heard far off on the right. Was it Grouchy with reinforcements? or was it Blücher? It was the Prussian generals Blücher and Bülow. Grouchy had made the fatal blunder of attacking a Prussian column merely, and let the main body of the

Prussians, more than 60,000 men, effect a junction with the English forces. For a while the brave Lobau had delayed Bülow's advance at Wavre, but when Blücher's column also came the French could not longer hold their ground. They were exhausted and outnumbered; brain and heart and hand could do no more. In vain Ney cried out to his men: "Follow me, I will show you how a marshal of France can die!" The Old Guard was the only portion of the French army that stood firm in the universal rout, the only group whom consternation, despair, and the panic of defeat did not overcome. Even if the famous words "the Guard dies but never surrenders" were not said until afterward, the Guard acted in the spirit of the utterance.

The day of Napoleon's destiny was over; the star of Austerlitz and Wagram had declined forever. With more moderation he might have made his conquest permanent; but when the people of Europe realized that Napoleon's heel was treading down the free ideals and crushing the institutions by which he himself had been raised to power, then the France which he had robbed of liberty and the Europe which he had despoiled rose against him. Yet the mists of time transfigure. Not all the learning and critical research of modern scholarship has dispelled the illusion that has gathered around his name. The words of Chateaubriand are still true: "The Bonaparte which we see to-day is not the true Bonaparte: he is a legendary figure formed of the reveries of the poet, the tales of the soldier, and the songs of the people. He is the Charlemagne and the Alexander of the medieval epoch. The hero of the imagination will remain the real personage: the other portraits will vanish away."

For the second time France was crushed under the tread of invading armies. The Hundred Days formed but an episode in the history of Europe; but it had serious consequences for France. For after this second victory of the allies it was manifest that the feeling of the powers toward France had hardened. France had taken the part of the man whom Europe had outlawed and was therefore the accomplice of the emperor. The first restoration had been merciful, the second would be terrible in its righteousness, in its determination to subdue revolution. An indemnity of seven hundred millions, payable in five years, with military occupation by 150,000 men to be supported by France until it was paid, and a reduction of territory to the limits of 1790, was the punishment

meted out to the conquered country. Even her "natural frontiers" were denied to France, for Savoy and part of Alsace were taken away.

France faced the future with an alienated, if not an alien, king, upon the throne; with a government which in principles and in policy antagonized the nation. Fortunately, in the bosom of the nation the truths of the great revolution still lived and were destined to will and to work in succeeding years. Beneath Bourbon suppression and beyond Bourbon reaction was the force of things intense, elemental, national, which the spirit of 1789 had waked imperishably. The history of France in the nineteenth century is the epilogue of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, and the prologue to the drama of the twentieth century.

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